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In this dissertation, I explore the significance of remembering, especially in its 
communal form, and its relationship to narrative identity by examining the practices that 
make possible the formation and transmission of a heritage. To explore this issue I use 
Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur, who have dedicated several of their major works to 
remembrance and forgetting. In comparing Heidegger and Ricoeur, I suggest that 
Ricoeur’s formulation of the identity of a subject and a community offers an alternative 
to Heidegger’s account. For, if Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity offers the possibility 
of a new relationship to history and community, it nevertheless overlooks the possibility 
of a humanism that is not tied to a metaphysical account of subjectivity. By contrast, the 
positive work of remembrance can recover heretofore concealed possibilities through our 
being faithful to the past, and saving it from the destructive forces of time.  
To show how the fragility of memory preserves the past against the destructive 
work of time and brings with it the hope of a better future, I emphasize one specific 
theme—namely, the debt we owe to the dead, which opens the possibility for ethical 
consideration of an historical community. In this regard, this dissertation pursues two 
goals. The first task is to elucidate how Heidegger’s and Ricoeur’s phenomenological 
projects understand the intimate connection between remembrance and the creation of a 
community. The second goal of this dissertation is to show how Ricoeur is able to 
respond to the problems that Heidegger’s ontological account of memory raises. The 
completion of these two tasks will contribute to a phenomenological hermeneutics of 
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In describing the challenges facing the construction of a memorial to the victims 
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Marita Sturken suggests that perhaps the 
most complex challenge is how to do justice to the tension between those who are able to 
view the memorial in the present and those who died in the attack.1 She writes “[i]n the 
face of absence, especially an absence so violently and tragically wrought at the cost of 
so many lives, people feel a need to create a presence of some kind, and it may be for this 
reason that questions of memorialization have so quickly followed this event.”2 While the 
construction of a memorial there has been delayed, this “rush to memorialize” reveals an 
important feature of remembering, namely the proper way to memorialize the past such 
that its does justice to the victims, lauds the endurance of those who continue to survive, 
and embraces the values that a group or community take to be fundamental.3 More than 
that, when we raise such questions regarding the possibility of doing justice to the dead 
                                                
1 A similar question arises in the recent controversy regarding the construction of a mosque near the site of 
the World Trade Center. Some argue that building a mosque disrespects the memory of those killed there 
and will cause some victims undue pain, while others, notably Mayor Michael Bloomberg, have suggested 
2 Marita Sturken, “Memorializing Absence.” Understanding September 11. Ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. 
(New York: The New York Press, 2002): pp. 374–84, p. 375. 
3 The phrase “rush to memorialize” is used in a number of recent essay that have appeared over the last 
decade to indicate just how quick we have been to erect monuments to traumatic events. Sturken, for 
example, wonders “Could we imagine people talking of memorialization after the destruction of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, or the bombing of Hiroshima? Or, for that matter, that the people of Rwanda talked of 
memorialization after the massacres that killed hundreds of thousands there? Throughout history, collective 
and public memorialization has most commonly taken place with the distance of time.” “Memorializing 
Absence,” p. 375. Janet Donohoe similarly uses the phrase in wondering whether or not such a rush can 
obscure questions about the meaning of such desire to remember. Cf. Janet Donohoe, “Rushing to 
Memorialize,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Vol. 13, no. 1 (Spring 2006): pp. 6-12.  While the 
desire to memorialize is no doubt a central feature about what it means to be human, the pace at which it is 
done can obscure ethical and political questions.  
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and the proper ways to do so, we are ultimately unable to deny that such an act is partly 
constitutive of communal identity. 
In my dissertation I examine the contribution of memory to the identity of a 
community. In order to do so, I argue against a common metaphor often used to describe 
memory—that of a storehouse or lockbox. This metaphor has several significant features 
worth mentioning. First, it emphasizes that memories primarily belong to individuals. As 
a result, it would seem that communal memory does not actually exist; it is instead an 
aggregate of individuals’ memories. Second, in order to render these memories public, 
they are externalized in monuments, memorials, museums, and the like. These places 
retain an element of “interiority” insofar as they are often separated from the places 
where we conduct our everyday business. Third, this metaphor appears to separate the 
past and the present, such that our memories can be turned into objects of historical 
research. In so doing, however, it can lead to a viewing of the past as a curiosity or as 
“said and done.” These assumptions contribute to an abstract conception of memory that 
is individual, archival, linear and alienating. 
My dissertation responds to this image of memory in two ways. First, I explore 
how communities are constituted and challenged by remembering the past. An account of 
what it means to remember requires understanding how we belong to the past. Narratives, 
I argue, help to make sense of who we are at the communal level. Additionally, I examine 
how narratives offer us the possibility to come to terms with the very real experiences of 
trauma, loss, and anxiety. 
Second, I examine some of the ethical and political implications of the connection 
between narrative and identity. Examples of the uses and abuses of memory are easy to 
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come by, and so we can wonder what some implications of the “rush to memorialize” are 
especially since the desire to remember or forget can be distorted by political aims, 
psychological barriers, and ethical demands. How much of the past should we remember? 
How much should we forget? If possible, what, and who, should we forgive?  
In examining these issues, I draw from Martin Heidegger’s and Paul Ricoeur’s 
phenomenological accounts of selfhood. While different in some respects, both offer an 
account of the self that arises from the dialogical structure of calling and responding. 
From Heidegger, I argue for understanding authentic selfhood as a vocational 
commitment to continually live up to one’s Being. We find ourselves called to respond to 
our past in order to give it a new, unique future. While Heidegger offers an account of 
selfhood that takes heritage, destiny and fate into consideration, he nevertheless neglects 
the ways that we exist “from others.” 
In order to restore the specific modes in which human beings exist with, for, and 
from others, I turn to Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur argues for a conception of the self that “is 
constituted and defined by its position as respondent to propositions of meaning issuing 
from a symbolic network.”4 Like Heidegger, Ricoeur sees this response as attesting to 
one’s own Being; unlike Heidegger, Ricoeur suggests that insofar as remembering and 
forgetting are responses to the past, they attest to our narrative and ethical identities. To 
be called is to experience a summons from an other – it is to be enjoined to live with and 
for, and even from, others in just institutions. 
To show how the past can operate as one source for such an injunction, I 
emphasize one theme: the debt we owe to the dead. Just as the self is constituted through 
                                                
4 Paul Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Prophetic Vision.” Trans. David Pellauer. 
Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1996): pp. 262-275, p. 262. 
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otherness, memory occurs in the space between individuals and the past to which they 
belong, such that to remember means to respond to a claim or call that issues from others 
who have passed. The meaning of the past does not exist as if it were there waiting to be 
uncovered; nor is it a construction that we impose on it. Rather, remembering moves 
between the individual who places an event into his or her own narrative identity, and its 
symbolic expression as a debt, whose embodiment enables memory to be passed on to 
others. This movement allows memories to form a tradition or heritage, and opens up the 
possibility for reinterpreting what happened.  
Furthermore, the transmission of tradition undermines the rigid distinction 
between individual memory and communal memory. Memory has different modalities, 
which move between two poles. At one end, there is the unique perspective individuals 
have on the events of the past, which is expressed as testimony. At the other end, a 
symbolic order codifies memories in rituals, commemorations, and texts. This pole 
secures the public transmission of memory beyond the sphere of those who personally 
witnessed the event. Not only does the embodiment of such memories ensure that that 
they can be transmitted to others despite temporal discontinuities, they also render us 
inescapably responsible for the way that we transmit it. The gap between the present and 
the past, self and other, makes each of us responsible for how we remember our past and 
how we are responsible to others. 
At the same time, I recognize that the gap between the present and the past, 
individual and community, can have tragic consequences. In order to illustrate the 
connection between tragedy and this debt, I again draw from Heidegger’s and Ricoeur’s 
respective interpretations of tragedy. Both use tragedy to highlight an important element 
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of human experience. In Heidegger’s interpretation, tragedy occupies a transitional place 
in the “History of Being.” It signifies at once the dawn of metaphysics and its inevitable 
decline. In this regard, it recalls the always-questionable sources for thinking about who 
“we” are to be. It calls upon us to remember that who we are called to be is never settled, 
and offers an occasion to reflect on the way that the hidden consequences of the past can 
bring us to ruin. It reminds us that the meaning of our decisions comes to us too late, and 
that it is impossible to forge an enduring connection with those who came before us. 
Ricoeur, by contrast, suggests that tragedy instructs us in responding to the 
intractability of ethical and political conflict. All too often, we often act from moral 
principles or on the basis of a tradition that is not as inclusive or as just as we would like 
to think. Rather than inevitably ruin us, Ricoeur sees in tragedy an occasion to reorient 
our perspective. This means that we must be attuned to the possibilities that arise from 
our social institutions and norms, as well as the limits of such possibilities. As a result, 
we are compelled to refigure or reorient our actions as a response to the claims of others. 
In short, we ought to see how the debt can be made lighter or responsibly increased. 
Rather than choose between Heidegger and Ricoeur, I suggest that their positions 
are complementary. From Heidegger, I argue that the past is never done with us, even if 
we want to be done with it. Heidegger’s emphasis on mortality reminds us that solidarity 
with the living is never permanent, perhaps even impossible. From Ricoeur, I argue that 
remembering, forgetting, and forgiving are ways of reconciling ourselves with the past 
and offer us the hope of establishing a new, more inclusive communal identity. Thus, 
while Ricoeur offers us the possibility of hope through new beginning, Heidegger 
reminds us that those modes of expressing such hope can never fully capture (recapture) 
 6 
the past as a unified vision for the future. Remembering is a creative response to the past. 
Self-constancy with remembering requires flexibility – to interpret, explain, and recount 
one’s past means that such identity can be told otherwise. It allows us to move forward 
while acknowledging that we can never fully discharge the debt. It allows us to work 
through the loss of the past, while indicating that such work will inevitably be 
incomplete. 
 
Outline of Dissertation 
In the first chapter, I will begin by introducing the problem of memory and 
forgetting in a broad phenomenological context, but especially focusing on tracing the 
understanding of remembrance and forgetting in conjunction with the question of the 
subject. To have a past is not to be understood in terms of a linear passage of time, nor is 
memory to be configured solely in terms of the possession of an individual subject. 
Instead, to have a past must be understood in terms of seeing oneself as belonging to a 
past far beyond what one knows, and to be already subjected to the demands of a 
community and tradition. To remember one’s tradition or heritage is to recognize one’s 
dependence on it, and to be responsible for it. To be a self, in other words, is to recognize 
a debt to and be responsible for the other who is only as having been. Memory is one 
way, then, that human existence is open to the possibility of being with others. It is 
precisely the otherness of tradition inscribed in selfhood that prevents the self from being 
a closed, solipsistic, or autonomous self.  
In the next chapter, I introduce Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology of the 
1920s, which he uses as a method to uncover that which grounds experience but is 
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forgotten in that very experience and the articulation of that experience. Here, 
Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ plays an important role, for facticity indicates the 
opacity of life in its very movement, which is to say, in its thrownness. Heidegger names 
the tendency of life to hide this opacity behind its everyday experience “fallenness” in 
Being and Time. Furthermore, as the project of Being and Time is developed in 
subsequent works, such as Basic Problems of Phenomenology and Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics, the specific problem of forgetting appears in the context of temporality 
and the thinking of being as pure presence. As such, forgetfulness and fallenness become 
keywords by which we can enter into dialogue with Heidegger’s phenomenological 
ontology. The second division of Being and Time, which contains important terms, such 
as repetition, heritage, destiny, guilt, debt, and historicity, is concerned with the 
existential-ontological structure that makes it possible for Dasein to remember its past. 
As such, remembrance is an important key to constituting intersubjectivity along 
historical lines in what Heidegger calls the Da-sein of a people. 
In the third chapter, I examine how Heidegger gives a clearer account of these 
important concepts in the 1930s, where history comes to the forefront of his concerns. 
Here, Heidegger constantly emphasizes that forgetting has priority over remembering—
without an original forgetting, there can be no remembering or retrieval of the question of 
Being.5 While his first attempt to recover this question remains squarely within the 
confines of phenomenology, his later writings suggest that a poetic thinking can 
                                                
5 In Being and Time, Heidegger suggests, “remembering is possible only on [the basis] of forgetting, and 
not vice versa (BT 389/SZ 339). In his course immediately following the publication of Being and Time, 
Heidegger writes “understanding oneself by way of feasible and directly encountered things involves a self-
forgetting. The possibility of retaining something which one was just now expecting rests only on the basis 
of the original forgottenness that belongs to factical Dasein.” The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
Trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 290).  
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commemoratively retrieve a forgotten and concealed origin that nevertheless remains 
hidden in decisive moments of western metaphysics. If the modern conception of the 
subject constitutes the forgetting of being, the remembrance of the thoughtful poetry of 
Sophocles founds a new relationship to truth, being, and others. I will limit my discussion 
by specifically looking at his interpretations of the famous ‘Ode to Man’ in Sophocles’ 
Antigone in Introduction to Metaphysics and Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister while 
developing their significance in conjunction with Elucidations on Hölderlin’s Poetry and 
his lecture course Hölderlin’s Hymn: Andenken. I draw out some of the implications of 
the connection between poetic language and the recollection of being, specifically seeing 
how Heidegger employs a notion of the tragic in conjunction with remembrance. Rather 
than tragedy representing a heroic figure, embracing his or her fate, Heidegger’s account 
of tragedy in these essays suggests instead that it is impossible to fully remember the 
past; it is always subject to forgetting. As such, it is possible for the past to return, and 
thus it is possible to recognize the ways that we are responsible for its return. 
The fourth chapter introduces Ricoeur’s work on memory and forgetting by way 
of his account of selfhood and attestation. Ricoeur’s account of the meaning of history is 
able to retrieve the phenomenological insights that Heidegger turns away from in his later 
works while at the same time offering an account of experience of the past that is 
ethically engaged with its meaning. Remembrance, on Ricoeur’s interpretation, is to be 
understood as an ability, or power, in which humans participate. The power to remember, 
in this work, becomes explicitly part of the dynamic of being in which humans creatively 
participate. For Ricoeur, the question of the subject of memory is a question of who 
responds to the obligation of remembering the past and of reviving hope for the future. 
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His approach here indicates a path for what I call a poetics of remembrance. The activity 
of constructing a narrative integrates the different experiences of time and from it 
constructs a unity that does not dissolve the heterogeneity of different human and 
communal experiences of time. The historian’s project of narrating the past is bound by a 
duty to represent it as it actually happened. To show how the identity of the remembering 
self is connected to the remembered past, I first develop Ricoeur’s account of 
“emplotment,” focusing on how otherness is intertwined with selfhood to reconfigure the 
possibilities of communal existence. Next, I examine Ricoeur’s account of how narratives 
represent or “stand-for” what happened in the past. Central to this relationship, as I will 
make clear, is the role attestation and testimony play. Ricoeur suggests that passivity 
experienced in being called by the past bears witness to otherness, which means, I argue, 
that remembering is essentially a relationship to death and the dead.  
This chapter further indicates ways that remembrance contributes to a richer 
intersubjective life by drawing out some of the ethical and political implications of 
memory, forgetting, and forgiving. Taking cues from the epilogue to Memory, History, 
Forgetting, which focuses on forgiveness, I develop an account of memory and 
remembrance that shows how a commemoration not only preserves the past by reminding 
us of deeds and events, but also that remembrance is an act that has implications for the 
future. The poetics of remembrance, as I will present it, is something in which humans 
are always already entangled. In this sense, communities participate in narratives and 
have a specific self-understanding that arises from the ways that they remember 
themselves to have been. However, because these memories are based on objective traces 
and testimonials, they always carry with them the possibility of being retold and re-
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envisioned. This imaginative possibility that comes with historical being-in-the-world 
allows one to give voice to those who have been forgotten and tell new stories that open 
the possibility for a new way to understand ourselves in our being with others. 
Specifically, to remember something is not merely to see the past as dead, but rather as a 
resource for opening the future to new possibilities.   
 11 
Chapter I: What Calls for Remembering? 
I.1 Introduction and Thesis 
What does it mean to remember the past? What calls to be remembered? There is 
little doubt that certain situations provoke us to become aware of the significance and 
meaning of the past. However, it is unclear how the past is given to us, in these situations, 
not as present but as past. It is quite enigmatic that the remnants of the past can 
stubbornly remain meaningful in the present, despite their being past. Said differerently, 
it is strange that the absence of the past nevertheless remains in the present, without 
becoming present. That the past, as absent, remains meaningful, however, seems to 
indicate that these remnants and ruins call out to us to remember them. What is the nature 
of this obligation to and for the past, and how does a responsibility for the past shape how 
we are to remember the past? These questions indicate the central place remembering has 
in understanding the structure of human identity, and form the core concerns of this 
dissertation. 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of works concerned with the possibility and 
meaning of memorializing the traumatic events of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.6 Certain places, such as Auschwitz, Hiroshima, the killing fields of Cambodia, 
                                                
6 The most comprehensive bibliography of the study of memory has been meticulously compiled by John 
Sutton, and can be found at his website, http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/Memory. (Retrieved on 
July 30th, 2010). There has been a proliferation of journals devoted to the study of memory, including 
History and Memory, Memory, and Memory Studies have all begun publishing articles in the last twenty 
years; The Journal of Memory and Language began publishing in 1985. This proliferation suggests that 
memory has become an increasing concern among people at the turn of the millennium and continuing into 
it. There are several general introductions to memory that have done a fine job of setting out the basic 
historical and philosophical problems tied to memory: Douwe Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory. Trans. 
Paul Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Mary Warnock, Memory (London: Faber, 
1987), and Anne Whitehead, Memory (New York: Routledge, 2009). The best phenomenological studies of 
memory begin with Edward Casey’s Remembering, 2nd Ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2000), David Farrell Krell, Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1990), Charles Scott’s The Time of Memory (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999). David Wood directs 
his own phenomenological insights to the way that memory appears in conjunction with the more general 
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the Bogside area outside of Derry in Northern Ireland, and more recently “Ground Zero” 
in lower Manhattan, have all become highly politicized and controversial sites of 
remembering precisely because we are at a loss as to how to understand the meaning of 
those distressing places and times. That debates continue over the meaning of these sites 
and the proper way to honor those who died there indicates that not only are we 
concerned with continued significance of these events, but that we are also concerned 
with the proper way to remember those who died there and honor those who survived 
these traumatic events. A philosophical analysis of the meaning of remembering can help 
to clarify our understanding of remembering, its possibility, and its limits.  
In this dissertation, I examine how remembering constitutes the identity of a 
people and community, and the ways that this very experience of remembering can 
challenge that very identity. Traditionally, the connection between memory and identity 
has been understood solely on the basis of an individual’s identity. By taking this 
approach, the philosophical tradition has tended to privilege the mind as the source and 
receptacle of images and memories. As a result, a community is often understood as an 
aggregate of such individuals or is instead understood as a kind of super-individual, that 
subsumes each person into its communal body. Against this long-established tradition, I 
pursue one way that remembering is not limited to the account of the mind’s contents. 
Instead, I examine how remembering is always situated in the thick of things; not only do 
we remember events, but we remember with others, at a particular time, in a particular 
                                                                                                                                            
experience of temporality in The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989) and 
more recently in Time After Time (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007). The 
phenomenological study of memory is applied in the collection Framing Public Memory. Ed. Kendall R. 
Phillips (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), Meaning and Representation in History. Ed. 
Jörn Rüsen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), and Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook. Eds. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2008). 
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place, and through particular practices and rituals. As such, particular places retain a 
sense of the past and situate ones memories in such a way that their meaning can be 
reanimated through particular acts of remembering with others.  
In this chapter, I will sketch out one way that the past confronts the present with a 
challenge. This challenge is the way that the past can be understood in two different and 
apparently incompatible ways. On one hand, the past is what is understood as no longer 
there. On the other hand, the past can also be understood in terms of its having-been, and 
harbors within it the possibility of the present and future.7 Traditionally,  the hermeneutic 
problem of memory and history takes the form of a problem of intersubjectivity. The past 
is not only at risk of being forgotten, but it is also at risk of being misunderstood because 
it is foreign or other. After developing these two challenges, I introduce the notion of a 
called subject. The called or summoned subject that I draw arises from the 
phenomenological hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur. This subject is 
one who is capable of fulfilling the obligation to remember the past and, through such 
remembering, is able to revive hope for the future. As such, one constitutive element of 
the summoned subject is its remembrance of the past. Remembering, by responding to a 
call from the past, can shape who we are and how we are with others by bearing witness 
to the past.  
                                                
7 This distinction comes from Martin Heidegger’s distinction between the past as no longer 
(Vergangenheit) and the past as having-been (Gewesenheit). The former term suggests that there is a 
finality to the past, such that it is “over and done with,” or, as a common phrase might have it, it is “ancient 
history.” To suggest that the past also exists as “having-been,” on the other hand, refers to the way we are 
our past, and the way that we carry our past along with us. Heidegger thus writes, “‘As long as’ Dasein 
factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as already having been, in the sense of 
the ‘I-am-as-having-been [ich bin-gewesen].’” Cf. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson. (Harper Collins: San Francisco, 1962): p. 376. The phrase “always already” emphasizes the way 
that we carry the past along with us as well, or, analogously, as in the phrase “I am still working.” The past 
as “having been” suggests an existential sense of the past rather than a chronological sense of it. See 
Chapter II for further details about this distinction and its meaning in Heidegger. 
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In exploring the communal dimension of our experience of remembering, I 
develop a twofold claim. First, what motivates a people or community to remember is a 
certain self-understanding or conception of who they take themselves to be and the 
concomitant attempt to live up to that conception. Secondly, remembering opens itself up 
to the challenge from others who witnessed the event in question, and in what social and 
ethical contexts such challenges are able to arise. This ability to witness and testify, I 
argue, suggests that intersubjectivity, or what it means to be in community, is constituted 
through and challenged by the particular ways a community remembers and forgets its 
own past. As I will be arguing throughout this dissertation, remembering has two distinct 
though inseparable dimensions: a poetic dimension that can challenge a community’s 
self-understanding and a constitutive dimension that establishes the identity of such a 
community or people.8 
 
I.2. The Challenges of the Past: Identity, Time, and Memory 
Before developing how the called subject can motivate us to rethink what it 
means to remember, it will first be necessary to understand why such an account is 
                                                
8 These two elements of remembering echo Heidegger’s distinction between Vergangenheit and 
Gewesenheit as he applies to history itself. On the one hand, history can refer to the science of history 
(Historie), and, on the other hand, it refers to the “history that we are,” (Geschichte). Cf, Being and Time, 
§§72-76.  There is a similar distinction in contemporary discussions regarding the difference between 
memory and history, where memory seeks a fusion with the past and make it part of its identity and history 
refers to the objective study of what happened. Paul Ricoeur develops the relationship between these two 
ideas in Memory, History, Forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000). A similar idea can be found in some discussions of the meaning and implications of 
testimony. For example, Dori Laub distinguishes witnessing, as being an eye-witness to historical facts and 
who is thus subject to rigorous standards of assessing the historical record, from witnessing in the sense of 
bearing witness to a truth about what it means to be human. Dori Laub. “Bearing Witness, or the 
Vicissitudes of Listening.” Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. 
(New York: Routledge, 1992): pp. 57-74. I will discuss this notion further below. As will become apparent 
over the course of this dissertation, I am more sympathetic with Ricoeur’s attempt to show how both 
memory and history contribute to identity, rather than with those who suggest that the two have entirely 
different aims and are even opposed to each other. 
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required. Many discussions of the relationship between memory and identity, whether 
individual or communal, tend to rely on two basic assumptions. The first is that memory 
is something intensely private, like a box or storehouse of images that are available for 
recall. On this view, persons can share memories, even memories of the same event, 
although they fundamentally belong to each person individually. The second assumption 
concerns the relationship between the subject who remembers and the object of 
remembering. The identity of the knowing subject is temporally distinct from the object 
remembered, making the connection between the two problematic. While these two 
claims capture two important features of memory, focusing solely on them can obscure 
other roles that memory plays in helping to constitute the texture of our world: first, the 
way that remembering is a social phenomenon, and, second, a sense of the way that we 
belong to the past. In this section, I will sketch out these two assumptions, noting their 
respective shortcomings. In the following section, I introduce the alternative to the 
traditional account of remembering. 
 
I.2.1 Individual Memory, Communal Memory 
        Analyses of remembering often begin with the claim that memories first and 
foremost belong to individuals. John Locke, for example, took memory to be a power of 
the mind “to revive perceptions, which it once had, with this additional perception 
annexed to them, that it has had them before.”9 Memory is thus regarded as a capacity of 
recalling to mind specific events that an individual witnessed or in which he or she was 
personally involved. No doubt, part of the allure of this position is its connection to the 
                                                
9 John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. P.H. Nidditch. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), p. 150.   
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experience of remembering. Though we might remember the same thing, my memory of 
the experience is intimately bound together with my own perspective of what happened. 
Thus, even if two individuals share the memory of the same thing, the remembered object 
has the status of something that is viewed from different perspectives. My memories are 
just that: mine.  
If memories belong to individuals, then the act of remembering is also an 
individual affair. That we continue to record and retrieve data from a kind of box of 
memories reinforces the idea of remembering as a process of recalling a previously 
inscribed detail that has been imprinted, whether such an imprint is left on a magnetic 
tape, file in a hard drive, or, analogously, in the mind. This view of the operation of 
remembering has been further bolstered by neuroscience, which has suggested that the 
brain devotes specific regions for particular functions, and psychoanalysis, which 
suggests that we can uncover hidden or repressed memories. Memories, then, appear to 
be stored in particular lobes of the brain, much the same way that memory of a computer 
is stored in a microchip. Given the right stimulus, we can retrieve these memories. 
If memories are thusly understood as documents, traces, or vestiges of the past 
that are stored in an archive, then remembering becomes akin to the retrieval of such 
traces. This storehouse of the mind finds its cultural correlate in archives, museums, 
computers, and other institutions, objects, and practices where we feel obligated to collect 
remains, testimonies, documents, images, speeches, videos, and every other piece of the 
past. These collections are intended to provide proof that this past actually happened, 
even when we are unsure why these particular vestiges are worthy of being remembered. 
Pierre Nora puts this point forcefully, saying that the mind becomes a “gigantic and 
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breathtaking storehouse of what it would be impossible for us to remember, an unlimited 
repertoire of what might need to be recalled.”10 The archive takes the place of memory 
insofar as it is the repository of all traces of the past, thus ensuring that, even though an 
individual cannot remember everything, the past can be saved.  
The importance of the trace is further emphasized by a number of metaphors we 
have to describe memory. Henry Roediger identifies a number of spatial metaphors that 
philosophers and psychologists have used to describe memory. The metaphor of the wax 
tablet has already been suggested as one of them. Others suggest that we think of memory 
as like rooms in a house, as a junk box, a switchbox, library, dictionary, tape recorder, 
subway map, and record player.11 These metaphors are further reinforced by the ways 
that we use memory in conjunction with technology. Computers, for example, keep a 
record of our on-line activities and can keep track of a wide array of our “real-world” 
activities, such as shopping patterns, taxes, and letters. Furthermore, surveillance cameras 
are becoming more prevalent in our cities and shops, recording our movements for instant 
playback. These metaphors, while pervasive, can nevertheless obscure different ways to 
think about memory. 
This common understanding of memory thus succumbs to what Edward Casey 
calls “an unexamined mentalism.”12 By this phrase, Casey means “the view that human 
minds—or surrogates for these minds, most notably computers—furnish the ultimate 
locus as well as the primary limit of human experience.”13 To speak about acts of 
                                                
10 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations Vol. 26 (Spring 
1989): pp. 7-24, p. 13. 
11 Henry Roediger. “Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology.” Memory and Cognition Vol. 8, no. 3 
(1980), pp. 231-246, p. 233. 
12 Edward Casey, Remembering, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 88 
13 Casey, Remembering, p. 88.  
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remembering and the objects that we remember construes memory as a specifically 
mental achievement that individuals perform. Indeed, as Casey further notes, we often 
speak about remembering in terms of “keeping something in mind,” thereby reinforcing 
the image of the mind as a receptacle of images. We understand the relationship between 
the sphere of the mental and the external world. Indeed, this problem arises because we 
tend to think of the mind as a container of representations, invisible and inaccessible to 
the outside world and to others. This reinforces the thought that all acts of the mind, 
including remembering, occurs only from within the solitary confines of the ego, which 
must then stretch out into a separate world in which it finds corroboration and validation.  
Such accounts of memory imply that there is no such thing as “collective 
memory.” Because remembering is performed by indvidiuals, and memories are “stored” 
in minds, the phrase “communal memory” becomes dangerously misleading. Only 
individuals remember; communities do not. Amos Funkenstein, for example, writes “just 
as a nation cannot eat or dance, neither can it speak or remember.”14 Collective or 
communal memory, on such an account, is in fact the aggregate of the memories of the 
individuals who comprise that community. The memories of people who have 
experienced the same event, for example a baseball game, will each have different 
associations and feelings that arise from that experience.  
Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam argue that the notion of a “collective memory” commits 
the fallacy of concrete generalization.15 It mistakes a generalization and an abstraction for 
a concrete entity. Thus there is no such “thing” as a nation, sports team, company, or 
                                                
14 Amos Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness.” History and Memory Vol. 1, no. 
1 (1989): pp. 5-26, p. 6  
15 Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam. “Collective Memory: What Is It?” History and Memory Vol. 8, no. 1 (1996): 
pp. 30-50, p. 35 
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community. There are only individuals who comprise such organizations. The only way 
that a “society,” “nation,” “community,” or “tribe” can thus be said to exist is through the 
continued subsistence of the individual members of those collectivities they comprise. A 
nation or community has no separate existence from its individuals. Nevertheless, they do 
identify a more limited use of such terms. They can be legitimately used metaphorically 
for collections of people who share myths, customs, stories, habits, and the like. In order 
to resist the temptation to reify such ideas, one should use the term “collected memories,” 
rather than “collective memory,” to more accurately describe such a phenomenon.16  
The upshot of this approach, Jeffery Olick notes, is that such analyses are 
“formally open to the investigation of psychological or even neurological factors in social 
memory outcomes. Symbols, texts, or rituals that commemorate the past do not have a 
life of their own, on this account, but are instead causally elicited by identifiable and 
measurable factors.”17 As such, the “collected memory” approach is better able to 
integrate different approaches to memory, including behavioral, psychological, cognitive, 
and neurological findings.  
However, by affording the individual a central role in the elaboration of memory 
in communal contexts, Olick explains that the collected memories approach ignores the 
way that certain ways to be with others is not reducible to individual, psychological 
processes.18 Communities can provide the frameworks through which people remember, 
exemplars for how individuals ought to remember, and even value some histories at the 
expense of others. It thus appears that in order to explain memory, we need to account for 
                                                
16 Jeffery Olick offers the term “collected memory” to describe those accounts that are based on such 
individualistic principles. The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility. 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 23-27. 
17 Olick, The Politics of Regret, p. 25. 
18 Olick, The Politics of Regret, p. 27. 
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its sources in social and communal life. 
Collective memory is closely associated with the ideas of the sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs. The social phenomenon of memory, on Halbwachs account, is not a collected 
or aggregate of individual memories. Rather, as Halbwachs argues, “it is in this sense that 
there is a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that 
our individual thought places itself in these [social] frameworks and participates in this 
memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.”19 In other words, social contexts 
offer those frameworks and structures that make possible individual acts of remembering.  
Thus, the past is not so much preserved, but reconstructed on the basis of present 
concerns. This makes collective memory a horizon for specific acts of memory. There 
are, Olick writes, “clearly demonstrable long-term structures to what societies remember 
or commemorate that are stubbornly impervious to the efforts of individuals to escape 
them that arise because of the interests of certain institutions that provide acceptable 
patterns of behavior, possibilities for acting and understanding oneself, others in the 
community, and foreign others.”20 It provides a sense of life, mores, habits, in short, an 
ethos, for a community that allows it to understand its past. Language, narrative, and 
dialogue thus become central to the preservation of memory. 
The emphasis Halbwachs places on the social frameworks, however, threatens to 
subsume individual memory into collective or communal memory. Though psychological 
account of memory over-emphasizes memory as an individual achievement, it now 
appears that memory is possible only as a collective or social achievement. Is there a way 
that memory can be understood that does justice to both its communal dimension and its 
                                                
19 Maurice Halbwachs. The Social Frameworks of Memory. On Collective Memory. Ed. and Trans. Lewis 
A. Coser. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992): pp. 37-189, p. 38. 
20 Olick, The Politics of Regret, p. 28. 
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individual one? 
There are good philosophical reasons for supposing that something like collective 
memory exists as a correlate to individual memory. In order to see how such an account 
is possible, it will first be necessary to develop the meaning of a collective attitude or 
collective intentionality. While it is tempting to analyze collective attitudes in terms of 
individuals who have them, this account fails to identify what John Searle and others 
have called “collective intentionality.”21 The difference between a collection of 
intentionalities and “collective intentionality” is the difference between an aggregate of 
individuals acting the same way and genuine cooperative activity. For example, while 
driving on the highway, each person in their respective cars has the same goal, namely, to 
get to their destination. This is an example of aggregate action, where each person has the 
same intention but there is no unified, collective action. There is no “we” involved in 
such a case. If however a few motorists were to help another motorist push his car to the 
shoulder of the road to change a tire, the act would be a case of genuine collective 
intentionality. The reason for this is that, as Taylor Carman writes, “your comportment 
and my comportment are immediately intelligible to each of us as our doing something, 
not as the mere summation of your doing it and my doing it.”22 Each person’s 
contribution to the act makes sense only as part of our performing the action together.23 
This can occur even if each person performs a different task, as happens in many team 
                                                
21 Cf. John Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions.” Intentions in Communication. Eds. P. Cohen, J. 
Morgan, and M.E. Pollack (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1990): pp. 401-416 and his The 
Construction of Social Reality (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995). Taylor Carman employs this 
account to describe Heidegger’s existential-ontological meaning of being-with as presented in Being and 
Time. Cf. Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): pp. 237-244. 
22 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, p. 242.  
23 Cf. Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” pp. 402-403. 
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sports.24 While each member of the team may have a different task, each of their 
individual actions makes sense insofar as it contributes to or impedes the effort of the 
team. As such, the meaning of each individuals action depends on the existence of a 
collective intentionality, and thus makes the meaning of collective intentionality 
irreducible to the sum of individual acts. 
One important example of the phenomenon of collective intentionality and of 
collective memory can be found in commemorations. Edward Casey again proves to be a 
helpful interlocutor here. Commemorations are literally instances of intensified 
remembering.25 Memory is intensified in commemorations because it is a highly 
mediated affair: texts, such as eulogies and liturgies, become the vehicle through which 
we remember, the ritual provides a social setting in which remembering occurs, and these 
two become fully realized only when the commemoration is performed with others.26 
Casey writes, “if I am remembering at all on such an occasion, I am remembering with 
[others] and they with me. It is a matter of something communal.”27 On the occasions of 
such commemorations, we can only attain the commemorative aim via an interpolated 
ritual and text in the co-presence of others. Commemoration and memorialization are 
essentially public and essentially done with others, even as they are performed by 
individuals. 
                                                
24 This may reach a kind of limit case in baseball, whose central tension is uniquely centered between the 
pitcher and the batter. However, while the pitcher’s job, as managers, scouts, and journalists like to say, is 
to throw strikes, that only makes sense insofar as it is part of a collective intentionality to make outs, which 
is a collective effort.  
25 Casey, Remembering, p. 217. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology points out that the prefix 
com- acts as an intensifier of the root. Thus to commemorate is to intensify in memory. 
"commemorate"  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. Ed. T. F. Hoad. Oxford University 
Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  Marquette University.  11 August 
2010  <http://0-
www.oxfordreference.com.libus.csd.mu.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t27.e3086> 
26 Casey, Remembering, p. 218. 
27 Casey, Remembering, p. 216-217. 
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In commemoration, we participate with others in two ways, one of which Casey 
names a “vertical” aspect and the other a “horizontal.”28 The horizontal names the way 
that we commemorate with others who are present and who participate in the act of 
commemoration. The vertical, by contrast, refers to those whose absence is 
commemorated in the event. On some occasions, such as in mourning, the two coincide: 
“the dyadic community of myself-as-griever and the other-as-grieved is at once 
horizontal and vertical.”29 In grieving and mourning, the others with whom one mourns 
and the one who is mourned help give the intentional act of mourning meaning. It “calls 
on us not as separate beings but as always already intertwined; it calls us in our strictly 
social being.”30 Commemoration thus deals with overcoming the separation between 
individuals, and even shows that such separation is derivative of an original belonging 
together that cannot be reduced to its members. 
Furthermore, the significance of the communal dimension of remembering, Casey 
argues, does not end with the way it is founded on one’s already socially established 
being. He writes, “commemorating also creates new forms of sociality, new modes of 
interconnection: between past and present, self and other, one group and another, one 
form of thinking or acting or speaking and another, one sex and another, one art form and 
another.”31 Remembering thus does not merely pay tribute to the past and to our 
collective being together. It also helps to construct new forms of community and 
sociality. Remembering can thus transform our understanding of others and add different 
configurations for communal existence. 
                                                
28 Casey, Remembering, p. 247. 
29 Casey, Remembering, p. 247. 
30 Casey, Remembering, p. 250. 
31 Casey, Remembering, p. 251. 
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I.2.2. The Distinction between the Past and the Present 
If, as Casey suggests, the separation between self and other is overcome in 
commemorations, this overcoming just as much applies to the distinction between past 
and present. By highlighting the distinction between the past as something to which we 
belong and the past as something that is finished, I introduce a second common 
assumption that often occurs in discussions of the relationship between the present and 
the past. In order to sharpen the meaning of identity and highlight its importance in 
discussions of remembering, especially concerning its meaning in communal and 
commemorative contexts, I will turn to David Hume’s challenge to questions of identity 
across time, and its further amplification by Derek Parfit. 
In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes “if any impression gives rise to the 
idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of 
our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression 
constant and invariable.”32 It makes no sense to speak of an enduring self that underlies 
experience and combines a variety of such experiences into a unity that could be 
possessed by an “I” because there is no experience of something constant that underlies 
our impressions of other things. Rather than discovering a single impression that could be 
called a self and designated by the personal pronoun “I,” Hume argues instead that the 
self is nothing but a “bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each 
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux or movement.”33 Giving 
rise to the idea of the self are the relationships among the various impressions, or, as 
                                                
32 David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 164. 
33 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 165. 
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Hume writes, “the objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are suppos’d to 
continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together 
by resemblance, contiguity, or causation.”34 This means that myself now and “my” self at 
a point sometime in the past or in the future is not connected except insofar as the two 
events resemble each other, are continuous with each other, or are causally connected to 
each other.35  
Derek Parfit, following Hume, rejects the claim that a self underlies and unites 
various experiences. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit rejects the “non-reductionist” view 
of the self, which posits a Cartesian ego or soul that subtends and unites various 
experiences, and argues instead that there is “no further fact” of the self underlying 
experience.36 In its place, Parfit argues that there is only a spectrum of more or less 
related psychological or physical connections, which ultimately renders the self radically 
indeterminate. When speaking about one’s death, for example, Parfit suggests that the 
sentence “I shall be dead” does not capture the relationship between my present 
experience and the inevitable event of my own demise. Rather, a more accurate statement 
would be, “there will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to 
these present experiences.”37 It is instead the psychological and physical connections 
between past and present and future that matter, not a “self” who “owns” the events of his 
or her life. W. James Booth describes Parfit's position thusly, “it is the related events of 
the body and mind, related in a way that admits of considerable indeterminacy that 
                                                
34 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 166. 
35 It should be noted that phrasing it thusly seems to invite the kind of metaphysical view that Hume is 
trying to dismantle. To speak of “myself” in the future, it would seem, requires something like an 
underlying substance or subject that is the same such that we could call both “my” self at different times. 
Rather, it should be reemphasized that all that exists are the varying degrees of resemblance.   
36 Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
37 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 281. 
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matter, not identity.”38 
The upshot of both Hume’s and Parfit’s accounts is that they can explain how an 
individual can come to look at his or her past actions as if they were performed by 
another person. The psychological and physical relations matter, and not identity, By 
removing such relations and unbinding oneself from those ties, a person becomes less 
connected to the previous “individual.” This suggests that the self, for Hume and Parfit, is 
ultimately temporal relation. They interpret the self as scattered along a linear sequence 
of past, present, future that require unification. The “self” endures a sequence of temporal 
moments, which appear from the future, become present, and then fade into the past. A 
past event is one that has happened and is now irretrievably lost, something that was once 
here but is no longer.  
W. James Booth suggests that Hume’s and Parfit’s accounts of selfhood have 
significant consequences for understanding the relationship between agency and 
selfhood. For example, consider the meaning of imputing acts to others and holding them 
responsible for such actions. Imputation connects an agent to an action by designating 
someone responsible for the effects of a particular action. “If there is no enduring self but 
only mutable and dissolvable relations,” Booth writes, “then it would seem also that the 
self as a subject of attribution, as a responsible agent accountable for her past deeds and 
able to assume commitments to a future, would also be weakened or would wither away 
altogether.”39 By arguing for a conception of identity cast in terms of the relationship 
between psychological and physical experiences, Hume and Parfit suggest that moral 
concepts such as imputation and responsibility admit of degrees and are more provisional 
                                                
38 W. James Booth. Communities of Memory: On Witness, Justice, and Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), p. 5.  
39 Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 6. 
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than has been commonly assumed. For example, it can make sense to say that the 
indiscretions of one’s youth were almost committed by someone else, if in the 
intervening years that person has repented, lived well, or otherwise changed. Parfit’s 
account thus reveals how it is possible to be able to say and mean such things because it 
clarifies how assigning responsibility is connected to one’s identity. Responsibility for 
one’s past or one’s future can simply cease to hold, given the right conditions.  
Paul Ricoeur identifies an important reason why Parfit’s account makes it difficult 
to assign responsibility for actions. Ricoeur writes, “what [Parfit’s] puzzling cases render 
radically contingent is this corporeal and terrestrial condition which the hermeneutics of 
existence, underlying the notion of acting and suffering, takes to be insurmountable.”40 
When, for example, Parfit suggests that the meaning of death is just a matter of saying 
that there might be experiences in the future that are not related to the present, he misses 
the way that death is in each case my own and that I experience my own death as 
mattering.  Ricoeur wonders, “are we capable of conceiving of (I do not say of realizing) 
variations such that the corporeal and terrestrial condition itself becomes a mere variable, 
a contingent variable…?”41 Even if such a question cannot be answered at the 
epistemological level, Ricoeur nevertheless suggests that “the existential invariant of 
corporeality and worldliness, around which revolve all the imaginative variations of 
literary fiction, [must] itself [be] taken as indispensible on the ontological plane” (OA, 
151). In short, what Parfit tries to imagine is a subject who is no longer embodied and no 
longer tied to its world.  
In fact, it seems that Parfit’s neglect of the existentiality of human being will have 
                                                
40 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), p. 150. 
41 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 151. 
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serious consequences for the very possibility of memory and identity. Take, for example, 
Edward Casey’s examination of body memory in his book Remembering. He offers an 
example of a person who, after more than ten years of not driving a 1926 Model T Ford, 
was able to slide back into the driver’s seat of one and drive away.42 What was striking, 
Casey notes, is that no explicit recollection was needed, nor did the driver attempt to 
refamiliarize himself with the car. Casey concludes that “it is evident from this example 
and many others like it that habitual body memories are at once pre-reflective and 
presupposed in human experience.”43 If Casey is correct in his claim that body memory 
orients us to our world and even opens up the world for us, then it would seem that Parfit 
not only annihilates the self, but his also dissolves the possibility of experience as such.  
For Parfit there is no “me” or “I” to which an action could be imputed. Similarly 
there is no “author” which could be responsible for initiating a course of events. Thus 
there is nothing that would ground the possibility of experience, identity, or moral 
accountability. By removing an “I” that could be held accountable, Parfit renders an 
important dimension of practical life opaque. Practical life requires deliberation; without 
the ability to choose and without the ability to plan a future, our practical lives become 
unmoored. Booth captures this sense of agency required for practical life when he writes 
“the idea of a purely present-tense self is unintelligible from the standpoint of the person 
as agent because (among other things) it lacks the notion of the mineness of the future 
that allows us to make sense of deliberation.”44 By doing away with the possibility of 
imputation, Parfit also eliminates the possibility of being responsible. As Ricoeur writes, 
“imputing would not only be placing an action under someone’s responsibility but would 
                                                
42 Casey, Remembering, p. 148. 
43 Casey, Remembering, p. 149.  
44 Booth. Communities of Memory, p. 9 
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moreover be placing an action, as that which can come under the category permissible-
impermissible, under the responsibility of someone who can be deemed culpable-
inculpable.”45 Imputation thus serves to link a particular action, with all of its ethical 
import and meaning, to a particular agent. Imputation and deliberation matter because 
they make assigning responsibility for actions possible and enable one to hold another 
accountable for actions.  
Parfit and Hume leave us at an impasse. They reveal that the account of the self as 
a substance or ego that remains the same throughout changes is inadequate. The 
implications of this claim for our understanding of the relationship between memory and 
identity should not go unnoticed. By rejecting the “further fact” of an ego and upholding 
a reductionist view of the self, understood as a bundle of perceptions and stronger or 
weaker psychological perceptions, they can thus provide a plausible account of the 
difference in identity between the child of four, the awkward teenager of sixteen, the 
thirty-three year old adult, and the seventy-four year old senior citizen. It is plausible, and 
often correct, when one says at thirty-three, that the actions of the sixteen year-old are not 
one’s own. In arguing for this position, however, Hume and Parfit render it difficult, if 
not impossible, to be a self that can have actions imputed to it and be responsible for 
them. A self cannot have actions imputed it if there is no self that could be the subject of 
attributes and if it cannot be said to be the author of its actions. 
This problem arises because of Hume’s and Parfit’s understanding of time. 
Roughly put, their accounts of selfhood suggest that it is scattered across discrete units of 
time that are in need of unification. Time is understood as a collection of units that begin 
by not being present, are momentarily present, and then are no longer present. Once time 
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is understood thusly, the most plausible way to reunite the self is by offering an account 
of the relationships between the self and linear and abstract moments. Specifically, a past 
event, on this account, is one that has happened, but is now irretrievably lost. Even if it 
has significance for the present, it is only due to causal relations—events in the past can 
cause effects in the present and future.     
But is this interpretation of the relationship between the self and time, and more 
specifically the self and the past, the only way to do so? Can the past be understood in a 
way different from something irretrievably gone?  Martin Heidegger’s distinction 
between the past as finished and done, no longer there (Vergangenheit) and the past as 
having-been (Gewesenheit) offers a helpful distinction between two ways of thinking 
about the past. The former suggests that the past is finished, and foreign to the present. 
To understand the past has “having-been,” on the other hand, means that it “is anything 
but bygone. It is something that I can return to again and again.”46 It has more to do with 
how one’s present understanding of the world and one’s own self-understanding carries 
an understanding of the past with it, and how absense itself helps to shape the present. 
This suggests that the past underlies and makes possible any particular perspective on the 
world, even if one can never fully reveal the meaning of the past that underlies one’s own 
identity.47 
Edward Casey’s description of commemorations is also useful in illuminating this 
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distinction. On the one hand, commemorations reveal the way that a community exists as 
having-been. They honor the past, and pay homage to it. As such, “they seek to preserve 
and stabilize the memory of the honoree, and to do so in a time-binding, invariant 
manner.”48 Commemorations attempt to ward off the ravages of time, and show how the 
memory of something past lasts into the present and will continue into the future.49 They 
help those who participate in them come to terms with the past by not letting it revert into 
something over and done with, and instead actively harboring the meaning of the past in 
the present and transmitting such a meaning to future generations. They thus reveal the 
way a particular community exists as having-been.  
On the other hand, Casey notes, we cannot fully commemorate something unless 
it has come to an end in some significant sense.50 If the event or person were still alive, 
we would not be commemorating but celebrating (or suffering from) it. As such, we can 
only commemorate those events that are no longer here. Commemorations are, in short, a 
way of coming to terms with endings. They are, in important respects, Janus-faced 
insofar as they look back to the past, they look ahead to the future. Commemoration thus 
comes to terms with endings and the past by carrying it forward into the present, 
recognizing how its effects still affect us and can continue to do so. 
What, then, is the role that memory plays in an account of practical identity? 
While memory plays an integral role in constituting identity, it is not the only factor. As 
Kant and Hegel have suggested, self-consciousness presupposes memory; without the 
                                                
48 Casey, Remembering, p. 226. Italics in the original. 
49 Casey notes further that it is for this reason that many memorials are made of materials that are meant to 
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obduracy is compensated for by its considerable accessibility to the many who can own individual copies 
of it, p. 227. 
50 Ibid, p. 255. 
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ability to tie together representations from the past, the present would be empty.51 As 
such, memory both ties the present to the past and is a condition for the possibility of 
self-consciousness. Insofar as agency requires the agent to persist through time, such that 
it can be the subject of imputation, it requires memory in order to be able to identify the 
relevant features of the past that carry over into the present. Remembering does not 
merely confront the finality of the past, insofar as part of what it means to remember is 
contained in those actions that help to carry the past forward into the present in order for 
it to be remembered again in the future.  
 What then is the collective identity that constitutes a community as responsible or 
as being indebted? Clearly, the Cartesian ego that underlies identity will not be adequate 
to understand how this is possible; there is, as Parfit and Hume have argued, no “further 
fact” to identity that would serve to render individuals or communities responsible. At the 
same time, Parfit and Hume miss an important feature of identity in their accounts, 
namely the way that identity seems to endure through a commitment to a project. This 
feature of identity is not mere sameness over time, but, as Ricoeur suggests, selfhood.52 
Selfhood refers to the way that one can maintain oneself, despite change. The 
commitment and recommitment of a group to a specific plan of action contributes to a 
way that a community becomes responsible for its actions, such that those actions are not 
merely the province of individual agents. The notion of commitment shares a kind of  
kinship with a number of important phenomena, such as promising, bearing witness, and 
offering testimony.  On the basis of this form of identity, we can, for example, hold the 
                                                
51 Cf. Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 229ff., 247. Also, Cf. G.W.F. Hegel. The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Trans. J.N. Findlay. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 479ff. 
52 I will be discussing Ricoeur’s account of selfhood in Chapter IV. Cf. Oneself as Another, pp. 117-125. 
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current presidential administration responsible for the actions executed by prior 
presidents, accept apologies from governments for their culpability for past offenses, and 
hope that future generations can fulfill the promises that we make on their behalf. As 
such, the identity at the core of community is, in part, one that enables a group to be held 
responsible and to make promises; it is one that configures a community as being 
indebted to and responsible for its past and enables it to be held accountable for its 
actions and promises. 
 
I.2.3. The Hermeneutics of Historical Subjectivity 
Memory, as I have indicated, is not confined to the achievements of an individual, 
subsisting self. Rather, I have suggested that there are good reasons to think that the basic 
structures and frameworks through which individuals remember something are provided 
by communal or collective existence. Furthermore, such communal existence helps to 
transmit these frameworks for remembering. The separation between the present and the 
past, self and others, and history and present action is not as strict as one might be 
initially led to believe. There is a sense in which the present “belongs” to the past, such 
that we can be with past others in mourning and grieving, and that the meaning of 
selfhood is to be found in conjunction with others. This blurring of distinctions, I have 
suggested, occurs quite forcefully in commemorations. How is it possible to 
commemorate events in the first place? What, in other words, calls us to remember 
certain events, specific places, unique individuals, and particular times?  
 In order to answer these questions I draw from the hermeneutic tradition, which 
takes the question of history and historical knowledge as one of its main concerns. The 
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hermeneutic tradition has cast the problem of historical knowledge in terms of 
intersubjectivity, which makes knowledge of the past part of the broader problem of 
relating to an other. Wilhelm Dilthey articulates this position most explicitly. Dilthey’s 
primary aim was to pose the question of the meaning of history and its relationship to 
human life.53 Insofar as “understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou,” historical 
understanding is a relationship between the self and the other.54 Such a rediscovery is to 
be found in what he calls projective “re-creation” or “re-living” (Nacherleben) by which 
the individual transposes himself or herself into the place of another person, moving 
along with the events in the same way that the person experienced them.55 Dilthey writes, 
“when we find in history values…we can by empathy (durch das Nacherleben) put back 
into them the relationship to life that they once contained.”56 Moving along with and 
experiencing the event as others had suggests that remembering the past is a 
reconstruction of those values that motivated the action in the first place. 
 It is clear that such a recreation is not as straightforward as it initially appears. 
Memory is never innocent. It always carries dispositions, beliefs, values, and prejudices 
of the one remembering. Nevertheless, Dilthey claims that “the interpreter can 
momentarily emphasize and strengthen some mental processes and allow others to fade 
                                                
53 Cf. Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview”. Trans. 
Charles Bambach. Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond. Ed. John Van 
Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002): pp. 147-176. 
54 Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Sciences,” Selected Writings. 
Ed. H.P. Rickman. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): pp. 168-245, p. 208.  
55 Ronald Bontekoe. Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 
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56 Dilthey, “The Construction of the Historical World,” p. 244. 
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into the background and thus reproduce an alien life in himself.”57 In so doing, the 
interpreter is in a position to bring to light the various constraints that can impede 
remembering the past, including those prejudices and presuppositions that the 
interpretation necessarily carries with it, the difference in values between the present and 
the past, and the ability of the interpreter to imagine himself or herself in the place of 
another person. While remembering is a projective recreation of the past and allows us to 
come to know what happened by the imaginative reinsertion of oneself into past events, it 
is never completely successful. 
 If we extend Dilthey’s claim that understanding involves rediscovering the “I in 
the Thou” to include the relationship between the past and the present, it follows that we 
understand the past on the basis of the present and that we come to understand the present 
only insofar as we understand the past. Ronald Bontekoe suggests that there are at least 
two ways in which the expansion of self-understanding occurs. First, when an individual 
struggles to understand past actions, events and objects, she necessarily draws upon her 
own experiences in order to unlock their meaning. The result is that “her understanding 
of human nature expands, and with it the clarity with which she grasps the nature of that 
uniquely significant member of the human species—herself.”58 When this idea is applied 
to the relationship between the present and the past, we find that the study of the past can 
help us gain clarity on the present. The second way that historical research expands self-
understanding is by inverting the first pattern. Rather than examine the events, actions, 
and objects of the past, the individual now turns to events, objects, and actions in the 
present in order to see how they affect others. Bontekoe puts this point nicely: “in order 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): pp. 246-263, p. 258. 
58 Bontekoe, Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle, p. 57. 
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to gauge how her actions affect others, the individual must again project herself into the 
position of someone else, but this time in order to understand her creation from the 
standpoint of their experience.”59 As a result, in the recreation of the past, I come to 
understand myself differently. To use a phrase from Ricoeur, I come to understand 
myself as another. 
 Furthermore, Dilthey’s approach focuses on the whole of life, as it shows up in 
pre-reflective experience, and how such a whole is interconnected. To understand such 
life, one cannot conceive it abstractly in terms of causal connections. Rather, it must be 
understood in the purposive terms of motivation, and the way that such a life is always 
shared with others. He writes, 
What primarily characterizes generations, ages, and epochs is that they are 
general, dominant, and permeating tendencies. They involve the 
concentration of the whole culture of such a temporal span within itself, 
so that the values, purposes, and life-rules of the time can provide the 
norm for judging, evaluating, and assessing the persons and tendencies or 
direction that give a specific time its character. An individual, a tendency, 
and a community derive their meaning through their inner relation to the 
spirit of the age.60 
 
Self-understanding and the understanding of others depends on the commonalities of a 
generation and the shared tendency or direction toward which such a generation sees 
itself going. Thus, a generation helps to form the unique context or situation in which 
individuals find themselves, and offers the basic questions that a generation finds posed 
to itself. 
I introduce this admittedly simple sketch of Dilthey’s conception of historical 
understanding for several reasons. First, Heidegger’s concept of “generation,” which he 
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introduces in Being and Time, is indebted to Dilthey. Heidegger uses this concept in order 
to shed light on a constellation of related ideas, such as a “heritage” and the endowment 
and appointed task that each generation faces. Second, it helps to underscore a tension 
that arises within the hermeneutic conception of history that forms a basic problem that 
requires further development. On one hand, it appears that history concerns a special kind 
of object of knowledge, namely knowledge of past things. On the other hand, history also 
affects our own self-understanding and thus is not limited to the strictly epistemological 
domain. This tension is manifest in Heidegger’s distinction between the two senses of the 
past, the past as no longer and the past as having been, as well as the distinction between 
two senses of history, history as something lived through (Geschichte) and the objective 
study of the past (Historie). It is also evident in the contemporary opposition between 
memory and history.61 Historian Bernard Bailyn frames their differences clearly. In its 
historiographical mode, history is “the critical skeptical, empirical source-bound 
reconstruction of past events, circumstances, and people based on the belief that the past 
is no only distant from us but also different.”62 Memory, by contrast, is “not a critical, 
skeptical reconstruction of what happened. It is the spontaneous experience of the past. It 
is absolute, not tentative or distant, and it is expressed in signs, symbols, images, and 
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mnemonic clues of all sorts.”63 Memory is thus alive and belongs to particular 
communities; history, on the other hand, is analytical, detached, and is a reconstruction of 
the past. One concern will thus be establishing the relationship between these two senses 
of the past. 
Third, Dilthey’s conception of historical understanding suggests that the problem 
of history and the relationship one has to one’s past is ultimately a relationship between 
the self and other. To understand the past is to understand oneself as another. The 
relationship to the past is not one that separates individuals from one another, as if 
memory and individuals are isolated. Rather it shows how the self and the other, 
understood now in terms of the relationship between the past and the present, mutually 
imply each other. To think of oneself as another is, as Paul Ricoeur shows, no simple 
task. Rather, in his work on the meaning of selfhood, appropriately titled Oneself as 
Another, he writes that to think of the relationship between selfhood and otherness is not 
merely to compare the two. Rather, it is to suggest from the beginning that “selfhood 
implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the 
other, that instead one passes into the other.”64 Thus, selfhood is not merely similar to 
another; to be self at all is to be self inasmuch as one is also other. 
The aim of interpretation is to reveal the meaning of the object, which makes 
hermeneutics the discipline that attempts to establish the method by which one can come 
to understand the past better. While Dilthey’s conception of historical knowledge remains 
epistemologically motivated, in that it aims at the possibility of knowing the past, Martin 
Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur raise the hermeneutic structure to the ontological level. This 
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is not to say that epistemological concerns about knowing the past are irrelevant to 
them—Heidegger wants to show that it is because Dasein is open to its own Being that its 
history is also an issue for it, and Ricoeur argues that the epistemological and the 
ontological domains are not to be kept rigidly separate. Understanding and interpretation 
are modes of our being in the world, and not merely methods of approaching texts. As 
such, hermeneutics designates, on the one hand, the basic way that human beings exist, 
which is to say as in terms of one’s own possibilities and the being that one “has to be.” 
Human beings understand and interpret themselves in terms of their ability to be. On the 
other hand, it designates the proper access to the subject. 
 
I.3 The Called Subject: Witnessing and Testimony 
How is memory constituted in the self and through communal existence? One 
avenue for answering this seemingly straightforward question is to examine the way that 
testimony and bearing witness help establish a relationship to the past and to others. The 
idea of bearing witness is central to hermeneutic phenomenology insofar as texts from the 
past continue to hold significance today, and, importantly, call out to readers to 
understand, interpret and apply them in the present. Such texts testify to a past world, and 
mark out the parameters of a common life. However, how they do so remains 
underdeveloped. Thus, my turn to Heidegger and Ricoeur, and more specifically their 
respective understandings of testimony and bearing witness, is an attempt to begin to 
develop the meaning of testimony in the hermeneutic tradition as a way to mark out the 
meaning of the past as it absently remains in the present. 
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I.3.1. Two Meanings of Testimony 
In order to secure the meaning of bearing witness and its relationship to memory 
and history, it will first be useful to distinguish two related meanings of “testimony.” 
Testimony and witnessing not only pertain to a specific epistemological problem that 
deals with the reliability or truthfulness of a certain domain of propositions. It can also 
refer to a particular modality of being human. In the ordinary sense of the word, the 
witness is an eyewitness, one who has firsthand experience of an event and reports what 
he or she has seen. This form of witnessing is often employed in the historical sciences, 
which attempts to narrate the past “such as it actually happened.” As such, historiography 
attempts to explain what happened, giving a causal account, from a third-person 
perspective. The form that witnessing takes in historiography is thus one aspires to be 
objective, distanced, and critical of what happened. The witness’s testimony is put on 
trial, so to speak, insofar as her testimony questioned and secured in its veracity.  
There is, however, an additional sense of witnessing: bearing witness to 
something, which may be either one’s own memory or the memory of something passed 
down from previous generations. To bear witness, in W. James Booth’s words, “is to 
remember, to be a living memory, to guard the past, to ask others to do likewise, and to 
illuminate the traces of the past and their meaning.”65 Here, witnessing is closer to the 
idea of being faithful to the past; it is an act of fidelity to it. Rather than the distance 
between the present and the past that makes possible the historical sciences, the act of 
bearing witness in memory is an attempt to reconnect with the past, and to bring it back 
in order to transmit it to the future. Witnessing, in other words, does not merely render an 
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account of events; it keeps the absence of the past present.66 In testifying to what 
happened, the witness transmits memory to others. By speaking, she acts in fidelity to the 
past, not just to give an account of what actually happened, but to reveal a particular life 
in common and to be motivated by a burden, perhaps in desire to discharge a debt or 
feeling of guilt, or a feeling of gratitude, one that attempts to honor the past. 
An example of such witnessing should sharpen and clarify the tension between 
the historical and epistemic sense of testimony and the way that testimony is also an 
attempt to safeguard the past from the ever-widening gulf of temporal distance and from 
the desire to forget. Dori Laub recounts a lively debate after historians and 
psychoanalysts listened to a Holocaust survivor’s account of the uprising at Auschwitz 
during the fall of 1944. The witness recounted that “we saw four chimneys going up in 
flames, exploding. The flames shot into the sky, people were running. It was 
unbelievable.”67 As a matter of the historical record, however, this testimony is 
inaccurate—only one chimney was destroyed, not four. Because of her inaccurate 
testimony, historians “could not accept—nor give credence to—her whole account of the 
events.”68 To this, one participant responded that the witness was not testifying to an 
historical fact, the number of chimneys destroyed, but rather something more “radical” 
and more “crucial.”69 The witness testified to something unimaginable, not merely to the 
horrors she saw while an inmate at Auschwitz, but also to the event of an uprising and the 
possibility of resistance and survival in an overwhelmingly desperate and bleak situation. 
In one sense, the witness saw something that did not in fact happen—the destruction of 
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four chimneys. In other sense, what did not happen made all the difference to her 
survival. By seeing something that she could not fathom, something that she thought was 
impossible—and in fact was impossible, in a sense—she was able to summon the 
strength to persevere. In other words, she testified to the meaning of the situation, and not 
the empirical details. 
Thus, her testimony is in one sense false—four chimneys were not destroyed. In 
another sense, by bearing witness to the meaning of event, she reveals that what actually 
happened made all the difference in this woman’s life. Seeing the impossible, that is, 
what did not happen, gave her the power to make what was seemingly impossible 
possible—surviving the Shoah. In so doing, she transformed herself into a kind of living 
reminder of the past, exhorting others not to forget the unspeakable horrors that she 
experienced and the possibility of speaking and acting against those horrors. 
What is striking about bearing witness is that the events recounted stand out and 
remain unable to be assimilated into a coherent narrative. Dori Laub, himself a survivor 
of the Shoah, suggests that the testimony involved in recounting these events “seems to 
be composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences 
that have not settled into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed 
as knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of 
reference.”70 As such, what is witnessed through these various media resists being 
incorporated into a cohesive unity, one that would finally explain or account for such an 
event happening. What monuments, memorials, and other ways of bearing witness reveal 
is that testimony, rather than being reducible to a propositional form of knowledge, is a 
discursive act whose very speech or writing produces evidence for its truth. Testimony is 
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discursive because it is “a vow to tell, to promise, and produce one’s own speech as 
material evidence for the truth,” and, as a result, it “accomplishes a speech act, rather 
than simply formulate a statement.”71  The meaning of historical events always exceeds 
and transforms the medium in which they are expressed. 
The term testimony thus covers an array of significations. On the one hand, to 
witness something is to be an eye-witness to an event. In this instance, being an eye-
witness to an historical event suggests the ability to give an accurate report of a sequence 
of events. The witness’s testimony is an account that adjudicates between two parties’ 
claims. Testimony in this sense has a juridical connotation, and is often given in a highly 
formalized and symbolic setting, such as a trial. On the other hand, to bear witness to 
something suggests that what was seen was an event that transcends the ability to be put 
into our everyday language. In this case, the witness testifies to something that cannot be 
seen and to something that resists being fully understood.72 To testify, in this sense, 
means to bear witness to that which is unsayable and to make this unsayable element of 
language appear within speech as unsayable. This dimension of witnessing and testimony 
indicates a political, and even religious, dimension that resists full articulation and 
continually calls established and conventional meanings into question. There is a tension 
between these two senses of witnessing here: to be an eye-witness to an event means to 
develop an historical account and indicates a fidelity to what actually happened; to bear 
witness indicates a relationship to a truth about human existence that transcends those 
facts and cannot be easily assimilated into such an account. There is both a juridical sense 
of witnessing, and a quasi-religious, or ethical sense, of witnessing. This productive 
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tension introduces the historical truth of what happened as well as the phenomenological 
truth of the experience of something that exceeds the account.  
Both Heidegger and Ricoeur suggest that bearing witness plays a central role in 
their respective hermeneutic accounts of the self. Rather than conceive of the self in 
terms of an underlying substratum that remains the same throughout change, both offer 
an account of the self that primarily takes the way that it is “steadfast” or “self-constant.” 
Their respective accounts of selfhood attend both to the way that the self is constituted 
through temporality generally, and remembering specifically, and how such remembering 
helps to establish the identity of a community. Central to their accounts is the role that 
testimony and witnessing play, a role that is especially evidenced in their analyses of 
conscience. Conscience reveals the self as having been addressed by a tradition and 
charged with the responsibility of being tradition’s heir. It names those moments where 
the normal course of life is interrupted, discloses the unique historical situation, and 
makes a reorientation or recommitment to something possible. To see oneself as being 
addressed, or called, by one’s life and placed in a position of having to respond to such a 
call comprises the dialectic of address and response, and is the formal structure of bearing 
witness that I will be developing.  
 
I.3.2. The Called Subject in Heidegger 
For Heidegger, the meaning of bearing witness is to be found in the more 
“existential” passages of Being and Time, wherein he elaborates the meaning of death, 
guilt, conscience, resoluteness, and repetition. The notion of “authenticity” and being 
authentic pervades that work, and offers the possibility of a style or way of life that 
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involves constantly renewing one’s responsibility for one’s own history..73 The function 
of conscience is to dislodge Dasein from the interpretation and understanding of itself 
from the perspective of its everyday concerns, and return to it the possibility of 
committing itself anew to the possibilities that arise from its own being. Heidegger writes 
“the sort of Dasein which is understood after the manner of the world both for Others and 
for itself, gets passed over in this appeal”by the call of conscience and its everyday 
world“is something which the call to the Self takes not the slightest cognizance.”74  The 
“self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgment and hiding-place, gets brought to 
itself by the call” (BT 317/SZ 273).  By listening to the call, “Dasein is in thrall to its 
ownmost possibility of existence” (BT 334/SZ 287). Conscience calls Dasein to 
responsibility, though not in the sense of being responsible for its actions. Rather, 
conscience calls Dasein to be responsible for the very possibility of being a self at all. 
This suggests that through the call of conscience, Dasein bears witness to the genesis of 
the responsibility it has for being a self at all. 
Heidegger’s account will have significant implications for the meaning of history 
and temporality. Rather than the everyday experience of time, which is measured out by 
clocks and calendars, the temporality of selfhood transforms how Dasein experiences its 
                                                
73 While I do not wish to get into an extended discussion of the “moral” or “normative” claims that this 
notion may or may not entail, a few words about this will be necessary. It is clear that Heidegger’s 
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justifying our normative or moral claims nor in arguing for a supreme principle of morality from which we 
could deduce maxims for acting. That said, insofar as (some) moral theories and Heidegger’s examination 
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both engage in similar projects. Heidegger is recommending a certain way of life, by advocating that we 
take up a specific relationship to ourselves. In this regard, authenticity shares some important 
characteristics with Aristotle’s conception of virtue. Nevertheless, authenticity is not the realization of 
some universal human “essence,” and it cannot be properly captured by appealing to traditional moral 
concepts and values. See Chapter II for more detail on Heidegger’s conception of authenticity. 
74 Heidegger. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper & 
Collins, 1962), p. 317. I will be using the Macquarrie/Robinson translation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit 
throughout, citing the translation first (BT) and German pagination second (SZ) in the body of the text.  
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past. In the 1924 lecture, The Concept of Time Heidegger explicitly links up the 
connection between conscience and the past: “The past remains closed off from any 
present so long as such a present, Dasein, is not historical. Dasein, however, is in itself 
historical in so far as it is its possibility. In being futural Dasein is its past; it comes back 
to it in the ‘how.’ The manner of its coming back is, among other things, conscience.”75 
Conscience discloses to Dasein those possibilities for being a self that it inherits from 
tradition. Such responsibility is the explicit appropriation of a possibility for existing 
derived from a shared culture and a common tradition. Rather than conceive of the past in 
terms of empirical facts that can be known, Heidegger instead suggests that the meaning 
of the past is revealed in the appropriation of one’s past as a possibility for the future. 
“Conscience” becomes a key-word for the transformation of one element of one’s 
heritage into a possibility for the future. It amounts to revitalizing the past in 
understanding itself from its own future. Remembering, as a form of bearing witness, is a 
way to restore the past from a common understanding of it as a set of facts that are no 
longer present and from forgetfulness. 
 In so doing, Heidegger maintains the distinction between “history” and 
“historicity,” or “history” and “memory,” to the point of radically separating the two. 
Historicity names the way that Dasein lives its history. Because of Dasein’s historical 
condition, there is “stretching behind it an absolute past that it will never be able to 
appropriate completely, and for which, even so, it is ‘originally’ guilty.”76  Because the 
past has already happened by the time Dasein arrives, it cannot be fully incorporated into 
its understanding. As such, a quasi-scientific investigation into the past will miss how it is 
                                                
75 Heidegger, The Concept of Time. Trans. William McNeill (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 1992): p. 19. 
76 Françoise Dastur. Death: An Essay on Finitude. Trans. John Llewelyn. (London: Athlone, 1996): p. 71. 
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irrevocable. History, on the other hand, refers to the objectification of past objects in 
representations, thereby reifying the past and thus “forgetting” the history that Dasein 
essentially is. Where histories are written according to a chronological or linear structure, 
historicity refers the possibility of retrieving and repeating one’s own historical being 
(Cf. BT/SZ §74). At each moment Dasein is called to be responsible for itself and its 
history; it thus maintains a recommitment to itself and to its past through the very way 
that it bears witnessing” to it. This moment of bearing witness calls received concepts 
and categories into question insofar as its relationship to the past essentially wonders 
whether or not we have lived up to the task of remembering who we truly are at all. To 
bear witness is to reveal the questionability of oneself, which includes the temptation to 
understand the past over and done with, while also opening up new specific possibilities 
for understanding who we are. Witnessing and testifying thus reveal that some 
possibilities have been played out, and are no longer a source for self-understanding, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, witnessing indicates a way to understand ourselves anew. 
 While Heidegger abandons the language of conscience, debt, and authenticity in 
the years immediately following the publication of Being and Time, he nevertheless 
maintains a rigid distinction between history, as an objective science of what happened, 
and the experience of history as it is lived. Concomitant with this continued development 
is his interest in giving an account of the “history of Being.” Such a history designates the 
withdrawal and concealment of Being in the Western metaphysical tradition. This 
“history” involves the tension between the historical sciences, which empirically describe 
and narrate the history of thought, and historicity itself, which resists chronological 
narration. The contemporary age is characterized by a lack of a sense of its own 
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historicity; it instead sees the past as something that can be discerned and, in practice, is 
fully understandable. As such, the present age is separated from its past. 
Heidegger’s account of the history of Being is an attempt to thus revitalize a sense 
of the past that we have dangerously ignored. In order to do so, he appeals to Greek 
tragedy, specifically Sophocles’ Antigone. While his remarks on tragedy are scattered, 
Heidegger places particular emphasis on Sophoclean tragedy as highlighting the 
ontological meaning of tragedy itself. On one hand, Sophoclean tragedy marks a time of 
transition, specifically the one between the pre-metaphysical thinking of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus and the inauguration of metaphysics with Plato and Aristotle.77 On the other 
hand, the ontological meaning of such tragedy becomes the privileged mode of disclosing 
the entire history of Being, which is only disclosed through its withdrawal.78 Tragedy, in 
other words, discloses the origins of thinking, or the meaning of the past, only once its 
development has reached its completion and has exhausted its possibilities for enlivening 
the present. Tragedy thus “bears witness” to the moment where the transmission of 
possibilities occurs, and it attests to the way that these possibilities play themselves out as 
something to which we must submit or undergo.79 
While tragedy appears to underlie much of Heidegger’s work in the 1930s and 
1940s, he only explicitly engages Sophocles’ Antigone  twice: once in his 1935 work 
Introduction to Metaphysics and again in 1941, in a lecture on Hölderlin’s poem “The 
                                                
77 Cf. Basic Questions of Philosophy. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Shuwer. (Bloomington: 
Indianapolis University Press, 1994): p. 186. 
78 Cf. Heidegger. Mindfulness. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum Press, 2006): 
p. 197-198. 
79 Robert Gall recognizes this aspect of tragedy when he writes, “the characters of tragedy undergo what 
has already happened. … The past rises up as a given in tragedy, but a given that has unforeseen 
consequences, that plays itself out in unexpected ways to which the characters must submit.” Cf. Robert 
Gall. “Interrupting Speculation: The Thinking of Heidegger and Greek Tragedy,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 36 (2003), pp. 177-194, p. 179. 
 49 
Ister.” In the former, Heidegger emphasizes the way that tragedy bears witness to the gap 
between the present and the past.80 In so doing, their respective meanings come to be in 
the first place. It expresses the violent forces of history, by showing the way that humans 
are submitted to powers beyond their control and thus become shattered. Such shattering 
exposes both the power of history and reveals the meaning of being human. In the lecture 
on Hölderlin, by contrast, Heidegger reveals the place where the conflict between human 
beings and Being itself takes place.81 Such a place is essentially historical, as Heidegger 
now explicitly calls the process of retrieving those possibilities from the past, 
“remembrance” (Andenken). Remembrance means to be attentive to that which is 
incomparably distant and foreign, and thus to recognize how we are connected to and 
submitted to a world that is not of our own making. 
Heidegger’s turn to Sophocles’ tragic poetry can help reveal the meaning of 
remembering. Heidegger’s inquiries into the essence of tragic poetry reveal a dynamic 
tension issuing from Being itself: on one hand, the desire to master and control the ways 
that we remember the past, and, on the other hand, the countermovement of Being that 
conceals its temporal and finite character. Where tragedy highlights the blindness that 
results from taking too narrow a perspective on oneself, Heidegger finds a similar 
blindness arising from our attempts to make our way in the world. Heidegger suggests 
that by directly confronting the possibility of forgetting the question of Being, we will be 
led to a critical retrieval of the unthought ground of philosophical thinking. As such, 
                                                
80 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000): pp. 151-176. 
81 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister. Trans. Julia Davis and William McNeill. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996): pp. 51-114. 
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rather than try to overcome the possibility of forgetfulness, we must instead directly 
confront forgetting as a distinct possibility of our time. 
 Heidegger’s difficult and idiosyncratic language often forces the reader to 
experience the limits of forgetting and remembering the question of Being. Rather than 
attempt to overcome forgetfulness in an act of remembering, which might be envisaged 
as a temple or monument of remembering, his suggestion is preparatory. We must make 
our way by reflecting on those old, venerable words whose saying directs us to the co-
belonging of remembering and forgetting. It is, for Heidegger, commemorative thinking 
(Andenken) that reveals how the confrontation and opening the question of the possibility 
of remembering and forgetting such a question can only arise through a confrontation 
with that which has been handed down to us through tradition and history.  
 How is this commemorative thinking supposed to take place, and how might it 
help us understand the intertwining of remembering and forgetting? If the attempts to 
overcome the possibility of forgetting further compound our forgetting, how might we 
understand what we are to remember? Similarly, are there some things that we are better 
off forgetting? Heidegger here leaves this question open, and in order to attempt to give 
an answer to it, I again find an ally in Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur’s work develops a 
conception of poetics that is a creative response to the calls of tradition. As such, 
Ricoeur’s conception of poetics is intimately tied to action and interpretation. This will be 




I.3.2. Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of the Summoned Subject 
 The concept of “poetics” runs throughout Ricoeur’s work. His early work, 
Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, develops a “poetics of the 
will.” He envisages this poetics as an antidote to the tendency of modern philosophy to 
posit the self as the foundation of all being. Against this tendency and in a rather 
Heideggerian move, Ricoeur focuses on the “gift of being, which heals the rents of 
freedom.”82 Though he later abandons the project of developing the poetics of the will, he 
nevertheless maintains that a commitment to a poetics runs throughout his major works: 
The Symbolism of Evil, The Rule of Metaphor, Time and Narrative do 
aspire to in several ways to the title of poetics, less in the sense of a 
meditation on primordial creation than in that investigation of the multiple 
modalities of what I will later call an ordered creation…[which] still 
belongs to a philosophical anthropology.83 
 
For Ricoeur, a poetics of an “ordered creation” focuses on a capacity of the self to 
innovate new meanings through speaking, acting, and interpreting. Ricoeur calls the 
self’s capacity to innovate, “a synthesis of the heterogeneous.”84 In this a synthesis, two 
similar fields of meaning are not combined, but rather the reader draws out a similarity 
between two dissimilar semantic fields. As Richard Kearney writes, Ricoeur’s 
understanding of hermeneutics replaces “the visual mode of the image with the verbal,” 
and in doing so Ricoeur “affirms the more poetical role of imagining—that is, its ability 
to say one thing in terms of another, or to say several things at the same time, thereby 
                                                
82 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature. Trans. Erazim Kohak. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966),  
p. 30 
83 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography.” The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur Ed. E. Hahn (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1995), p. 14. 
84 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. ix. 
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creating something new.”85 As such, Ricoeur departs from the Husserlian legacy of 
phenomenology, which emphasizes visual and eidetic modes of thought with a “semantic 
innovation” that juxtaposes two different worlds, a real and imaginary one, to produce 
new meaning. In doing so, Ricoeur’s theory of poetics opens up new possibilities of 
meaning by going beyond the reference to the immediate world of perception. The result 
of this operation is the disclosure of new ways to be, interpret, and act in the world. We 
can transform the world through action on the basis of such imaginative projections of 
new ways to be in the world.  
 Against Heidegger’s direct route to a conception of Being, one which 
immediately connects the understanding of Dasein to an understanding of Being, 
Ricoeur’s conception of hermeneutics focuses on those winding, indirect paths through 
which we decipher meanings. In doing so, Ricoeur emphasizes and examines the 
innovative power of symbols, metaphors, and narratives. The verbal metaphor in poetry, 
for example, combines two different fields of meaning: on one hand, the poet takes what 
is impertinent at a literal level and transforms it into something pertinent at a new, poetic 
level. Ricoeur further applies this notion of semantic innovation to the construction of 
narrative identity. The plot, goals, and causes are brought together in the temporal unity 
of the narrative work. The result of this particular reconfiguration of the meaning of 
actions also reconfigures the reader’s understanding of his or her world.86 This means that 
by reading a narrative, we are able to reconfigure and re-create not only how we 
understand our possibilities in the world but also how we understand ourselves. 
                                                
85 Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: Owl of Minerva. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2004), p. 38. 
86 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation.” Trans. John B. Thompson. From Text to 
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 The narrative view of identity means that we understand ourselves according to a 
narrative model. A narrative account of oneself does not merely include the first-person 
perspective; it also is deeply informed by a dialectical process that includes our bodies, 
our emotions, social relations, and histories. Each of these elements contributes to our 
narrative self-understanding. In order to answer the questions “what happened?”, “who 
acted?”, “why did they act?”, and “under what circumstances did the action take place?” 
we need to appeal to the resources that narrative provides. Thus, when we want to give an 
account of ourselves, we construct our identity as if it were a narrative. We receive this 
identity, in part, from external forces, such as tradition, but nevertheless are in the 
position to creatively interpret and critically appropriate the very tradition that we have 
been given. Indeed, Ricoeur notes that “narrative identity is not a stable and seamless 
identity.”87 “It is,” he continues, “always possible to weave different, even opposed, plots 
about our lives.”88 Narrative identity is in the position of always making and remaking 
itself through the challenges of others and the reflexive self-understanding of the self and 
the world. 
 John Wall suggests two important results of Ricoeur’s conception of narrative 
identity.89 Narrative identity is poetic, firstly, because it arises out of a tragic conflict.90 
The self inevitably comes into conflict with those narrative forces that threaten to 
overwhelm it. For example, Antigone’s identity is threatened insofar as her action runs 
counter to the political power of the State. Wall writes, “this threat, in its broadest sense, 
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88 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 248. 
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is the discordance of the self’s own existing, particular meaning to itself with the larger 
social history on which this meaning nevertheless depends, a potential rupturing of 
meaning through one’s narrative incommensurability with others.”91 Antigone reveals the 
tension between selfhood and otherness as it is taken to its breaking point. 
 The second feature of narrative identity is the creative response that is engendered 
through the impetus to act. The self always stands in relationship to its community, and 
as a result must mediate the ways that meaning must be rendered more inclusive. 
Antigone, again, shows that tragedy arises through the inability of the protagonists to go 
beyond their respective narrow visions. As such, the moral that tragedy can show us is 
that we must respond to our situation in the recognition of otherness that challenges us. 
The challenge that the other poses to us, then, is to re-create and reconfigure the tacit and 
heretofore unremarked upon ways that we understand our selves through our narrative 
practices. It is, in other words, an effort to take both one’s own narrative identity and the 
otherness that challenges us into account. 
There is another sense of testimony that has not yet been addressed. W. James 
Booth suggests that “the impulse to bear witness is intimately related to…a silence that 
fuels the witness’s sense of the need to bring that past before his contemporaries.”92 This 
silence is not an absolute or total silence; if it were, it would risk not meaning anything at 
all. Silence is not a mere void, the complete disappearance of the past, or the erasure of 
all traces of the past. Rather, silences are “absences that shape our world by pointing to 
its incompleteness, to the co-presence in it of the seen and unseen.”93 Such absences and 
silences arise from voluntarily and involuntarily forgetting as well as the effacement, 
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92 Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 74. 
93 Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 75. 
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erosion, or destruction of traces. These absences are a kind of a “hollow” or “indentation” 
of the past.94 They are neither fully present nor absent, occupying a liminal space 
between the two shaping experience. Such “hollows” are silences that mutely speak by 
enjoining us to remember what happened. 
In order to understand the way that such “hollows” and “silences” are created by 
language, I will be focusing, in chapters three and four respectively, on the way that 
Heidegger’s conception of tragedy and Ricoeur’s elaboration of the role that narrative 
plays in our lives help to give an always tenuous and fragile voice to such silences. While 
Heidegger tends to suggest that the gaps and fissures of poetry cannot be rendered present 
through strategies of textual interpretation,95 Ricoeur argues that, in principle, we must be 
able to narrate such silences and lacunae. Silences in bearing witness, I will be 
suggesting, can motivate recounting what happened, even if it cannot be completely 
narrated. As such, in what follows, I will focus on the ways that the past can challenge 
our self-understanding and how it functions at the same time to constitute some of the 
ways that we understand ourselves.  
The constant reconfiguration that arises through the mediation between listening 
and speaking is poetic, I argue, and can perhaps best be revealed through the challenges 
that poetry gives to us to respond to a hidden meaning of the past. The witnessing self 
finds herself in a strange position of having to testify for the past. She cannot avoid the 
burden to bear witness, for the events demand to be recounted, nor can this task be 
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delegated to another person or representative. The responsibility to bear witness, in other 
words, cannot be transferred to another person. The witness herself experiences the 
necessity to testify as a radically unique, non-substitutable, and non-interchangeable 
burden.  It is for this reason Paul Celan writes that “no one bears witness for the 
witness.”96 The appointment to bear witness is one that individuates the person such that 
it is only that particular person who can adequately bear witness. Celan described his 
poetic endeavors as “the efforts of someone, who overarced by starts that are human 
handiwork, and who, shelterless in this till now undreamt-of sense and thus most 
uncannily in the open, goes with his very being to language, stricken by and seeking 
reality.”97 To seek out reality, as his poetry attests, is to explore those traumatic events 
that gave the impetus to speak. To seek this reality, however, is not done in order to relive 
it. It is an attempt to emerge from the paralysis of being stricken, and to engage in the 
work of remembering in order to move past it. He thus writes that language “had to pass 
through its own answerlessness, pass through frightful muting, pass through the thousand 
darknesses of deathbringing speech. It passed through and gave back no words for that 
which happened; it passed through this happening. Passed through and could come to 
light again, ‘enriched’ by all this.”98 It is by remembering the wound and trauma that the 
event, in its incomprehensibility and terror, becomes manifest and available to us. To 
give oneself over to the power of language, and to the power of remembering, is one way 
to make one’s shelterlessness and unhomeliness a way to understand what transpired. As 
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such, the testimony proffered through poetic memory gives reality and meaning to the 
vulnerability and powerlessness that calls to be remembered. 
 
I.4. Conclusion 
Bearing witness and testimony are keys to understanding the meaning of 
remembering and the possibility of doing justice to the past and those who were affected 
by it.99 Elie Wiesel has suggested that testimony is the defining mode of discourse of the 
present age: “If the Greeks invented tragedy, the Romans the epistle and the Renaissance 
the sonnet, our generation invented a new literature, that of testimony.”100 Indeed, many 
works of literature, poetry, and art call attention to testimony as its subject and the 
witness as the medium of transmission. Wiesel’s Night trilogy, Paul Celan’s 
“Todesfuge,” Marcel Ophüls’ The Sorrow and the Pity, to name only a few, attempt to 
come to terms with the horrors of World War II and the Shoah by bearing witness to its 
unspeakable horrors. The act of testifying, of bearing witness, is a defiant gesture made 
against the flow of time, which erases the traces of the past, and gives a tenuous voice to 
the muteness of the dead. Furthermore, public monuments and memorials, such as the 
museum and memorial at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Cenotaph in London, the Genbaku Dome 
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in Hiroshima, the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., and Ground Zero in 
Manhattan, starkly remind the community of specific places, events, and people who call 
out to be remembered. Testimony, as evidenced through the proliferation of these sites 
and the continued discussions of their meaning, has become one of the primary ways that 
we relate to the events that help us understand both our contemporary times and our 
history. 
 Understanding and interpreting oneself happens through the dialectical experience 
of belonging to a tradition and the experience of distance, alienation, and foreignness 
from that tradition. The past is at once very familiar to us and strangely foreign to us; it is 
both our own past and a past that nevertheless happened to someone else. Since memory 
is always of the past, the deposit of memories in our habits, in our bodies, in specific 
places each of us holds dear, and in the continuation of institutions provides the necessary 
stability for self-understanding insofar as they help to perpetuate particular social 
practices and preserve communal relationships. The significance of this form of memory 
saturates communal existence, often underlying explicit knowledge of it because it does 
its work tacitly, without explicit awareness. At the same time, such practices and habits 
never completely overcome the sense of distance and absence of the past. In order to 
remember something, as noted above, it must have come to an end. The sense of the past 
as having passed on can lead to melancholy, mourning, regret, remorse, or nostalgia. In 
each of these experiences, the painful recognition that the past cannot be changed is 
central. 
 Historical understanding and interpretation aim at overcoming the distance 
between the past and the present to which the interpreter belongs, and incorporate this 
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distance into one’s own identity, while at the same time recognizing and preserving its 
foreignness. To the extent that memory forms a core part of identity, it contributes to the 
establishment of habits, institutions, and places that help to characterize the ethos of a 
community. Memory, furthermore, is intimately connected to a demand that certain 
images, events, and traces be preserved as a kind of bearing witness to the past, and 
transmitted as debt owed to the past. To fail to bear witness to the past would be to fail to 
be a member of the community, insofar as such a failure damages and betrays the identity 
of the collective to which one belongs. 
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Chapter II: Authenticity, Historicity, and Community 
"The past, from which the soul thought it had ransomed itself, stood there again with its 
demand, not as a recollection, but more terrifying than ever by having conspired with the 
future."101 
--S. Kierkegaard 
II.1 Introduction and Thesis 
The next two chapters will be an examination of the meaning of historicity and 
the ways it gives rise to the possibility of communal identity first through the lens of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics and then through his appropriation of 
Sophoclean tragic poetry during the 1930s. Specifically, I will show how the meaning of 
community and solidarity with others is achieved through the experience of one’s own 
finitude, which is to say, one’s own death. While it might seem that the experience of 
death isolates by individuating Dasein, I suggest that death instead opens Dasein to others 
by exposing it to the history that Dasein already is.  
In this chapter, I develop the connection among a constellation of concepts —
which include guilt, conscience, resoluteness, and repetition—that appear in Being and 
Time. These concepts designate the peculiar and finite way that human beings bear 
witness to the transmission of meaning, which is to say the way that we are our history. I 
argue that Heidegger’s ontological conception of remembering essentially individuates 
each Dasein by confronting it with the finitude of its own particular historical situation. 
In other words, remembering occurs a call or summons to bear witness to the genesis of 
the meaning of one’s own historical situation and to transmit such meaning for the future. 
Remembering, in short, is not primarily directed toward recovering the past “as it was,” 
but instead it exposes each person to his or her ownmost future. 
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In developing my argument, I hope to make Heidegger an active participant in 
contemporary discussions about the meaning and possibility of collective memory. The 
study of collective memory has become an increasingly important way to show how 
representations of the past, including texts, monuments, memorials, and norms, can help 
to organize, structure, and perpetuate a shared identity for future generations. 
Participation in such representations and rituals is essential for endowing the individual 
with a sense of identity within a community because it is an active and dynamic process 
of meaning-making through time. It is only because an individual is situated within a 
community that he or she can remember the past, even in apparently individual and 
utterly private situations. Insofar as memory is crucial to personal identity, such an 
identity arises out of a network of social and shared objects, institutions, events, and 
meanings. To be an individual is to be situated within an historical community.  
I hope to use discussions of collective memory to shed light on Heidegger’s 
formal account of historical human existence, both in its authentic and inauthentic forms, 
offered in Being and Time. Similarly, in appealing to Heidegger’s account of historicity, I 
hope to show that memory is not merely a matter of a finished and completed past. In 
other words, memory is not merely a matter of keeping in mind certain events and 
historical figures. Rather, memory helps to structure the self-understanding of an 
individual and community by exposing the past as a challenge to transform and revitalize 
the possibilities of our own future. This understanding of memory is a matter of the way 
one takes a stand on the meaning of the past. To show this, I interpret the contemporary 
distinction between memory and history, where memory refers to those cultural 
institutions, rituals, and practices that preserve a community’s identity and where history 
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refers to the work carried about by historians and their practices of historiography, in 
terms of Heidegger’s distinction between history as the experience of the origins of 
historical meaning (Geschichte)  and History (Historie), which Heidegger suggests 
objectifies and ultimately forgets the history (Geschichte) that Dasein is. 
The distinction between history (Geschichte) and History (Historie) provides a 
link between Heidegger’s phenomenological years and his turn to poetic language that 
would reveal the truth of Being. He opposed the academic and scientific understanding of 
history to the lived experience of history. Heidegger’s philosophical contribution to our 
understanding of the significance of history diverges from those speculative theories of 
history that Marx or Hegel offer. Furthermore, he is not interested in offering an account 
of the study of history, which would provide the epistemic criteria and methodology for 
the selection of documents, procedures in accurately dating events, and determining the 
particular causes or intentions of agents’ actions. His interest instead is to show the way 
that history existentially individuates each Dasein. At issue in such a problem is the sense 
or meaning history has for human existence. By emphasizing the way that the past claims 
or summons us, Heidegger transforms the meaning of heritage and tradition in two ways. 
First, he shows that the past is not only a repository for dateable facts, events, or 
personages, and that meaning of history is not confined to an attempt to reproduce or 
represent the interests held by agents and their peers. Second, he shifts the emphasis of 
heritage from a passive reception of traditions, legacies, rites, and rituals from previous 
generations to a freely chosen appropriation of such a past on the part of Dasein itself. 
Historical Dasein discloses and enacts history, allows one to encounter a world. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first introduces the problem of 
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remembering and forgetting in the analytic of Dasein by articulating the main aims of 
Being and Time. The second and third sections examine the inauthentic and authentic 
ways that Dasein remembers the past. The fourth section argues that because Heidegger’s 
account of authenticity remains focused on the first-person experience of the past, it is 
unable to give an account of the ways that we are responsible for the way that we exist 
from others. 
  
II.2. Forgetting the Question of Being 
Before presenting how Dasein’s particular hermeneutic situation helps to 
constitute the way it experiences its past, it will first be necessary to outline briefly the 
central aims and structure of Being and Time. What first strikes the attentive reader is, as 
the opening pages of Being and Time make clear, that Heidegger is less concerned with 
the way we remember the past than he is with confronting the persistent threat of 
forgetting the fundamental question of philosophy. Forgetting this decisive question is 
different from the forgetfulness that arises as a result of the distinction between the 
present and the past. Rather, Heidegger is concerned with a kind of philosophical, even 
ontological, forgetfulness—we forget that which underlies our judgments, comportments, 
and existence but is nevertheless necessary for us to be able to be at all. The question of 
Being has thus been forgotten, and it is only on the basis of such forgetfulness that the 
question of Being can be explicitly retrieved and posed again (BT 21/SZ 2). By framing 
the question of Being in this manner, Heidegger claims that that remembering is 
meaningful only insofar as it attempts to recover something from forgetfulness. In order 
to see how he argues this, it will first be necessary to detail the significance of basic 
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problem Heidegger identifies in Being and Time, as well as sketch out the proper mode of 
access that will allow a retrieval of the question of Being. 
 
II.2.1. Heidegger’s Aims and Method 
Throughout the 1920s, Heidegger employs hermeneutics as his preferred 
methodology to articulate the basic sense and meaning of pre-theoretical life. What 
interests him is the way that life is meaningful prior to the application of theories and 
concepts. The meaning of human existence is not dependent on objective or abstract 
concepts, but is instead given to humans in the immediacy of existing. Theodore Kisiel 
concisely summarizes Heidegger’s lifelong topic, “the true locus of our experience is not 
in objects or things which ‘in addition are then interpreted as signifying this or that,’ but 
rather the signifying element itself now dynamized and set in motion, the ‘It’ that 
‘worlds.’”102 This dynamic signifying movement allows one to make sense of oneself, of 
others, and of one’s surroundings, environment, and historical situation in the first 
place.103 In order to see how he approaches the basic question of Being and Time, it will 
first be helpful to trace in a brief sketch some of the ways that Heidegger articulated this 
problem in the years leading up to Being and Time’s publication. Additionally, because 
Heidegger sometimes treats some central issues in Being and Time rather hastily, notably 
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the connection between conscience and historicity, referring back to these earlier texts 
will help us understand their significance more clearly. 
By most accounts, Heidegger found his philosophical voice and broke through to 
the topic that would be his life-long concern in War Emergency Seminar of 1919. In the 
closing hours of the semester, he introduces hermeneutics by saying 
The gripping experiencing of lived experience that takes itself along is the 
understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition, the originary 
phenomenological back-and-forth formation of concepts from which all 
theoretical objectification, indeed, every transcendental positing, falls 
out.104   
 
The “hermeneutical intuition” refers to the method through which he will explicate the 
pre-theoretical, immediate sense of life. Such a method is not to be carried out from an 
abstract, or third-person, perspective. It is instead to be a kind of lived experience, one 
which is already caught within a web of meaning. He applies this starting point in his 
1920-1921 courses on religious life, which often begin with a description of the ways that 
life is already religious. Doing so involves making the implicit sense and meaning of 
religious practices, rituals, and beliefs explicit. By beginning with the rich 
meaningfulness of life, prior to theoretical reflection, Heidegger intends to capture the 
sense of life without reducing it to an objective content. 
 Later, in the 1923 course, Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger 
provides the following formal definition of hermeneutics: “a definite unity in the 
actualizing…of the interpreting of facticity in which facticity is being encountered, seen, 
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grasped, and expressed in concepts.”105 The schematic definition suggests that the phrase 
“hermeneutics of facticity” should be understood in two senses. On one hand, it 
designates a particular method and subject matter; it is the interpretation of factic life. On 
the other hand, it suggests that factic life is itself interpretive. Hermeneutics brings factic 
life into clarity and factic life itself is hermeneutic and essentially interpretive. The 
hermeneutics of facticity is the formal articulation of life experience by life experience 
itself. On the basis of this definition, Heidegger goes on to claim that 
Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our 
own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its 
being, communicating Dasein to itself in this regard, hunting down the 
alienation from itself with which it is smitten. In hermeneutics what is 
developed for Dasein is a possibility of becoming and being for itself in 
the manner of an understanding of itself.106 
 
Not only is Dasein’s factic life to be understood as an activity of interpretation, but 
hermeneutics itself can bring Dasein’s very interpretive tendency to fruition. 
Hermeneutics is successful only to the extent that it makes possible an explicit form of 
self-understanding.  
Importantly, a hermeneutic methodology is not an algorithm for calculating or 
deriving truths. It instead belongs to a “hermeneutics of facticity,” which attempts to 
uncover the pre-conceptual meaningfulness of human life, which is often forgotten or 
unremarked upon in everyday experience and life. Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach to 
facticity begins with the position that the sense of life is not initially explicit, and that in 
the immediacy of living we are not concerned explicitly with its sense. Such a 
methodology can be carried out only on the basis of a kind of first-person perspective, 
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and one which stays close to lived experience and brings it to a kind of fulfillment. 
Similarly, the plan of Being and Time first delimits the ways that Dasein already exists as 
forgetful of its own Being, and then show, on the basis of such forgetting, that it is 
possible to retrieve its ownmost Being from the threat of falling into total oblivion. 
On the basis of these early lectures, Being and Time builds on the model of a 
hermeneutic argument, in which the meaning and force of a lost question is to be 
retrieved by carefully working out the tendency of the present situation.107 Heidegger’s 
objective, put succinctly, is to work out “the question of the meaning of Being and to do 
so concretely by showing that time is the horizon for any understanding of Being 
whatsoever” (BT 19/SZ 1). Whereas ontology has traditionally been conceived as an 
inquiry into what is, Heidegger argues that such an approach forgets the difference 
between Being and beings, or the “ontological difference.”108 In doing so, the 
philosophical tradition has interpreted beings from the point of view of their 
substantiality and persistence, which is, Heidegger points out, only one modality of 
temporality: the present. Heidegger’s task, therefore, is to show how the unity of 
temporality—the past, present, and future—makes possible the question of Being at all. 
As such, Heidegger’s work may be best understood as a project of reawakening the 
forgotten ways that time itself structures both human existence and the understanding of 
Being.  
But, why should we think that the question of Being needs to be raised again? Is 
not this question too abstract and obscure? Heidegger recognizes that the current fashion 
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in philosophical circles is to ignore such a question, and offers several reasons why we 
might think that the question regarding the meaning of Being need not be reopened: 1) 
Being is the most universal and empty of all concepts; 2) Being is ultimately indefinable 
because it cannot be derived from higher concepts or presented through lower concepts; 
and 3) the meaning of Being is obvious since everyone understands it immediately, as in 
such phrases as “The sky is blue,” or “I am happy” (BT 22-23/SZ 3-4). Heidegger does 
not recount these prejudices in order to refute them, but rather to better understand their 
origin and remind the reader why the question of Being may seem superfluous. 
Importantly, the third reason—that we implicitly understand the meaning of 
Being—motivates the necessity for posing the question of Being again. This is the 
hermeneutic situation of the present age. Heidegger writes, “the fact that we already live 
in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness 
proves that it is necessary in principle to raise the question again” (BT 23/SZ 4). If we 
were content to let such a question remain shrouded, we could not assess the conditions 
of possibility for other regional or ontic inquiries, such as politics, ethics, anthropology, 
and the natural sciences. If phenomenology is to uncover how meaning is possible in 
concrete contexts, then it must also be able to disclose how such uncovering is possible. 
If, however, it cannot reveal how such disclosure is possible it cannot reveal the 
possibility of meaning as given in concrete contexts. Thus, at stake in ignoring or 
forgetting the question of Being is the prospect of nihilism, which is to say, meaning 
might come to naught. To reopen the question of Being should thus have significant 
consequences not only for the ways that we understand the most basic philosophical 
question. It should help clarify the meaning of our own temporal existence and the 
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meaning of history insofar as temporality is the ground of Being.  
 
II.2.2 From Understanding to Tradition 
 In order to clarify the meaning that history has for life, it will be first useful to 
delineate Dasein’s peculiar hermeneutic situation. In its experience of the world, Dasein 
encounters things not as inert, brute objects upon which it then imposes meaning, but 
instead as things that already have significance. Part of what accounts for the significance 
that things have is that Dasein grows into inherited contexts of meaning; it experiences its 
world as have already been interpreted. Such interpretations lay out the specific 
possibilities that Dasein can then take in understanding its own being. To have a tradition 
means to identify with those practices and world into which one was thrown, thereby 
transmitting them and preserving them as true. The hermeneutic circle of understanding, 
interpretation, and transmission of possibilities thus becomes the site where Dasein’s 
tradition happens. 
 Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s world begins with an account of Dasein “as it is 
proximally and for the most part – in its average everydayness” (BT 37-38/SZ 16). In 
such average, everyday existence, Dasein need not explicitly know or reflect on its 
experiences or their meaning. It has, Heidegger notes, “grown into and in a traditional 
way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself primarily and, within a 
certain range, constantly” (BT 41/SZ 20). This feature of Dasein’s Being is significant 
because it reveals that Dasein is unique because it has a pre-ontological understanding of 
possibilities for being, given to it by its tradition. As such, the “understanding of Being is 
itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is 
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ontological’ (BT 32/SZ 12). Dasein already understands the meaning of “to be” in its 
everyday life, which becomes manifest in the way that it deals with its world. 
What, however, does it mean to say that Dasein has a pre-ontological 
understanding of Being? Heidegger describes Dasein as Being-in-the-world in order to 
capture a sense of the way that Dasein finds itself already involved in the project of 
making sense of things, itself and others. “In understanding its own Being,” Heidegger 
writes, Dasein “has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports 
itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant – in terms of the ‘world’” (BT 
36/SZ 15). It is familiar with those things that it help it “make do,” even if such 
familiarity is often silent. Dasein’s “making do” and “dealing with” things indicate that it 
is a “clearing” in and through which beings become manifest. This clearing, as Hubert 
Dreyfus explains, is another word for Dasein’s situation: “Current Dasein…is always in 
the world by way of being in a situation—dealing with something specific in a context of 
things and people, directed toward some specific end, doing what it does for the sake of 
being Dasein in some specific way.”109 In its situation, Dasein takes care of things. This 
context, however, is not merely characterized by Dasein’s immediate surroundings. Such 
a situation is, in Heidegger’s terminology, its disclosed in the way that Dasein finds itself 
which is indicated by the use of the term Befindlichkeit. It refers to the existential 
structure of Dasein’s Being that allows the world to matter to it. Things have salience – 
they are attractive, boring, tempting, repelling, and so forth. When it deals with things, 
there is typically little need to express what one is doing. Dasein finds itself immersed in 
its daily activities, actively trying to get things done. 
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To say that Dasein is characterized by a pre-ontological understanding reorients 
the meaning of human existence from a subject that possesses or is defined by certain 
properties to one that understands its existence in terms of possibilities. Understanding, 
on Heidegger’s account, is intimately connected to Dasein’s ability-to-be. To understand 
oneself in terms of possibilities means to understand oneself in terms succeeding or 
failing to live up to the meaning of such possibilities. For example, I can understand 
myself as a student by fulfilling some institutional criteria, such as enrolling in a college 
and courses; however, the existential understanding of such possibilities entails that I can 
only be a student by continually living up to what it means to be a student or failing to do 
so. By situating understanding in such terms, Heidegger suggests that understanding is 
primarily a “know how” or facility with things and not a theoretical or scientific “know 
that.” Thus, in being a student, I understand my current situation in terms of knowing 
how to participate in academic life, which would include knowing how to study, write, 
and so forth. This means that Dasein is essentially defined by the future. “As projecting,” 
Heidegger writes, “understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its 
possibilities as possibilities” (BT 185/SZ 145). Understanding is the mode of Dasein’s 
Being wherein possibilities of being involved in the world, with others, are realized as 
possibilities for it to take up. 
 By understanding, Heidegger therefore does not refer to a specific kind of 
cognition, one akin to explaining or conceptualizing, or an explicit grasping of something 
(BT 385/SZ 336). Rather, taking a cue from the everyday sense of understanding, which 
means something like “being able to manage” or “being a match for” something, 
Heidegger suggests that the existential meaning of understanding does not refer to those 
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things over which we have competence, but rather the competence we have at existing as 
the kind of being that we are (BT 183/SZ 143). Understanding is an ability by means of 
which Dasein knows how to do something. In understanding, we do not necessarily have 
explicit perception of the things around us, but rather they are available for us to use. It is 
because Dasein has practical know-how that it can encounter things in terms of their 
possibilities – that is, things can be useful, a hindrance, or indifferent to Dasein’s 
projects. As such, understanding does not consist in one’s explicitly being aware of 
carrying out something. It is instead the non-explicit teleologically structured way that 
Dasein manages to go about it activities for the sake of itself. 
 Interpretation, by contrast, emerges from the unthematized situation that Dasein 
implicitly and non-thematically understands. Heidegger writes, 
To say that  “circumspection discovers” means that the “world” which has 
already been understood comes to be interpreted….All preparing, putting 
to rights, repairing, improving, rounding out, are accomplished in the 
following way: we take apart (auseinanderglegt) in its ‘in-order-to’ that 
which is circumspectively ready-to-hand, and we concern ourselves with it 
in accordance with what becomes visible through this process. That which 
has been circumspectively taken apart…has the structure of something as 
something. (BT 189/SZ 149) 
 
Interpretation is the act of making the meaning of what one is doing explicit and helps 
reveal the way that something appears as something. Interpretation thus works out 
possibilities that have already been projected in understanding, and makes explicit what 
was previously implicit. The process of making the pre-understanding explicit, however, 
does not leave the way that we are engaged with the world unchanged. Rather, in the 
process of explicitly laying out possibilities, Dasein can discover new possibilities for 
understanding and interaction. 
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Further possibilities arise when Dasein makes explicit those possibilities that were 
implicitly understood. Heidegger observes that the spectrum of interpretation runs from 
“the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in a concernful understanding 
and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand” 
(BT 201/SZ 158). Thus, we interpret a hammer, for example, when we use it in hanging a 
picture on the wall, and when we discard it without further ado as being unusable or 
unsuitable. We also offer an interpretation of the hammer when we explicitly enumerate 
those properties that make it a good hammer, such as its weight and the materials that 
give it is hardness. The explicit statement can disclose the ready-to-hand tool in such a 
way that it reveals the primordial way that it is given, that is, in Dasein’s getting to work 
at something, is concealed. Assertion conceals the original way that meaning is formed, 
which is to say, through concerned involvement with the world. 
Interpretation need not be construed as essentially linguistic; interpretation does 
not require explicitly expressing something in propositions. Rather, meaning found in 
interpretation Heidegger notes, precedes its explicit articulation. “To significations,” 
Heidegger writes, “words accrue” (BT 204/SZ 161). This suggests that there is a level of 
meaning formation that occurs at a level prior to interpretation. This level, he argues, is 
“discourse.” Discourse is, Hans Ruin writes, “a pre-linguistic discursiveness…within 
which the ‘interpretive’ movement operates, or out of which it arises.”110 This pre-
linguistic discursivity means that, Heidegger explains, “in language, as a way things have 
been expressed or spoken out, there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein 
has been interpreted” (BT 211/SZ 167). Because of such discursivity underlies Dasein’s 
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interpretation of the world, there always will be new ways to interpret and understand the 
world.  
Discourse, furthermore, is the articulation of intelligibility (BT 203/SZ 161), and 
as such must be intersubjective. This is because discourse helps constitute Dasein’s way 
to be with others, specifically through communication of shared dispositions and 
understandings. “In discourse,” Heidegger posits, Dasein’s “being-with is ‘explicitly’ 
shared and so does the understanding of Being-with…Dasein-with is already essentially 
manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding” (BT 205/SZ 162). The totality of 
significations that have been brought to language or otherwise expressed helps to 
preserve and harbor “an understanding of the disclosed world and therewith, 
equiprimordially, an understanding of the Dasein-with of Others and of one’s own Being-
in” (BT 211/SZ 168). For objects, others, and the world to be significant, they must be 
part of a shared world, whose intelligibility has already been expressed. 
Heidegger concludes that “the understanding which has thus already been 
‘deposited’ in the way things have been expressed, pertains just as much to any 
traditional discoveredness of entities which may have been reached as it does to one’s 
current understanding of Being and to whatever possibilities and horizons for fresh 
interpretation and conceptual Articulation may be available” (BT 211/SZ 168). Once an 
interpretation gets expressed in language, it becomes the shared property of a community 
of speakers. As we become competent in speaking, we become acculturated to a form of 
life. Possibilities are handed down, shared, and safeguarded. In this manner, we come to 
inhabit, though in a largely tacit way, a definite heritage and tradition. 
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 On this account, understanding, interpretation, and the expression of possibilities 
in language help to constitute the way that tradition becomes transmitted to future 
generations. In Dasein’s everyday understanding, the possibilities it “has” are so familiar 
to it so as to be unremarkable and unremarked upon. These possibilities cannot be 
separated from the situation in which Dasein finds itself. As it appropriates or lays hold 
of some possibilities and not others, it interprets itself. In so doing, it makes its 
interpretation of those possibilities explicit, and thereby makes those possibilities public. 
The next generation will find itself similarly situated, with possibilities that are more or 
less available to it, which form the background texture of their own Being-in-the-world. 
In this manner, tradition thus becomes integral to understanding who Dasein is. Tradition 
involves a realm of previously articulated possibilities, which form the familiar 
background for our self-interpretation. 
This suggests that we cannot understand who we are without understanding our 
relationship to tradition, even if such understand is tacit. We find ourselves in a world, 
attuned to it in a specific way. Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit, which William 
Richardson characterizes as one’s already-having-found-oneself-there-ness, suggests that 
the past has made us who we are.111 This suggests that a kind of memory plays an 
important role in Dasein’s understanding of itself, its world, and others. By finding 
ourselves already in a particular place, with determinate possibilities, we find ourselves 
with particular possibilities for understanding and already legitimated ways of 
interpreting our environment. Nevertheless, we are not passive vessels, determined by the 
possibilities that tradition offers. Rather, because tradition offers directions and 
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possibilities for understanding ourselves, it implicates us in its transmission. It could be 
said that in interpreting ourselves in light of tradition, we enact it. Insofar as we continue 
to interpret ourselves in light of such possibilities, we transmit them to others.  The 
interpretation of ourselves as being certain kinds of people, and as living up to or failing 
to live up to certain norms, helps to hand down these possibilities to future generations. 
As a heritage continues to develop, certain possibilities will remain “in play,” and other 
will fade from significance. Some possibilities, in other words, cease to be legitimate 
possibilities to pursue. In short, this account of the meaning of tradition is neither an 
explicit achievement of a subject, nor is it performed in isolation from others. 
 
II.2.3. Idle Talk: The Transmission and Decline of Tradition 
 If all Heidegger had to say about this topic was that the transmission of tradition 
occurs through the on-going activity of interpretation, his thesis would be unremarkable. 
The above account, however, does not exhaust Heidegger’s description of the 
significance the relationship to the past past plays in Dasein’s existence. He makes two 
further claims about the effect that tradition exerts on Dasein’s particular situation. The 
first is that tradition tends to decline and fall into a superficial level that blocks access to 
the possibility of properly appropriating the meaning it offers. The second claim is that as 
it tends to make things self-evident, tradition tends to perpetuate certain interpretations 
and possibilities at the expense of others. The result of these two tendencies levels 
meaning and closes off certain possibilities for meaning that can reveal different ways to 
understand human life. 
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 Heidegger introduces the term “falling” in order to capture the way that Dasein 
becomes absorbed in the world, caught up in its everyday affairs, but without taking 
notice of its very Being. Falling names one way, perhaps the primary way, in which 
Dasein is a self. Falling and its counterpart, inauthenticity, play a central role in 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s everyday existence. In order to understand what 
“falling” means, it may be useful to first note what it does not mean. First, Heidegger is 
clear in suggesting that falling does not refer to some sort of metaphysical deficiency or a 
failure to live up to the demands of a universal human nature. He similarly suggests that 
inauthenticity does not signify “really not authentic” “as if in this mode of Being, Dasein 
were altogether to lose its Being” (BT 220/SZ 176). Furthermore, falling should not be 
taken to suggest that Dasein has fallen from a pristine state into the mire of the world, nor 
is it a theological understanding of human existence in terms of a sinful nature. Rather, 
falling, like understanding, disposition, and discourse, is an existential feature of Dasein – 
as long as it is, it exists as falling. 
Inauthenticity designates one of the ways that Dasein can exist as falling. 
Dasein’s everyday way to be a self is one in which it abdicates responsibility for itself. 
Inauthenticity “does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts 
rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world—the kind which is completely 
fascinated (benommen) by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the ‘they’” 
(BT 220/SZ 176). Dasein’s fascination with the world is a kind of “numbing” of 
possibilities. How does the everyday experience of the world anesthetize the way that 
Dasein feels? What are the traits of inauthentic existence? 
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 Befitting a phenomenological approach to the matters themselves, Heidegger does 
not define inauthenticity in necessary and sufficient terms. Rather, he identifies a cluster 
of structural features that characterize the experience of being inauthentic. Over two 
quick pages, Heidegger characterizes inauthenticity as being tempting, tranquilizing, 
alienating, entangling, and turbulent (BT 221-223/SZ 177-178). There is, admittedly, a 
certain self-evidence regarding the meaning of inauthenticity with these terms; their 
relationship, however, remains rather unclear. First, it may help to dispel a common 
interpretation of the meaning of inauthenticity. While these terms appear to suggest 
inauthenticity and falling is morally evil, Heidegger cautions that “our own Interpretation 
is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of 
everyday Dasein” (BT 211/SZ 167). It is not that inauthenticity ought to be avoided, but 
that we should be wary of importing moralistic language in a description of human 
existence. In short, because these terms are used to describe the meaning of Dasein’s 
everyday existence rather than morally censure those people whom we might think to be 
inauthentic we should attend to their existential and ontological meanings. 
 “Being-in-the-world,” Heidegger writes, “is in itself tempting” (BT 221/SZ 177). 
By characterizing the world as “tempting,” Heidegger reiterates that his conception of the 
self is not a static unchanging identity, but is instead a movement, which is manifested in 
the ways that Dasein is oriented toward practical activities that form the core of its 
identity. Such a movement is one in which Dasein plunges itself or, rather, is pulled into 
its everyday concerns. Rather than suggest that such activities are conscious 
comportments that it willingly and knowingly takes up, its practical activities constitute 
its routine – Dasein experiences its day to day life in terms of the things that need to get 
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done and tasks that need to get accomplished. Certain tasks need attention, and other 
projects can draw us into them fully absorbing us in finishing it. Heidegger had earlier 
formulated this point thusly, “Dasein finds ‘itself’ proximally in what it does, uses, 
expects, avoids – in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is 
proximally concerned” (BT 155/SZ 119). In short, the jobs, chores, and other tasks come 
to have a weight to them, which claims Dasein’s attention to ensuring that these things 
get done. The result of this is that Dasein tends to think of itself in terms of what it does. 
 Why should we think of life as being “tempting” in the first place? To call life 
tempting suggests that it seduces or entices us to live such a life. We saw above that 
engaging oneself in one’s practical affairs appears to exhibit a tendency such that Dasein 
is drawn into them. But this is not all that Heidegger has to say about the tempting quality 
of our practical activities. Earlier in Being and Time, Heidegger further argues that what 
makes life tempting is that it levels down all possibilities for Being by controlling “every 
way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right” (BT 165/SZ 
127). It does so because “it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness 
and thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’…what has been covered up gets passed off 
as something familiar and accessible to everyone” (BT 165/SZ 127). Dasein’s everyday 
life helps to circumscribe the possibilities that it has for understanding and interpreting its 
existence. This urge to make things available and familiar as a matter of course is rooted 
in a desire to “guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, 
genuine, and full” (BT 222/SZ 177). There is no need to look into things because 
everything is in its right place, and, if not, it can be made readily available.  
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 Dasein, in other words, wants to be disburdened of its possibilities. Most 
forcefully, it wants to abdicate responsibility for its self; it does not want to be 
accountable for who it is. For this reason, it takes refuge in common appeals to the “one.” 
Because its everyday public life levels down possibilities, Dasein is disburdened from 
taking responsibility. Dasein does things because that is the way that “one” does it. 
Practices, judgments, decisions are justified because Dasein can always appeal to a 
timeless, abstract norm: things have always been done that way. However, such an appeal 
is dubious because it is supposed to be timeless precisely because such a justification 
deprives Dasein of its answerability. No one has to own up to a decision or claim a 
particular way of doing things as one’s own because it can always pass off responsibility 
to an anonymous other, the “one” or “they.” In making such appeals, Dasein is not so 
much attempting to get away with anything morally problematic; it instead justifies its 
practices with the appeal to the anonymous and abstract “one,” because such a 
justification affords it some security and some refuge. Everything appears to be as it 
should be. 
 Everyday life is tempting because it makes things easier for Dasein. Nevertheless, 
while the “tempting tranquilizing” of Dasein’s everyday possibilities is meant to find 
security amidst the vicissitudes of life, Dasein in fact “drifts along toward an alienation” 
and dispersion among its possibilities (BT 222/SZ 178). Heidegger’s initial description of 
the alienation of its everyday life focuses on Dasein’s self-absorption. It tends to get 
caught up in trying to “figure out” who it is, and in doing so constructs character types 
(Cf., BT 222/SZ 178). A contemporary analogue might be to find some solace and 
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direction for life in self-help books or writing a memoir to help one come to terms with a 
certain part of one’s life. 
However, a different kind of alienation comes to the fore when considering the 
various projects in which we are engaged. For example, in his discussion of curiosity, 
Heidegger suggests that the fore-sight that partially characterizes the possibility for 
understanding can become “idle curiosity.” The German word Heidegger uses, 
“Neugier,” suggests that circumspection can become a greed for the new. Curiosity sees 
“not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just 
in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty” 
(BT 216/SZ 172). Because of its inability to tarry and observe, Dasein is distracted. 
Curiosity constantly uproots Dasein, and moves it from one fad to the next. Such 
curiosity knows “just in order to have known” (BT 217/SZ 173).   
Heidegger reinforces this point later, at §75, in order to sharpen the difference 
between the distracted, inauthentic Dasein and the steadfast and loyal authentic Dasein. 
He writes, “everyday Dasein has been dispersed into the many kinds of things which 
daily ‘come to pass’” (BT 441/SZ 389). One’s identity is forged by “the opportunities 
and circumstances which concern keeps ‘tactically’ awaiting in advance” (BT 441/SZ 
390). Such opportunities present the next new thing that Dasein must keep up with, and 
forget what has come before. Heidegger dramatically writes, “blind for possibilities, 
[Dasein] cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the ‘actual’ that is left 
over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that 
is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the ‘today,’ it understands the ‘past’ in 
terms of the Present” (BT 443/SZ 391). What gives these claims their force is an 
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underlying supposition that historical meaning derives from Dasein’s projection of 
possibilities into the future. In other words, what belongs to the “past” is not merely facts 
that happened; rather past “is first opened up for the present by its direction into the 
future.”112 Dasein’s dispersion in its current possibilities means that it loses both an 
understanding of who it truly is and a sense of the concealed and forgotten possibilities 
contained in the cultural tradition it has inherited. Rather than retrieving those 
possibilities that the past harbors, Dasein’s thinking becomes constricted, and the 
possibilities through which it understands itself and its world are judged according to 
their usefulness. Possibilities are appropriated only because Dasein knows the practice to 
be “tried and true.” Otherwise, the possibilities are discarded as a mere relic of the past, 
suitable only for academic study.  
 It may be helpful to briefly take stock of where we are, before moving to the way 
that tradition is transmitted. First note what may seem to be a rather obvious point: 
human being is the site where tradition is transmitted, where memory occurs and is 
passed on to others. As we saw above, however, this does not commit us to an account of 
memory that is dependent on the conscious achievements of a subject. As was borne out 
by the account of inauthenticity that Heidegger presents, the transmission of tradition 
through memory occurs tacitly and uncritically to the extent that it is in fact a form of 
forgetting. Thus, rather than seizing on the possibility of appropriating one’s own unique 
historical tradition, Dasein tends to transmit only the most superficial and banal 
interpretations, which become self-evident modes of life that resist being revealed for 
what they are. In the drive to seek security, Dasein disburdens itself of being responsible 
for itself, and thus traverses well-worn paths of thinking and acting. Despite this picture 
                                                
112 Benjamin Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins, p. 87 
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of human existence, Heidegger nevertheless makes it clear that our heritage contains 
concealed possibilities that can be revitalized and taken up anew. Inauthencity, in other 
words, is but one way to dwell in our own historical world. 
 How do Dasein’s possibilities come to be leveled down? More specifically, how 
do such possibilities come to be seen as the only viable possibilities for Dasein to 
understand itself from? How, in other words, does Dasein’s tradition become transmitted, 
and what are the implications for the way that it understands and experiences the past? 
Furthermore, is it possible to retrieve such possibilities from oblivion? 
 Because discourse and communication are the way that Dasein’s understanding 
gets shared and passed to others, we should look for an answer in Heidegger’s account of 
“idle talk” (Gerede). As Heidegger makes clear, “discourse is expressed by being spoken 
out, and as always been so expressed” (BT 211/SZ 167). Such expression is 
communication, which itself aims at “bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed Being 
toward what is talked about” (BT 212/SZ 168). As such, expression and articulation 
make meaning available to others in such a way that we make such meaning worldly, 
which is to say something that can be talked about, passed along, discussed, challenged, 
taught, revised, and the like. In working out his conception of idle talk in a draft of Being 
and Time, Heidegger comments, “every Dasein moves in such an interpretation, which 
for the most part coincides with the way the generation of a particular time has been 
interpreted and which is modified with the time.”113 A generation’s self-understanding 
gets shared and passed along to other members of it, as wells as being a response to the 
previous generation and taught to the next one. 
                                                
113 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1985): p. 270 
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 Heidegger names the availability of meaning to the members of a community 
“average intelligibility” (BT 168/SZ 212). Average intelligibility, as the name suggests, 
implies a basic level of understanding among communicators, and one which does not 
“have a primordial understanding of it” (BT 212/SZ 168). The reason for the lack of a 
primordial understanding of the matter, Heidegger quickly adds, is because “we already 
are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets 
understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and 
superficially” (BT 212/SZ 168). Thus, rather than sharing understanding with others in a 
genuinely meaningful and authentic way, all that gets understood is what gets passed 
about in chatter and gossip. These forms of communication serve “not so much to keep 
Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, 
and cover up the entities within-the-world” (BT 213/SZ 169). Rather than opening 
possibilities for meaning, idle talk closes off such possibilities by making the matters 
appear to reach a common understanding. 
  Communication consists in sharing an understanding of one’s possibilities with 
others, and need not be an explicit transfer of meaning in statements and assertions. It 
also includes the ways that we can constitute a kind of rapport with one another. Insofar 
as idle talk is the primary mode in which possibilities are passed along, it becomes the 
central way that meaning gets passed along to others. Idle talk not only constitutes one of 
the fundamental ways that Dasein becomes entangled in its projects, but it also indicates 
the primary relationship it has to its past. Heidegger suggests that Dasein is not only 
“inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in 
terms of that world by its reflected light, but also…Dasein simultaneously falls prey to 
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the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold” (BT 42/SZ 21). By falling 
prey to the tradition, its contents are 
made inaccessible, proximally and for the most part [and] it rather 
becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and 
delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those ‘primordial’ 
sources from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have 
been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed, it makes us forget that they 
have such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going 
back to these sources is something that we need not even understand. (BT 
43/SZ 21)  
 
Tradition does not explicitly give Dasein the means to understand its Being. It is instead 
an obstacle that impedes and “blocks access” to those sources for thinking. Furthermore, 
tradition uproots and disperses Dasein by constricting its “interests to the multiformity of 
possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and 
alien of cultures” (BT 43/SZ 21). Rather than uncover that which gives rise to thought, 
Dasein relationship to its past ultimately takes the form of historicism: it only looks to 
cultural traditions in order to determine their social function and validity. Finally, the 
transmission of tradition is such that it covers over, obliterates, and deprives Dasein of 
“its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing” (BT 42-43/SZ 21). Such 
“external” traditions and practices conceal the way that Dasein’s factic life is always 
open to question. Dasein, in short, forgets its fundamental relationship to the primordial 
sources of meaning from which it draws its possibilities. Forgetting, in other words, 
belongs to a particular mode of Dasein’s being – that of inauthenticity. 
The explication of Dasein’s Being, in other words, must be accompanied by a 
destructuring of the sedimented layers of the past, “which would alone enable [Dasein] to 
go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own” (BT 43/SZ 
21). This means that Dasein’s proper Being can only be explicated through an 
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understanding of its historicity. Heidegger writes, “in its factical Being, any Dasein is as 
it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not” (BT 
41/SZ 20). Dasein’s everyday Being arises from an understanding, and even pre-
understanding, of its historical Being. This means that the past is not some repository of 
facts or something that has “after-effects” on Dasein’s existence. Rather, “Dasein ‘is’ its 
past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on 
each occasion” (BT 41/SZ 20). This means that the past is not something that “follows 
along after Dasein but [is] something which already goes ahead of it” (BT 41/SZ 20). The 
past should not be ontologically construed as something that is irretrievably lost. Rather, 
the ontological meaning of the past can only be understood in terms of Dasein’s 
possibilities. 
Before characterizing the temporality of Dasein’s authentic existence, it will be 
useful to first draw some conclusions about the temporality of inauthentic Dasein. In 
inauthentic existence, Dasein loses itself in its concerns and becomes absorbed in the 
daily task of living. Rather than become concerned with its ownmost potentiality for 
Being, Dasein’s everyday existence involves the projection of a specific, existentiell, 
understanding of Being that is based on a non-thematic readiness for dealing or coping 
with things. Such facility with one’s daily activities, Heidegger suggests, corresponds 
with a kind of forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is not a relationship to past events, but rather 
concerns Dasein’s ownmost Being. In such ontological forgetting, Dasein closes itself off 
from the fact that its own Being is questionable. Who Dasein is can never be fully settled. 
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II.3 The Problem of Authenticity  
 If a specific kind of forgetting belongs to the mode of being inauthentic—that of 
forgetting that its own Being is at stake—it would seem natural to conclude that 
remembering belongs to the mode of being authentic. There is a broad consensus 
regarding the meaning and implications of inauthenticity – namely that it refers to the 
ways that Dasein avoids taking responsibility for who it is and for the way that it projects 
itself into possibilities, and lets itself be carried along by its daily concerns and the 
possibilities that are made available to it. Nevertheless, there is less agreement regarding 
the meaning of authenticity and its implications for understanding historicity. The 
understanding of the self, to say nothing of its communal existence or its relationship to 
the past, is thus still enigmatic. This situation, however, has started to change in recent 
years.114 I argue that authenticity indicates the way that Dasein takes responsibility for 
itself by wholeheartedly committing itself to itself. This wholehearted commitment to a 
vocation or calling clarifies the meaning that the past and history has for human life. My 
aim here is to show the way in which authenticity designates how human beings can take 
responsibility, or testify to, the history that we are—or, in Ricoeurian terms, authenticity 
is a kind of attestation through remembering. 
However, before explicating my own account of authenticity, it will be useful to 
briefly sketch out several ways to understand the meaning of authenticity: one is 
existential-individualist in character, another more ontologically oriented, and the third is 
emphasizes the grasp of one’s own existence as a narrative. These three interpretations 
dominate discussions of the meaning of authenticity. My aim is to incorporate certain 
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elements that each of these conceptions draws attention to while supplementing them 
with my own account. This should help render more clearly the meaning of authenticity 
as Heidegger presents it, as well as helping to articulate a more complete and nuanced 
understanding of it. 
 
II.3.1. The Existential-Individualist Interpretation 
One of the most dominant accounts of authenticity is the existential-individualist 
account. I name this account of authenticity “existential-individualist” partly because 
Sartre’s own definition of existentialism in the essay “Existentialism as a Humanism” 
explicitly acknowledges Heidegger as an inspiration, and partly because this 
interpretation tends to focus on the way the individual takes a stand apart from the 
anonymous public to create its own values and meaning. This tends to lead to the charge 
that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is incommensurable with communal existence.  
Jacques Taminiaux, for one, argues that Heidegger affords too much authority to 
the individual Dasein, whose authenticity entails its isolation and detachment from social 
and communal concerns.115 Taminiaux characterizes Heidegger’s claim that “Dasein is in 
each case my own” as the culmination of the modern metaphysical tradition of 
subjectivity, and finally bringing it to its final “paroxysm.” He writes, “on the one hand, 
the project offers the most sobering and unrelenting description of finitude, and on the 
other hand, it turns out to be the last implementation of the absolute pretensions of 
metaphysics.”116 While Heidegger offers a careful and precise account of finitude, his 
account nevertheless “turns out to be the last implementation of the pretensions of 
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116 Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology, p. xix. 
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metaphysics.”117  This tension is encapsulated in the concise, yet powerful, phrase 
“Dasein exists for the sake of itself.” “These words,” Taminiaux writes, “signify that 
Dasein is always engaged in the care of itself, and of itself alone, and that Dasein wills 
itself exclusively…The Dasein of Sein und Zeit is open only to make room for a circle 
leading back to itself. Dasein has an authentic understanding if and only if it wants to be 
itself.”118 Taminiaux’s concern thus raises the problem about the ways that Dasein is 
related to others, especially as it concerns the ways that Dasein may not be able to be 
with others from out of its ownmost possibilities. 
Patricia Huntington offers two reasons for interpreting Heidegger’s conception of 
Dasein’s authenticity in terms of a dislocation between an individuated Dasein and the 
community in which it finds itself. The first, she writes, is that “he bases critique, 
undialectically, on the total negation of what is, namely the world of popular opinion and 
everyday practices.”119 Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s everyday social existence is, as 
this interpretation emphasizes, almost purely negative, employing pejorative phrases such 
as being “lost in” and “falling prey to” the anonymous norms of the everyday. In the 
social and political sphere, Dasein cannot be itself. Heidegger writes, for example, 
“falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing; it is at the same time 
alienating” (BT 222/SZ 178). The alienation that arises through Dasein’s falling 
furthermore suggests “a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away 
from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquilized supposition that it 
possesses everything or that everything is within reach” (BT 223/SZ 178). Everyday life 
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is reassuring because it presents values as being part of the texture of the world, already 
there for us, and therefore in no need of justification. 
The second reason to be wary of Heidegger’s account of authenticity, Huntington 
argues, is that “Heidegger grounds the recuperation of agency, undialectically, in a 
transgressive dislocation of prevailing social norms that repudiates public accountability 
or normative theory in toto.”120 If Dasein cannot draw an authentic understanding of itself 
from the prevailing political or social categories, it can only retrieve itself by dislocating 
itself from the public sphere and the norms that govern the public arena. Dasein, on this 
interpretation, must “win itself’ by attending to its ownmost possibilities and not those 
given to it by its tradition. The only imperatives that are binding for Dasein are those that 
it resolutely stands upon when it chooses itself. Indeed, when it resolves upon itself in the 
moment of decision (Augenblick), Dasein must divorce itself from the inauthentic 
traditions, practices, and norms of das Man that it previously unthinkingly relied upon for 
its possibilities. The implication thus is that Dasein, in being authentic, must be beholden 
only to those claims that arise from how it seizes on its own possibilities and not those 
given to it by another Dasein or its past. Rather than succumb to the anonymous 
standards of das Man, Heidegger suggests that Dasein stands against them, in either what 
amounts to a willful, perhaps even fascistic, positing of values or a kind of stoic 
withdrawal from the historically rich world and the world that it shares with others.  
The language Heidegger uses in Being and Time, no doubt, gives the motivation 
for such a reading. For example, in his account of being-toward-death, which confronts 
Dasein with the possibility of impossibility—the experience of the possibility of its own 
nothingness—Heidegger suggests that Dasein finds a possibility that is non-relational, 
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and thus individuates each Dasein in its own being. No one can die for me, and I cannot 
die for another. The emphasis placed on individuated Dasein, facing death, separated 
from others, seems to suggest at the very least that the problem of Dasein’s relationship 
to others can only be inauthentic; to be with others means to deliver oneself over to das 
Man and abdicate responsibility for oneself. Tina Chanter writes “in the end, Heidegger’s 
Dasein stands alone against the world, resolute in its finitude. Dasein’s isolation is 
uncompromising. It begins and ends in the closed circuit of Dasein’s own self-
understanding.”121 The image is one of a resolute Dasein standing alone, above the 
masses, triumphantly willing itself and creating its own values. 
There is, no doubt, something to this interpretation of Dasein’s authenticity, 
especially as it emphasizes the way that Dasein retrieves itself in Being-towards-death 
and insofar as it places respect for its individuated being at the center of its interpretation. 
Dasein in being authentic takes a stand on its own existence. However, insofar as it 
suggests that Dasein is alone responsible for the willful imposition of values this account 
appears to be significantly at odds with Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity. Dasein is not 
a willful subject who creates values ex nihilo and imposes them on a valueless or neutral 
field of objects. Indeed, Heidegger seems to suggest that the Sartrean existential subject 
is but a product of the metaphysics of subjectivity, which argues that the subject is the 
origin and center of meaning.  
Rather, Dasein is always situated within a world, claimed by the past even as it 
projects its possibilities. In Being-toward-death, for example, Dasein does not so much 
choose or create its values as it appropriates and recognizes that the values it lands upon 
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are always inherited and drawn from the past. Heidegger thus suggests that in being 
authentic, Dasein “discloses current factical possibilities…and discloses them in terms of 
the heritage” that it takes over (BT 435/SZ 383). Indeed, authentic resolve is not freedom 
from the past or freedom from the social and communal contexts in which Dasein finds 
itself as it is a freedom through an appropriation of those hidden and heretofore concealed 
possibilities that it inherits.   
 
II.3.2. The Ontological Interpretation122 
 The “ontological interpretation” integrates the conception of authenticity with 
Heidegger’s broader philosophical concerns—the project of delineating the possibility of 
raising the question of Being. Michael Zimmerman’s Eclipse of the Self and Thomas 
Sheehan’s work perhaps best represent this understanding of authenticity. Both focus 
primarily on the formal elements of Heidegger’s project, and make the connection 
between Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s existentials and Aristotle’s conception of 
Being explicit. While highlighting the continuity and the debt that Heidegger owes to the 
Aristotle and the Greeks, their account sometimes appears to offer a highly abstract, and 
even theoretical, account of human being.  
Zimmerman describes authenticity thusly: “to be authentic means resolving to 
accept the openness which, paradoxically, one already is….Authenticity means to be 
most appropriately what one already is.”123 In contrast to the existential account, 
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Zimmerman emphasizes the “openness” that Dasein already is, is a temporal openness.124 
Thomas Sheehan offers a similar account in his account of authenticity as “waking up to 
and ‘allowing’ one’s appropriation-unto-beingness.”125 In a different essay, he similarly 
characterizes authentic selfhood as when “man comes into his own by resolving not to be 
his own but to let himself go into the potentiality he already is. In so doing he wakes up 
to the fact that his transcendence is rooted in and governed by the lethe-dimension of 
disclosure.”126 At the forefront of this interpretation is the notion that authenticity is that 
the individual has gained a more appropriate or proper understanding of itself through 
moments of intensification that disclose the truth of its disclosive existence. As such, 
conscience, Angst, and death all help to disclose the truth of Dasein’s very Being. 
 Authenticity is, in this reading, a kind of ontological insight into the nature of 
human being.127 In being authentic, one has a particular understanding of the way that 
humans really are, and not as how it is in flight from the finitude of its facticity. Sheehan 
presents Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity as drawing on, and occupying a 
position in between, Plato’s objective-transcendent conception of Being and Aristotle’s 
completed and present perfect understanding of Being. Dasein’s Being, for Sheehan, is an 
existential a priori: it is that which is prior to and beyond determination. Sheehan’s 
interpretation of Heidegger thus places the account of authenticity into a broader theory 
of human nature.  
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While this account plays close attention to Dasein’s temporal openness, it appears 
to be more of a “theory” of human nature or human Being. Insight into one’s own Being, 
in other words, is an insight into the openness that one already is. At this point, it 
becomes difficult to pinpoint the way that authenticity is a way of existing that has 
practical implications. If authenticity is a transformation in the way that Dasein exists, it 
is difficult to see how an insight into its own nature can motivate it to change. In other 
words, the mere suggestion of a theory of human being does not, at least by itself, offer 
reasons for transforming one’s style or mode of existence. For example, Sheehan 
suggests that there is an essential difference between retrieving specific past possibilities 
and retrieving one’s essential “alreadyness,” and that Heidegger is more concerned with 
the latter.128 However, if this is the case, it becomes unclear what sort of relationship 
there is between the existential-ontological concerns of Being and Time and the 
existentiell-ontic realm. In other words, it obscures how the experience of our 
“alreadyness” is historical. 
 
II.3.3. The Narrative-Coherence Interpretation 
 The final understanding of authenticity I want to consider is the “narrativist,” 
which can be found in Charles Guignon’s work.129 In his essay “Authenticity, Moral 
Values, and Psychotherapy,” Guignon suggests that the distinctive temporal structure of 
authenticity “involves taking over the possibilities made by the past and acting in the 
                                                
128 Sheehan. “Heidegger’s New Aspect: On In-sein, Zittlichkeit, and The Genesis of “Being and Time.” 
Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 25 (1995): pp. 207-225, p. 220. 
129 While one may argue that Paul Ricoeur belongs in this tradition, considering his work on time and 
narrative, I will be arguing in chapter four that his position is different enough from Guignon’s. Ricoeur’s 
position, I argue, allows for human existence to be narrated while also recognizing the fundamentally 
incomplete and revisable nature of such a narrative through attestation. Others who work in the narrative-
coherent tradition include Alistair MacIntyre and David Carr. 
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present in order to accomplish something for the future. Or to rephrase this in the 
narrativist mode, such a life is lived as a coherent story.”130 What this means is that there 
Dasein has certain “constituent ends,” or ends that Dasein constitutes as a particular way 
of life and which it experiences its actions as integral to being a person of a particular 
sort. Such ends involve the way that Dasein takes up possibilities and “projects them as a 
coherent and unified configuration of meaning for its life as a whole.”131 For example, I 
might exercise not only to become healthy, but because that is what healthy people do. 
By thinking of Dasein in terms of a coherent and unified project of a story, Guignon 
emphases the ways that lived life is a process of self-building and self-composing into a 
unified whole that only makes sense in light of one’s own temporal finitude. An authentic 
life is meaningful, in other words, because of its temporal unity and its coherence. 
The strength of this account of Dasein’s existence is that it emphasizes the 
difference between the “styles” of living authentically and inauthentically. To be 
authentic is to be focused and to recognize “the gravity of the task to which one is 
delivered over and to take full responsibility for one’s life.”132 Similarly, to be inauthentic 
means to be dispersed and distracted; it forgets that it is called upon to take a coherent 
stand in the world where the meaning of its existence is genuinely at stake.133 Rather than 
understanding certain ends as constituting the meaning of its projects, in its 
inauthenticity, Dasein experiences life as a series of episodes that are more or less related, 
lacking cumulative significance and a sense of an overriding purpose. To be inauthentic 
                                                
130 Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy” in Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. 
Ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): pp. 215-239, p. 230. 
131 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1983):  p. 135. 
132 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge p. 135 
133 Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” p. 227 
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means that one cannot see the point of its own life as a whole. In focusing on the 
difference in styles of life, rather than content, Guignon reveals that the difference 
between inauthentic existence and an authentically owned existence lies not in the 
content of one’s life but rather in the style of one’s life and “how” one lives life. 
Guignon is surely right to suggest that the difference between being authentic and 
being inauthentic lies in the difference between focused and coherent activity and 
dispersed and distracted activity. Nevertheless, those moments that would enable Dasein 
to seize its ownmost Being are moments that cannot be easily assimilated into a narrative 
and even can call narrative coherence into question. As I will be arguing below, Dasein’s 
relationship to its own death and its own birth cannot be understood in terms of events 
that frame its life. Rather, these two experiences offer Dasein the opportunity to 
reconfigure the meaning of its life. Indeed, the kind of biographical distance I would need 
to make sense of my life as a narrative just is not available to me as I live it. Indeed, 
insofar as the possibility of being authentic arises through the breakdown of meaning that 
occurs in such extraordinary instances, such as in conscience and Angst, Heidegger 
suggests that such experiences resist being incorporated into a narrative whole. Such 
events instead reveal that who Dasein is cannot be reduced to those actions or deeds that 
it commits.     
Perhaps part of the problem with how Guignon understands authenticity lies in his 
use of the term “coherence” to explain Dasein’s authentic, or owned, existence. 
Coherence, as found in many philosophical discussions, refers to a particular kind of 
epistemic criteria, such that certain propositions are consistent with other propositions or 
are entailed by other propositions. This philosophical meaning of coherence thus 
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represents a real danger in using such a term to describe Heidegger’s position. The 
coherence view of authenticity can call to mind a requirement to think of oneself and 
actions, as in Kant’s practical philosophy. Furthermore, Dasein’s existence is not 
primarily characterized by its cognitive achievements, such that authenticity is a matter of 
making beliefs cohere with actions. Instead, as Guignon himself notes, authenticity is a 
matter of how one lives rather than the beliefs that cohere together. 
 
II.4. Death, Conscience, and History in Being and Time 
Thus far, I have suggested that Dasein’s inauthenticity is a matter of closing off 
and forgetting those possibilities that would allow it to grasp its own being. By 
uncritically accepting the traditional modes of self-understanding, Dasein participates in 
the transmission of tradition, though at the loss of appropriating those possibilities that 
arise from the structure of its own being. The question becomes one of elucidating a 
positive conception of Dasein’s authentic being.  
If, as I argued above, forgetting the question of Being belongs to Dasein’s 
inauthenticity, then it would be natural to suggest that remembering it belongs to 
authenticity. Similarly, if the temptation to take it easy and avoid responsibility for 
oneself characterizes the meaning of inauthenticity, it should not be surprising to see that 
authenticity is characterized by the active appropriation of the possibility to be oneself. 
Indeed, to be oneself, as John Haugeland suggests, means living “in a way that explicitly 
has everything at stake.”134 To be Dasein authentically means taking over “the ultimate 
riskiness of its life as a whole—it lives resolutely as and only as ultimately 
                                                
134 John Haugeland, “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism,” in Heidegger, 
Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus Vol. 1. Ed. Jeff Malpas and Mark Wrathall 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000): pp. 43-77 (73). 
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vulnerable.”135 Following Haugeland, I suggest that risking one’s life by setting it at stake 
is best understood as a commitment to a vocational calling. Such a calling thus means 
being a witness to or enacting one’s own historical Being by remembering the past as a 
future possibility. 
Human finitude provides the phenomenological context for understanding 
memory and history. Just as forgetting does not primarily refer to events in the past that 
Dasein can no longer recall to mind, remembering should not be taken as referring to a 
set of cognitive judgments that aims at recovering a sense of what actually happened. 
Remembering instead refers to the way that Dasein is open to its ownmost possibilities. 
This becomes clear in his work entitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, where he 
articulates a conception of authentic memory:  
The basic fundamental-ontological act of the Metaphysics of Dasein as the laying 
of the ground for metaphysics is hence a “remembering again.” True 
remembering, however, must at all times interiorize what is remembered, i.e., let 
it again come closer and closer in its innermost possibility.136 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the possibility of such “interiorization” first 
occurs in the experience of the possibility of one’s own death. “Authentic Being-towards-
death,” Heidegger therefore claims, “is the hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality” (BT 
438/SZ 386). The problem of history, and thus the problem of remembering, arises in 
conjunction with the problem of death. By exposing itself to its finitude, Dasein’s 
relationship to its past becomes manifest through such notable experiences as conscience, 
resoluteness, and repetition. 
 
                                                
135 Haugeland, “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism,” p. 352, ftn. 9. 
136 Heidegger. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997): p. 164. 
 99 
II.4.1. The Death of Dasein 
In order to see how the experience of the past arises through a confrontation with 
one’s own mortality, it will be necessary first to go into some detail about Heidegger’s 
understanding of death. Heidegger raises the problem of death in order to bring into view 
the possibility of Dasein existing as a whole and as authentic. While the first division of 
Being and Time shows Dasein absorbed in its daily concerns, forgetful of its own Being, 
such an account neglects the conditions that make it possible for its own Being to become 
an issue for it. We can further wonder whether or not the existential account offered in 
the first division gets at the whole of Dasein insofar as it only focuses on the way that 
Dasein exists in its everydayness. As long as the analysis does not get at the way that 
Dasein exists toward its birth and towards its death, Heidegger cannot yet lay claim to 
bringing the whole of Dasein into view.  
An account of Dasein’s being-a-whole poses a problem from the very beginning: 
if Dasein’s being is constituted by its possibilities, then as long as it is, it is “not yet.” 
Heidegger writes, 
As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, 
which Dasein can and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the 
‘end’ itself belongs. The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, 
which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, to existence—
limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for 
Dasein. (BT 276-277/SZ 233-234) 
 
In introducing the problem of death, Heidegger notes that there is “something still 
outstanding” in its Being. While Heidegger initially appears to connect this lack to 
Dasein’s physical death, his subsequent analysis of guilt and conscience reaffirms that “it 
is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something to be 
settled” (BT 277/SZ 236). IRather than describe the biological event of death, Heidegger 
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is concerned with developing an existential account of death. While Heidegger obviously 
wants to retain something of the common notion of death, as the ceasation of 
possibilities, it is just as clear that he wants to reveal the ontological inadequacy of the 
biological understanding of death.137 He thus takes special care to distinguish the 
existential conception of death from the end of life, which he calls “perishing,” and the 
demise (Ableben) of Dasein. Against these traditional and common understandings of 
wholeness and end, Heidegger offers an account of the way that, as Carol White writes, 
“the end of Dasein qua Dasein is the existential end which determines Dasein’s 
wholeness as an understanding of being.”138 Because Dasein is not simply a biological 
entity, and has its own Being to be, it does not merely perish. Its end is distinctively its 
own. 
 Heidegger defines the meaning of death thusly: “death, as the end of Dasein is 
Dasein’s ownmost possibility—non-relational, certain, and as such indefinite, not to be 
outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end” (BT 
303/SZ 259). Befitting Heidegger’s characterization of the essence of Dasein lying in its 
existence and ability to be (BT 67/SZ 42), Dasein’s death is to be understood as a 
possibility. Nevertheless, the kind of possibility that characterizes death is a strange kind 
of possibility. Existentially understood, death is not a one time, sudden occurrence that 
happens at a specific time and place. Death, in other words, is not “being-at-an-end,” 
either biologically or physiologically, but is instead the way that Dasein is “being-
                                                
137 Heidegger identifies several different ways that “something outstanding” becomes completed. The first 
example is one in which one has a debt that needs to be repaid, which indicates that a sum that is an 
aggregate of distinct parts. The second example refers to the phases of the moon. Against this example, 
Heidegger suggests that the moon is always full, and it is merely our perspective from Earth that makes it 
appear to wax and wane. A third example is of a piece of fruit, which in the course of ripening is in a 
constant state of immaturity and progressively matures.   
138 Carol White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude. Ed. Mark Ralkowski (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2005) p. 71 
 101 
toward-the-end.” Death is, in other words, the preeminent possibility of Dasein itself. It is 
a “way to be,” which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. From the moment that Dasein’s 
being is thrown into the world, Dasein is at the same time delivered over to the facticity 
of its own death. Dasein’s death is thus an existential feature of its Being, which 
determines the way that it lets its own being matter. 
Death is, Heidegger writes in an odd turn of phrase, “the possibility of the 
impossibility of any existence at all” (BT 307/SZ 262). To claim that death denotes the 
impossibility of existence suggests that Dasein is no longer able to be, and no longer able 
to understand itself in terms of its possibilities, or as Heidegger says it “is the possibility 
of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (BT 294/SZ 250). Unlike other possibilities, death 
can only stand before us; it is constantly impending. “Death, as possibility, gives Dasein 
nothing to actualize, nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be” (BT 307/SZ 262).  
Death is something that Dasein stands toward, which means, as Sean Ireton puts it, 
“[Dasein] continually relates to its end and is always aware that this limitation of being 
forms its horizon of existence.”139 Rather than other possibilities that can be made actual, 
death, as a possibility, is one that, when actualized, renders us no longer able to be. Its 
status as an existential possibility is thus one that makes it always and only a possibility. 
By “standing towards” death, Heidegger stresses the way that death operates as a horizon 
of possibility against which we come to understand the significance of our own existence. 
This horizon does not as much limit and separate two distinct realms of being – death and 
life – as much as it contains and encompasses life. 140 Insofar as Dasein existence means 
                                                
139 Sean Ireton, An Ontological Study of Death (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007): p. 249 
140 Carol White offers an appropriate metaphor to describe this difficult characterization. She suggests that 
the “clearing,” “opening,” or “lightening” that Dasein is, is akin to clearing in a forest:  “a forest clearing 
highlights the things in it by setting them off against the dark background of the surrounding forest.” The 
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that it stretches out into its possibilities, their meaning only comes to light against the 
possibility of its death. Death helps to form that which it limits. As such, Heidegger 
writes, “death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life” (BT 290/SZ 246). 
 What, then, does Heidegger mean by characterizing the impossible possibility of 
death as Dasein’s “ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped” 
(BT 294/SZ 251)? To characterize death as Dasein’s “ownmost” (eigenst) possibility, 
Heidegger stresses the way that the Being of Dasein is “in each case mine” (BT 67/SZ 
41). By stressing death’s “ownmost” quality Heidegger reiterates that it is the most 
personal and intimate experience – “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him” 
(BT 284/SZ 240). Even if a person were to sacrifice herself for another, she is not taking 
the other’s dying away. In recognizing the way that death is in each case mine, Dasein 
avails itself of the possibility of laying hold of its own Being insofar as it recognizes it as 
solely its own possibility. Laying hold of such a possibility indicates that death is a non-
relational possibility. Where Dasein’s possibilities help to circumscribe the various 
relationships it can enter into with others and with things, death “is the possibility of the 
impossibility of every way of comporting oneself toward anything, of every way of 
existing” (BT 307/SZ 262). Death thus  “makes manifest that all Being-alongside the 
things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us” (BT 
308/SZ 263). Such an individuating function of death is not necessarily sociological, but 
existential. Death throws Dasein back on itself to disclose its ability to be. 
 Death thus individuates Dasein. It furthermore cannot be “outstripped” or 
bypassed (überholt). Two further dimensions of death can clarify what this means: the 
                                                                                                                                            
clearing refers to the realm of possibilities revealed to Dasein by Being; beyond the clearing, in the forest, 
lie impossibilities in the realm of Being’s concealment. Such impossibilities lie beyond our ability to 
represent or control them, yet are still part of the clearing. Cf. Time and Death, p. 74. 
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certainty of death, its indefiniteness. Because it is certain, it lurks behind all of our 
possibilities. Furthermore, because we do not know when it will happen, it constantly 
casts a pall over us. Death cannot be expected, as one might wait for the arrival of a train. 
Eventually the train arrives, and, once it has, we can view it as a past event, one that has 
been temporally surpassed. Death, by contrast, cannot be similarly expected or viewed as 
“on time” or “late.” It is instead an unsurpassable horizon that cannot be transcended. 
Because death is a possibility that retains its status as a possibility for as long as Dasein is 
alive, and because it threatens to undermine Dasein’s possibilities, it is the most extreme 
of possibilities. 
 The characteristics of the existential conception of death discussed above – that it 
is Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational possibility, not to be bypassed, certain and indefinite 
– offer a formal sketch of this phenomenon. However, because it is a sketch it is, as it 
now stands, incomplete. In order to flesh out some of its implications, Heidegger situates 
these features within the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein’s Being. Everyday 
Dasein will cling to life at all costs, and put off thinking about the possibility of its death. 
It tends to think of death as an event that may happen, but probably will not happen 
today. By refusing to claim death as its own possibility, Dasein becomes alienated from 
itself and takes refuge in its everyday affairs. Dasein tends to avoid confronting the 
possibility of its death, and instead, as noted above, opts to take things easy, tranquilizing 
itself in its everyday affairs. In consoling the dying, Dasein tends to assuage itself and 
others of the possibility of death (BT 297/SZ 254).  
 How does this compare to authentic Dasein’s Being-toward-death? In contrast to 
inauthentically fleeing death, the authentic way to be toward death involves making 
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Dasein’s ownmost self manifest. In order to explain what this means, it may be useful to 
explore one claim Heidegger makes regarding death: “in the first instance, we must 
characterize Being-towards-death as a Being towards a possibility – indeed, toward a 
distinctive possibility of Dasein itself” (BT 305/SZ 261). Above, I noted the way that 
death is a peculiar kind of possibility, one which Heidegger often calls “the possibility of 
the impossibility of Dasein’s existence.” The possibility of death, however, is not 
something that can be actualized without obliterating Dasein’s ability-to-be as such. What 
then does it mean to seize on the possibility of the impossibility of existing? 
 Heidegger names the ability to be authentically open to the possibility of death, 
“anticipation” (Vorlaufen). The term “anticipation” is a technical term, one which should 
not be understood as a kind of mental phenomenon similar to expectation or one in which 
a subject looks forward to a specific possibility. In “anticipating” its death, Dasein does 
not expect or await something to happen or brood about the event that will end its life. 
Rather, as the German Vorlaufen suggests, “anticipation” is a kind of metaphor that refers 
to the way that Dasein runs ahead (Vor-laufen) into the possibility of its death. For this 
reason, I will sometimes use “running ahead” or “forerunning” in characterizing the 
meaning of anticipation. 
 Dasein’s anticipation of its death is one way for it to understand who it is, and as 
such anticipation is one way for Dasein to project itself into its possibilities. To run ahead 
suggests that Dasein propels itself into a possibility that cannot be realized. Such a 
possibility is also an impossibility. The limit that is death is thus one whose 
excessiveness increases as Dasein runs forward: “In anticipation, of this possibility it 
becomes ‘greater and greater’; the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no 
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measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless 
impossibility of existence” (BT 307/SZ 262). Thus, the possibility of death is not merely 
the oblivion of possibilities, but it is the most extreme of possibilities.141 To run ahead 
thus suggests a dynamic potentiating process that does not seek to master and manipulate 
a possibility, turning it into something actual. Rather, in running ahead, Dasein 
understands itself in terms of a possibility that remains a possibility. 
 It can never be stressed too much that when Heidegger speaks of the possibility of 
the impossibility of Dasein’s existence, he is referring to death in the existential sense 
rather than the biological sense. How, then, are we to concretely understand this 
phenomenon? There are a few different interpretations of this phenomenon, a description 
of which would require its own study. Nevertheless, a rather common interpretation of 
existential death is, as Hubert Dreyfus characterizes, “a structural condition of Dasein’s 
existence that an individual’s identity can always be lost. Dying is, then, the resigned, 
heroic acceptance of this condition.”142 The image of an isolated, heroic Dasein, jutting 
its chin into the wind, characterizes the existential account of authenticity. While 
Heidegger does maintain that Dasein can never have a fixed, constant identity, the heroic, 
and rather pessimistic, conception of death only makes sense if one measures the 
                                                
141 Carol White further notes that the German prefix “un-“ can signify a negation or an excessive amount. 
When Heidegger italicizes the “Un-“ of “Unmöglichkeit,” he does so in order to stress this dual character. 
Thus the possibility of death is both an “impossibility” and the most extreme of all possibilities. Cf. White, 
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prefix. Rather, the “un-“ indicates an intensification of the Heimlich, such that the meaning of the two 
terms overlap. Cf. Freud. “The Uncanny.” Freud, The Uncanny. Trans. David McClintock (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2003): pp. 121-161, p. 124-126.   As we will see in the next chapter, Heidegger continues 
with this characterization of death as the ultimate possibility and as a “measureless measure” of existence. 
142 “Forward” to White’s book, xxxi, see also Dreyfus Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 305. 
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possibility of such a loss against the twin epistemological and metaphysical ideals of 
certainty and permanence.  
 Against this reading, both John Haugeland and Carol White argue that death is a 
kind of world-collapse, and Dasein’s anticipation of its death is the readiness for such a 
collapse and acknowledgement that what upon which it stakes its life is always fragile 
and vulnerable to such collapse. Existential death, White writes, “occurs when old worlds 
die and new ones are born.”143 When a world dies, old possibilities are no longer viable 
and new possibilities take their place. For example, the modern revolution of science 
allowed things to be treated and understood in new ways that were beyond what thinkers 
in the Middle Age could fathom.144 Even if one were to try to recreate that era, it would 
never be the same because there the possibilities contained in that world are no longer 
viable. There thus is a specific sense in which past is “dead to us,” namely insofar as the 
possibilities that the dead had are not possibilities for us any longer. A change in the 
understanding of one’s Being leaves old possibilities behind and, with it, brings new 
possibilities in its place. Certain possibilities are now available for us that were not 
envisioned by our forebears. Possibilities turn into impossibilities, for they are no longer 
legitimate ways to understand existence, and impossibilities turn into viable possibilities 
through which Dasein can now understand itself. 
 White’s account of death reiterates the relationship between an individual and the 
culture and tradition in which it finds itself. She writes, “as Dasein we always have to 
take up being-toward-the-end either by taking being for granted and thus simply moving 
within the possibilities of being that our culture has laid out, or by making an issue of it 
                                                
143 White, Time and Death, p. 89 
144 White, Time and Death, p. 89. 
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and thus determining where the limits of our cultural possibilities actually do lie.”145 
Either Dasein understands itself from within the possibilities of its inherited tradition, 
which as noted above means that Dasein is closed off to appropriating its own 
possibilities, or it can risk itself and show that the current ways of understanding what it 
is to be are vulnerable or perhaps even untenable. Rather than remembering a particular 
event or practice, Heidegger’s account suggests that, when facing death, we are put into a 
position where we can remember or retrieve the formal structure of our very Being.  
The experience of death enables Dasein to recognize that the possibilities for 
understanding Being handed to it by others are no longer viable, or said differently, are 
impossible. Some things never will have been – some ways to understand ourselves have 
passed, and can no longer be. Such possibilities are dead to us. To be towards death 
would thus mean to stake one’s way of Being, one’s life on something, while recognizing 
that it too will pass. Heidegger’s conception of death as a possibility suggests that it is a 
possibility that reveals Dasein’s very Being as possibility. To run ahead does not mean to 
get beyond death or overcome it, but rather it suggests that Dasein seizes it as a 
possibility, letting it determine its own Being. It stakes its Being on a different 
understanding of who it is to be, one distinct from the ones it unquestioningly takes over. 
In running ahead, Dasein breaks free from its tranquilizing concern for its everyday 
affairs, which can be more or less realized in its projects, and prepares to take a stand on 
who it understands itself to be.   
 
                                                
145 White, Time and Death, p. 81 
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II.4.2. Guilt, Conscience, Resoluteness 
 What then does it mean to stake oneself on a way of Being, even when 
recognizing that a commitment to that identity is always vulnerable?  How is it even 
possible to commit to such a possibility that is so fragile? At stake in these questions is 
the very possibility of being authentic in the first place; a possibility that is given to 
Dasein in its current, factical situation and as such is given to it despite Dasein’s tendency 
to abdicate responsibility for itself by appealing to the unquestioned authority of its 
tradition. The last section showed that when Dasein authentically faces its own death 
Dasein’s existence and relationship to Being is disclosed as something that is at stake, 
and that who it is, can always be put into question. This section will show that the 
experience of anticipation coalesces in conscience, in which Dasein experiences the 
possibility of granting the past a unique future. 
 Conscience exposes Dasein to its historicity. Heidegger does not explicitly 
connect conscience with historicity in Being and Time; however, in earlier lectures and 
essays he makes their relationship a little more apparent. In his review “Comments on 
Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews,” Heidegger quickly establishes the experience 
of “the meaning of conscience and responsibility that lies in the historical itself,” in one 
paragraph.146 Despite its brevity, the importance of this connection cannot be 
underestimated. Conscience, he suggests, is the way that we continually “have 
ourselves,” and it is enacted through “a constant renewal of anxious worry that is of 
necessity motivated by a concern for the self as such, and is moreover oriented in a 
                                                
146 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews.” Trans. John van Buren. 
Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): pp. 1-38, p. 29. 
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historical manner.”147 To stake one’s life does not mean making a one-time commitment. 
Rather, it requires continually renewing one’s loyalty to such a commitment over time 
and in different situations. Heidegger thus writes that “conscience is a historically defined 
‘how’ of experiencing the self…In indicating this connection between the sense of 
historical experience and the sense of the phenomenon of conscience, we are not giving 
the concept of the historical a broader meaning; rather, we are understanding it in such a 
way that it is being returned to the authentic source of its sense.”148 The way we 
authentically experience ourselves is through appropriating past possibility as something 
that we must live up to. Conscience thus refers to an individual’s transformation of a 
possibility inherited from its culture by committing oneself to it and to live up to its 
demands. Thus, rather than avoiding taking responsibility for who we are, as we do in 
being inauthentic, authenticity involves directly confronting the historical dimensions of 
one’s own self, by continuously renewing the responsibility we have for the history that 
we are. In doing so, conscience can give the past a unique future. 
Benjamin Crowe identifies another lecture where Heidegger connects conscience 
to the experience of history. In the 1924 “The Concept of Time,” Heidegger explains that 
“the past remains closed off from any present so long as such a present, Dasein, is not 
historical. Dasein however is in itself historical insofar as it is its possibility. In being 
futural Dasein is its past; it comes back to it in the ‘how.’ The manner of its coming back 
is, among other things, conscience.”149 Heidegger again contrasts the experience of 
history as an appropriation of one’s past for the sake of the future with the objectifying 
tendencies of the historical sciences. To be historical, Heidegger suggests, requires 
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148 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” p. 28-29 
149 Heidegger, The Concept of Time, in Crowe, p. 181. 
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understanding ourselves from our possibilities, which is to say from the future. The 
appropriation of such possibilities, Heidegger suggests, is the experience of conscience. 
To be historical is to see the past not as something dead that no longer affords 
possibilities for existing, but as an inheritance that can be transformed. In Heidegger’s 
account in this lecture, conscience is the way that Dasein appropriates and transforms 
some element of its own cultural inheritance. It is the way that Dasein gives the past a 
new and unique future.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger’s account of conscience implies a more limited role 
for it to play than he previously claimed. The narrower function it plays arises because of 
the formal analysis of Dasein’s authentic Being. As long as the discussion of death 
remains at the existential-ontological level there is a particular problem. It could well be 
that the account that Heidegger has thus far provided is a free-floating, abstract 
construction, a “fantastical demand” to run ahead into death, that could never be 
accomplished by Dasein, who always lives in a specific time and place. In order to ensure 
that his existential analysis has such traction, Heidegger needs existentiell testimony of 
Dasein’s authentic ability to be. Because Dasein understands itself initially from the 
guiding norms of its situation, it must be “shown” the possibility of being authentic. It is 
here that Heidegger locates the phenomenon of conscience: “in the following 
interpretation, we shall claim that this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s 
everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience’” (BT 
313/SZ 268). The voice or call of conscience thus functions to bring Dasein back from its 
everyday concerns. 
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Against the moral, theological, and epistemological conceptions of conscience, 
Heidegger conceives conscience as a form of disclosure, one in which Dasein’s own 
Being is disclosed to itself. Dasein’s everyday understanding of its Being is one that is 
characterized by a failure to listen to itself. Instead, it understands itself from the 
possibilities that have been delivered to it by its tradition and by the “idle talk” found in 
its everyday conversations with others. Heidegger further characterizes this chatter as a 
failure to listen to oneself because Dasein instead listens in on the lives and exploits of 
others (BT 315/SZ 271). Such listening “must get broken off; in other words, the 
possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein 
itself” (BT 316/SZ 271). Hearing, Heidegger earlier claimed, is being open to the voice 
of the other (BT 206/SZ 163). Insofar as conscience is the mode through which Dasein 
gains access to itself, it does so by opening Dasein up to the possibility of being 
addressed. Conscience thus first appears in the form of a voice that gives its addressee 
something to understand. 
What does conscience give to understand? Heidegger is quick to characterize the 
call as one that says nothing, or at least nothing that can be talked about in our everyday 
language. The call speaks in the mode of silence (BT 318/SZ 273). The contrast between 
our everyday language in which we try to convey some information or make a report 
about something to someone and the call of conscience is that the call participates in an 
uncanny mode discourse – silence. The result of this is that “the call is precisely 
something which we ourselves have neither planned for nor prepared for nor voluntarily 
performed, nor have we ever done so” (BT 320/SZ 275). In suggesting that the call need 
not be a vocal utterance and that such an experience is uncanny, Heidegger suggests that 
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there can be sudden flashes where a new understanding of our situation is opened up 
because there is a break with the current possibilities that Dasein’s world gives to it. The 
call of conscience thus testifies to the power of the unexpected and unhoped for to change 
the path of Dasein’s life. It makes a new future possible by throwing Dasein’s life into 
relief.  
Silently speaking, the call gives Dasein something to understand—it bears the 
message of its guilt. In a by now familiar maneuver, Heidegger distinguishes the 
ontological sense of guilt from the everyday understanding of guilt, which includes both 
the juridical and moral senses of it. The ontological meaning of guilt contains two 
elements: the experience of not being the basis of one’s own existence (facticity) but 
nevertheless being responsible for the cause of the “not.”150 Although Dasein does not lay 
the foundation for its own existence, and it cannot be the master of its own existence, it 
nevertheless must take upon itself the responsibility for its very being. The “nullity” or 
“not’ of Dasein’s existence lies in the fact that Dasein is not the basis of its own Being, in 
other words, that it is thrown into existing. Heidegger writes that Dasein’s “thrown basis” 
means that “the Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis 
into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis” (BT 330/SZ 284). 
Thrownness refers to the way that Dasein finds itself always already disclosed, open to 
the world and finds itself in the position of having to respond to claims that have already 
been made on it. To be thrown is to exist through an identification with those possibilities 
that have been inherited from one’s own tradition. The appeal of conscience calls Dasein 
                                                
150 Françoise Dastur notes that the German Schuld, or ‘guilt,’ shares a root with sollen, which indicates an 
obligation. As such there is both a sense of responsibility and indebtedness that is contained in the 
ontological understanding of guilt. Heidegger and the Question of Time (Humanity Books: Amhurst, NY, 
1998): p. 31. 
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to be responsible for the way it determines its always-incomplete character, and to 
determine who it is to be responsibly. Despite the fact that the situation in which Dasein 
finds itself is not one that it is responsible for, this lack nevertheless makes Dasein 
responsible for choosing how to understand itself in light of the possibilities given to it. 
As such, we can say that the call of conscience calls Dasein to be responsible for itself, 
even though Dasein finds itself in a situation not of its own making. To be responsible in 
this sense means to make a decision regarding who one is to be.  
If the addressee of the call of conscience “is an appeal to the they-self in its Self” 
(BT 319/SZ 274), we might well wonder who calls Dasein. Heidegger’s response is 
enigmatic in its simplicity: “in conscience Dasein calls itself” and “is at the same time 
both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made” (BT 320/SZ 275). These claims 
seem to suggest that Dasein is closed on itself in an act of auto-affection or a kind of 
conversation with itself. However, rather than conclude that Dasein is solipsistically 
closed upon itself, the caller opens Dasein up to its “ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-
self” (BT 320/SZ 275). Dasein, as called, experiences this call to its ownmost possibility 
as something that it must assume and make its own, and so cannot be the source of the 
call. Heidegger suggests that “‘It’ calls against our expectations and even against our 
will…the call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me” (BT 320/SZ 275). 
The transcendence of the call ensures that it is a non-subjective call, and indeed there is 
no author or origin to the call.151 The call arises from “within” Dasein, and as a result the 
call is the site where the self experiences itself as other. This other who calls, however, is 
not “someone else who is with me in the world” (BT 320/SZ 275), nor is it definable in a 
                                                
151 It is precisely this lack of origin that Ricoeur describes as a kind of “strangeness without a stranger.” Cf. 
“Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker of Testimony,” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, Imagination. Ed. 
Mark I. Wallace. Trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996): pp. 108-126, p. 111. 
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worldly way at all. Rather, the impersonal “It” calls Dasein to appropriate its possibilities. 
The identity of the caller “is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial thrown Being-in-the-
world as the ‘not-at-home’—the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world” (BT 
321/SZ 276-277). The caller is thus not a specific person or a transcendent power but is 
instead the bare, strange fact of being at all that calls Dasein back to itself in its sheer 
individuated thrownness. As a result, the experience of the uncanny call cleaves the two 
modalities of Dasein’s being: on the one hand, as it is lost in its everyday possibilities, 
and on the other, Dasein as authentic.  
 Heidegger’s account of conscience has been criticized for neglecting the way that 
Dasein can be open to others. Indeed, given the formal nature of his general analysis it 
sometimes does appear that Heidegger suggests that in such an experience Dasein is 
closed on itself, or that a “true self’ reaches up from Dasein’s innermost Being to call it. 
However, some care must be taken in answering the question of the “who” that calls 
Dasein. One way to understand the meaning of the impersonal “it” that calls Dasein is by 
noting that “every Dasein always exists factically” (BT 321/SZ 276), or as the familiar 
phrase explains, Dasein is a thrown projection. To say that Dasein exists as thrown means 
that Dasein understands itself in terms of inherited possibilities, which are circumscribed 
by its cultural heritage, its language, ethnicity, social groups, family, and the like. It 
suggests that Dasein exists as already having made certain decisions about who it is to be, 
further embedding it within a nexus of meaningful relations. Similarly, because Dasein is 
thrown into existence there is something still outstanding and something that is still at 
stake in living; Dasein’s existence is an issue for it. It is because it is capable of opening 
itself to the possibilities that it finds already in the world that it can be an heir to them and 
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assume its own factic being. As a result, it is the strange and uncanny structure that 
constitutes Dasein’s thrown projection issues the call.  
Nevertheless, it is unclear what connection exists between conscience and 
historicity, as Heidegger had earlier claimed. The call is a kind of formal indication of 
those moments in life where the problems of one’s own historical situation become 
manifest in its uncanniness. In the essay on Jaspers, Heidegger seeks a way to understand 
life and human existence that is not reducible to an objective or scientific account. The 
term “historical” is used in order to ensure such an account of life insofar as we 
understand its meaning in the sense of a history that we are and not in terms of facts that 
have happened. History arises not from the chronological development of events, but 
from those unexpected moments that can alter the course of one’s life in a profound way, 
moments that make possible a new future by throwing one’s life into relief. Conscience 
helps in understanding this meaning of history because it is one that shatters the 
apparently stable structure of Dasein, opening it up for a radical reinterpretation of who it 
is to be. 
Similarly, Dasein’s being-guilty and being indebted come to have meaning 
through Dasein’s recognition and affirmation of its existence as a thrown projection. To 
be responsible for the history that we are means to take up responsibility for something 
for which it was not responsible for in the first place. While the past has already 
happened and cannot be changed, its possibilities are nevertheless open for retrieval. 
Dasein’s existence as a nullity means that it must always understand itself from those 
possibilities into which it was thrown, and not from its own making. Such a structure will 
ensure not only that in landing on certain possibilities it excludes others, but also that 
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there will be possibilities that are not available for Dasein to appropriate. It is not possible 
for us to merely return to previous ways of understanding what it means to be out of 
nostalgic longing. Thus, in projecting its possibilities, Dasein is responsible for them, 
even though it has inherited them. The call of conscience makes possible a new future for 
its past.  
 To hear the voice of conscience, as Heidegger describes it, means to project 
oneself onto one’s own being guilty (BT 288/SZ 334). This entails a recommitment, or 
“attestation” to living one’s life from the basis of one’s own Being: “conscience 
manifests itself as an attestation which belongs to Dasein’s Being – an attestation in 
which conscience calls Dasein itself face to face with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” 
(BT 334/SZ 288). In such attestation, Dasein commits itself to its own Being, which 
entails committing itself wholeheartedly to a vocation.152 
 Heidegger further characterizes Dasein’s response to the call of conscience as 
“resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit, BT 296/SZ 343). The meaning of the German 
Entschlossenheit should not go unremarked upon. While Heidegger again differentiates 
the everyday meaning of the word, “determination” and “resolve” from the ontological 
sense, there nevertheless remain some commonalities between the two. By using the 
word Entschlossenheit, Heidegger intends to capture a sense of the way that in “resolve,” 
Dasein’s Being is unlocked or opened up (Ent-schlossen). In resolution, then, there is a 
sense in which new possibilities for existing are unlocked, opened up, or as Heidegger 
                                                
152 Crowe notes that many of Heidegger’s examples of conscience during the lectures of the 1920s are 
religious in nature. However, it need not be. For example, Heidegger seemed to regard the experience of 
fighting as a moment where one can be “there for oneself.” Crowe nevertheless maintains that the religious 
experience of “graced moments” or being wakeful or vigilant remains paradigmatic. Cf., Heidegger’s 
Religious Origins: p., 183-184. 
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sometimes says “set free.” It is the way that Dasein’s Being, as the site where meaning, 
truth, and history happens, is put into practical activity.  
Resoluteness amounts to “letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in 
the ‘they’” (BT 345/SZ 299). However, this does not mean that Dasein becomes 
“detached” from the world or that it becomes isolated from others. Furthermore, “the 
‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content,’ nor does the 
circle of Others get exchanged for a new one” (BT 344/SZ 297f).  Rather, “resoluteness 
brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, 
and pushes it into solicitous Being-with-Others” (BT 344/SZ 298). This means, 
Heidegger explains that, “both one’s Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly 
and concernfully, and one’s solicitous Being-with-Others, are now given a definite 
character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 344/SZ 298). Far from 
detaching Dasein from its world, then, Dasein’s resolve is the way that it explicitly seizes 
on specific possibilities, which it has inherited from its tradition and from its current 
situation. In seizing specific possibilities, Dasein attests to who it is to be, and in doing so 
commits itself to being a unique kind of person.153 
 
II.4.3. Repetition, Historicity, and Remembering 
 The meaning of Dasein’s resolve is further enhanced in the account of 
“repetition” (Wiederholung) and historicity in §74. Repetition augments resolution by 
incorporating historicity into the Being of authentic Dasein. In the context of this 
discussion, Heidegger elucidates from where Dasein draws those possibilities upon which 
it resolves. Dasein’s appropriation of its own having-been is to be taken over from the 
                                                
153 Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins, p. 189. 
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Dasein who is as having been. To appropriate a past and make it one’s own past requires 
taking over possibilities from those who have come before. I will focus here on the ways 
that Dasein’s constitution as a self is achieved through the retrieval of what is other.154 It 
is this movement that constitutes remembering in Being and Time. 
Dasein’s facticity, or having-been, raises the question of Dasein’s coming into 
being, or birth. Facticity, of course, does not refer to the past in the sense of something 
that has happened and is now over, but rather indicates something irretrievable in 
existence that nevertheless remains effective. This raises the issue of Dasein’s birth, or its 
“being-towards-its-beginning,” and is placed at the other “end” of Dasein’s existence as a 
counterpart to Dasein’s mortality. Being-toward-birth, like being-towards-death, is not a 
possibility that can be made ‘actual.’ Instead, Dasein “stretches along between birth and 
death” (BT 425/SZ 373). This stretching, however, cannot be thought in terms of life’s 
connectedness or in terms of a cohesive narrative unity.155 Indeed, Heidegger wonders 
whether thinking of Dasein’s existence in terms of the “connectedness of life,” access to 
authentic historicity will be blocked off (BT 439/SZ 387) because it takes Dasein to be 
something merely objectively occurring. Against this, Heidegger suggests that the 
“movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along,” or historicity, 
will reveal the temporal ‘constancy’ of the self (BT 427/SZ 375). 
Throughout this discussion, Heidegger maintains a rigid distinction between 
history as it is lived and history as a science. The original sense of history (Geschichte) 
                                                
154 Hans Ruin gives a similar account of the nature of historicity in Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme 
of Historicity Through Heidegger’s Works (Almqvist & Wiksell International: Stockholm, 1994). Cf. 
especially chapter III. 
155 Steven Crowell suggests that Heidegger’s critique of the ‘connectedness of life’ can be extended to a 
critique of narrative theories of selfhood, specifically MacIntyre’s. Cf. “Authentic Historicality” Space, 
Time, and Culture Ed. David Carr and Cheung Chan-Fai (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2004): pp. 57-73, 
p. 63. 
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refers to an enactment of possibilities that open up or free a past that has become stale; 
history as a science, however, refers to the objective sequencing and study of past events. 
What characterizes the phenomenon of history is its enigmatic relationship with the 
past—“why is it” Heidegger asks, “that the function of the past gets particularly stressed 
when the Dasein which historizes ‘in time’ is characterized ‘temporally’?” (BT 431/SZ 
379) Heidegger begins by attending to everyday utensils and artifacts we might find in a 
museum. These objects are peculiar because they have meaning only in reference to a 
world that has passed; these objects ‘belong’ to a past world. Their belonging to this past 
world is made possible only by referring to one who was engaged practically with them. 
A past world exists only because it was related to a Dasein who is no longer here—or, 
more accurately, who is only as ‘having-been here’ (da-gewesen). This claim 
nevertheless makes the enigma of Dasein’s historicity all the more pressing—for 
Dasein’s having-been, which is equiprimordial with the future and present, is distinct 
from the passage of time. 
However, we must be careful at this point, for Heidegger wants to show that 
historical existence arises from factically existing Dasein. To show this, Heidegger must 
be committed to the claim that history is not the result of a passage of time, such that only 
someone who is no longer there is ‘historical’ and could then be studied, but that history 
belongs to Dasein originally. As such, there are two dimensions of ‘the past,’ whose 
relationship Heidegger must now articulate: the past that is a quality of the Dasein no 
longer there (da-gewesen), and the past that is constitutive of Dasein (Gewesen), which is 
to say its “having-been.” The former refers to the way that others belong to a world that is 
no longer there; the latter describes the existential past that is constitutive of the temporal 
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stretch of an individual Dasein. The transition between the two, then, concerns the 
transition from the temporality of the other—whose historical being is the result of a 
passage of time—to the temporality of the factically existing self—whose historical being 
constitutes a specific way of being.156 It is this transition that constitutes the particular 
event that is the “happening” or event wherein the pastness of the Dasein who is as 
having-been is generated. To this end, Heidegger needs to explain how possibilities of the 
Dasein who is as having-been can be wrestled away from it and taken up by the factically 
existing Dasein.  
In §65, Heidegger had already suggested that the meaning of past is possible on 
the basis of a projection of the future, such that Dasein must live up to its past.157 In the 
sections on history and temporality, Heidegger intends to graft the specific historicizing 
happening of Dasein to the formal, authentic account of care already described as 
resoluteness. In so doing, he offers an account for the possibility of the way that the 
having-been of the past nevertheless remains effective in the present.  By assuming its 
own burdensome guilt, Heidegger writes, Dasein “discloses current factical possibilities 
of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, 
as thrown, takes over” (BT 434/SZ 383). Though Dasein need not explicitly be aware of 
its past as past, the possibilities it takes up are nevertheless possibilities it has been given. 
Its heritage is the source out of which the factically existing Dasein draws its 
possibilities; and thereby signals a transition from the time of Dasein in its factic 
                                                
156 Ruin, Enigmatic Origins, p. 131. 
157 §65 suggests that the future (Zukunft) is to be understood in terms of what is to come (Zu-kunft). 
Heidegger adds to this that the “anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back 
understandingly to one’s ownmost ‘been’ Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having 
been. The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future” (BT 373/SZ 326). I take this 
to mean that to be authentic in part means that Dasein must project its possibilities in a way that allows it to 
be worthy of the past that it has.  
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specificity back to the time of the other Dasein, who exists as having been. Heidegger 
names this transmission of tradition that Dasein projects a possibility it takes over from 
elsewhere, ‘retrieval’ or ‘repetition’ (Wiederholung).  
Importantly, repetition retains specific features of the call of conscience, namely 
hearing and responding to the address of an other, that constitutes Dasein’s communal 
existence. Heidegger writes that the resolute Dasein “comes back to itself and hands itself 
down [and] then becomes the repetition of a possibility of experience that has been 
handed down. Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say going back into the 
possibilities of the Dasein that has been there” (BT 437/SZ 385). There is an affirmation 
of Dasein’s primordial indebtedness to a past other, and an attempt to ground this 
indebtedness in the factically existing Dasein. Heidegger suggests that this movement of 
the retrieval of possibilities must take place, naming this necessity “fate” (BT 435/SZ 
384). While fate is often understood in terms of events that befall an individual, 
Heidegger stresses instead that “Dasein is fate.” Dasein is fated to have a history and is 
obliged to respond to that history by projecting the possibility that must be kept open as a 
possibility. Such repeating can be more or less explicit, more or less conscious, and more 
or less oriented to the future. Dasein exists as thrown into being and is thus in a way 
“powerless” to avoid projecting its possibilities on the basis of its thrownness. At the 
same time, in being thrown Dasein is delivered to the “superior power” to take over these 
inherited possibilities, transforming them for its own time. In this way, the retrieval of 
possibilities reveals itself in the concrete ways we communicate to make manifest those 
possibilities we are revitalizing. Because Dasein is essentially being-with-Others, “its 
historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny” (BT 436/SZ 384). 
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Destiny occurs as the happening of community. Dasein’s heritage indicates the transition 
between times, from the time of Dasein to the time of Dasein who is no longer there, such 
that “Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full 
historizing of Dasein” (BT 436/SZ 385). The retrieval of possibilities is not a nostalgic 
recreation or a mechanical reproduction of the past, but is instead the return of a possible 
‘having-been’ that arises out of Dasein’s authentic self-understanding. Dasein’s authentic 
history, in other words, rests upon the retrieval of possible modalities of being.   
 Dasein’s indebtedness and guilt enables it to respond and be responsible for its 
retrieval of its inherited and yet ownmost possibilities. In this manner, the retrieval of 
tradition is a responsive movement through which the self repeats and transforms that 
which is other. Retrieval, on Heidegger’s account, is the appropriation of the tradition’s 
possibilities while at the same time transforming these possibilities for its own time. In 
retrieving such possibilities, Dasein at once recognizes its distance from the past, while 
also acknowledging the efficacy of the past. Because of this interplay between one’s 
heritage and the appropriation of such a heritage, authentic historicity becomes the name 
of the passage through which Dasein must come to itself through that which is other and 
in such a way that such a passage constitutes a new origin. 
 Heidegger emphasizes that in retrieving or repeating the past Dasein is not 
returning to some golden age and does not harbor some nostalgic longing for a bygone 
era. He writes, “the repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something 
that is ‘past,’ nor does it bind the ‘Present’ back to that which has already been 
‘outstripped’” (BT 437/SZ 385). Repetition is not a glorification of the past, and 
repetition does not hold up the past as a model that should be recreated in the present 
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because it avoids acknowledging one’s inheritance precisely as inheritance. Repetition, as 
noted above, is a kind of response, a “reciprocative rejoinder” to the past as possibility 
(BT 438/SZ 386). As such, it takes the past as a challenge to the future, and not as 
something that is to be studied for its own sake through a kind of scientific labor. The 
past here is to be understood as harboring a promise for Dasein’s future; something that 
harbors unique possibilities for existing is hidden in that which has passed.  
 Dasein’s historicity is not an aggregate of facts, which the historian can then put 
together into a cohesive narrative. Rather, history is integral to who Dasein is. Through 
Dasein’s self-interpretation and self-understanding, Dasein participates in the 
transmission of tradition, by bearing witness to the possibilities of the Dasein who has 
been. In so doing, Dasein makes history its own through a vocational commitment, rather 
than dispersing itself in its everyday business.  
 
IV. Conclusions: Being-From-Others? 
 I have suggested that repetition and authentic historicity build upon the call of 
conscience insofar as both rely on a dynamic of hearing and responding to a call. 
Dasein’s response attests to the transmission of new possibilities for existing that have 
already been given to it by its past. The renewal, retrieval, or repetition of such 
possibilities occurs only when Dasein anxiously confronts its own mortality. The 
seemingly solitary posture that results suggests that the death of others cannot play a 
significant role in its retrieval or repetition of possibilities. Insofar as Heidegger had 
excluded the death of others from shedding light on our own mortality, it becomes 
difficult to see how the retrieval of possibilities from a heritage becomes meaningful. In 
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concluding this chapter, I wish to challenge and supplement Heidegger’s claims about the 
way that Dasein can retrieve those possibilities of the Dasein who has been. 
 The experience of death as a possibility, Heidegger argues, is one that opens 
Dasein up to the possibility of retrieving those possibilities from the past that have been 
until now concealed. Death opens Dasein to the possibility of taking a stand on the 
history that it is. To experience oneself as mortal is to experience the fragility and 
vulnerability of one’s own Being. The cogito sum, in other words, does not define my 
being; rather, Heidegger notes, the sum moribundus exposes me to the finite being that I 
am.158 While each of our lives is defined in terms of the way that it lives up to death, such 
an experience is necessarily one that can be experienced by each of us in our 
individuality. The death of others, as Heidegger argues, is one that does not necessarily 
expose Dasein to its own possibilities. As Dennis Schmidt puts it, “even if the death of 
the other is suffered as an irreparable loss, the loss that the other suffered has still not 
become accessible.”159 Each of us is destined to die alone, and even though our 
lamentations try to create solidarity with the dead, lasting solidarity is not possible.  
 The experience of death puts Dasein in the position of answering for itself and of 
being responsible for itself. Nevertheless, we can further wonder whether my experience 
of my own death as possibility is the primary, and even only, form of the consciousness 
of death. Heidegger’s emphasis on the connection between death and historicity raises a 
peculiar paradox. Whereas Dasein constitutes the past as having been, the Dasein who 
exists as having-been chronologically precedes the present era. How is it possible, we can 
                                                
158 Heidegger. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 316-317. 
159Dennis Schmidt, “What We Owe the Dead.” Heidegger and the Greeks. Edited by Drew A. Hyland and 
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ask, to constitute the past in the very act of retrieving it? Does not the retrieval itself 
presuppose the historical reality of the past as a reality that is possible rather than 
constituting its meaning in retrieving it? On the other hand, if the past is constituted 
through Dasein’s comportment to its possibilities, in what sense is it ‘retrieved’? These 
questions raise the status of the ‘connectedness’ of authentic historicity, and in what this 
‘connectedness’ might mean.  I take these problems to comprise the “enigma” of 
historicity to which Heidegger alludes when he wonders “in what way this historizing, as 
fate, is to constitute the whole ‘connectedness’ of Dasein from its birth to its death” (BT 
429/SZ 387). I will here proffer a brief outline of some implications of what Dasein’s 
authentic historicity may mean. 
Heidegger suggests that to be Dasein is to find itself in the midst of an already 
constituted world, and can thus recognize that it is indebted to the claims its history 
makes on it. Recognizing this debt, however, is possible only in virtue of Dasein’s ability 
to question the force or legitimacy of such a tradition. Historicity is the condition for the 
possibility of distancing ourselves from the past and the condition that allows us to see 
ourselves as belonging to a tradition. In other words, the retrieval attests to the efficacy 
that tradition has as the responsibility that Dasein always already had for owning its past. 
What it means to be Dasein, therefore, is to be found in a past constituted by Dasein’s 
very historicity. Dasein is thrown into a world that is already there, and a past that has 
already happened; at the same time, it has the task of appropriating its past. As Françoise 
Dastur notes, it is a matter of an “absolute past,” which we cannot completely 
appropriate. What is absolute is not its inappropriability, but its pastness. While the past 
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is irrevocable and has already happened by the time we have arrived, we are nevertheless 
responsible for appropriating it and making it our own past.160  
As a result, the remembering that is figured in the retrieval must therefore be of a 
different sort than the remembering that is connected to historical events. Dasein’s 
heritage, or inheritance (Erbe), is, as we know, grasped in the act of “handing down to 
oneself of the possibilities that have come down…but not necessarily as having thus 
come down” (BT 435/SZ 384). In interpreting inheritance in this way, Heidegger 
transforms the passive reception of an unchosen legacy into an active transformation of 
those possibilities in relation to Dasein’s own projects. Dasein can authentically relate to 
the past only insofar as it retakes past possibilities in terms of a future yet to come. This 
becomes clear in the moment of anxiety, which “brings one back to one’s thrownness as 
something possible which can be repeated. And in this way it also reveals the possibility 
of an authentic potentiality-for-Being – a potentiality which must, in repeating, come 
back to its thrown ‘there,’ but come back as something futural which comes toward 
(zukünftig)” (BT 394/SZ 343). Anxiety thus discloses possibility of being reborn through 
a confrontation with one’s own mortality.  
Heidegger emphasizes the priority of the future, especially the possibility of one’s 
own death, over the past. Such emphasis reaches a climax when he suggests: 
In the fateful repetition of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself 
back ‘immediately’ – that is to say, in way that this temporally ecstatical – 
to what has been before it. But when its heritage is thus handed down to 
itself, its ‘birth’ is caught up into its existence in coming back from the 
possibility of death (the possibility which is not to be outstripped, if only 
so that this existence may accept the thrownness of its own ‘there’ in a 
way which is more free from Illusion. (BT 442-443/SZ 391) 
 
                                                
160 Dastur, Death: An Essay in Finitude, pp. 71-72. 
 127 
This entails that Dasein catches up to its “birth” when it is disclosed as a repeatable 
possibility, which is to say, as rebirth. In so doing, it frees itself for a resolute choice that 
it can now make in the face of death, freeing it from the illusions that constitute its 
inauthentic Being. 
 However, while there is something to Heidegger’s analysis, specifically the way 
that the experience of anxiety exposes us to the possibility of self-responsibility, it 
neglects an important experience of such inheritance. Lisa Guenther captures this 
experience in the concise phrase “Being-from-Others.”161 This phrase captures the way 
that others give to me not only concrete possibilities of existing, which are of necessity 
culturally and historically bound, but also the way that others, specifically my parents, 
give to me the possibility of existing as such. There is, she writes, “a rigorous distinction 
must be made between the originating possibility of birth and all the other possibilities 
granted to me at birth, in order to mark the ontological distinction between the 
unrepeatable, deeply passive, and irreducibly past possibility of birth, and the heritage of 
repeatable possibilities given to me at birth.”162 Birth, on the one hand, gives me the 
sheer ontological possibility of existing, and, on the other, the tradition, language, 
practices, and the like that are received but must also be chosen. 
Guenther develops her account by attending to the ways that an account of 
motherhood can enrich Heidegger’s account of heritage. I will take a slightly different 
path in developing the way that Dasein’s “being-from-Others” can take place. 
Specifically, I would like to highlight the way that the experience of mourning can reveal 
the way that Dasein’s existence is “from others.” 
                                                
161 Lisa Guenther, “Being-From-Others: Reading Heidegger after Cavarero”. Hypatia: Vol. 23, no. 1 (Jan-
March 2008): pp. 99-118. 
162 Guenther, “Being from Others,” p. 106. 
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The form remembering is perhaps experienced most forcefully in mourning. This 
may sound like a rather striking conclusion, insofar as the death of others cannot help us 
to understand our own finitude. Death, recall, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility, one which 
no one can take away from it. Indeed, even if I experience the other’s death as an 
immense loss, the meaning of the death of the other always eludes us (BT 282/SZ 238). 
As Dennis Schmidt suggests, if anxiety opens the experience of the finitude of the world 
and forces Dasein to take responsibility for itself, then in mourning, “the limits of the 
capacity of the self to define itself by itself are exposed.”163 This means that in the 
experience of mourning, we recognize that the meaning of the world is something that 
extends far beyond my own projects and my own possibilities.   
The debt owed the dead that is recognized in mourning becomes manifest when 
we recognize we can no longer be with them—the lack of our ability to be with the other 
in death makes the separation between the living and dead more apparent. In other words, 
what is experienced in mourning is the recognition that there is a loss of possibilities that 
cannot be recuperated or fully retrieved. The debt becomes manifest when we recognize 
that the dead do not endure in solidarity with the living. Authentically being with others 
requires the recognition that Dasein itself can never adequately appropriate the dead’s 
possibilities. In this manner, we ought to recognize that funeral rites, commemorations, 
and memorials neither cancel nor overcome death. They do not bridge the distance 
between the past and the present, but instead become the markers that signify the failure 
of possibilities because they reveal an unbridgeable separation between the self and the 
other. As such, the retrieval or repetition of tradition is not something in which the debt to 
the dead is settled but that through which the loss of the past is preserved and concealed. 
                                                
163 Dennis Schmidt, “What We Owe the Dead” p. 117. 
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In this manner, the transmission of tradition does not appear in the preservation of 
tradition but instead occurs through the failure to wholly render the debt paid in full. I 
owe a debt to the dead to bear witness to their being dead, and to those possibilities that 
never will have been. 
 The community that is formed on the basis of Dasein’s historicity, if my 
interpretation is correct, indicates a two-fold relationship to the past that can be best 
captured in the phenomenon of mourning. On one hand, mourning and remembrance are 
attempts to honor the debt we owe the dead by carrying the memory of the loved one. 
Mourning, in this way, makes the absence of the other all the more present. On the other 
hand, the mourner does not undertake the act of mourning to cling to the past, as if it 
were an act of nostalgia. Rather, one mourns in order to move forward. Through 
mourning, we recognize the way that we are constituted by others, and that our existence 
is dependent on others. In it, we recognize a debt to others, perhaps to bear witness to 
their life and to ensure that we recognize that their lives were not in vain. Nevertheless, 
through such experiences, mourning and remembrance enable us to recognize that the 
possibilities that the dead have given us can never be fully appropriated, so that the past 
something that is never fully our own. However, in coming back to itself in these acts of 
remembrance, Dasein becomes open to retrieve those lost and forgotten possibilities of 
human existence and attest to them (BT 448/SZ 396-7). The attempt to make manifest 
our debt in mourning through such resolve at the same time conceals because that which 
is to be made manifest can never be fully present. In other words, those acts of 
remembrance that attempt to preserve the loss of the past are thus always inadequate. In 
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this way, then, the debt we owe the dead is something that can never be settled. To honor 
our dead is a burden we must take up, but of which we can never take possession. 
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Chapter III: Heidegger and the Origins of Remembering 
III.1 Introduction and Thesis 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Heidegger’s conception of repetition, or 
retrieval (Wiederholung), makes remembering and forgetting possible because it casts the 
relationship to the past in terms of calling, hearing, and responding to one’s heritage. 
Repetition, furthermore, is the movement through which Dasein inherits its own 
possibilities, preserving and transforming them as it projects its own future. In this 
chapter, I analyze the relationship between remembering and tragedy that Heidegger 
develops in the 1930s and 1940s. During these years, tragedy becomes one of the primary 
ways, if not the primary way, that Heidegger conceives of history and memory.164 This is 
most evidently seen in his interpretations of Antigone, first in 1935 and then again in 
1941. Heidegger’s conception of tragedy, I argue, refers less to insights gleaned from its 
dramatic elements than it does to disclosing the limits of thinking from the Greek 
heritage. 
 This chapter thus has two related aims: first, to illustrate an ontological 
conception of the tragic by way of Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone; 
second, to clarify the relationship between his conception of the tragic and what it means 
to remember. It is sometimes supposed that Heidegger’s interest in Sophoclean tragedy is 
evidence of his idealization of the Greeks.165  However, while Heidegger does attempt to 
retrieve the experience of Being through the Greeks by way of tragedy, his position is 
considerably more nuanced than offering a nostalgiac return to them. Specifically, he 
                                                
164 Dennis Schmidt makes a similar claim in his On Germans and Other Greeks (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001), p. 226. 
165One significant example of this line of thinking can be found in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s Heidegger 
Art and Politics. Trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).  
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draws a connection between remembering and tragedy such that the crisis and the 
contradictions emerging in the present are understood to be the fated or destined result of 
the concealed foundation of metaphysical thinking. If we keep in mind what Heidegger 
means by tragedy, and that it is not a simple return to a Greek conception, we will be in a 
better position to understand what he means by remembrance (Andenken). 
 
III.2 Tragedy and Historicity 
 Heidegger’s interest in tragedy overlaps with some of the most tumultuous years 
of the twentieth century. References to it can be found in his Rectoral Address in 1933 
and extend through “The Anaximander Fragment,” written in 1946, before he drops it as 
a topic.166 However, his references to it are scattered through essays and lectures, such 
that it is impossible to say that he sets out a “theory” of the tragic in the manner that 
Hegel, Schelling, or even Nietzsche had.167 Thus, not only are the references to tragedy 
terse, but even when he focuses on tragedies, most notably Antigone, to glean an 
                                                
166 This has led some commentators, notably Kathleen Wright, Veronique Fotí, and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe to advance the claim that Heidegger’s turn to tragedy cannot be separated from his involvement 
with the abhorrent politics of National Socialism. To suggest that Heidegger’s political choices are tragic, 
whether interpreting such commitments as supremely ignorant or deludedly heroic, is no doubt a tempting 
connection to draw. It is uncanny that his turn to tragedy and the tragic overlap with the politics of Nazism. 
However, drawing this connection seems to ignore Heidegger’s own attempts to move an understanding of 
tragedy away from the willful or heroic subject. This certainly calls for a further understanding of the 
relationship between a non-subjective conception of politics and the tragic, as Heidegger understands it, but 
it is also just as certain that such an account lies far beyond the parameters of this dissertation. 
167 Schmidt notes that as early as the 1930 lecture entitled Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger makes a 
rather suggestive claim that connects tragedy to the movement of history: “In the history of all essential 
questions, it is our prerogative, and also our responsibility to become the murderers of our forefathers; 
indeed, this is even a fateful necessity for us!” Cf. The Essence of Human Freedom. Trans. Ted Sadler 
(New York: Continuum, 2002): p. 27. While there is no direct reference to tragedy, the claim Heidegger 
makes here, according to Schmidt, is clearly Oedipal in its suggestion that the movement of history is 
essentially one of parricide. Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 227. It should also be noted that 
Heidegger referred also to Plato’s parricide of Parmenides in his lecture on the Sophist, in which he 
suggests that the destruction of the tradition requires a similar kind of parricide: “Ruthlessness toward the 
tradition is reverence toward the past, and it is genuine only in an appropriation of the latter (the past) out 
of a destruction of the former (the tradition)”. Cf. Plato’s Sophist. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André 
Schuwer. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997): p. 286. Heidegger’s method can be understood as 
a kind of parricide, which also centers on the problem of the possibility of critiquing the tradition to which 
one has been given.   
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ontological meaning, he presents them as a digression from the main theme of the lecture 
or essay. Heidegger’s references to tragedy are complicated because he often focuses on 
one part of the play, such as the famous choral “Ode to Man” in Antigone. It is thus 
difficult, if not impossible, to systematize his various claims about this topic and develop 
something that could be called “Heidegger’s theory of the tragic.”  
Nevertheless, the importance of tragedy to Heidegger’s thought during this period 
can be worked out through an interpretation of a few passages where he raises the issue 
of tragedy as it relates to the aims of philosophical thinking. In this section, I introduce 
Heidegger’s understanding of the tragic in two steps. First, I develop a distinction 
introduced by Peter Szondi between a “poetics of tragedy,” which emphasis the features 
of the genre, and a “philosophy of the tragic,” which is more existential in nature. The 
second step develops Heidegger’s conception of the tragic by drawing on several 
passages in which he declares the importance of tragedy in the development of 
metaphysics. The first passage, taken from The Basic Questions of Philosophy, situates 
tragic poetry within the history of western metaphysics and its inevitable “decline,” and 
helps to clarify the relationship between remembering and tragedy. The second passage, 
from Mindfulness, contains perhaps the most direct statement of Heidegger’s 
understanding of tragedy. The following section will apply these insights to Heidegger’s 
readings of Antigone.  
 
 134 
III.2.1 Tragedy and the Tragic  
 Peter Szondi, in his book An Essay on the Tragic, makes a distinction between 
what he names a “poetics of tragedy” and a “philosophy of the tragic”168 The poetics of 
tragedy, first systematically proposed by Aristotle, “determines the elements of tragic art” 
and distinguishes it from other literary genres, such as lyric and epic poetry as well as 
history.169 A poetics of tragedy develops the elements of tragedies and the different ways 
that authors compose such works. Tragedy, under this heading, can be placed under the 
heading of an aesthetic theory insofar as it refers specifically to the cathartic and 
purifying response to dramas and how authors can elicit such an experience from an 
audience. Furthermore, a poetics of tragedy is not limited to merely detailing how an 
audience reacts to watching a tragedy unfold on stage but also how it participates in the 
performance of the drama.170 
 By contrast, a philosophy of the tragic is a more recent phenomenon, whose 
origins lie in German Idealism, and thus render it uniquely German.171 The philosophy of 
the tragic is not a theory about specific tragedies nor is it an attempt to define the 
boundaries of a literary genre and distinguishing it from others. Rather, as J.G. Finlayson 
writes, “it is a theory about what makes a work of theater into a tragedy, about what it is 
to be a tragedy.”172 If the poetics of tragedy tells us something about a literary genre, a 
philosophy of the tragic relates to us something about human experience that makes the 
genre possible. There is thus a kind of priority of the philosophy of the tragic over the 
                                                
168 Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002): p. 1-3. J.G. 
Findlayson’s “Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic.” The Journal for the History of 
Philosophy Vol. 37, no. 3 (July 1999): pp. 493-520, p. 494 makes a similar distinction in his own 
discussion of Hegel’s conception of tragedy. 
169 Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 1 
170 Cf. Finlayson, “Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic,” p. 494. 
171 Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 1. 
172 J.G. Finlayson, “Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic,” p. 494. 
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literary analysis of tragedies. It is because there is something called “the tragic” in human 
experience that we can name certain dramatic performances “tragedies.” Finlayson even 
suggests that because of the widespread disagreement over what constitutes a work being 
a tragedy, we need to inquire into those features that make tragedies particularly tragic.173 
What features characterize tragedies? What is the tragic? 
 In a provocative essay, Jacques Taminiaux distinguishes two ways to understand 
the meaning of the tragic: one that draws from Plato, and the other from Aristotle.174 
Though Aristotle is responsible for delineating the features of the genre of tragedy, 
thereby setting the basic groundwork for a “poetics of tragedy,” there is nevertheless a 
germ of the meaning of the tragic contained in the Poetics. Specifically, the tragic can be 
found in his claim that in tragedies we find an imitation of action. This imitation, 
Taminiaux suggests, is not a passive reception of a representation, but is instead “an 
active composition of a plot which reveals universal possibilities of human 
interaction.”175 The philosophical importance of tragedy lies in its ability to represent 
action, thereby bringing some of its latent elements to light. The actions represented in 
tragedies narrate a human’s downfall, a downfall that results from irresolvable tensions 
arising from the protagonists’ failures to deliberate on their actions. Once we recognize 
the complexities and ambiguities of practical life, we should be in a better position to 
avoid, or at the very least alleviate, conflicts that might arise in practical life.  
                                                
173 J.G. Finlayson, “Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic,” p. 495. 
174 Jacques Taminiaux, “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone.” Phenomenology and 
Literature: Historical Perspectives and Systematic Accounts. Ed. Pol Vandevelde. (Würtzburg: 
Königshausen & Neuman, 2010): pp. 58-76. As I turn to Paul Ricoeur in Chapter IV, it will become clear 
that Ricoeur is more “Aristotelian” in his understanding of tragedy, while Heidegger is more “Platonic” in 
his reading of its significance. 
175 Taminiaux, “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone,” p. 62. 
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The lesson here is that tragedy does not merely evoke an aesthetic response, such 
as pity and catharsis. It imparts an ethical lesson to the audience and helps to establish a 
community. Finlayson explains, “a theory of the tragic tells us something about human 
experience, human actions, and the ethical-life of a community in which the actions are 
played out.”176 The tragic dimension of human existence, on Taminiaux’s reading, 
similarly refers to the way that “human deeds often [transcend] the doer’s intentions 
because action as interaction…is unpredictable, indefinite in its beginning as well as in its 
effects.”177 The tragic wisdom arising from such an experience is thus an appeal to 
deliberate on a course of action, while recognizing that such actions are intertwined with 
those of others. 
In contrast to the lessons regarding praxis found in the Aristotelian conception of 
tragedy, the philosophical understanding of the tragic that dominates the German 
tradition is marked, Taminiaux argues, by a strong Platonic influence. Plato, according to 
Taminiaux, offers a metaphysics or ontology of tragedy. Plato’s suspicion of any kind of 
imitation extends to his wariness of the poetic renderings of tragedy, and saves some of 
his most pointed critiques of representation by directing them at the poets who have no 
precise knowledge of their craft or the objects that they depict.178 A good tragedy, one 
that does not unthoughtfully represent objects in a public forum, would be one that 
imitates the Forms, those models of excellence in which all other modes of representation 
                                                
176 Finlayson, “Conflict and Resolution in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic,” p. 494. 
177 Taminiaux, “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone,” p. 62.  
178 This is especially evident in the Apology, where Socrates describes himself trying to refute the Oracle at 
Delphi’s claim that he was the wisest in Athens. Where politicians think themselves wise, but are not in 
fact wise, and where artisans know some things, but tend to overreach in their claims to knowledge, the 
poets do not even possess the wisdom to write poetry, and instead rely on inspiration (cf. Apology, 22a-c).  
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deficiently participate.179 Thus, dramatists only depict the ways that humans are trapped 
in a theater of appearances, unable to free themselves from their shackles. 
By rigidly separating the realm of appearances from the metaphysical realm of the 
Forms, Plato effectively introduces a different way to think of tragedy. Taminiaux writes: 
“if we mean by tragedy a drama or action which is entirely based on the contemplation of 
the ontos on,” then tragedy becomes a kind of “metaphysical document.”180 The ordinary 
spectator, the citizen, in other words, is not truly able to appreciate the meaning of 
tragedy; only the philosopher, who speculatively inquires into the Being of beings (ontos 
on), apart from the contamination of the everyday and the common, can understand and 
judge what tragedy is truly about. It is this speculative, and thoroughly metaphysical, 
understanding of tragedy that Taminiaux suggests saturates the German appropriation and 
transformation of Greek tragedy, and reaches a kind of apex in Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Antigone.181 
  
III.2.2 Historicity and the Tragic 
In order to assess the relationship Heidegger draws between tragedy and 
remembering, and the extent of the Platonism that Taminiaux sees in Heidegger’s 
account, I will now examine two passages in Heidegger’s writings that Karen Gover 
identifies as being remarkably direct in stating the place and significance of tragedy as it 
pertains to metaphysics and its “ending.”182 The first is a 1938 text labeled “From the 
                                                
179 Taminiaux. “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone, p. 61. Also see Plato, Laws, 
817b-c 
180 Taminiaux, “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone,” p. 61. 
181 Szondi similarly suggests that the “philosophy of the tragic” is thoroughly German: “the concept of the 
tragic has remained a fundamentally German one” An Essay on the Tragic, p. 2.  
182 Karen Gover. “Tragedy and Metaphysics in Heidegger’s ‘The Anaximander Fragment.’” Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology Vol. 40, no. 1 (January 2009): pp. 37-53, p. 37. See also her dissertation 
“Heidegger and the Question of Tragedy (PhD diss, The Pennsylvania State University, 2005). 
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First Draft” included in Basic Problems of Philosophy situates the meaning of tragedy 
within the larger framework of the history of western metaphysics. The second, from §69 
in his 1938 work Mindfulness, contains some of his most direct claims regarding the 
meaning of tragedy and its connection with the movement of historicity from the “first 
beginning” to an “other beginning. While I generally agree with Gover’s analysis, I will 
be reading these two passages with an eye toward the problem of the meaning of history 
with which Heidegger is concerned.183 
 First, however, a word of caution is in order. As noted above, Heidegger does not 
offer a systematic or speculative theory of tragedy. The reason for this is because 
Heidegger is generally averse to traditional forms of metaphysical questioning. If a 
metaphysical question takes the traditional form “what is it?” or “what is the essence of 
it?” then any inquiry into tragedy that begins by attempting to define tragedy or 
determine what its essence is will succumb to a form of metaphysics that Heidegger 
wants to rethink. Thus, to raise the question “what is tragedy?” is, in Gover’s words, to 
“risk reinscribing tragedy within its metaphysical determinations.”184 A different, non-
metaphysical, approach is thus needed in order to assess how tragedy is related to history. 
In “The Question of Truth from the First Draft” tragedy occupies a decisive place 
the transformation of the meaning of truth. Heidegger writes: 
The recollection of the first shining forth of aletheia, as we require it and 
which we hold to be possible only on the basis of the question of truth, 
may be articulated in five levels of reflection: 1) The unexpressed flaming 
up of aletheia in the pronouncements of Anaximander. 2) The first 
unfoldings of aletheia, though not the ones explicitly directed to a 
foundation, in Heraclitus, Parmenides, the tragic poets, and Pindar. 3) The 
                                                
183 To be sure, these two aims are not entirely separable especially insofar as it is only at the end or close of 
metaphysics that we can come to terms with the “history of Being.” As such, what I am proposing is a shift 
of emphasis, rather than a radical rereading.  
184 Gover, “Tragedy and Metaphysics in Heidegger,” p. 38. 
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last glimmering of aletheia within this question of beings…as the basic 
philosophical question in Plato and Aristotle. 4) The extinguishing of 
aletheia and its transformation into homoiosis (correctness). 5) The 
mediate and mediated transition from aletheia to homoiosis on the by-way 
over incorrectness.185 
 
At first glance, this account appears to be a straightforward historical narrative, one 
where tragedy is one moment in the historical development of the truth of Being. The 
chronological development seems to suggest a narrative account, and implies that we 
could catalogue various uses of the term aletheia in those Greek sources or trace the 
etymological development of the term in an attempt to come to a better understanding of 
its meaning.186 Because tragedy is situated between Parmenides and Plato, it may appear 
that the task of retrieving the meaning of truth requires an examination or return to a 
conception of truth that belongs to a particular historical time.  
 Interpreting the unfolding strictly historically, however, is misleading. Heidegger 
is not interested in giving a historical account of the development of aletheia that could 
be reviewed and dated by classicists or historians of philosophy. In order to see why 
Heidegger is reluctant to conceive of tragedy thusly, we need to pay attention to his 
distinction between the truth proper to historicity, as distinct from the truth with which 
historiography deals. Truth as aletheia refers the concealing and unconcealing of Being, 
and whose manifestations define an historical epoch. The recognition that it does so, 
however, becomes apparent only at the end of western metaphysics such that we can 
                                                
185 Martin Heidegger. Basic Questions of Philosophy. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre 
Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): p. 186. 
186 A common criticism of Heidegger is that his “etymologies” of basic Greek words at best twist around 
the meaning of the words, and at worst have no connection to the way that such words were historically 
used. Indeed, Paul Friedländer leveled this very criticism at Heidegger’s conception of aletheia, and 
suggest that the etymology of the word contrasts with Heidegger’s interpretation to such an extent that we 
should be skeptical of Heidegger’s conception of his interpretation of aletheia as “unconcealment.” For an 
account of their debate, see Robert Bernasconi’s The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of 
Being (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1985: pp. 19-23. 
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trace its degradation from unconcealment to correspondence. Tracing this history is not a 
matter for the historical sciences. “Historiography,” Heidegger claims, “means an 
exploration of the past from the perspective of the present” because it is primarily 
concerned with comparing and calculating the similarities and differences between 
historical ages, and it does so only in order to come to know and to understand them. 187 
To think of history solely in terms of a linear and chronological progression suggests that 
it is made, produced, and, implicitly intelligible because it relies on notions of agency, 
motives, intentions, and design.188 This approach can be understood as a matter of 
accurately representing the past “such as it actually happened,” or as a way to make the 
past come alive on the basis of present purposes. Humans, on this model, make history, 
whether through actions or by reading and interpreting historical works, and places 
human activity at the center of all historical thinking. 
Heidegger argues that when we interpret history in terms of historiographical 
objects and methods, we have been “abandoned” among beings. Such abandonment 
arises because the historical sciences mistake ontological questions for empirical 
questions. With empirical questions, “everything becomes obvious, without any 
impenetrable depths, and this transparency derives from a luminosity in which the eye of 
knowledge is dazzled to the verge of blindness.”189 Historiographical inquiry interprets to 
                                                
187 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 33. 
188 This view of history is common to both religious views of history, which posit that history is a product 
of God’s providence, and a humanist view of history, in which history is the product of human activity. As 
Eric Sean Nelson suggests, the model of history that claims that it is “something made and produced relies 
on problematic notions of agency, design, intentionality, and decision.” Cf. “History as Decision and Event 
in Heidegger” Arhe Vol. 4, no. 8 (2007): pp. 97-114, p. 105. 
189 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 169. Note the allusion to Hölderlin’s claim that “King 
Oedipus has an eye too many,” which Heidegger had suggested in Introduction to Metaphysics is the 
“fundamental condition for all great questioning and knowing as well as their sole metaphysical ground.” 
Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000): p. 112. Further references to Introduction to Metaphysics will be cited in the text as IM.   
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beings and their significance in terms of their usefulness for understanding the present, 
ignoring and blocking the possibility of beings to have their own significance. The desire 
of historians to come to know everything that has happened “reveals behind all progress 
and all domination over beings a dark emptiness of irrelevance and a shrinking back in 
the face of the first and last decisions.”190 The question of Being has withdrawn from 
concern, and it has been deemed too obvious a question to pursue: “beings are now taken 
for all that is, as if there were no such thing as Being and the truth of being.”191  
The suggestion that tragedy’s importance is because of its function in Athenian 
democracy or because it has specific features misses its philosophical significance. Nor is 
its significance tied exclusively to its chronological place in the development of the 
aletheia. Finally, it is not important because it offers a narrative paradigm for thinking the 
history of the West.192 What remains distinctive about tragedy is the way it opens up a 
different kind of meaning of history, one more in line with human being’s historicity and 
the truth of being. Thus, the place that tragedy occupies in Heidegger’s “history” is 
primarily significant because of its ontological, rather than chronological or 
narratological, qualities.  
If the place that tragedy occupies in Heidegger’s “narrative” is important for 
ontological rather than strictly historical reasons, how does Heidegger thus understand 
                                                
190 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 169. 
191 Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, p. 169. 
192 James Crooks, for example, suggests that both Heidegger and Nietzsche use tragedy as the “narrative 
model of Western history.” This is problematic for a few reasons. First, his argument neglects those places 
where Heidegger discusses tragedy, including his interpretation of Antigone. Second, it seems to erect a 
kind of paradigm through which we can come to definitively understand the historicity of the present 
situation, a move about which Heidegger is often skeptical. In so doing, Crooks suggests that Heidegger 
uncritically appropriates features of tragedy, such as “undergoing,” and “tragic flaw,” and “destiny” or 
“fate.” Finally, Crooks often appears to neglect the way that Heidegger’s reflections on tragedy often 
challenge and call in question the way that we are to understand the meaning of metaphysics. Cf. “Getting 
Over Nihilism: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Appropriation of Tragedy.” International Journal of the 
Classical Tradition. Vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 2002): pp. 36-50. 
 142 
the “place” tragedy occupies in the history of Being? If the significance of history is not 
to be found in contingent events, anecdotal stories that we recount to one another, or in 
that which is finished and no longer present, how are we to understand its significance? It 
is clear that by situating tragedy between the “first unfoldings” of aletheia and its “last 
glimmering,” Heidegger wants to capture something of the transitional quality between 
two different epochs. It thus plays a significant role in what Heidegger calls the “history 
of Being.” Because tragedy names the transition between the initial flaring up of aletheia 
and the metaphysics of the West, Heidegger’s return to it at the “end of metaphysics” 
becomes apparent because it signifies the way that such a transition occurs. Heidegger 
continues to argue that the contemporary age is also a transitional space between two 
kinds of “beginnings.” We need attend to what sort of “history” tragedy discloses, as well 
as its difference from the chronological and datable history with which historians are 
generally concerned, and finally what it means to think of tragedy “ontologically” rather 
than dramatically. 
To think tragedy ontologically requires thinking through its relationship to 
historicity. Heidegger claims that such “historical reflection” aims at understanding 
history as a “happening.”193 Rather than treating the past as an object, or domain of 
objects, as historiography does, historical reflection looks “for the meaning of a 
happening, the meaning of history.”194 The meaning of history becomes evident as a 
possibility, which suggests that historical reflection receives its meaning from where it is 
going, rather than from where it came. The future is decisive for understanding the 
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meaning of the past because it is “the beginning of all happening.”195 The primary sense 
of the past, and of history, comes from the future: “the happenings of history are 
primordially and always the future, that which in a concealed way comes toward us, a 
revelatory process that puts us at risk, and thus is compelling in advance.”196 By placing 
the emphasis of the past’s meaning on the future, what it means to be past is that the past 
exists as having been (Gewesen). To exist as having been refers to that which is lasting 
and harbors the future: “the essential having-been [Gewesendes] abides in coming.”197 
This history is, Heidegger argues, a “history of being,” which is entirely unlike the 
history created by acting and suffering human agents. The history of being is instead a 
history in which human beings already find themselves and a history that carries them 
through its unfolding. 
The unfolding of Being’s history is essentially related to a dynamic disclosure and 
concealing, exposing and sheltering, and remembering and forgetting of the truth of 
being. The past as “having-been” is carried along insofar as that beginning “sends” 
possibilities. The idea that the past exists as having-been is, in Michel Haar’s words, “an 
absolutely inaugural anteriority.”198 It is a past that is irrevocable, yet one which 
summons the future. This inaugural beginning, the “first essential having-been,” “exerts a 
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destiny-like influence over the whole tradition.”199 It is, in short, a kind of “destinal 
sending,” and contains, in advance, the totality of all of history’s possibilities. It is for 
this reason that Heidegger employs a number of related terms to meaning of history: the 
history (Geschichte) of being is a happening (Geschehen) that constitutes a destiny 
(Geschick).200 
The commencement, the “first beginning,” persists throughout the entire history 
of Being; if it did not, the Greek interpretation of the being of Beings would not exert the 
influence that it does over the history of metaphysical thinking. However, as Haar writes, 
“the commencement has always already fallen into oblivion, has always already been left 
behind…but remains sheltered within the entire process.”201 It has “always already” done 
so because it contains the seeds of the future, and implicitly contains all of history’s 
possibilities, and has thus “sent” them. The contemporary age has thus already been 
determined by possibilities that have been handed down to it, though it has not yet 
realized that such possibilities define it. A new relationship to history is thus needed 
because the relationship to the “first beginning” that characterizes western metaphysics 
no longer harbors possibilities for contemporary life. 
There is thus a tension between those possibilities that have already been “sent” 
out and inherited, and the inability to recognize the significance of such possibilities. 
Heidegger argues that this tension is between a “first beginning” and an “other 
beginning.” Where the “first beginning” refers to the “Greek” experience of the Being of 
beings and the inception of Greek metaphysics, the “other beginning” refers to the 
                                                
199 Michel Haar, “The History of Being and its Hegelian Model,” p. 48. 
200 Charles Guignon, “The History of Being.” A Companion to Heidegger. Eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark 
Wrathall. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): pp. 392-406, p. 393. 
201 Michel Haar, “The History of Being and its Hegelian Model,” p. 49. 
 145 
explicit recognition, transformation, and appropriation of this first beginning as a 
heritage. This “other beginning” names, in Eric S. Nelson’s words, “the other of history 
entering into and potentially interrupting and transforming existing historical life.”202 A 
reflection on the first beginning shows that it “can never be repeated in the sense of a 
mere imitation, and that…it remains the only thing repeatable in the sense of a reopening 
of that by which the discussion has to commence if a beginning, and consequently the 
other beginning, is to come to be historically.”203 This “other beginning” does not imply 
that history has “ended” or that history is somehow impossible. Rather, the “other 
beginning” is a break with history as commonly understood and as traditionally 
experienced. It is an experience of an end that is at the same time another beginning, 
which Heidegger names “remembrance” or “recollective thinking” (Andenken). 
Historical reflection and recollective thinking is thus a movement between a first 
beginning and an other beginning. Recollective thinking is thus part of the dynamic 
tension between the first beginning and the other beginning. It looks back and thus steps 
back from the first beginning in order to grasp the meaning and essence of metaphysics. 
In so doing, it can look ahead to another beginning that is to come. The reason for the 
Janus-face of remembering the other beginning is that we are historically situated and 
finite, dwelling at the “end” of one mode of thinking and not yet crossed over to a “totally 
other” mode of thinking and relating to our own historical existence. As such, in 
experiencing the crisis of the present, the past is not entirely closed off to us; rather, it 
allows us to hear and respond to what the tradition has given to us as a task to re-
inaugurate a tradition. Thus, the other beginning experienced in remembering is one 
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where we distance ourselves from the past in order to experience it again, as if for the 
first time.204 
Heidegger’s conception of remembering means neither an imitation of the past 
nor an encounter of it “as it actually happened.” Rather, remembering is oriented toward 
the future, and toward the unfathomability of the “first beginning.” Eric Nelson again 
puts the point concisely: Heidegger attempts to encounter the past “from the non-identity 
and interruptive force of…the ‘other beginning,’ which is accessible in its relation to and 
difference from the first.”205 It refers to a time that cannot be determined through 
historiographical dating and always has the power to disrupt and call the present into 
question. Heidegger’s remembering reveals the mode of being of the historical and 
establishes a different relationship to history that can encounter, experience, and respond 
to the past. Remembering is thus shot through with otherness, such that we can never 
fully retrieve the past or determine and calculate what will happen. 
What, however, do this “other beginning” and the possibility of remembering 
have to do with the importance of tragedy? The experience of the tragic is essential to the 
experience of the historical. Karen Gover suggests that “the word ‘tragic’ is used to 
characterize a thinking that attempts to overcome metaphysics and to overcome it not by 
attempting to go beyond or to transcend the tradition, but rather by means of an 
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undergoing” of it.206 Heidegger appeals to Greek tragedy in order to describe the dynamic 
movement between the first beginning and the other beginning. Heidegger suggests that 
the recollection of aletheia “comes down to a discussion of the essential steps of the basic 
movement of the great Greek philosophy, whose beginning and end are attached to the 
names Anaximander and Aristotle.”207 Between them lies Sophoclean tragedy. 
Heidegger’s return to the Greeks is thus to be “supported by the question, the one through 
which the primordial Greek thinking must surpass itself and enter into another beginning” 
rather than slavishly attempt to imitate or reconstruct the Greek world.208 In other words, 
to think tragedy means to think through what the tradition has given us in order to 
inaugurate another beginning. It is to think through Greek tragedy other than the Greeks 
thought. Such a rethinking hopes to transform and open up other possibilities than those 
handed down and uncritically accepted. We must, in short, “remember” the meaning of 
Greek tragedy better than the Greeks knew it themselves in order to open up a different, 
other beginning of thinking. 
What does it mean to say that Heidegger thus wants to “remember” a sense of the 
tragic more tragic than the Greeks had conceived? In a dense passage in Mindfulness 
(Besinnung), Heidegger offers a dense, and often paradoxical, statement of the 
philosophical significance of tragedy and the tragic, by connecting it to the meaning of 
history. “By realizing that the ownmost of ‘the tragic’ consists in the beginning being the 
ground of the ‘going under,’ and the ‘going under’ not being the end but rather the 
rounding of the beginning we also realize that the tragic belongs to the sway of be-
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ing.”209 Just a few sentences later, Heidegger continues this thought: “what is 
fundamentally important is only the knowing-awareness of the beginning as the ground 
of the ‘going under’ that rounds the beginning.”210 “Going under” (Untergang), as Robert 
Gall notes, means “decline.”211 To go under is to experience time as disjointed; it is to 
“undergo” and suffer the slings and arrows of time. Gall writes, “tragedy shows us a 
passage, a going-between and falling-between past and future that nonetheless holds 
together…past and future in and through the present.”212 Such a transition between two 
times is held together in such a way that what has been and what will be are not abstractly 
related to the present, as if they were merely “no longer” or “not yet.” Rather, the 
transition holds together the having-been of the past and the yet-to-come of the future by 
giving meaning to the present. 
By suggesting that “going under” “rounds the beginning,” Heidegger thus 
implicitly reiterates the tenuous connection between the “first beginning” and the “other 
beginning,” present in the passage from Basic Questions of Philosophy. It is only by 
confronting the way that the Greeks had initially grasped the meaning of Being, that 
Heidegger can show how a particular understanding of Being has been at work 
throughout history and how it has withdrawn. If the present age is defined by its lack of 
raising the question of Being, a confrontation with the “decline” or “going under” of the 
present acknowledges the removal of a ground, or basis, for what takes place and for 
understanding being. It is an acknowledgement of the finitude and mortality of human 
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being. Going under indicates a time of transition between the first and other beginnings, 
and lets us see what it means to go about the world and undergo time. 
The tragic not only names the way that we undergo time; it also names, in 
Gover’s words, “the movement according to which the history of being paradoxically 
discloses itself through a kind of withdrawal.”213 The origin of this history discloses itself 
once its unfolding has reached its completion. Thus, the experience of history is one in 
which we undergo that which has already happened; we suffer consequences for actions 
that happened prior to our arrival. This is a common experience in Greek tragedy: 
Agamemnon has already sacrificed his daughter and led his soldiers to victory over the 
Trojans before the opening act of the Agamemnon; Clytemnestra has already killed 
Agamemnon at the beginning of The Libation Bearers; Orestes has already killed 
Clytemnestra as the Eumenides begins; Oedipus has already killed his father and 
unknowingly married his mother when Oedipus Rex begins; Polyneices is already dead, 
and Creon has already issued his edict that Polyneices shall not be given a proper 
burial.214 In this regard, the significance of the past only comes to light when it is too late, 
that is, when its possibilities have exhausted themselves and thus carry the characters 
along through to their end. 
At the same time, Heidegger clearly does not interpret the history of being in 
terms of the actions of individual humans. Rather, this “tragic” movement occurs at an 
epochal level, and thereby emphasizes the way that history carries along and implicates 
humans who have not intended or willed the consequences of its trajectory. To conceive 
history as tragic furthermore means to recognize that the unfolding of history operates 
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according to a hidden and concealed necessity. By recognizing this hidden necessity, one 
can begin to delineate way that humanity itself is both a victim who undergoes its 
“decline” and the protagonist who continues to perpetuate such a movement. As such, it 
is not as much a matter of transcending or inverting metaphysics, but “undergoing” it 
more essentially than before and witnessing it in its inevitable decline.215 
  Heidegger’s understanding of tragedy is thus ambiguous. On one hand, he 
specifically connects it with the works of Sophocles, thereby placing it in a specific place 
in the unfolding of aletheia before its degradation. On the other hand, from the point of 
view of the “end of metaphysics” where Heidegger now sees the present age standing, 
tragedy names the necessity and inevitability of the unfolding of the history of being. It is 
in this latter understanding of tragedy that he explicitly connects it to “undergoing” and 
“decline” (Untergang). Tragedy thus refers to a kind of loss or passing-away, a refusal or 
withdrawing, of Be-ing (Seyn). In the experience of tragedy, the past is left behind or 
future is renounced – yet in such a way that what has been or what will be gives meaning 
to the present. By leaving behind one’s past or future, one recognizes the way that their 
absences nevertheless are definitive of who they are.  
 Heidegger understands the “undergoing,” and by extension the historicity of be-
ing, as essentially tragic: “if in the thinking of beginning we speak of an ‘end,’ then this 
‘end’ never means a mere cessation and lessening but means rather the completion that 
equals but falls away from the beginning—a completion of that which the beginning 
posits and decides as possibilities by leaping ahead of its history.”216 The inceptive 
moment that initiates the beginning inaugurates an inevitable decline. To fulfill the 
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beginning means both to complete it and to exhaust its possibilities. As such, the tragic 
names the movement of the history of Being, which reveals itself only through its 
withdrawal, indeed to the point where such a withdrawal is no longer experienced as a 
withdrawal. The origin discloses itself as an origin only when its unfolding as history has 
been completed. The decline and withdrawal of metaphysics culminates in a situation 
where its possibilities are no longer viable, which thereby indicates the possibility of an 
other beginning. The tragic similarly confronts us with an “abyss,” the removal of a 
permanent ground that would secure beings in their presence. It presents us with the 
experience of our mortality, and implies that our finite being characterizes who we are. 
Heidegger thus turns to tragedy in order to show how we go about our existence, how we 
undergo our history, and how possibilities for understanding who we are no longer make 
sense, thereby give us the opportunity to open up a new history. 
 
III.3 Introduction to Metaphysics: The 1935 Interpretation of Antigone 
Heidegger interprets to Sophocles’ tragic poetry in Introduction to Metaphysics 
for two closely related reasons: first, in order to illuminate the relationship between the 
Greek experience of Being and Greek Dasein, and, second, so that he can bring this 
experience to bear on the present time, thereby opening new possibilities for life. In this 
manner, his interpretation is an instance of his desire to overcome metaphyiscs by 
experiencing it more originally than did the Greeks. Sophocles’ tragedies, along with the 
philosophical fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus, are key texts for understanding 
who we are because in them “Greek Being and Dasein [a Dasein belonging to Being] 
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were authentically founded”.217 The “poetic thinking” of Parmenides and Heraclitus 
contains the first “decisive determination” of being human, though it is only with the aid 
of Sophocles’ tragedy that we can finally “hear” what this determination might mean 
(IM, 154). By appealing to Sophoclean tragedy, Heidegger brings to light the site of a 
conflict, more specifically, the site where the dynamic, violent relationship between 
human being and Dasein happens. This conflict is capable of opening up the possibility 
of another history, one free from the constrictions of metaphysical thinking and capable 
of founding another understanding of who “we” are. This other sense of who “we” are is 
founded, not on nostalgia for a lost time, but on the recognition of the vulnerability and 
fragility of a common bond with the past. 
Heidegger’s turn to Sophoclean tragedy repeats the ontological, rather than 
chronological, origins of the history of a people, and more specifically the history of the 
West. Heidegger characterizes the difference between these two as the difference 
between a beginning and a commencement.218 A chronological beginning is that with 
which something starts. By contrast, a commencement is that form which something 
originates. For example, a war may begin with skirmishes; its commencement, however, 
began long before any actual fighting.219 The beginning often disappears as events 
progress, while the commencement only comes to light at the conclusion of such a 
course. By focusing on the ontological commencement, rather than its chronological 
beginning, Heidegger suggests that we come to appreciate what it means to be human 
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“only when humanity steps into the confrontation with beings by attempting to bring 
them into their Being—that is, sets beings into limits and form, projects something new 
(not yet present), originally poeticizes, grounds poetically” (IM 153-154). Human beings 
cannot start with the commencement, we can only see what it means to be human, in 
other words, with something that points to or indicates the origin.  Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Antigone is an attempt to indicate the commencement of western 
metaphysics.  
In order to “step into,” and thus experience, the ontological inception, he offers a 
striking interpretation of the choral ode of Antigone, one which is notable for a number of 
idiosyncracies. For one, it does not consider the plot of the text. Heidegger does not 
mention Antigone’s act of defiance, Creon, or even Antigone herself. Nor does his 
account include the final verse of the ode itself in which the chorus hopes that Antigone 
has not committed the crime of burying Polyneices.220 Instead, Heidegger separates the 
the ode from the context of the play, offering a nuanced, though no doubt coercive 
reading of this text. Words that are often translated into accessible and familiar language 
become jarring in his translation; the rhythms of everyday language become inadequate 
once we hear the poetic meter of the chorus. The importance of these jarring aspects of 
the poem serves a larger purpose: they wrench the reader out of the familiar, everyday 
world, leaving her without a way. “From the start [the poem] breaks up all everyday 
standards of questioning and defining” (IM, 158). This jarring, shattering effect of the 
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ode is emblematic of the human relation to Being itself—so much so that the ode 
participates in what it describes. 
 What permeates the choral ode, he says, “assails us three times, like a repeated 
assault, and from the start breaks up all everyday standards of questioning and defining” 
(IM, 158). These opening salvoes are three Greek phrases: to deinon, pantoporos aporos, 
and hupsipolis apolis. Heidegger interprets the latter two phrases as paradoxes, which 
might offend the sensibilities of those who would prefer a more traditional translation.221 
However, in forcing language to its breaking point, Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Sophocles intends to capture different moments in the Greek experience of the “opposed 
con-frontations of Being” (IM, 158). With Heidegger’s translation, these terms articulate 
the oppositional unity that characterizes the Greek experience of Being, but the Greeks 
did not explicitly develop. By unfolding them and standing within the clefts that they 
open, Heidegger intends to retrieve that which has been forgotten in order to open the 
possibility of an other beginning. 
The initial assault begins with the opening two lines, “polla ta deina…” which 
has been traditionally translated as “Many are the wonders, none/is more wonderful than 
what is man.”222 Rather than this classical rendering, Heidegger instead interprets it: 
“Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing/uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond 
him” (IM, 158). These first two lines of the choral ode characterize its fundamental idea, 
which Heidegger will continue to fill in as his interpretation progresses. In order to 
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unlock the meaning of the text, Heidegger focuses on the way that “the human being is, 
in one word, to deinotaton, the uncanniest” (IM, 159). The Greek word “deinon,” 
Heidegger argues, “provides the inner integrity of the poem and sustains and permeates 
the whole” of it (IM, 158). How, then, does Heidegger translate the term “deinon”? And 
what experience does he intend to capture?  
 The word deinon has a number of different meanings, which include wonderful, 
terrible, marvelous, strange, and powerful. In order to capture the range of these 
significations, Heidegger translates it with the word “unheimlich,” a word already 
familiar to readers of Being and Time, where it refers to the experience of anxiety, in 
which Dasein is confronted with itself in its barest facticity. In Introduction to 
Metaphysics, however, Heidegger wants to draw out the range of experiences contained 
in this word. Just as deinon has a plurivocity of meanings, the German word unheimlich 
combines oppositional meanings, which Heidegger takes advantage of in order to reveal 
the essence of human being. The word unheimlich is the opposite of heimlich, which 
means “familiar” and “native.” It also shares a semantic kinship with heimisch, that 
which belongs to the home. 223  One is at home in the familiar and everyday. Indeed, the 
familiar and everyday is where we take refuge and find protection from the truly 
disturbing. We are safe in the protection of the familiar home, in the heimlich. 
The unheimlich would thus seem to indicate that which is unhomely, unfamiliar, 
and uncanny. However, there is a further meaning to the heimlich that should be noted: it 
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can also mean “secret” or “concealed.”224 In this context, however, unheimlich does not 
mean unconcealed or the unhidden. Rather, the “un-” of unheimliche is like the “un-” of 
unmöglichkeit in Being and Time; it functions to intensify the meaning of the word. This 
prefix, as Carol White notes, can mean both “not” and “excessive amount.225 It thus 
belongs to two sets of meanings, which, while not contradictory, are different:  it is that 
which is familiar and that which is concealed and kept out of sight. Das Unheimliche is, 
in other words, the recognition of a strangeness that is part of the familiar, always lurking 
at the edges of the familiar but never noticed. It is strange that we do find things familiar 
at all, strange to be anything at all. When we recognize this uncanniness, it is a 
recognition of something that was there all along, but concealed rather than purely 
absent. The unheimlich, then, indicates an experience of unfamiliarity or strangeness of 
something that is deeply and intimately familiar. That which has been unconcealed was 
previously present, though unremarked upon, it jars us out of our everyday familiarity in 
becoming apparent. As a result, we discover who we are only when we are cast out of the 
home, and constantly being thrown out of the familiarities in which we previously sought 
refuge. The unsettling is both disruptive, insofar as it jars us out of the familiar, and 
disclosive, in so far as it reveals the ground of the familiar. 
The “uncanny” thus names the complex experience or happening of disclosure 
that displaces human being from its “home” in the familiar. “We understand the un-canny 
as that which throws one out of the ‘canny,’ that is, the homely, the accustomed, the 
usual, the unendangered. The unhomely does not allow us to be at home” (IM, 161). In 
displacing human beings from their “home” the uncanny makes that which was hidden, 
                                                
224 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” p. 125.  
225 Cf. Carol White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude. Ed. Mark Ralkowski (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2005): p. 88, note 71. 
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unhidden. While human being is secure in its home, such security comes with a price: 
specifically, security allows human being to hide its own being from itself. The uncanny 
thus exposes human beings in two senses: it displaces them from their familiar modes of 
understanding, valuing, and thinking, and it discloses the tendency to hide and find 
security from one’s very being. Rather than “uncanny,” it may thus be more exact to use 
the term “unsettling” to describe the unheimliche insofar as “unsettling” refers to 
something that jars us from our place.226 
 Furthermore, saturating the meaning of deinon is the presence of “power,” 
“force,” and “violence.”227 Indeed, for Heidegger the violence that characterizes deinon 
defines the fundamental relationship between Being and beings. Because human being is 
exposed to the tension between beings and Being, it is defined by and through violence. 
However, such violence is not to be construed as mere “brutality,” “arbitrariness,” or the 
deviation and transgression of a moral norm (IM, 160).228 The ontological dimension of 
violence that Heidegger indicates has nothing to do with the useless suffering that results 
from evil actions. Rather, it refers to the “overwhelming sway” of phusis (IM, 160). It 
suggests a gathering of elemental forces of nature, which threatens to overpower humans. 
The overwhelming power of das Gewaltige, also refers to the excessiveness proper to 
                                                
226 In translating unheimlich as ‘unsettling,’ I follow Claire Pearson Geiman’s translation in her essay 
“Heidegger’s Antigones”. Though the more common translation of unheimlich is ‘uncanny,’ ‘unsettling’ 
captures the sense of dwelling or settling that Heidegger draws upon in his understanding of the 
unheimlich. It furthermore clarifies the connection between the 1935 interpretation of Antigone with the 
1941 interpretation, which Heidegger puts more emphasis on the sense of dwelling that is at the root of the 
unheimlich. Cf. Geiman “Heidegger’s Antigones.” A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Ed. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 311, note 14.   
227 The German word for “power” that Heidegger uses is “Walt-,” whose compounds include the common 
words for government (e.g., Kommunalverwaltung). Authority (e.g., Amtsgewalt), being mighty or 
powerful (e.g., gewaltig), and for violence and violation (Gewalt). Cf. Gaiman, Heidegger’s Antigones, p. 
167. 
228 Heidegger goes on to suggest that “violence is usually seen in terms of the domain in which concurring 
compromise and mutual assistance set the standard for Dasein, and accordingly all violence is necessarily 
deemed only a disturbance and offence” (IM, 160). This everyday, politicized sense of violence is quite 
distinct from the “ontological” violence that characterizes Dasein. 
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Being itself. By translating this as “overwhelming sway,” we can see how this notion 
contains within it a kind of tension: it expresses the gathering together of the sway and its 
excessive character.229 
It is against this background of the formal and semantic considerations that the 
meaning of deinon as unheimlich needs to be further clarified. What is the experience of 
the uncanny? What is the occasion that motivates this experience? The first line of 
Heidegger’s interpretative translation of the ode seems to provide an answer to the first of 
these questions, “manifold is the uncanny;” many things can be said to be unsettling (IM, 
156). However, Heidegger does not interpret this line as naming the different things that 
are unsettling; rather he wants to examine how human beings exist as unsettling. Clare 
Pearson Geiman suggests three different, though intimately connected, meanings of 
deinon: 1) the totality of beings that confronts human being, which challenge, sustain, 
and envelop it; 2) the Being of this totality; and 3) the human being’s essential relation to 
both the totality of beings and to Being itself, and thus expresses the peculiarly human 
modes of acting and knowing. 230 
The first sense of deinon refers to the fundamental force or power of beings as a 
whole. It is “the overwhelming sway, which induces panicked fear, true anxiety, as well 
as collected, inwardly reverberating, reticent awe” (IM, 159). This overwhelming sway 
initially indicates the elemental power (Gewaltige) of beings to overpower and 
overwhelm (Überwältigende). It thus indicates the Being of beings in their powerful 
capacity, reaffirming Heidegger’s commitment to illuminate the finite ways that Being 
becomes manifest. This experience of the unsettling arises as we are exposed to the 
                                                
229 William McNeill. “Porosity: Violence and the Question of Politics in Heidegger’s Introduction to 
Metaphysics. The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14:2-15:1 (1991): pp. 183-212, p. 190. 
230 Clare Pearson Geiman, “Heidegger’s Antigones,” p. 166. 
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natural elements, an experience that both draws us close and induces fear and awe. The 
sublimity of nature threatens to overwhelm us, thus revealing our potential 
powerlessness, vulnerability, and impotency. The totality of beings, including the 
“foaming tide,” the “southerly tempest,” the “raging, clefted swells” each threaten to 
overwhelm and drown human being with its shear force. Deinon, in Heidegger’s 
interpretation, thus initially characterizes nature as an emerging, temporally ordered, 
force. 
The second sense of deinon refers to the Being of this totality. Heidegger suggests 
that this sense of deinon is connected to dikē. Eschewing traditional translations of dikē 
as “justice,” and purging it of its juridical and moral connotations, Heidegger 
idiosyncratically translates dikē as “fittingness” (IM, 171). In doing so, Heidegger 
indicates the “direction” that the “arrangement” of forces gives to the movement of 
power (IM, 171).231 It thus means something like according things their own fitting time 
and place. Deinon as dikē is both the dynamic structure of forces that confront the human 
being and the temporally unfolding movement of that very power. Rather than thinking 
nature as merely ordered according to static and abstract physical laws, Heidegger 
describes nature as a dynamic, emerging force that is temporally structured by the 
ordering of logos: “Being, phusis, is, as sway, originary gatheredness: logos. Being is 
fittingness that enjoins: dikē” (IM, 171). The conception of Being as the “overwhelming 
                                                
231 The German word Heidegger uses to translate dikē is “Fug,” which is rather difficult to translate. Dennis 
Schmidt offers a few idiomatic expressions to help clarify its meaning, including “mit Fug und Recht” (“to 
be fully justified” or “to have full right”) and “die Zeit ist aus den Fugen” (“time is out of joint”).  Schmidt, 
On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 250-251. Clare Pearson Gaiman notes a further semantic relationship 
between Fug and a musical fugue, which is a composition of music with many voices based on a single 
melody and repeated in various ways. Cf. “Heidegger’s Antigones” note 12, p. 311. 
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sway” exceeds, shatters, and otherwise resists the human inventions and creations that 
attempt to master it and make it fully intelligible. 
 The third and final sense of deinon is captured in the sense of the human being as 
the one who uses violence. Deinon in this sense “means the violent in the sense of one 
who needs to use violence—and does not have violence at his disposal but is violence-
doing, insofar as using violence is the basic trait not just of his doing but of his Dasein” 
(IM, 160). Human beings are unsettling because they are “exposed to this overwhelming 
sway” and more importantly “because they are violence-doing” (IM, 160). Rather than 
understand violence as a specific act against an established order or against others, 
Heidegger sees in human beings an essential, “ontological” violence. Because they are 
the most unsettling, humans are violent from the “ground up” because they “[use] 
violence against the overwhelming” (IM, 160). Human beings both belong to the 
overwhelming sway of Being, while at the same time struggle mightily against this very 
sway. As such, human Dasein marks the site where the violence of Being turns against 
itself. 
Heidegger connects this sense of violence with technē, or the human 
resourcefulness and ingenuity that found or establish a world. Technē does not primarily 
refer to the production or creation of artifacts; it refers to a kind of knowing, one which 
“[puts] Being to work in a being,” and “brings Being to stand and to manifestation as a 
being” (IM, 170). The poem sings the praises of the inventiveness of human beings, who 
are able to set sail over the foaming tide, tame wild beasts, and till the earth, and create 
shelter from raging storms. In Heidegger’s idiom, technē refers less to the production or 
craftwork of particular tools or objects than to the ability to “set Being into work as 
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something that in each case is in such and such a way” (IM, 170).232 Echoing the 
hermeneutic structure of understanding in Being and Time, technē “sets to work in 
advance that which gives to what is already present at hand its relative justification, its 
possible determinateness, and thus its limit” (IM, 170). Technē refers to how humans are 
“initially and constantly looking out beyond what, in each case, is directly present at 
hand” (IM, 169). Rather than see things in terms of their actuality, we see things in terms 
of their possibilities. To see a field as fertile or fallow, a river as a waterway, or rock as 
building material, is to see them in terms of their possibilities. These very acts change the 
human understanding of land, of nutrition, rural and urban centers of commerce, and so 
forth, showing them to have always harbored such a possibility. Doing so does not 
merely control nature, but instead it enables the overwhelming force of nature to appear 
in the first place. In short, it aids in setting up a world. In so doing, technē “works out” 
the manifestation of Being in history. 
Human beings are thus doubly uncanny. On one hand, we live in the midst of the 
unsettling and are exposed to the “overwhelming sway,” which throws us out of that 
which is “homely.” On the other hand, we actively transcend the limits of the homely. As 
Heidegger puts it: 
Human beings are the uncanniest, not only because they spend their lives 
essentially in the midst of the un-canny understood in this sense [of the 
overwhelming], but also because they step out, move out of the limits that 
at first and for the most part are accustomed and homely, because as those 
who do violence, they overstep the limits of the homely, precisely in the 
direction of the uncanny in the sense of the overwhelming. (IM, 161) 
 
                                                
232 In “On the Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger expands his understanding of technē and dikē by 
interpreting them in terms of the dyad ‘world’ and ‘earth’ respectively. Whereas the violence of technē 
opens up a world, dikē refers to the resistance of the earth to final and total mastery. As such, technē, 
Heidegger writes, “puts Being to work (Er-wirkt) in a being” (IM, 170). Through the artwork, beings come 
to appear as what they are. Importantly, it is in the work of tragedy that “human being” is “set to work.” 
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Human beings erects marvels to behold and expose themselves to Being; but in doing so, 
their works shatter against the enigma of Being. Robert Gall thus suggests that by 
“violating familiar limits, human beings show what is native (heimisch), essential, to who 
they are.”233 This means that the unsettling is not some accidental feature or property of 
human being, but instead is a kind of fate that human being must endure and suffer as its 
own. The transgression of limits thus constitutes, challenges and undermines human 
existence. The unsettling element of this ode to which Heidegger calls our attention thus 
suggests that the overwhelming and unsurpassable emerges in, through, and from our 
very actions and refuses our control. 
 Heidegger further develops the dynamic, even paradoxical, characterization of the 
relationship between human being, the overwhelming sway of beings, and Being by 
focusing on the movement inherent in two phrases: pantoporos aporos and hupsipolis 
apolis. While his interpretation of both phrases distorts their “literal” meaning, Heidegger 
suggests that they designate a conflict that characterizes the connection between human 
existence and Being. Pantoporos aporos, which Heidegger translates, “many ways 
without a way,” indicates humanity’s continuous attempts to make a home for itself in the 
overwhelming sway of beings. As noted above, technē is the way in which human beings 
make their way through the wolrd, and it also reveals the essential homelessness of our 
Being. This unsettling nature of being human suggests that to lack a determinate place 
constitutes what it means to be human. In being unsettled we are expelled from our 
world—the uncanny jars us from those possibilities that we had settled upon for 
understanding our world. However, being thusly unsettled we often tie ourselves all the 
more tightly to that world. 
                                                
233 Gall, “Interrupting Speculation,” p. 185. 
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 However, the relationship does not have a chronological progression, as if 
humans were first exposed to the overwhelming, and then try to find a place in it. 
Heidegger claims, quite to the contrary, that, “in all this they first become the uncanniest, 
because now, as those who on all ways have no way out, they are thrown out of all 
relation to the homely, and atē, ruin, calamity, overtakes them” (IM, 162). Human beings 
are those beings who make things and, in so doing, make and remake the world as all the 
more familiar. At the same time, such making and remaking all the more entrenches 
humanity’s essential homelessness. It is therefore not the case that humans first 
experience the unsettling and then try to make a home; rather Dasein finds itself 
accustomed to a particular “route” or mode of self-understanding. It is because the 
familiar inexorably tugs at us that the most pressing concerns of our own Being do not 
explicitly become an issue for us. Because we are everywhere, always already underway, 
we find no final way out. What is unsettling then is that we discover who we are only 
when we discover that the familiarity of our existence is quite strange. We find ourselves 
ensnared in the familiar; or to use the language of Being and Time, we find ourselves 
entangled in the fallenness of the everyday.  
Pantoporos aporos therefore means that the strange nature of humans lies in their 
attempt to try to make their way in the world, yet without ever finally transcending the 
world once and for all. Humans are essentially resourceful, having many routes and ways 
(pantoporos) that enable them to continuously make the world a hospitable, even 
familiar, place for human dwelling. However, this essence turns into its opposite, insofar 
as human beings “are continually thrown back on the paths that they themselves have laid 
out; they get bogged down in routes, get stuck in ruts, and by getting stuck they draw in 
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the circle of their world, get enmeshed in seeming, and thus shut themselves out of 
Being” (IM, 168). Thus, in having many routes, or possibilities for understanding our 
world, we find ourselves without a way (aporos), and confront an impossible possibility. 
Not only does the latter suggest that we are unable to have complete mastery over the 
world, despite our attempts to find our way. It also suggests that our desire to make our 
way in the world closes us off to who we are. 
The tension between the disclosive and concealing power of technē echoes 
Heidegger account of death in Being and Time. The ways and routes established through 
technē become undone in the experience of death, which confronts us with the possibility 
of absolute impossibility of exising. Insofar as such possibilities arise from our very 
Being, the lack of the “way out” cannot be understood as an external limit. It is instead a 
kind of “internal” limit that characterizes the way that we are “everywhere underway.” 
Heidegger reminds us that humans have no way out in the face of death, which shuts “us 
simply and suddenly out from everything homely once and for all” (IM, 169). There is no 
exit from death, no resource that would help us control or tame this limit beyond limits. It 
is precisely because death cannot be mastered that it enables human beings to retrieve the 
experience of the originary force of Being. Being-toward-death opens up the possibility 
of a new relationship to the world, and is found in the way that we relate to, or fail to 
relate to, our ownmost possibilities at all. 
 Hupsipolis apolis, which Heidegger formulates as the paradox “towering high 
above the city and citiless,” specifies some of the communal implications of human 
beings’ uncanniness. In setting up a home, humans drive themselves from that home (IM, 
162). As the site that enables various possibilities to be actualized and given concretion, 
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the founding of the polis also exiles the human.234 While the common understanding of 
the polis is the city, Heidegger interprets the Being of the polis as the ontological “site” 
where human beings are unsettling, one which makes possible the empirical and 
historical city-state. The polis corresponds to the existential structure of “world” that 
Heidegger first described in Being and Time. Where in the latter, the world refers to the 
totality of significations or web of meaningful relations through which Dasein 
understands itself, the polis on Heidegger’s interpretation is “pre-political” insofar as it 
allows political institutions to come into being, and is the “originally unifying unity of 
what strives in confrontation” (IM, 139). In other words, if we interpreted a polis 
ontologically, we would find that the various structures of the city—its walls, statues, 
festivals, and buildings—mean something because of the possibilities for existing that 
they reveal. The polis, in other words, attests to the confrontation between humans and 
overwhelming totality of beings—two things which are wholly incommensurate. The 
foundational act of human knowing and work creates a space for the being of beings to 
become manifest. To set up a world, or found the rule and measure for human being as 
the polis, humans are unable to be fully bound by that order. In other words, the only way 
for humans to exist is to exist as dwelling without a home, in search of a home. This “pre-
political” conception of the polis thus marks the place where human beings become at 
home, and at the same time homeless, in the face of the overwhelming. 
 While Heidegger underplayed the historical dimensions of the world in Being and 
Time, he does not do so in his interpretation of the polis. In its ontological sense, “the 
polis is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which and for which history 
                                                
234 For a sustained interpretation of the polis in Heidegger’s oeuvre, see Miguel de Beistegui’s book 
Heidegger and the Political. (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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happens” (IM, 162). Those poets and thinkers that found the site of history are those who 
“use violence as violence-doers and become those who rise high in historical Being as 
creators, as doers” (IM, 163). In creating order and governance for the city, they rise high 
in it. In so doing, however, they become without a city. Again, as with his 
characterizations of to deinon and pantoporos aporos, we find that hupsipolis apolis 
indicates the violence both of a gathering together as well as an excess that threatens to 
overwhelm and bring to ruin. Indeed, just as the threat of death permeates Dasein as a 
limit against which its resourcefulness shatters, arising from the nature of Dasein itself to 
the point of constituting its nature, the threat of the unhistorical threatens to overwhelm 
and bring to ruin historical Dasein. The founding of history in and through the violence of 
setting to work being into beings is part of human resourcefulness, yet this 
resourcefulness always is in danger of being overwhelmed by a countermovement that 
arises from within itself.  
 The human activity of technē is caught in a paradoxical necessity. On the one 
hand, Dasein is creative insofar as it can secure and establish a world through it. It orders, 
stabilizes, and controls the forces of nature, and helps to create the possibility for 
standards of justice and governance, and any possible configuration of communal 
existence. On the other hand, technē is not a separate power that humans bring to bear on 
nature. It is instead the actualization and mastery of forces that implicitly belong to 
beings in general and to Being as such. “Language, understanding, mood, passion, and 
building are no less part of the overwhelming violence than sea and earth and animal” 
(IM, 166). These abilities pervade human beings to such an extent that “they have to take 
[them] over expressly as the beings that they themselves are” (IM, 166). The violence of 
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technē, which discloses beings, Heidegger writes, “is a disciplining and disposing of the 
violent forces by virtue of which beings disclose themselves as such” (IM, 167). Dasein 
is thus pressed, beyond its own action, into the site of its disclosure. It is the relationship 
to Being that defines human being, thus suggesting that it is not humans that make history 
through great deeds but that history makes human being. 
Human being is forced to be the “site of openness,” in which there is a struggle 
between the presence of a world and those possibilities that threaten to undermine and 
destroy such a world (IM, 174). Ruin and disaster is not merely one possible outcome of 
life, it is basic to the structure of human existence, and belongs to the way that human 
being appears in history: “historical humanity’s Being-here means: being-posited as the 
breach into which the excessive violence of Being breaks in its appearing, so that this 
breach shatters against itself” (IM, 174). Furthermore, as the breach, “the Dasein of 
historical humanity is an in-cident, the incident in which the violent powers of the 
released excessive violence of Being suddenly emerge and go to work as history” (IM, 
174). Insofar as human being is the “site of openness,” it is also the uncanniest. Though it 
is always at the mercy of the overwhelming power of nature, it nevertheless feels the 
impulse to oppose it and transform it into its own abode. However, it is also in this very 
gesture, through the creativity of technē, that human being unleashes the frightful and 
overwhelming power of nature. Heidegger puts this point thusly: 
For the poet, the assault of technē against dikē is the happening through 
which human beings become homeless. When one is put out of the home 
in this way, the home first discloses itself as such. But at the same time, 
and only in this way, the alienating first discloses itself, the overwhelming 
as such. In the happening of uncanniness, beings as a whole open 
themselves up. This opening up is the happening of unconcealment. This 
is nothing other than the happening of uncanniness. (IM, 178) 
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It is the “happening” of uncanniness that is at the same time the “happening” of history. 
The site of human historical dwelling, the polis, is at the same time the place of its 
homelessness, such that to dwell homelessly is to dwell historically. The polis is the place 
where the confrontation between technē and dikē occurs, such that the violent 
overwhelming and its counterturning come to light in art, language, and poetry. It is only 
because human beings are uncanny that there is history. 
It is in tragedy that the Greek heritage comes into its fullest expression. Heidegger 
writes: “the Greeks had a deep intimation of [the sudden and violent power of Being] and 
uniqueness of Dasein, an intimation into which they were urged by Being itself, which 
disclosed itself to them as phusis and logos and dikē” (IM, 174-175). Human beings are 
the most unsettling because it is, as Miguel de Beistegui argues, “in his very opposition to 
the overwhelming ruling of nature he brings the uncanniness of nature to stand and shine 
forth in the work.”235 At the point where human being “comes to posit himself in the 
midst of beings, in what appears like a triumphant stand, the very power of nature comes 
to be exposed in its irreducible unmasterability.”236 The essence of human being becomes 
apparent when it is forced beyond itself, such as when one’s creations and pretenses to 
knowledge wind up undoing him or her. 
Though Heidegger does not explicitly make this connection, it is clear that 
something like this occurs in Greek tragedy. Oedipus, for example, becomes undone 
when his attempts to find out who made Thebes impure lead back to himself. Similarly, 
Antigone’s attempt to honor her brother by burying him ends with her own entombment. 
Tragedy thus indicates the structure of world formation, how they come into Being, and 
                                                
235 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, p. 125. 
236 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, p. 125. 
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the violent possibilities of existing that confront human being with the possibility of 
disaster. In the drive for mastery, knowledge, and dominion human being’s fatal undoing 
becomes inevitable. The reason for this is that the original relation between technē and 
dikē comes to be the ordering of the world through technology. While technē initially 
discloses the power of the overwhelming sway, it soon overtakes nature in an attempt not 
to disclose it but to control it. The result of this is that the originary violence and 
uncanniness that characterizes the Greek sense of the Being of beings becomes concealed 
by the strategies of global technology and the forgetfulness of Being. 
We should be careful at this point, for it is easy to fall into thinking that 
Heidegger’s language indicates a willful, “Promethean” subject who performs acts of 
violence against the established norm.237 Heidegger is in fact wary of the willful subject, 
and often suggests that the conception of human being as creative and heroic in fact 
conceals the original strife that underlies and makes possible its very Being. Rather, 
human being is compelled or forced into the “in-cident” or “breach.” It is forced into 
being-there (Da-sein). Heidegger writes that the “necessity of shattering can subsist only 
insofar as what must shatter is urged into such Being-here. But the human being is urged 
into such Being-here, thrown into the urgency of Being, because the overwhelming as 
such, in order to appear in its sway, requires the site of openness for itself” (IM, 173). 
Thus, by blindly resisting the overwhelming sway, through the construction of a world, 
human beings also necessitate their own downfall. The downfall is thus not a result of a 
lust for glory in battle; it is instead the result of blindness and ignorance, which constitute 
the conditions for all knowing, that is, questioning: “the greatness and genuineness in 
                                                
237 Véronique Fóti, for example, in her essay “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sopoclean Tragedy” suggests that 
“the figure of man, the creator, is drawn with Promethean pathos,” Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on 
the Work of the 1930s. Ed. James Risser (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999): pp. 163-186, p. 169. 
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historical knowing lie in the character of this inception as a mystery” (IM,166). Like 
Oedipus, then, we do not know who we are, and that is who we are; our Being is a 
question for us. However, this very condition both motivates questioning, and brings 
about our ruin. 
What it means to be human is manifest only when humans are pushed, beyond 
their own actions, to the limits of existence. As such, Heidegger writes, “insofar as 
humans are, they stand in the no-exit of death” (IM, 169). Just as in Being and Time, 
where the unsettling (unheimliche) opens up the possibility of authentically relating to 
one’s own finitude, Heidegger’s use of the unsettling continues to resonate with the 
experience of finitude and death. The work of technē, which is at the same time the 
institution of human historical existence, is at the same time the work of death. In other 
words, the work of technē, in projective acts of disclosure, brings with it the inevitable 
ruin that is at the limit of each project. Though what it means to be is only manifest 
through human beings, the opening of human beings shatters them against the 
overwhelming itself. The very fact that we do not know who we are forces us to try to 
master ourselves, though it is through this very desire that we come to ruin.  
Greek tragedy teases out the experience of the always present possibility of a sudden 
reversal, as well as the singularity of each existing Dasein. By returning to Antigone, 
even in a strained translation of one passage that threatens to collapse, Heidegger 
attempts to recapture the experience of Being that the Greeks felt. Thus, what Heidegger 
wanted to retrieve through his interpretation of the choral ode is the a sense of what 
motivated the Greeks to the heights of poetry and philosophy, rather than the crude 
classicism that is found in academic texts or in the superficial appropriation of Greek 
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values by political institutions and parties (Cf. IM, 213). The result of this, Heidegger 
hopes, is to reconnect a people with its heritage. 
We are now in a position to sketch out the reason why Heidegger’s turn to tragedy 
in Introduction to Metaphysics can illuminate the possibility and meaning of history for a 
people. History, rather than a series of events that can be placed into a narrative, 
transports humanity “back to the being that it itself is and has to be” (IM, 153). History is 
the transportation of a people into its heritage or what Heidegger sometimes calls 
“endowment.” It is, in other words, a potential community becoming an actual, living 
community. In Being and Time, we saw that this process required the individually 
existing Dasein to critically distance itself from current public opinion and the projection 
of a future based on its heritage. While Heidegger has shifted focus from the individually 
existing Dasein to the Dasein of a people, his account of the appropriation and 
transmission of tradition remains the same. The Being of the Dasein of a people (Volk) is 
a matter of actively remembering, retrieving, and appropriating its heritage (IM, 41).238 
Formally speaking, this means to project a possibility that one has taken over from its 
past. This requires overcoming the disguised, fractured tradition that is uncritically 
passed down. 
                                                
238 The notion of “Volk” is highly contested in Heidegger circles because of its appropriation by the politics 
of National Socialism. However, it is also important to note that Volk has no necessary connection to race, 
as the Nazi’s loudly claimed. Aside from terminological considerations, it is also clear that as Heidegger 
uses this term, he uses it in order to come to grips with the crisis that Europe, and specifically Germany, 
was experiencing during the 1930s. For nuanced accounts of Heidegger’s relationship to the politics of his 
times see: Richard Wolin, ed. The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1993); Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis, eds. The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Gregory Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to 
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Charles Bambach, Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, 
National Socialism, and the Greeks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Miguel de Beistegui, 
Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (New York: Routledge Press, 1998). 
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Greek tragedy, when understood in conjunction with Heidegger’s account of 
Greek Dasein, expresses and enacts the structure of appropriating and transmitting one’s 
heritage. While human beings are caught in a paradox—that of being in the position to 
create order and the necessity to continually call this order into question—such a paradox 
entails that “the Dasein of historical humanity is an in-cident, the incident in which the 
violent powers of the released excessive violence of Being suddenly emerge and go to 
work as history” (IM, 174). By putting Being to work, a heritage is appropriated and 
determines the outline or shape of a historical people’s proper future, its destiny (IM, 47). 
The appropriation of a heritage allows a people to become united by a commitment to a 
common project and a shared destiny. Because the disclosure of Being remains 
appropriate for humans through the work of technē, and will ultimately be shattered 
against its own internal limits of disclosure, the only measure for its historical greatness 
is the extent to which it engages the past and draws out the hidden possibilities of that 
historical tradition (IM 41). Without the founding, creative acts of the poets, thinkers, 
priests, and rulers there is no meaning.  
Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Antigone runs closely parallel to its 
drama, even if it does not explicitly engage it. Antigone’s burial of her brother introduces 
her, offers a “space of appearance” that sets into motion the “overwhelming” force of the 
plot, and culminates in Antigone’s live burial by Creon. Thus, the play’s climax is where 
the contradiction between Creon’s and Antigone’s respective claims becomes most 
apparent, where their respective fates play out. Antigone is hupsipolis insofar as she is 
defined by her identification with divine laws, which grounds the human law by 
organizing and taking care of property, family rites, and recognizing the particularity of 
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each member of the family. She is also apolis, insofar as the divine law comes to oppose 
the human laws of justice and politics in the play, which ultimately leads to her burial at 
the limits of the city. Both Creon and Antigone, in being stubbornly attached to their 
respective “worlds,” come face-to-face with the “no exit” of death, the untenable 
exclusivity of their positions, self-understanding, and lives. In this manner, the play 
reveals the “singularity” of each protagonist by paying tribute to their struggle that 
defines them as human being. 
Despite the parallel, there are significant ways that Heidegger fails to appropriate 
the meaning of this tragedy. For example, Véronique Fóti writes that Heidegger construes 
human being’s resourcefulness “exclusively in terms of the ontological status of human 
creations, to the exclusion of questions concerning singular agency or the political 
arena.”239 As a result there is little connection between Antigone’s burial of Polyneices 
and her own burial by Creon and Heidegger’s own conception of technē as “violence-
doing” against the “overwhelming sway” of Being. Her burial, dramatically speaking, is 
imbued with two meanings: it refers, on the one hand, to her intention to fill the tomb of 
Polyneices, and, on the other hand, because she too is buried, it constitutes her bridal 
chamber and marriage to death. As she approaches her tomb, she remarks: “Tomb, bridal 
chamber, prison forever/dug in rock, it is to you I am going/to join my people, that great 
number that have died.” 240 She thus understands her own death as a marriage to those in 
her family who have already died.241 Even if we shift the emphasis to Creon’s actions, 
specifically his own edict to leave Polyneices’ corpse exposed to the elements and burial 
                                                
239 Fóti, “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy,” p. 169. 
240 Antigone, Trans. David Grene, lines 891-893. 
241 Cf. also Judith Butler’s Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (New York: Columbia 
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of Antigone, we come no closer to understanding the meaning of technē as it reveals and 
is overwhelmed by the powerful forces of nature.  
The tension between Heidegger’s account of tragedy’s significance and Antigone 
itself results in the inability to fulfill the promise to retrieve the Greek experience of 
Being because he neglects the concrete contexts in which remembering occurs in 
Antigone. The play, significantly, focuses on the proper way to remember and honor the 
dead—a conflict that takes the form of the issue of burial. The individual’s death both 
links together and destroys bond between the family and the community. Death links the 
two because death in the protection of the polis is the highest duty an individual can 
perform for his community, and the burial of the individual by the family restores his or 
her singularity. While death equalizes people, burial emphasizes that it was this person 
who lived and died. At the same time, death undermines the familial bond because, for 
Antigone, Creon’s refusal of burial rites for Polyneices does not restore the equilibrium 
between the community and the family. Antigone’s burial, in both senses of the genitive, 
becomes a sign of the tragic distortedness of the Theban community rather than the site 
where the singularity of the dead individual is honored. Indeed, part of what makes 
Antigone a tragic figure is that the loss of her brother is not recognized by Creon as a 
legitimate loss. Her attempt to mourn is not recognized by the political community, thus 
doubling her loss: not only has she lost her brother, but she has lost the ability to mourn 
for her loss. The connection between the dynamic of concealing and revealing that 
characterizes the Greek experience of Being and tension between the burial and the 
exposure of the corpse that runs throughout Antigone is a missed opportunity to 
understand the ontological possibilities contained in remembering and mourning.  
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  To the extent that Heidegger does not name Antigone or her act, he too misses the 
significance of remembering that this play introduces. He fails to call attention to how 
specific forms of remembering, such as burial, contribute to the maintenance of the bond 
between the living and the dead. Additionally, given that the polis is characterized as 
conflicted unity, he fails to recognize how such a bond is vulnerable—it might not be 
recognized by others as a legitimate connection to the past and to the dead. This means 
that Heidegger’s own interpretation fails to measure up to its task of retrieving the Greek 
sensibility because it does not recognize the fragility of those acts through which we 
remember the past. It would have to call attention to itself as an act of remembrance, 
which the account given in Introduction to Metaphysics does not fully accomplish. For an 
account of Antigone that calls attention to itself as remembrance—perhaps even 
poeticizing the essence of remembrance—we turn to his 1942 his lecture course entitled, 
Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister.   
 
III.4 Hölderlin’s Hymn: “The Ister”: The 1942 Interpretation of Antigone 
In the early 1940s, Heidegger revisits the connection between remembering and 
tragedy in his back-to-back lecture courses on Hölderlin’s hymns “Remembrance” and 
“The Ister.” Strikingly, in both semesters, Heidegger connects his reading of one of 
Friedrich Hölderlin’s poems with the experience of the Greek tragic festival. In doing so, 
he deepens and modifies the conception of tragedy first introduced in Introduction to 
Metaphysics by explicitly connecting it to the structure of remembering. These poems 
thus offer Heidegger an occasion for reflecting on what we have inherited from the 
Greeks, and what heritage is to be our own to pass to the future. The structure of tragedy, 
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which Heidegger now interprets through the image of the Ister, will provide a path for 
understanding the “course of remembrance,” and the structure of remembering will 
illuminate the meaning of tragedy for the contemporary age.242 
Just as in the 1935 interpretation, Heidegger’s return to Antigone takes the form of 
a digression from the main theme of the course. However, where Sophocles’ poetry was 
enlisted to clarify Parmenides “poetic thinking,” in 1942 the same choral ode is used in 
order to reveal a complementary poetic sensibility between Sophocles and Hölderlin. 
This shift immediately suggests a modification in Heidegger’s own understanding of the 
relationship between the Germans and the Greeks. In his earlier interpretation, 
Heidegger’s remembering and retrieval of the Greeks is a projection of his own heritage 
because the Greeks and the Germans share the same heritage; to remember the Greeks 
means acknowledging a debt to them and project an understanding of ourselves on that 
basis. In 1942, however, Heidegger recognizes the impossibility of retrieving the Greek 
world, thus making remembering (Andenken) a matter of recognizing first that the Greek 
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world is no longer our own and, second, that it is a non-appropriative preparation for new 
possibilities for understanding who we are. 
Heidegger’s revisions to his interpretation of Antigone have not gone unnoticed. 
For some, it sheds light on his political commitments and his deepening reservations 
about the on-going war in Germany. Véronique Fóti suggests that these reservations are 
notably evident because Heidegger’s “entire rhetoric has changed from a rhetoric of 
power to a rhetoric of alienation.”243 This rhetorical shift signals a change from the 
violent and uncanny conflict between technē and dikē to a conception of the uncanny that 
emphasizes human being’s unhomely character. Kathleen Wright interprets such a 
rhetorical shift as a desire on Heidegger’s part to conceal the “militantly political version 
of the essence of poetry and poetic dwelling” in the 1930s with the “quietism” of his later 
years because of his political failings.244 
Heidegger himself has interpreted these lectures in terms of an encrypted critique 
of National Socialism.245 We should, for obvious reasons, be wary of Heidegger’s own 
recommendation for understanding the meaning of this course. Not only may we be 
naturally suspicious of his motives, but we may question his assumed transparent self-
understanding and the attempt to control the interpretation of his work. More 
hermeneutically, taking these suggestions can foreclose the possibility of genuinely 
coming to an understanding of what is being said in these lectures. 
If Heidegger’s return to the ode is not primarily motivated by political concerns, 
and if it cannot be fully explained by the historical and political conditions of war-torn 
                                                
243 Véronique Fóti, “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy,” p. 173. 
244 Kathleen Wright, “Heidegger and the Authorization of Hölderlin’s Poetry,” Martin Heidegger: Politics, 
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245 Cf. Véronique Fóti, “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy,” p. 165. 
 178 
Germany, what motivates his return to it? Julian Young offers an interesting suggestion 
worth developing. He writes that Heidegger’s “attempt to portray Hölderlin’s 
‘remembrance’ of Greece as a reminding us of our true gods [was] a bad mistake” 
because it prevented him from listening to and being educated by what Hölderlin had to 
say about the relationship between tragedy, remembering, and the Greeks.246 Rather than 
retrieve a specific content of the Greek world, Heidegger instead turns his sights on the 
structure of remembering. The way we experience remembering, its form, thus is more 
important than the content of what we remember. 
In order to show how tragedy offers a structure for remembering, it will first be 
useful to rethink some of Heidegger’s reasons for retrieving the Greeks. Heidegger still 
maintatins that the forgetfulness of Being characterizes the present age and uses a number 
of striking metaphors to describe it, including calling it a time of “destitution,”247 a time 
of “night,”248 and a time of “winter.”249 Calculative thinking is a consequence of 
forgetfulness, which obscures the way that we experience Being. Human action is 
interpreted, under calculative thinking, as “that which a process yields and provides a 
result.”250 The contemporary age is characterized by its drive to order things, amass 
results, and judge something in terms of its usefulness. “The only thing that is ever 
questionable,” Heidegger writes, “is how we can measure and fathom and exploit the 
world as quickly as possible, as securely as possible, and as completely as possible” 
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(HHI, 42). This suggests a deeper problem than merely not knowing who we are. Not 
only do we not know who we are, but this very problem is no longer experienced as a 
problem for us any longer.  
The reason for this forgetfulness of Being is, simply put, that the modern age 
lacks a festival.251 More specifically, not only does the present age lack a festival but it 
does not even recognize that it lacks a festival. The result of this lack has significant 
implications for understanding the meaning of communal life and the meaning of history. 
It suggests that we tend to take our life in common for granted and as no longer in need 
of being questioned. It is as if our communal narrative identity has become self-evident. 
What thus needs to be grasped through the festive celebration is the way that we come to 
challenge who we are through the course of remembering, thus offering the possibility for 
configuring another sense of who we are. The festival thus offers an occasion for 
remembering who we are by calling our everyday practices into question, thus 
inaugurating history. 
What makes Greece unique, Heidegger claims, is that its calendar “is actually 
(eigentlich) a festival calendar.”252 The experience of festive time inaugurates another 
history because it offers an experience of time distinct from everyday time. To observe a 
holiday means “setting oneself outside everyday activity, the cessation of work.”253 A 
cessation of work is distinct from a break from work or a vacation. Such is the difference 
between describing the Sabbath, for example, as the day of rest, and calling a Saturday 
                                                
251 Cf. Heidegger. Hölderlin’s Hymne: Andenken: pp 59-85  
252 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymne: Andenken, p. 67 (my translation). 
253 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn: Andenken, p. 62 (my translation). 
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the first day of the weekend.254  One ceases to work during a festival, not merely to rest 
and steel oneself for the oncoming work week, but to develop connection with the sacred 
and the holy. During a holiday, Heidegger continues, we “step into the…intimation of the 
wonder that all around us a world worlds at all, that there is something rather than 
nothing, that there are things, and that we ourselves are in their midst, that we ourselves 
are and nevertheless hardly know who we are, and hardly know that we do not know all 
of this.”255 Thus, when, as Hölderlin writes in “Remembrance,” one passes “a fragrant 
cupful of dark light, that I might rest,” on such a holiday, it is done so Heidegger argues, 
“in the poetic sense of the poet, the wedding festival between men and gods.”256 The 
poetic memory at work in “Remembrance”, according to Heidegger, thus steps outside 
the everyday and the ordinary in order to experience the holy. It is this experience of the 
holy that inaugurates a memory of another kind of experience of time and a different 
experience of history. 
The Greek festival Hölderlin has in mind here, according to Heidegger, is tragedy: 
“The tragedies (Trauerspiele) of the Greeks are festivals. It says: here, decisions are 
made about the rejoinder (Entgegnung) and also the rejoinder (Entgegnung) of the people 
and the gods.”257 Tragedy constitutes a people insofar as it places them into contact with 
the holy. Furthermore, the festivals of tragedy constitute history: “Festivals are the 
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authentic (eigenlichen) days of history: history making days.”258 Festivals do not merely 
commemorate something that has passed, but they help to prepare for what is to come. 
Thus, the poet’s reference to the festival day that marks the beginning of spring, that day 
in March “when night and day are equal,” in fact marks the transition from the foreign, 
which calls us into question, to the home. As a result, the poet’s founding of history 
through tragic poetry is a cause for both mourning and for celebration.259 Because the 
festive experience through tragedy is no longer available to us, we can only experience 
the festival as a loss and as absent. Though Hölderlin’s memory directs us toward the 
festival, it does so only in terms of an absence and as no longer our own to appropriate. It 
is thus in order to restore a sense of the tragic that is appropriate to our own times and our 
own sensibility, that Heidegger finds an interlocutor in both Hölderlin and Sophocles. As 
such, we can understand the reason for Heidegger’s return to Sophoclean poetry as an 
attempt to bring the lecture’s listeners, and the book’s readers, face-to-face with the 
foreign in order to relate to and understand “one’s own.” 
 How, then, would it be possible to inaugurate a new festival calendar, one which 
is motivated by a recollection of the Greeks but also is a recognition that ours must be 
different from the Greeks? In offering a strategy for such retrieval, Heidegger cites 
Hölderlin’s letter to his friend, Böhlendorff: “We shall learn nothing more difficult than 
to freely use our national character. And as I believe, it is precisely the clarity of 
presentation which is as natural to us as the fire of heaven was to the Greeks. But what is 
proper to us must be learned as well as what is foreign. That is why the Greeks are 
                                                
258 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymne: Andenken, p. 78 (my translation). 
259 As Hölderlin writes in his epigram “Sophocles,” “Many have tried, but in vain with joy to express the 
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indispensable to us.”260 To this structure of appropriation, Heidegger further emphasizes, 
“what for the Greeks is their own, is what is foreign to the Germans; and what is foreign 
to the Germans is proper to the Greeks” (HHI, 124). Thus, the “clarity of presentation” is 
proper to the Germans, and the “fire of heaven” is foreign. What is significant about this 
structure is, as Dennis Schmidt notes, that the relationship to the Greeks “is not to be 
understood according to a model that takes antiquity as the childhood of our present 
where we find a sort of naïve and innocent form of the art of the present.” Instead, “it is 
to be understood as the realm in which what is most our own appears in the guise of 
something foreign.”261 The only way for the Germans to appropriate what is natural or 
proper to them is through a “journey” to the Greeks thereby retrieve the “fire from 
heaven.” Doing so will also allow the Germans to appropriate what is proper to them 
because what is proper for a people, a Volk, can only be appropriated if it is experienced 
in the foreign and as the foreign. This suggests that to retrieve or remember the Greeks 
expresses, at once, the unity between journeying from one’s home and dwelling within it. 
In becoming “unhomely” through the experience of the foreign, we cannot 
assimilate it, or otherwise reduce its otherness into the same. Rather, as Heidegger puts in 
his lecture on “The Ister,” “only where the foreign is known and acknowledged in its 
essential oppositional character does there exist the possibility of a genuine relationship, 
that is, of a uniting that is not a confused mixing but a conjoining in distinction” (HHI, 
54). Such a journey makes manifest a form of presence that is at the same time an 
absence. What is absent is doubly so: Greek possibilities are no longer our own, and we 
do not even immediately recognize the loss of such possibilities as a loss. It is as if we 
                                                
260 Hölderlin, as cited in Heidegger’s essay “Remembrance,” p. 112. 
261 Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 140. 
 183 
have lost the ability to experience a loss as a loss. We are, in other words, separated, even 
exiled, from something that is not ours to claim, but which nevertheless determines who 
we are. To remember the festival is to remember something that is foreign to us. We are, 
in other words, separated, even exiled, from something that is not ours to claim, but 
which nevertheless determines who we are. 
The journey through the foreign is played out on several levels: first, Heidegger 
argues that Hölderlin’s hymn itself “has taken into its singular core this becoming homely 
in one’s own” (HHI, 49); second, the image of the river’s course that Hölderlin poetizes 
suggests that it comes from the east and turns back on itself; and, thirdly, it is in 
Hölderlin’s own encounter with Sophocles and Greek poetry that the homeliness and 
homelessness of Western human being comes to be decided. The river Ister becomes an 
image through which Heidegger examines the relationship, both spatially and temporally, 
between Germany and Greece. Spatially, the river runs from the west, beginning near 
Heidegger’s Black Forest home, and flows east, emptying in the Black Sea. Heidegger 
interprets the course of this river as an expression of the relationship between east and 
west, Germany and Greece, and origins and ends. The river becomes the dynamic place 
where the destiny of the West is decided because it both indicates the relationship 
between two cultures, one Greek and the other German. Heidegger in fact reverses the 
flow of the river by suggesting that, though it begins in Germany, its commencement is in 
Greece.  
This reversal has at least two significant implications. First, the river flows 
hesitantly at its source, and appears almost to flow backwards. He writes, “such hesitancy 
can come only from there being a mysterious counterflow that pushes counter to its 
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originary springing forth” (HHI, 143). The “flow” toward the east is met with a counter-
turning that brings it back close to the originary power of the home. Second, “the Ister 
whiles by the source and is reluctant to abandon its locale because it dwells near the 
origin. And it dwells near the origin because it has returned home to its locality from its 
journeying to foreign parts” (HHI, 164). The Ister thus expresses the unity of journeying 
out from the homeland toward the foreign and dwelling within it.  
Heidegger names this dynamic movement of “coming-to-be-at-home” through the 
loss of the home the “law of history” (HHI, 143). Such a law “consists in the fact that 
historical human beings, at the beginning of their history, are not intimate with what is 
homely, and indeed must even become unhomely with respect to the latter in order to 
learn the proper appropriation of what is their own in venturing to the foreign, and to first 
become homely in the return from the foreign” (HHI, 125). This journey further requires 
letting “what is foreign come toward that humankind in its being unhomely so as to find, 
in an encounter with the foreign, whatever is fitting for the return to the hearth” (HHI, 
125). By revisiting Sophocles, Heidegger attempts to show how Antigone herself enacts 
this very journey, thereby securing the origins of western history. 
There are, however, significant risks that Heidegger takes in employing this 
particular interpretive strategy. Dieter Henrich puts the point succinctly when he argues 
that Heidegger “speaks with the conviction of someone in touch with Hölderlin’s ideas 
from the outset.”262 They give the appearance of a rapprochement between his 
philosophical analysis and Hölderlin’s poetry. It is as if Heidegger’s language is wholly 
in touch with Hölderlin’s. If this is the case, a particular dilemma arises: either the 
process of translating poetic ideas and images into a philosophical idiom requires, as 
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Julian Young puts it, “the substitution of co-designators, of synonyms”263 or it has no 
essential connection to the original text and is merely free-standing constructions. One 
interpretive strategy assumes that the foreign or other completely and adequately 
translated or subsumed into that which is one’s own; the other suggests that the two are 
incommensurable. While these two seem diametrically opposed, both presuppose that 
there is a gulf between languages or idioms that needs to be bridged in order for 
understanding to take place.  
Heidegger claims that understanding translation in terms of having to bridge 
languages reduces it to a methodology, one which tries to produce a mechanical 
algorithm that finds an exact equivalence between languages. Heidegger’s interpretive 
strategy for understanding and “translating” moves along a different path, one which 
“goes along” with the object of inquiry” (HHI, 28-29). The reason for this is “because 
every translation must necessarily accomplish the transition from the spirit of one 
language to another” (HHI, 62). Different languages have different “spirits” (Geister). 
However, rather than the Hegelian conception of “spirit”, with its connotations of the 
absolute and “that which conditions and determines every being in its being,” Heidegger 
suggests instead that spirit thinks “that which is fittingly destined for human beings” 
(HHI, 127-128). What is “fitting” is decidedly futural in character, and because it “always 
remains in coming” it is something “‘nonactual’ that is already ‘acting’” (HHI, 128). It is 
something into which we grow and from which we understand ourselves. Because human 
being is “open” to what is destined, to that which is coming, spirit refers to the way that 
we experience our world. 
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Because each language has a different “spirit,” translation and interpretation 
cannot be a one-to-one correspondence of terms. The past is not a matter of stepping into 
the mind or place of those who experienced an event, nor is it an attempt to find an exact 
equivalence between terms and worlds.264 For example, a contemporary orchestra 
performance of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 cannot fully recapture the initial 
audiences’ and performers’ attitudes and understandings of the piece, even if it is played 
on period pieces. At the same time, this does not mean that all performances are of equal 
worth. Rather, the performance seeks to recreate the composition from within its own 
vocabulary and experience. Interpretation, insofar as it is also a translation, “is more an 
awakening, clarification, and unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an 
encounter with the foreign language” (HHI, 65-66). Because translation is a poetic 
venture, it is creative, circumspect and approximate. It is an encounter with a foreign 
language in order to appropriate the possibilities that remain concealed in one’s own 
language: “We learn the Greek language so that the concealed essence of our own 
historical commencement can find its way into the clarity of our word” (HHI, 66). 
Heidegger’s reflections on translation and interpretation can help to clarify the structure 
of remembering. To remember or retrieve the Greek experience cannot be to reinstitute 
their sensibilities or their worldview. Nor does it mean that Greek experience is 
irretrievably lost to us, and that all forms of remembering the Greeks are equally true. 
Thus, remembering does not mean remembering a particular content of the Greek 
experience of Being. What Heidegger means by remembrance (Andenken) is instead a 
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certain style of thinking, one which is attentive to otherness, to the fragility, to the frailty, 
and to the mortality at the very essence of one’s belonging to a history and people. It is 
one that relates both to that which has passed, but from the perspective of that which is to 
come. Remembering the Greeks, in other words, is not done to revitalize some ancient, 
long-forgotten, understanding of Being. Rather, staging an encounter with Greek tragedy 
is thus done in service of the appropriation of our own “destiny.”  
Thus, in order to experience the force of Hölderlin’s poetry, Heidegger develops a 
sort of philosophical “play within a play” between Hölderlin and Sophocles. Heidegger 
writes: 
[Hölderlin’s] poetizing is itself the historical being of Western human 
beings as historical. Such poetizing must therefore remain in historical 
dialogue with those foreign poets who, in their own way, poetized the 
essence of human beings with respect to this becoming homely. The pure 
fulfillment of this poetic necessity in the foreign land of the Greeks is a 
choral song in the Antigone tragedy by Sophocles. (HHI, 64-65) 
 
Thus, in order to determine what is proper to “us,” we must first confront the meaning of 
Sophocles’ Antigone in order bring ourselves face-to-face with the “foreign of the other” 
(Fremden des Anderen) before we can understand Hölderlin’s poetry.265 This oblique 
approach to Sophocles, through a series of digressions is thus necessitated by the attempt 
to confront the reader and listeners with the experience of the foreign in order to 
appropriate one’s own. 
Immediately apparent in this interpretation is that Heidegger does not limit 
himself to the first part of the choral ode, as he did in 1935. He now draws on other 
aspects of the play, including its characters and its plot. Furthermore, the fundamental 
tension between technē and dikē is replaced by a more original tension, one between 
                                                
265 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymne: “Andenken,” p. 86. 
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polis-pelein. The result of this break with the earlier translation is that the place of 
Being’s disclosure is neither longer violently wrestled away from concealment nor can it 
be conceived as setting Being into work through the work of technē. Rather, as Clare 
Geiman suggests, the “founding” of the essence of Being takes place in tragedy’s 
orientation to the “not” and the “nothing,” which silently indicate the concealed source 
that “gives” place and time for human dwelling.266 
 Just as striking as the divergences between these two interpretations are the 
continuities. Heidegger organizes his interpretation around the already familiar phrases to 
deinotaton, hupsipolis apolis, and pantoporos aporos. To these three pairings, Heidegger 
adds the closing lines of the second antistrophe, which describe the banishment from the 
hearth (Hestia). These paradoxical formulations provide the basic structure for 
Heidegger’s interpretation, and help to clarify the necessity to pass through the foreign in 
order to appropriate one’s own home.  
Nevertheless, among these paradoxical formulations, the preeminent term in 
Heidegger’s interpretation remains to deinon. In Introduction to Metaphysics this phrase 
expresses the uncanniness of human being insofar as its violence lets the overwhelming 
sway be gathered together and exposed through the work of technē, and the natural 
tendency of human being to transgress and overstep its bounds into the unfamiliar. In this 
lecture, however, to deinon refers to the essential unhomeliness of human being. In what 
appears to be an apparent criticism of his earlier position, Heidegger writes: 
One might think that the deinotaton means that human beings are the most 
actively violent beings in the sense of that animal full of cunning that 
Nietzsche calls the “blond beast” and “the predator.” Such predatory 
uncanniness of human beings as historical, however, is an extreme 
derivative and essential consequence of a concealed uncanniness that is 
                                                
266 Clare Pearson Geiman, “Heidegger’s Antigones,” p. 174. 
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grounded in unhomeliness, an unhomeliness that in turn has its concealed 
ground in the counterturning relation of being to human beings. (HHI, 90) 
 
Human beings are the most unfamiliar beings because they are essentially not at home in 
the familiar. This “unhomeliness” is essentially ontological, and characterizes the human 
being’s relationship to Being. It is not a mere property of human beings; rather as 
Heidegger notes, when connected to the pelei, which Heidegger interprets as “to stir,” “to 
come forth,” and “to abide in one’s locale,” it reveals that human being emerges from its 
being unsettled. Thus, “uncanniess does not first arise as a consequence of humankind; 
rather, humankind emerges from uncanniness and remains within it—looms out of it and 
stirs within it” (HHI, 72). Furthermore, because human beings are essentially not at home 
in the familiar, the historical task of being human is to “come to be at home.” Human 
beings are to deinotaton because becoming homely is being unhomely. The unique 
pairing of becoming homely-being unhomely expresses the way that the passage through 
the foreign enables one to become at home. 
 Human being’s experience of the foreign, Heidegger goes at length to emphasize, 
is not to be construed as a kind of tourism or adventure. It is not the sort of exotic travel 
that French engaged in during the 18th century to exotic locales to find human beings in a 
“state of nature,” nor is it travelling to foreign countries to get a better understanding of 
who one is. Such an adventurer is interesting and not at home, no doubt, but not deinon. 
As the most unsettled, human beings ontologically are never simply at home or simply 
homeless. Rather, human beings come to be homely by being continually shut out of 
one’s home. To be unsettled, in other words, is to seek out a home in the context of a lack 
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of stable ground. As a result, the foreign, the unhomely, belongs together with the home, 
one’s own.  
As the most unsettling, human beings are always in danger of being shut out of 
the home in the very movement to become homely. Heidegger thus writes “the homely is 
sought after and striven for in the violent activity of passing through that which is 
inhabitual with respect to sea and earth, and yet in such passage the homely is not 
attained” (HHI, 73). In other words, human beings are, as Heidegger’s paradoxical 
formulation has it, pantoporos aporos. The human being makes its way through 
everything (pantoporos), but in doing so, finds itself without a way (aporos), and “unable 
to transform that which it has made its way through into an experience that would let it 
attain any insight into its own essence” (HHI, 75). As human beings “earn their living,” 
take care of their everyday business, and make their way, they fail to grasp who they are 
(HHI, 76). As a result, in comporting to beings, in caring for them and insofar as we can 
use and manipulate beings for our own purposes, we are shut out and excluded from 
grasping our essence; we “forget” our relation to Being in busying ourselves with beings 
(HHI, 76). This suggests that by building cities, establishing families, participating in the 
culture’s ethical and political life, and worshipping the city’s gods, we lose a relationship 
to our ownmost Being; similarly, it is because we do not know who we are that we try to 
make our way. 
 Because human being dwells amidst beings, and understands itself in terms of its 
involvement with beings, he or she is inclined to lose sight of and forget Being itself. In 
our familiarity with beings, we become oblivious to Being. Thus, the mode of 
unsettledness that is human being’s unhomeliness “is possible for human beings alone, 
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because they comport themselves to beings as such, and thereby understand being. And 
because they understand being, human beings alone can also forget being” (HHI, 76). 
Heidegger continues: 
Strictly speaking, unhomeliness is not all one form of the uncanny among 
others but is essentially “beyond” these, something the poet expresses in 
calling the human being that which is most uncanny. The most powerful 
“catastrophes” we can think of in nature and in the cosmos are nothing in 
terms of their uncanniness compared to that uncanniness that the human 
essence in itself is, insofar as human beings, placed among beings as such 
and set in place for beings, forget being. In this way, the homely becomes 
an empty and errant wandering for them, one that they fill out with their 
activities. The uncanniness of the unhomely here consists in the fact that 
human beings themselves in their essence are a catastrophe—a reversal 
that turns them away from their own essence. Among beings, the human 
being is the sole catastrophe. (HHI, 76-77) 
 
The essence of human being is thus understood as the being who, in its understanding and 
interpretation of beings, is confronted with Being as such. However, because of its 
involvement with beings, it is always at risk of forgetting Being itself. The understanding 
of beings brings us face-to-face with our very Being; at the same time, such an 
understanding of beings threatens us with the forgetfulness of Being. Human beings are 
thus pantoporos aporos. 
 The second characterization of human beings’ unsettling essence is hupsipolis 
apolis. This phrase, of course, mirrors the paradoxes of pantoporos aporos (Cf., HHI, 
79). Just as pantoporos aporos focuses on the “counterturning” within the word poros, 
the phrase to be deciphered now keys in on the movement of the word polis. Polis even 
further designates that which is at stake in poros: the polis is “a particular realm of poros, 
as it were, one field in which the latter emphatically comes to pass” (HHI, 79). The polis 
does not designate the city-state, nor does it refer to the political domain where decisions 
about governing take place. Rather, the polis is, Heidegger writes, “the word for that 
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realm that constantly became questionable anew, remained worthy of question” (HHI, 
80-81). It is “that realm and locale around which everything question-worthy and 
uncanny turns in an exceptional sense” (HHI, 81).267 The polis is the place where beings 
are made manifest in their inherent questionability, and is thus itself question-worthy. 
The pairing hupsipolis-apolis thus no longer reveals the possibility of 
appropriating oneself in the tension of world creation and world disclosure, as it did in 
1935. Rather, it now reveals, as Geiman notes, “the essential ground of the catastrophic 
turn away from essentiality” expressed by pantoporos aporos.268 The counterturning 
dyad hupsipolis-apolis will reveal the full scope of human possibilities from the 
perspective of the place where human being first appears. The polis, according to 
Heidegger’s interpretation, is now “the open site of that fitting destining [Schickung] 
from out of which all human relations toward beings—and that always means in the first 
instance the relation of beings as such to humans—are determined” (HHI, 82). To occupy 
such an “open site” means to be exposed, thus unconcealed, and to be thrust out of the 
“home,” thus binding human being to the possibility of forgetfulness and being shut out 
of the home. 
The polis is thus the site of human being’s unfamiliarity. It is so, as Miguel de 
Beistegui concisely puts it, because “man has the twofold tendency to look beyond his 
place into the place of being, thus opening his own place as the place of an essential 
belonging-together with being, as much as to overlook such a place, and thus to dwell in 
                                                
267 It is important to note that Heidegger begins each of these characterizations with a “perhaps,” as if to 
suggest that we cannot adequately define the polis once and for all and that there may be no empirical 
verification for his characterization. His desire to avoid the cruder forms of empiricism tempts some 
interpreters to conclude that Heidegger’s characterizations of these Greek words have no solid basis.  
268 Clare Pearson Geiman, “Heidegger’s Antigones,” p. 177. 
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such a way that the whole of being becomes the most familiar and obvious.”269 The polis, 
in its ontological sense, becomes where human beings come to understand beings in their 
familiarity, thereby ensuring that we overlook being itself. At the same time, the polis 
becomes the place where any comportment to beings becomes possible because it is also 
the place of Being. Heidegger thus writes: 
Human beings are placed into the site of their historical abode, into the 
polis, because they and they alone comport themselves toward beings as 
beings, toward beings in their unconcealment and concealing, and can be 
mistaken within the being of beings, and at times, that is, continually 
within the most extreme realms of this site, must be mistaken within 
being, so that they take nonbeings to be beings and beings to be 
nonbeings” (HHI, 87) 
 
The polis thus makes possible each particular conception of politics because it determines 
human beings “negatively” by locating human beings in an “open” space, which binds 
them to errancy, refusal, and forgetfulness. This “open” space is always historical, insofar 
as it is the ground for the possibility of relating to the whole of being in such a way that 
what is experienced is not just particular beings but the truth, or the being, of such beings. 
At the same time the “open space” is one that is unsettling: human beings can only make 
their way in the world and establish a home on the basis of being fundamentally not-at-
home. It thus renders human beings essentially apolis, without home and shut out of it. 
Furthermore, the polis is intimately connected to pelein, which means to emerge 
and come forth of its own accord (HHI, 71). The sense of motion contained in this term is 
rendered more specific in Heidegger’s suggestion that it “means the concealed presencing 
of stillness and tranquility amid constant and unconcealed absencing and presencing, that 
is, amid the appearing of change” (HHI, 72). By pointing to a kind of constancy amidst 
                                                
269 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, p. 137. 
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the change, pelein underlies the way that particular beings come into being and pass. As 
such, it is not simply present or absent; it is only as withdrawing that allows for beings to 
be. It is an originary movement of coming to be present, which is never simply present 
but only is present only as an absence. The motion of the polis as pelein determines the 
place of human being by way of absence, withdrawal, and even abandonment. 
This originary withdrawal and absence suggests the centrality of death in the 
drama of human affairs. To find oneself as human means to find oneself as mortal, and it 
is to discover that the possibility of such loss is constitutive of one’s place. Such 
vanishing establishes abandonment and death as the ground for human historical 
dwelling. Human being can only come to be at home in the world when it is faced with 
the fundamental possibility of not being there any longer, which is to say, faced with the 
possibility of its death.  
These tensions reveal that the relationship to absence, rather than presence, 
becomes the hallmark of unsettled human being. The relation to the homely is thus 
always a negative relationship. The human being is the most unsettling, to deinotaton, 
because it “finds no entry into [its] essence, [and] remains excluded from it and without 
any way that could allow it to enter the center of its essence” (HHI, 74-75). To 
experience how one’s being is unsettled is thus an experience of refusal, one in which the 
“unhomely is deprived of the homely” (HHI, 75). This refusal is itself strange:  
What becomes manifest in these relations is the essence of uncanniness 
itself, namely, presencing in the manner of an absencing, and in such a 
way that whatever presences and absences here is itself simultaneously the 
open realm of all presencing and absencing. (HHI, 75) 
 
It is not the case that human being is fundamentally homeless or that it essentially lacks a 
home. Such an understanding would be a mere negation and a mere absence of human 
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being’s essence. Heidegger instead wants to recover a positive sense of absence, a 
productivity of such a lack, a “presencing in the manner of an absencing.” The interplay 
between presence and absence comes to define, albeit tacitly and silently, the tension and 
movement that belong to the human being as the most unsettling being. 
 What, then, does Heidegger’s revised interpretation have to tell about Antigone 
herself? In his revised interpretation, Heidegger sees Antigone herself as revealing the 
essence of humanity, for she accepts the necessity of what befalls her as inherent in her 
own being (HHI, 103-104). Heidegger notes that her “suffering the deinon is her supreme 
action” which constitutes the movement and “drama of becoming homely” (HHI, 115). 
Antigone is thus not a tragic figure because of the consequences of her burying her 
brother. She is tragic on Heidegger’s ontological account because she reveals what is to 
be human by estranging herself from herself. Antigone’s actions do not stem from willful 
subjectivity, but arise because she enacts what it is to be human in her self-estrangement, 
which consists in her appropriating her unhomeliness and making it her essence and 
dwelling within it (HHI, 118). In Heidegger’s terms “her dying is her becoming homely, 
but a becoming homely within and out of such being unhomely” (HHI, 104). Thus, 
Antigone, who is unhomely, is such because she places herself in relationship to the 
hearth; in other words, in both presence and absence (HHI, 107). Her understanding of 
her situation is no accident, served by chance or the gods. Heidegger explains that “what 
determines Antigone is that which first bestows ground and necessity upon the distinction 
of the dead and the priority of blood” (HHI, 117). Rather than raise the ontic question of 
whose blood and to whom we owe our loyalties, Heidegger refers to the ontological 
ground that makes questions of particular filial piety and one’s particular heritage 
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meaningful. The primal bestowal of death and life, while remaining ultimately nameless, 
arises through the relation between human beings and Being itself. In other words, the 
homeliness and unhomeliness go together, as if through a “‘thoughtful remembrance’ of 
being and through a belonging to the hearth” (HHI, 115). Antigone’s suffering, as a 
result, arises through the pain of being separated and the ensuing search for the original 
belonging together of beings in their Being. It is by recognizing the most intimate truth of 
existence—that of her own suffering—that Antigone thoughtfully remembers the fragility 
and transitory character of her ownmost essence. 
 Separation from the hearth and the odyssey back to it reformulates the notion of 
tragedy first presented in Introduction to Metaphysics. The distinction between presence 
and absence that runs throughout Heidegger’s writings comes to a head when he draws 
out the meaning of human being that he finds in Sophocles’ Antigone. While he initially 
conjoined the reversal of fortune that occurs in tragedy with the necessary ruination of 
beings, the revision of the experience of tragedy as arising in his Hölderlin lectures 
describes the duality of presence and absence in terms of conjoining being at home and 
displacement. In refiguring this displacement, the absence that is the hearth can only be 
retrieved through a thoughtful remembering, recalling, or an expectant anticipation. 
 This thoughtful remembrance (Andenken) stands in marked contrast to his 
interpretation of technē in this new rendering of the ode. Technē in his interpretation in 
this ode is relegated to a conception of metaphysics that is instituted with Plato (Cf. HHI, 
114). Doing so ultimately equates technē with the dissolution of the self in the 
forgetfulness of Being by becoming lost in the desire for technical mastery of beings. 
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Heidegger in this way interprets Hölderlin’s line “Full of merit, yet poetically/Humans 
dwell upon this earth” as suggesting the following: 
In what they effect and in their works they are capable of a fullness. It is 
almost impossible to survey what humans achieve, the way in which they 
establish themselves upon this earth in using and exploiting and working 
it, in protecting and securing it and furthering their ‘art,’ that is, in Greek, 
technē. (HHI, 137) 
 
Technē becomes part of the works and achievements of culture, which is itself only the 
consequence of human dwelling. As a result, technē, as Heidegger makes clear, does not 
articulate the essence of human beings anymore. Indeed, though technē is responsible for 
the achievements of culture, it is only on the basis of dwelling that culture itself is 
possible. Because technē does not reach into the “essential ground of [human] dwelling 
on this earth” it misses the way that absence helps to define human being.  
In contrast to this, Heidegger’s interpretation of Sophoclean tragedy achieves 
remembrance by displacing this technological desire and by acknowledging absence as 
absence. Indeed, Heidegger characterizes tragic poetry as a form of knowing that is of a 
fundamentally different kind than that of technē. It requires a form of knowing that 
“demands of us a transformation in our ways of experiencing, one that concerns being in 
its entirety” (HHI, 166). This means that poetic thinking addresses the concealment of 
Being and preserves its absence in its saying. “Dwelling, being properly homely,” 
Heidegger writes, “is ‘poetic’” (HHI, 137). This means that poetic remembering reorients 
the relationship between human beings and Being itself. This new orientation, according 
to Heidegger, founds a new history and constitutes another beginning.     
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III.5. Conclusion: Tragedy and Remembrance 
In order to understand better the way that remembrance of Greek tragedy treats an 
absence as an absence, thereby enabling another beginning, I will return to Heidegger’s 
interpretation of “Remembrance.” Toward the end of this essay, Heidegger suggests that 
the word “but” structures the poem. This simple word occurs a number of times. 
Together, they mark out “the structure of the voyage of becoming-at-home in which is 
one’s own…[and] gives to the poem its hidden tone.”270  For example, in the second 
stanza, “But a figtree is growing in the courtyard,” announces a change in the time of 
memory, from the time of the everyday to the time of the festival. Heidegger suggests 
that this word is the “word of mystery…that which, purely sprung, remains its origin.”271 
The simple word “but” thus become a kind of absence that shapes our world by pointing 
to its incompleteness, to the co-presence in it of the seen and unseen.272 These sorts of 
absences are central to the work of remembering because they call upon us—much like 
the initial call to the sun that opens the hymn “The Ister”—to bear witness to what 
happened, retrieving what happened for the sake of that which has been lost. 
While the loss of one’s past cannot be fully retrieved or overcome, it is not a 
simple nullity. Here, the notion of being exiled might be of some help. To be exiled is to 
be separated from one’s own; it is the loss of something that once belonged to oneself. 
This “loss of a direct memory, of a community, makes one a stranger to something, not of 
others but of one’s own.”273 In being a stranger to one’s past, one is a stranger to oneself. 
It is precisely this experience that can motivate one to bring to light or give words to 
                                                
270 Heidegger, “Remembrance,” Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 172. 
271 Heidegger, “Remembrance,” Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 172. 
272 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 75. 
273 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 81. 
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something there, but concealed. In so doing, the experience of loss and absence, of death, 
draws our attention to those hollows that have been carved out of our experience because 
of our blindness or inattentiveness. Such attempts, however, do not bring such an exile to 
an end. Such traces point “us to the absence, and in so doing awakens in us the desire to 
remember, to make the present, to overcome what cannot in fact be fully overcome, 
namely that absence itself.”274 Loss and absence creates the impetus to remember, and to 
bring the past closer to us. However, in indicating such absences, such remembrances do 
not, and cannot, restore the past to us.275  
Tragic poetry achieves remembrance (Andenken) as a thoughtful engagement with 
the roots of one’s own tradition, recognition that it cannot actively preserve such roots 
without running the risk of concealing them.276 Remembrance, as Heidegger writes, 
“does not only think of what has been and of what is coming; it ponders from where the 
coming had first been uttered, and thinks back to where what has been must be 
concealed, so that this foreign element itself can remain what it is even when it is 
appropriated.”277 This suggests that in remembrance, human beings relationship to their 
very unsettled being becomes transformed. By adopting the language of Hölderlin’s 
poetry and Sophocles’ tragedy, Heidegger finds, “what is fitting in being unhomely is 
                                                
274 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 84. 
275 W. James Booth offers a number of compelling examples to illustrate this point, which are worthy of 
mention. The first is George Perec’s novel La disparition, translated as A Void. While Perec tells a coherent 
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276 Cf. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn: The Ister, pp. 114-119.  
277 Heidegger, “Remembrance,” Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. Trans. Keith Hoeller (Amherst, NY: 
Humanity Books, 2000): pp. 101-174, p.171. 
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becoming homely. Preserving such becoming is that being historical that attains its 
essential fullness when it comes to know what has been fittingly destined for it as that 
which has already been” (HHI, 128). Human being’s becoming homely is the disclosure 
of having been destined, thus endowing the task of becoming homely with a heritage and 
a temporal aspect. Yet it can only know such a destiny until after it has been transmitted, 
and thus only after one has been already claimed by it.  
 It is, in a sense, part of the task of bearing witness to the past, safeguarding it from 
utter annihilation. Antigone herself becomes who she is by being unhomely among 
beings, estranging herself from the everyday. She leaves the hearth and home, the realm 
of the everyday, in order to take up the task of burying her brother Polyneices. In so 
doing, he becomes “homely within being” (HHI, 120). Only by leaving the hearth, does 
she preserve and sustain the meaning of Being. She experiences the way that death 
estranges that which near and familiar. For Dennis Schmidt, this means that “she now 
signifies the quality which the West and its traditions of metaphysics and Christianity 
cannot grasp.”278 This quality is that “the most elemental human solitude is not isolated, 
but at the site of what will become communal life.”279 This quality, though Schmidt does 
not explicitly draw this connection, is found in Antigone’s tomb. The tomb becomes a 
marker of absence that structures the present. It is an absence that we must let be an 
absence. This need not be a cause for pessimism or resignation. Rather, bearing witness 
in this sense allows another history to speak by remaining committed to that which has 
been concealed and passed over by technology. 
                                                
278 Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 260. 
279 Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 260  
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Chapter IV: Remembering the Past: Selfhood and Community in Ricoeur 
IV.1. Introduction and Thesis 
The previous chapters developed Heidegger’s ontological account of 
remembering and its connection to communal existence. However, his desire to maintain 
a rigid distinction between historicity and historiography threatens to undercut the 
correlation between selfhood and community that arises in memory. In order to see how 
remembering can help contribute to communal identity, I will turn to Paul Ricoeur. 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the summoned, or called, subject helps to give some content to 
Heidegger’s ontological account of history, while retaining many of Heidegger’s 
achievements. I argue that there is no fundamental difference between their positions: 
Ricoeur appropriates some of Heidegger’s fundamental themes, and transforms them in 
their application to the human historical condition. 
Ricoeur’s appreciation of Heidegger’s phenomenology is most evident in his 
definition of the summoned subject, which he defines as a self “constituted and defined 
by its position as a respondent to propositions of meaning issuing from [a] symbolic 
network.”280 While Heidegger’s account of the call of conscience is formal, Ricoeur 
attends to the symbolic domain—including the text, action, narrative, ideology, and 
culture—that enable us to understand the source, the meaning, and the possible ways to 
respond to the call. Ricoeur suggests, “heritages are transmitted symbolically through 
language and most often on the basis of symbolic systems implying a minimum of shared 
beliefs and understandings about the rules permitting the deciphering of signs, symbols, 
                                                
280 Paul Ricoeur, “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Prophetic Vision.” Trans. David Pellauer. 
Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1996): pp. 262-275, p. 262. 
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and norms current in a group.”281 By attending to the symbolic dimension of heritage, 
tradition, and memory Ricoeur enriches Heidegger’s account of remembering and 
repetition. Despite the persisting notion that remembering is an individual act, I will be 
focusing on the way that its symbolic and mediated nature opens an irreducibly 
communal element.  
This chapter will have several parts. First, I examine Ricoeur’s methodological 
and substantive criticisms of Heidegger. I then introduce Ricoeur’s long route of memory 
by examining two basic forms of it—mnemē and anamnesis. In order to render these 
dimensions of memory meaningful, they need to be understood from within the 
perspective of narrative identity, which Ricoeur offers as a response to Heidegger’s 
existential analysis of Dasein. This brings us to the question “who remembers?” and the 
relationship between the self and the community. Here too Sophoclean tragedy plays a 
role, though in a manner quite different from Heidegger. Tragedy becomes a symbol for 
the way that remembering and forgetting come to constitute the relationship between a 
self and its community.  
 
IV.2 Ricoeur and Heidegger: On Human Historical Existence 
While generally sympathetic to Heidegger’s account of human existence, 
especially its hermeneutic and historical structure of being-in-the-world, Ricoeur claims 
that Heidegger’s approach misses an important interpretive dimension of human life. 
Ricoeur offers two distinct sets of criticisms: one set is methodological and the other 
substantive. Ultimately, despite their differences, the two stand in basic agreement to the 
                                                
281 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative, Vol. III. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. (Chicago: 
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extent that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics can be seen as a development and elaboration of 
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. 
 
IV.2.1. The “Short Route” and the “Long Route” 
 
In a series of methodological essays, Ricoeur situates his own understanding of 
hermeneutics by distinguishing it from Heidegger’s. Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, is “the 
theory of the operations of understanding in relation to the interpretation of a text.”282 In 
restoring the priority of the text to hermeneutics, the path to an ontological account of 
human existence becomes longer. In the essay “Existence and Hermeneutics,” Ricoeur 
suggests that there are two ways to “graft” hermeneutics to ontology, a short route and a 
long route.283  
The “short route” breaks “with any discussion of method [and] carries itself 
directly to the level of an ontology of finite being in order there to recover understanding, 
no longer as a mode of knowledge, but rather as a mode of being.”284 This route, which 
Heidegger takes, bypasses questions of methodology in order to reveal the essentially 
interpretive structure of human existence. Heidegger begins with the question “what kind 
of being it is whose being consists of understanding?”285 This question transforms the 
problem of hermeneutics from a method of textual interpretation to a mode of 
understanding one’s world. Rather than the hermeneutic problem of knowing the past as 
if it were other, the problem becomes the way that we belong to the past. 
                                                
282 Paul Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics.” Trans. John B. Thompson. From Text to Action. Trans. 
Kathleen McLaughlin and John B. Thompson. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991): pp. 53-74, 
p. 53. 
283 Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics.” Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin. The Conflict of 
Interpretation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974): pp. 3-26, p. 3, 6. 
284 Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” p. 6. 
285 Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” p. 6. 
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Despite the merits of the “short route” to ontology, Ricoeur argues that it runs up 
against two problems. The first is that Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein cannot adjudicate 
conflicting interpretations of human existence. Heidegger subordinates historical 
knowledge to ontological understanding without showing how we can derive historical 
knowledge from ontological understanding.286 In the essay “The Task of Hermeneutics,” 
Ricoeur writes, “with Heidegger’s philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to 
the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return that 
would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of 
the status of the human sciences.”287 This problem is especially evident in Heidegger’s 
claim that historiography cannot tell us anything authentic about Dasein’s existence. As a 
result, he cannot legitimately claim to have retrieved the origins of temporality and 
remains incomplete.288 The second problem arises from Heidegger’s rigid separation of 
the ontological and ontic domains. “If the reversal from epistemological understanding to 
the being who understands is to be possible,” Ricoeur writes, “we must then be able to 
describe directly…the privileged being of Dasein, such as it is constituted in itself and 
thus to be able to recover understanding as one of these modes of being.”289 The 
difficulty with this proposed strategy, Ricoeur argues, is that it is within language where 
we must seek understanding as a mode of Being. This requires an analysis of those modes 
of discourse, which would include the epistemological, symbolic, psychoanalytic, and 
historical forms of language. 
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The “longer route” Ricoeur proposes for interpreting human historical existence 
begins with the problem of language. It is “within language itself that we must seek the 
indication that the understanding is a mode of being,” that we can “keep in contact with 
the disciplines which seek to practice interpretation in a methodical manner.”290 Rather 
than separating truth from method, or ontology from epistemology, the longer route 
“starts from and is based upon the semantic elucidation of the concept of interpretation 
common to all the hermeneutic disciplines.”291 By beginning with the semantic and 
symbolic dimensions of language, Ricoeur elaborates how different dimensions of 
meaning arise and how they are grounded in human experience. Thus, the longer route 
requires that we attend to different methods for interpreting human experience, and assess 
the criteria for adjudicating conflicting interpretations. 
Signs and symbols mediate our understanding of experience. They do so because 
they mean more than what they say, and thus need to be deciphered. Ricoeur’s notion of a 
symbol, as David Kaplan defines it, is “any double-meaning expression defined by a 
semantic structure in which the first-order meaning designates a second-order meaning 
that is attainable only through the first-order meaning.”292 Signs and symbols thus mean 
something on two distinct, though interrelated, levels: an apparent, revealed meaning and 
a hidden meaning that needs to be further explicated. This surplus of a symbol’s meaning 
“gives rise to thought.”293 Hermeneutics is thus “the work of thought which consists in 
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deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning [and] in unfolding the levels of 
meaning implied in the literal meaning.”294 As such, it is not immediately connected to 
ontology, but instead reaches the ontological level only after being lead through the 
interpretation of signs. 
Though the symbol calls upon us to interpret it, there is no single method that 
could claim to have privileged access to its meaning. Not only do different domains of 
human life have different symbols, but also different disciplines have their own research 
programs, methodologies to interpret these symbols. In order to determine the meaning of 
these symbols, Ricoeur emphasizes the necessity for multiple hermeneutics in order to 
decipher hidden meanings. On one hand, hermeneutics shows how the past belongs to the 
present, and the ways that the self and community are constituted by tradition. On the 
other hand, we need a hermeneutic method that will be on guard against those forms of 
understanding that imply that the meaning inherited by tradition is all too clear. This 
dimension of the hermeneutic project aims at the demystification, and is thus skeptical of 
the apparent univocal meaning that is presented. Such hermeneutics removes the illusions 
and the false claims of understanding. These two aims—a hermeneutics of belonging and 
a hermeneutics of suspicion—characterize Ricoeur’s basic philosophical methodology.  
By being attentive to our belonging to a tradition and by being critical of the ways 
that we do so, Ricoeur’s methodology does not rely on only one philosophical program. 
As Bernard Dauenhauer suggests, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is governed by a logic of the 
“both-and” rather than the logic of “either-or.”295 Ricoeur “finds instruction not only in 
both Kant and Hegel, but also in both Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Benedict de 
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Spinoza, and Karl Marx and Freud.”296 We should thus not be surprised to see Ricoeur as 
eager to engage the problem of the relationship to the past, and steer a course between the 
phenomenological hermeneutics found in Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the 
Marxian critique of post-industrial society found in Max Weber’s and Jürgen Habermas’s 
critical theories.297   
 
IV.2.2 Substantive Differences between Heidegger and Ricoeur 
 
Ricoeur’s methodology has implications on the substantive level. Ricoeur 
critically appropriates Heidegger in at least three points: Heidegger’s conflation of being-
towards-death and being-a-whole, the rejection of Heidegger’s hierarchy of the different 
modes of temporality, and the rejection of Heidegger’s ontologizing of conscience and 
debt.298 
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First, Ricoeur argues that Heidegger overemphasizes Dasein’s Being-towards-
death by connecting it too tightly with Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.299 If we 
can disentangle the possibility of being a whole from being-towards-death, “the 
potentiality-of-being-a-whole can once again be carried back to the power of unification, 
articulation, and dispersion belonging to time” (TN3, 67-68). In doing so, the different 
facets of anticipatory resoluteness, including guilt, debt, and fallenness could be 
reinterpreted as equal features of Dasein’s being thereby restoring the unity of our 
temporal being. Our thrown Being could thus be revealed in the fact of birth as it is the 
necessity of our having to die (TN3, 68). Similarly, fallenness would not need to be 
interpreted strictly in terms of avoiding the confrontation with one’s own mortality; it 
could signify the avoidance of fulfilling one’s promises (TN3, 68). It thus appears the 
price Heidegger pays for his “short route” is his inability to see the way that these 
existential structures can also reveal the meaning of Dasein’s existence. 
Heidegger’s failure to take into account the material, cultural, and historical ways 
that the tradition is transmitted ends up interpreting Dasein “too monadically.”300 Ricoeur 
wonders, “is it true…that a heritage is handed down from the self to itself? Is it not 
always received from someone else? Yet Being-towards-death…excludes everything that 
is transferable from one person to another…The difficulty is compounded when we pass 
from individual history to common history” (TN3, 75). Ricoeur further develops this 
criticism in Memory, History, Forgetting by suggesting that the emphasis Heidegger 
places on being-toward-death obscures the social elements of human existence. Because 
                                                                                                                                            
Ricoeur’s longer route insofar as it can extend Heidegger’s insights to the concrete understanding of the 
world.  
299 Dauenhauer, “History’s Sources,” p. 238. 
300 Dauenhauer, “History’s Sources,” p. 238. 
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“death affects the self in its untransferable and incommunicable solitude,” Heidegger 
effectively closes off the resources for the potentiality-for-being and masks the joys of 
life.301 The radically one-sided dimensions of resoluteness thus obscures the “jubilation 
produced by the vow—which I take as my own—to remain alive until…” because it 
“[closes] off the reserves of openness characterizing the potentiality of being” (MHF, 
357). Thus, as Peter Kemp notes, Dasein is “an ontological Self who in its mineness or 
ownness implies that the other is totally excluded as a partner,” and, furthermore, that 
“Dasein is unable to understand that the other is in its existence another minenness, an 
irreplaceable other in the world.”302 In so doing, Ricoeur argues, Heidegger’s analysis of 
care misses both the way that the concrete experiences of one’s embodied self are the 
condition for the experience of others and the way that one’s close relations and 
anonymous others figure into our experience of finitude thereby endowing our experience 
of the world with a moral and ethical dimension.  
The second flaw Ricoeur identifies refers to the relationship between original 
temporality and the derived modes of historicity and “within-time-ness” (Innerzeitigkeit). 
“Within-time-ness” refers to the way that we reckon with time in our everyday lives. We 
experience time in the way that we care about things, others, the world, and ourselves. 
We “take time out” of our day to talk with our friends, we “lose time” in a traffic jam on 
the way to a meeting, we “do not have enough time” to accomplish all of those things that 
we want to accomplish in a day, and so forth. This existential conception of time is the 
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time in which we go about our business. This form of time can be further “leveled off” 
and rendered more abstract through such tools as the clock, which measures out the 
infinite and cyclical repetition of moments. Such moments come to be, are present for a 
moment, and then pass away. Each moment is a mere unit, and essentially 
interchangeable with any other moment. As a result, and despite its prestigious 
pedigree—Heidegger suggests that this conception of time is the dominant interpretation 
of temporality since Aristotle (Cf. BT 473/SZ 421)—it retains only a tenuous connection 
with the existential temporality of human being. 
Ricoeur is skeptical of Heidegger’s suggestion that heretofore all conceptions of 
time are essentially Aristotelian. Indeed, Heidegger “takes it for granted that science has 
nothing original to say that has not been tacitly borrowed from metaphysics, from Plato 
to Hegel” (TN3, 88). There is an important experience of time that is distinct from the 
temporality of human existence Heidegger describes and from Aristotle’s abstract 
conception of time. Ricoeur names this experience of time “cosmic time,” or the “time of 
nature” (TN3, 89). The time of nature refers to the expansive, even sublime, temporality 
of eons, which is revealed not only in geological formations such as the Grand Canyon, 
the ever-so-slowly-shifting continents, and the stars. It is also infinitesimally small, those 
milliseconds and microseconds that happen more quickly than a blink of an eye. This 
time is indifferent, to put it mildly, to human concerns. Indeed, to suggest that it is 
indifferent to us is perhaps to anthropomorphize it too much. Rather, it is better to say 
that in our experience of such wonders we recognize how fleeting and inconsequential we 
are to it.  
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With Ricoeur’s recognition of “cosmic time” comes the realization that its 
relation to the existential form of time is ambiguous: “we can speak of a mutual 
overlapping between one mode of discourse and the other. This borderline exchange 
takes on the extreme forms of contamination and conflict” (TN3, 92). They overlap 
insofar as a complicity is established between the passive experiences of time, such as in 
the experience of being thrown, and the contemplation of the stars. The sober 
contemplation of the heavens can lead to the recognition of the contingency of our 
existence. These two forms of experiencing time also conflict: “elegies on the human 
condition, ranging in their modulations from lamentation to resignation, have never 
ceased to sing of the contrast between the time that remains and we who are merely 
passing” (TN3, 93). We would not think that our lives are short if we did not also 
recognize the infinitude of cosmic time. The tensions between the cosmic and existential 
forms of time are nevertheless important for Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology: “we 
can swing from one feeling to another: from the consolation that we may experience in 
discovering a kinship between the feeling of Being-thrown-into-the-world and the 
spectacle of the heavens where time shows itself, to the desolation that unceasingly 
reemerges from the contrast between the fragility of life and the power of time, which is 
more destructive than anything else” (TN3, 93). These two experiences of temporality 
stand at opposite ends of a spectrum such that we need a third form of time that mediates 
the two. Ricoeur offers several names for this time, including “human time,” “historical 
time,” and “narrated time.” I will develop the meaning of this time below, but before 
then, however, there is a third point where Heidegger and Ricoeur diverge. 
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This third point refers to the phenomena of conscience. Conscience enables 
Dasein to respond to its being-guilty and thus to be responsible for itself. Heidegger’s 
inquiry into the meaning of guilt and indebtedness is strictly ontological, and wholly 
devoid of ethical or moral commitments. He thus writes “the primordial ‘Being-guilty’ 
cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself” (BT 
332/SZ 286). Ricoeur’s worry is that “Heidegger does not show how we can travel this 
road [from the existentiell to the existential] in the opposite direction, from ontology to 
ethics.”303 Heidegger’s account of conscience, according to Ricoeur, grants very little to 
the dimensions of “height” and “exteriority” that would allow us to extend authenticity to 
our being-with-others. By “height” Ricoeur means the way that the call “hangs over me,” 
“enjoins me,” “calls me from on high,” or, as Heidegger suggests, the way that call 
comes both from me and yet from beyond and over me.304 “Exteriority,” on the other 
hand, refers to the otherness of the call, which for Heidegger refers not to specific others 
to the experience of uncanniness—a “strangeness without a stranger.”305 By 
circumscribing the being of Dasein too tightly, Heidegger ultimately avoids the ethical 
dimensions of human experience. Ricoeur thus repeats the now familiar criticism that 
Heidegger’s ontological approach to human existence obscures the concrete, historical 
ways in which we experience conscience. 
If Ricoeur disagrees with Heidegger on these points, it is not as much to prove 
Heidegger wrong or claim that we have somehow overcome Heidegger and no longer 
need to deal with him. Rather, Ricoeur’s criticisms are meant to help open the way for 
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further rapprochement between Heidegger’s phenomenological insights to the existential 
condition and the more practical dimensions that Ricoeur sees Heidegger as excluding. 
This reorientation of Heidegger’s insights can be seen in Ricoeur’s phenomenology of 
memory and its application to human time. 
 
IV.3 The Phenomenology of Memory and Forgetting 
 
Ricoeur’s preference for the “long route” to ontology is in evidence at the 
beginning of Memory, History, Forgetting. There, he poses problem of memory around 
two questions: of what are there memories?” and “whose memory is it?” with the latter 
often taking priority over the former. Indeed, that question appears to structure the 
trajectory of Being and Time: the priority of the question “who?” is secured as a matter of 
ontological urgency (Cf. BT/SZ §25).306 To forget the question of Being is correlated to 
Dasein’s forgetting its ownmost Being; to remember the question of Being is to retrieve 
and repeat those fundamental possibilities for understanding oneself that one has 
inherited from one’s own heritage. 
Ricoeur, however, subordinates the question “who remembers?” to the question 
“what are the objects of memory?” Doing so, he argues, will avoid “the negative effect of 
leading the analysis of mnemonic phenomena to an impasse, when the notion of 
collective memory [is] to be taken into account” (MHF, 3). Many studies of memory 
flounder when they attempt to give an account of collective memory precisely because 
they start with the remembering subject or self, whose memories cannot be transferred to 
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another person without losing their character as being “my own” memories. Collective 
memory thus tends to be interpreted either as an aggregate of individual memories or as 
an analogue to individual memory. In order to avoid the pitfalls of beginning with the 
question of “who?” we need to begin phenomenologically, which is to say with the mode 
of intentionality that characterizes memory. If memory is memory of something, of what 
is it a memory? 
The answer to the above question is simple, if deceptively so. The problem of 
memory is the problem of representing the past. Ricoeur writes, “what is there to say of 
the enigma of an image, of an eikon—to speak Greek with Plato and Aristotle—that 
offers itself as the presence of an absent thing stamped with the seal of the anterior?” 
(MHF, xvi) On one hand, as Plato suggests, memory concerns “the present representation 
of an absent thing; it argues implicitly for enclosing the problematic of memory within 
that of imagination” (MHF, 7). For Aristotle, on the other hand, memory refers to “the 
representation of a thing formerly perceived, acquired, or learned [thus] including the 
problematic of the image within that of remembering” (MHF, 7). Memory’s presentation 
of an absence highlights the way that the absence is of something that has passed on. Or 
simply, in Aristotle’s simple thesis, “memory is of the past.”307 
Furthermore, Ricoeur maintains the dual character of our access to the past: “On 
the one hand, memory as appearing, ultimately passively, to the point of characterizing as 
an affection – pathos – the popping into mind of a memory; and, on the other, the 
memory as an object of a search ordinarily named recall, recollection” (MHF, 4). The 
affective side of memory refers to mnēme, and its practical side is anamnesis. 
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Nevertheless, it is impossible to fully separate one from the other, as Ricoeur’s 
distinction between these two forms of memory is less a substantial difference than it is a 
methodological one that allows him to sketch out the path from what memories are of to 
an account of the bearer of such memories. Before seeing the implications of memory for 
the meaning of selfhood and community, I will further sketch out the meaning of these 
two aspects to memory, as well as the meaning of forgetting that Ricoeur develops. 
 
IV.3.1. Memory as Mnēmē 
Mnēmē is the simple presence or affection of memories to the mind, which 
secures its character as an image or representation of something absent. While both 
memory and imagination represent something absent, imagining takes us into the absent 
realm of the possible, and remembering returns us to the absence of that which has been. 
Memory thus extends beyond the sphere of the mental and is intimately tied to specific 
places, our bodies, and specific rituals in ways that imagination is not.308We have 
memories of the past because the past affects us through our bodies and because we 
inhabit certain places. Such an affect can be understood in terms of the wounds and scars 
that it inflicts upon us or as the happy recognition of someone or something long gone.  
Nevertheless, the imagistic quality of our memories should not be overlooked. 
The representation, or eikōn, of memory, Ricoeur suggests, is “from the outset associated 
with the imprint, the tupos, through the metaphor of the slab of wax, error being 
assimilated either to an erasing of marks, semeia, or to a mistake akin to that of someone 
placing his feet in the wrong footprints” (MHF, 8). Memory, in other words, represents 
something that happened through a sign, symbol, imprint, or trace that mediates the past 
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and present. Our memories immediately refer to the past, but they also may contain 
hidden meanings that require hermeneutic insight to be understood. Furthermore, as 
Ricoeur notes, “there is between the eikōn and the imprint a dialectic of accommodation, 
harmonization, or adjustment that can succeed or fail” (MHF, 13). The affective 
dimension of mnēmē gives rise to hermeneutic and epistemic concerns—to establish that 
something actually happened, we need to interpret the trace. Doing so presupposes, 
however, that the imprint and the image correspond to one another through their 
resemblance or their causal connection.  
This introduces the second point: “a suspicion arises in our mind: what assures us 
that such a representation of a past thing is accurate, faithful to the past?”309 Or, as Plato 
writes in the Theaetetus, “supposing you were asked, ‘If a man has once come to know a 
certain thing, and continues to preserve the memory of it, is it possible that, at the 
moment when he remembers it, he does not know this thing that he is remembering?”310 
Insofar as memory raises the claim that it is our only access to those events that occurred 
in the past, it is vulnerable in at least two ways. On one hand, the distinction between the 
image and the imprint exposes us to the threat of forgetting, insofar as one can be 
detached from the other. On the other hand, the preservation of the trace can be 
manipulative, which suggests that preservation can risk altering the memory. Due to such 
epistemological worries, the affectivity of memory can never be entirely free from 
suspicion. 
Because memory characterizes the way that we are affected by the past, it is 
intimately connected to the notion of the trace. The trace, as W. James Booth suggests, 
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points to “what is missing, or simply [is] the marker of absence, of a hollow or 
impression. Above all, [it calls] us back to what is lost, seeking to ensure that effacement 
or concealment does not transform the silence of memory into an abyss of permanent 
forgetfulness.”311 Traces of the past bear witness to the reality of what actually happened. 
As such, they are condensations of the paradox of representing the past: “on the one 
hand, the trace is visible here and now, as a vestige, a mark. On the other hand, there is a 
trace (or track) because ‘earlier’ a human being…passed this way” (TN3, 119). The trace 
simultaneously belongs to the time of the present and the time of the past because it 
preserves the past in virtue of its remaining present. “As left behind, through the 
materiality of the mark, the trace designates the exteriority of the past…However, there is 
also a correlation between the significance of the followed trace and the efficacity of the 
transmitted tradition” (TN3, 229). The corporeality of the trace refers to a past that is no 
longer present, even as such corporeality also connects the present to the past, and shows 
how the present still belongs to the past. 
In order to elaborate the relationship between traces and memory, it will be 
helpful to unpack the different meanings of the trace. The trace first refers to the material 
“on which historians work” (MHF, 13). Here, the trace is to be understood in terms of the 
remnants of the past—such as oral testimony, ruins, archaeological sites, pottery shards, 
documents, and the like. The historian’s work is to arrange such remains by situating 
their meaning within an historical context. These traces, once taken down in writing, can 
become documents to be placed in the archive and can expand our knowledge of the past 
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if they are situated and organized in an institution that both conserves and preserves them 
against further deterioration.  
Another meaning of the trace refers to “the impression as an affection resulting 
from the shock of an event that can be said to be striking, marking” (MHF, 14). The trace 
thus leaves the marks of a lasting impression of an event. Footprints left in the sand, or 
tracks left in the ground are benign examples of this kind of trace, it is also manifest as 
psychic wounds, or the memory of an injury that can still be called to mind. The imprint 
is something that makes an impression on us, and indicates the lasting effect of such an 
event. Ricoeur describes this form of the trace, which he sometimes refers to as a 
“psychical” or “affective” trace, as “the passive persistence of first impressions: an event 
has struck us, touched us, affected us” (MHF, 427). This affective trace remains in our 
mind, while maintaining the mark of absence and distance. However, the threat posed to 
such psychic memories is not so much the threat posed by the constant march of time. 
Rather, as Jean Greisch notes, “if there is a threat here…it is in fact that the unerasable 
that we would prefer to bury in the past might come back to haunt us.”312 Traces of what 
affected us cannot be fully erased, and even continue to have an effect on who we are. 
These lasting imprints can compel a witness to testify to injustices. Despite all attempts to 
erase the past, there always remains an element of the past that cannot be erased, 
elements that nevertheless persist because something happened. 
The third, and final, meaning of the trace that Ricoeur notes is the corporeal, 
cortical imprint that is the focus of the neurosciences (MHF, 415). Neuroscience suggests 
that there is a connection between the impression left by experience and the material 
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imprint on the brain. Such a trace, remaining in the province of the neurosciences, can 
become the objects of a scientific analysis and hold the promise of an objective map of 
the brain and the corresponding states to which it gives rise. Forgetting, on this account, 
is not only a malfunction of memory but can also be explained by indicating the erasure 
of the cortical imprint due to deterioration or degeneration of brain tissue.313 These three 
conceptions of the trace reveal the dialectical tension between presence and absence at 
the center of the problem of representation. 
The trace is thus intimately connected to the understanding of memory as mnēmē. 
It names the particular the way the past affects us and the closely related problem of 
representing the past. To preserve the trace is to risk changing it, while if we do nothing 
to it, we risk forgetting that to which it refers. The affective dimension of memory, 
however, does not exhaust its meaning. If traces highlight the way the past intrudes on 
the present, they never fully connect the two. As Booth writes, “the trace points us to the 
absence, and in so doing awakens in us the desire to remember, to make the past present, 
to overcome what cannot be in fact fully overcome, namely that absence itself.”314 The 
very affectivity of the past thus introduces a practical side to memory, one to which I will 
now turn.  
                                                
313 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be focusing on the tensions that arise between the first two 
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David Kaplan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008): pp. 31-46. 
314 Booth, Communities of Memory, p. 84. 
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IV.3.2. Memory as Anamnesis 
Memory is not only the simple presence of an image of the past to the mind. It is 
also recollective. Ricoeur writes, “on the one hand, the simple memory arises in the 
manner of an affection, while recollection consists in an active search. On the other hand, 
the simple memory is under the dominion of the agent of the imprint, whereas 
movements and the entire sequence of changes…have their principle in us” (MHF, 17). 
The difference between these two forms of memory thus includes the distinction between 
the way that the past is evoked through the image and the way that the past is 
remembered through a search. 
The act of remembering is made possible only after time has elapsed, and Ricoeur 
notes, “it is this interval of time, between the initial impression and its return, that 
recollection traverses” (MHF, 18). The process of recollection requires being able to 
attend to the differentiation of magnitudes or proportions of the interval between “now” 
and “before.” “The main thing is,” Aristotle writes, “that one must know the time.”315 
The starting point of such recollection is, of course, under the sway of the person 
recollecting; nevertheless, along the course of recollection there are several paths open to 
reminiscing. In other words, for any given search, as anyone who has dug through 
archives can tell, there is always the possibility of finding something unexpected, going 
down the wrong path, or finding nothing at all. Traversing a particular interval of time 
through recollection is ultimately a form of reasoning because it follows a chain of 
inferences from the starting point of a recollection to a successfully recalled event or 
object. 
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The trace thus not only evokes the past, but it calls upon us to recollect the origin 
of it. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur explicitly links the notion of debt to the trace, 
arguing that the notion of a past that actually existed “is supported by an implicit 
ontology, in virtue of which historian’s constructions have the ambition of being 
reconstructions, more or less fitting with what was once ‘real.’ Everything takes place as 
though historians knew themselves to be bound by a debt to people from earlier times, to 
the dead” (TN3, 100). Ricoeur further suggests that were the historian to avoid thinking 
herself as being obliged by the debt owed the dead, history would lose its meaning (Cf., 
TN3, 118). In other words, the motivation or desire to recollect the past requires us to 
render the past its due.  
Under the figure of the debt, the historian operates under the constraint to 
represent the past such as it happened. Ricoeur names this constraint the “law of 
creativity.” As Ricoeur puts it: “The stringent law of creation…is to render as perfectly as 
possible the vision of the world that inspires the artist, [and which] corresponds feature 
by feature to the debt of the historian and the reader of history with respect to the dead” 
(TN3, 177).  The “law of creation” refers to the way that an historian must bind her or 
himself to the represented object in order to reconstruct an image of things as they really 
were and of events as they really happened (TN3, 145). In this manner, Ricoeur 
maintains his commitment to the phenomenological maxim to return to the things 
themselves as they are manifest to us. In this case, such a maxim means that historians 
must be committed to the way in which the artifacts of the past present themselves as 
past. The debt of the historian, and of the reader of history, means that both are under the 
obligation to represent the past as past, as lost, and as other to the present. Nevertheless, 
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such a debt is not without a price. The result of such self-binding is the feeling of 
“anguish and suffering” (TN3, 177). The historian who finds herself bound to do justice 
to the constraints posed by the trace and document does so in service of opening up a 
possible world for the reader to inhabit. It is a world that, in its own suffering, calls out to 
be recounted and not forgotten. By identifying with the suffering and anguish of the past, 
the historian feels anguish in her attempt to render, as perfectly as possible the vision of 
the world that motivates her to write such a history. 
While it is clear that not every act of recollection is motivated by a sense of 
indebtedness, to be responsible with memory requires such a notion. This is especially 
evident insofar as memory is prone to both uses and abuses. Recollection acts as one of 
the primary ways that a heritage is transmitted, or, as Ricoeur says, “it relates the being 
affected by the past to the potentiality-of-being turned toward the future” (MHF, 381). 
The historian thus “has the opportunity to carry herself in imagination back to a given 
moment of the past as having been present, and so as having been lived by people of the 
past as the present of their past and as the present of their future” (MHF, 381). It is thus 
intimately tied to the problems of bearing witness. To bear witness is not merely to 
recount facts about others or highlight important events. It is “the result of assuming a 
responsibility to bring them and their fates to light and to a sort of continued presence.”316 
To find oneself in a position to recollect the past in such terms is to find oneself as having 
to respond to those silent traces of the past, and work to bring them to light and carry 
them forward as a renewed future. This means that “we must struggle against the 
tendency to consider the past only from the angle of what is done, unchangeable, past. 
We have to reopen the past, to revivify its unaccomplished, cut-off—even slaughtered—
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possibilities” (TN3, 216). Indebtedness helps to give meaning to the work of recollection 
and to motivate the practices of memory. By operating under this figure of a debt, the 
historian finds herself under an obligation to remember a heritage that it takes over from 
another time (TN3, 256). 
By developing how memory is both an active recollection and a passive affect, 
Ricoeur suggests that Aristotle’s main contribution to our understanding of memory is his 
distinction between mnēme and anamnesis. He has, for Ricoeur, highlighted the 
fundamental peculiarity of memory to represent something absent as something that has 
passed. Thus, “on the one hand, he sharpened the point of the enigma by making the 
reference to time the distinctive note of memory in the field of the imagination” (MHF, 
19). Memory is not equivalent to imagination because, while both represent an absence, 
only memory refers to the past. “On the other hand,” Ricoeur continues, “by assuming 
the category of the eikon for the framework of the discussion, in connection with the 
category of the tupos, he is in danger of pursuing the aporia to the point of impasse” 
(MHF, 19). This impasse is such that there remains a question regarding the meaning of 
the “copy” or image that characterizes memory as a representation of the past and the 
extent to which memory requires resemblance with the initial impression.  
Mnēme and anamnesis together thus bring to light two contrasting elements of 
remembering. First, memory is about the past. To call a particular object of consciousness 
a memory, there needs first to be a distinction between the present in which the act of 
memory occurs and the past that caused the trace or image. Memory, in other words, 
requires temporal distance. This entails, Ricoeur suggests, that memory “is our one and 
only resource for signifying the past-character of what we declare to remember…To put 
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it bluntly, we have nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, 
has occurred, has happened before we declare that we remember it” (MHF, 21). 
Secondly, memory, given its recollective dimension, is prone to change and movement. 
Memory is thus never a static phenomenon, written in stone. The reconstruction of 
memory as a narrative will have significant implications for understanding the practical 
dimensions of identity. Together, mnēme and anemnesis suggest that memory is tied to a 
particular ambition – that of being faithful to the past (MHF, 21). It aims at ensuring a 
truthful relationship between the representation of the past and the past that is thus 
represented. 
 
IV.3.3. Memory and Forgetting 
 
A threat to memory lies in the possibility of forgetting, which is the partial or 
complete erasure of traces of the past. Traces, especially the traces of the past with which 
the historian works, are especially vulnerable to destruction. The destruction of archives, 
the forgery or willful suppression of texts not only distorts memory, they can also cause 
us to forget what actually happened. What is there to say, however, about the “psychical 
trace,” which is to say, the impression of the affection left by a marking event? This 
trace, as noted above, “consists in the passive persistence of first impressions: an event 
has struck us, touched us, affected us, and the affective mark remains in our mind” 
(MHF, 427). If this trace were to be destroyed, there could be no such thing as memory, 
for there would be nothing that persists. 
In order to establish the parameters of this problem, Ricoeur turns to both Henri 
Bergson and, again, to Heidegger. From Bergson, Ricoeur draws out a conception of 
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memory as an unconscious duration. The impression, or affectation, of memory remains, 
we know, “because…it makes recognition possible” (MHF, 430). In recognizing 
someone, the image comes back to me; it returns after a seemingly long absence, which 
makes recognition the mnemonic act par excellence (MHF, 430). We do not constantly 
perceive the survival of the image, as that would overwhelm us; rather, “we presuppose it 
and believe it” (MHF, 434). Ricoeur argues that “an ‘unconscious’ existence of memories 
must be postulated,” whose existence remains latent, in order to explain how we are able 
to recognize someone or something we have long since forgotten (MHF, 417). He names 
this “positive figure of forgetting” the “reserve of forgetting” (MHF, 417). It thus appears 
that forgetting is necessary for remembering, and makes possible recognition. Without a 
“reserve of forgetting” there can be no recognition, no recollection, and no memory. 
Where, however, does such an image “survive?” Following Bergson, Ricoeur 
suggests that such the question “where?” should be replaced with the question “how?” In 
this way, he avoids understanding memory in terms of the classic, and dangerously 
metaphysical, metaphor of the mind as container or receptacle of images. The reserve of 
forgetting thus does not refer to a storehouse of images; it instead signifies the duration of 
memories in habits and places. Our bodies, understood phenomenologically as the lived 
body (Leib) rather than merely physiological body (Körper), “possesses, in its very being, 
an efficacious operative intentionality animating all of its ongoing maneuvers.”317 This 
body memory is not explicitly intended, but is instead operative underneath all of our 
movements. It is a kind of forgetting in the sense that it “designates the unperceived 
character of the perseverance of memories, their removal from the vigilance of 
consciousness” (MHF, 440, Ricoeur’s italics). In order to explicate the way that the latent 
                                                
317 Edward Casey. Remembering, p. 178. 
 226 
survival of memories becomes the positive figure of forgetting, Ricoeur turns to 
Heidegger. 
While Ricoeur recognizes both those “point-like” episodes of recognition and 
those general forms of knowledge, such as the rules of grammar and language, there is 
also the “immemorial” (MHF, 441). The immemorial refers to “that which was never an 
event for me and which we have never even actually learned, and which is less formal 
than ontological” (MHF, 441). Forgetting the immemorial is a forgetting of those 
fundamental origins, origins which are irreducible to chronological beginnings. Here, 
Ricoeur cites a paradox Heidegger quickly introduces in Being and Time: “just as 
expectation is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering [Erinnerung] is 
possible only on the basis of forgetting, and not the other way around. In the mode of 
forgottenness, having-been primarily discloses the horizon in which Dasein, lost in the 
superficiality of what is taken care of, can remember” (BT 389/SZ 339). Having-been 
thus refers to “the complete anteriority of the past with respect to every event that is 
dated, remembered, or forgetting. An anteriority that is not confined to removing it from 
our grasp, as is the case of the past as expired (Vergangenheit), but an anteriority that 
preserves” (MHF, 442). This indicates a past that is “always already” with us, but one 
which cannot be given a specific date in the past. Rather, it is, as Steven Crowell 
suggests, “spectral,” which is to say one that cannot be narrated but is the ground for 
narratives.318 The past, as having-been, thus makes the reserve of forgetting an 
immemorial resource for the work of remembering and makes possible repetition 
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precisely because it does not consign the past to something that is wholly irretrievable 
and gone.  
Memory and forgetting are thus not opposites. Rather, they condition one another 
in a complex interplay that constitutes the human historical condition. In order to see the 
role it plays in constituting identity, it will be necessary to turn to Ricoeur’s conception of 
narrative identity and its correlate, communal identity.  
 
IV.4. Narrative Identity 
Ricoeur explicitly connects narrative, memory, and selfhood in Memory, History, 
Forgetting, which lays the foundation for his turn to collective memory. Insofar as 
memory is of the past, it “assures the temporal continuity of the person and, by this 
means, assures that identity” of a person (MHF, 96). This temporal continuity enables 
one to traverse from the living present to the distant past. “It is primarily in narrative,” 
Ricoeur writes, “that memories in the plural and memory in the singular are articulated, 
and differentiation joined to continuity” (MHF, 96-97).319 Because of this, memories and 
forgetting, to be understood, need to be formulated as a narrative. 
In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur argued that “time becomes human to the extent 
that it is organized after the manner of a narrative” and that “narrative, in turn, is 
meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience” (TN1, 3). 
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The most important application of narrative is thus to human experience. As such, the 
“core of [his] whole investigation” is summed up in his claim that historical 
consciousness finds its meaning in the search “by individuals and by the communities to 
which they belong, for their respective narrative identities” (TN3, 274). Given the 
centrality of memory, Ricoeur’s thesis can be further augmented to be that temporality 
becomes meaningful to human beings to the extent that memory, history, and forgetting 
are organized according to narrative.320 In this section, I will develop Ricoeur’s account 
of narrative identity, paying special attention to the role that memory plays in its 
constitution. 
 
IV.4.1. Idem-Identity and Ipse-Identity 
Identity, for Ricoeur, is primarily a “practical category” rather than a 
metaphysical one (TN3, 246). Metaphysical notions of identity, Ricoeur argues, are 
 
condemned to an antinomy with no solution. Either we must posit a 
subject identical with itself through the diversity of its different states, or, 
following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold that this identical subject is 
nothing more than a substantialist illusion, whose elimination merely 
brings to light a pure manifold of cognitions, emotions, or volitions. (TN3, 
246) 
 
Many accounts of personal identity do not recognize that the way that human beings exist 
is distinct from the way that objects exist. In Heideggerian terms, they make the mode of 
human being a present-at-hand object. In Ricoeurian terms, they conflate two distinct 
forms of identity: selfhood and sameness. Ricoeur gives the name “idem-identity” to the 
identification of the same thing over time. Idem “is a concept of relation and a relation of 
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relations,” which can be expressed in terms of numerical identity, qualitative identity, or 
the “uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the development of 
what we consider to be the same individual.”321 It allows us to identify and re-identify 
something as being the same over time. Idem thus refers to a substratum that allows us to 
think of change that happens to something that remains the same (OA, 118). When 
understood as being permanent over time, personal identity will “revolve around this 
search for a relational invariant” that remains the same through change (OA, 118). To 
search for something’s idem-identity is to search for the identity of an object. 
Selfhood by contrast, is constituted through praxis; it is an answer to the “who did 
this?” and “who is responsible for this action?” Such a question introduces a different 
form of identity, ipse-identity. Ipse is defined by being the self-same (soi-même) or being 
self-constant. There are two ways to understand ipse-identity: character and keeping 
one’s word. Character refers to the “set of lasting dispositions by which a person is 
recognized,” and as such it designates the point where ipse-identity becomes almost 
indiscernible from idem-identity (OA, 121). These lasting dispositions include habits, 
which are those behaviors or traits “by which a person is recognized, reidentified as the 
same,” and “the set of acquired identifications by which the other enters into the 
composition of the same,” which include the “values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes 
in which the person or community identifies itself” (OA, 121, Ricoeur’s italics). The 
stability of character that arises through habits and adhering to norms secures an 
individual’s “numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity across 
change, and, finally, permanence in time which defines sameness” (OA, 122). This 
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dimension of selfhood makes it legitimate to refer to others in terms of what they do, 
their interests, physical and psychological characteristics, and the like. 
If character marks the proximity between ipse-identity and idem-identity, then 
keeping one’s word and being faithful to one’s commitments “marks the extreme gap 
between the permanence of the self and that of the same and so attests fully to the 
irreducibility of the two problematics one to the other” (OA, 118). The ability to keep a 
promise implies a complex set of relationships, based on an understanding of being 
accountable and responsible. To be accountable implies a “manner of conducting 
[oneself] so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I 
am accountable for my actions before another” (OA, 165). The self becomes both 
dependable and capable of having actions imputed to it. Responsibility connects these 
two meanings of being accountable:  
 
The term “responsibility” unites both meanings: “counting on” and “being 
accountable for.” It unites them, adding to them the idea of a response to 
the question “Where are you?” asked by another who needs me. The 
response is the following: “Here I am!” a response that is a statement of 
self-constancy. (OA, 165) 
 
A promise is a kind of challenge against the changes that time brings about. Making a 
promise entails that I should be able to hold firm to my word, even were I to change my 
opinion or desires. To keep a promise is to respond to and uphold the trust that others put 
in me. It attests to my self-constancy, revealing me as the kind of person I am despite 
changes in desires, opinions, in my physical or psychological make-up.  
The permanence of the self as character is thus distinct from the sense of the self 
that is found when we hold someone to his or her word. In order to bridge this gap and tie 
together one’s character and one’s fidelity, Ricoeur draws on the poetic resources of 
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narrative. Because narratives articulate the essentially temporal and historical constitution 
of the world, and because the self has a memory and can keep its promises, personal 
identity can only be understood through the auspices of narrative. Narrative identity is 
constituted in a three step “mimetic arc,” which I will now elaborate. 
 
IV.4.2. The Mimetic Arc of Narrative 
Ricoeur’s account of mimesis in Time and Narrative, as Henry Venema describes, 
“repeats the central thesis of [Ricoeur’s] hermeneutical phenomenology: linguistic 
distance coupled with the proximity of belonging.”322 While Ricoeur uses the threefold 
structure of mimesis to give an account of our understanding of texts, I will be more 
concerned with the ways that it helps an individual and community make sense of its 
identity. Narrative selfhood arises through its belonging to and distance from its past. 
 
IV.4.2.1. Mimesis1: Prefiguration 
 
Narratives are, of course, narratives of events, people, places, circumstances, and 
actions. This means that “the composition of the plot is grounded in a pre-understanding 
of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal 
character” (TN1, 54). In order to narrate, we need be able to identify action according to 
its structural features, have an understanding of the norms and symbols that make an 
action intelligible as a particular action, and recognize that temporal elements that would 
help us configure the actions in a coherent order (TN1, 54).  Ricoeur names this pre-
understanding of the world, “prefiguration.” Prefiguration roughly corresponds to fore- 
structure of understanding that Heidegger identified in §32 of Being and Time. However, 
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while Heidegger focuses mainly on its formal elements, Ricoeur draws out three features 
of it: its structural, symbolic, temporal features. 
Because human action is structurally different from mere physical movement, 
there needs to be a “conceptual network” that would allow us to make sense of action. 
(TN1, 54-55). In order to understand an action, we must be competent to answer 
questions of who, what, when, where, why, how, with whom, and against whom such an 
action occurred. This means that the “semantics” of action refers to “goals,” “motives,” 
“agents,” “reasons,” “intentions,” “ability to do something,” “means,” “contingency,” 
“cooperation,” “competition,” “struggle,” and the like. These components refer to the 
“paradigmatic order” of narrative, which, because they are paradigms, can be applied to 
any given event.  
While the semantics of action makes use of the conceptual network of terms to 
distinguish action, the syntactic features are the rules that allow us to organize the 
motives, goals, and circumstances into a narrative. “Syntactic features” operate like 
schemata to unite the semantic elements of action into a whole (TN1, 56). Such schemata 
might include different genres of writing, such as revenge plays, tragedies, comedies, 
memoirs, and the like. These genres help to organize the goals, events, reasons, and 
agents into a whole. It is important to note that theses paradigmatic features have “only a 
virtual signification…that is, a pure capacity to be used” and only “receive an actual 
[effective] signification thanks to the sequential interconnections the plot confers on the 
agents, their deeds, and their sufferings” (TN1, 56-57). To understand oneself, an 
individual needs to be familiar with the conceptual network of the semantics of action 
and the rules of composition that allow such a network to be temporally ordered into a 
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whole. As Ricoeur puts it, “to understand a story is to understand both the language of 
‘doing something’ and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots” 
(TN1, 57). A tradition thus provides us with paradigms, typologies, possibilities, and 
structures that allow one to make sense of oneself, others, and the world, even if it does 
not do so explicitly. 
The symbolic character of our pre-understanding further complements the 
semantics and syntactic features of prefiguration. “If…human action can be narrated, it is 
because it is always already articulated by signs, rules, and norms” (TN1, 57). Cultural 
rules and norms make action intelligible insofar as they provide the structures that make 
an action count as an instance of a general rule. Thus, depending on the context and 
cultural tradition, raising one’s own hand could mean that one is hailing a taxi, voting, or 
greeting another person (TN1, 58). We thus need to situate an act “within a ritual, set 
within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and 
institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture” (TN1, 58). Actions can 
thus be read as “a quasi-text…insofar as the symbols, understood as interpretants, provide 
the rules of meaning as a function of which this or that behavior can be interpreted” 
(TN1, 58). We must have a pre-understanding of what counts a relevant feature, the 
norms involved, and what makes an action meaningful before we explicitly lay out what 
it means. 
The symbolic dimension indicates an implicit a prescriptive, even ethical, 
dimension of actions and narratives: 
 
As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated 
or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. 
They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more 
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valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, 
can be extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, 
better or worse. (TN1, 58)  
 
As a result, configuring actions into a narrative “can never be ethically neutral” (TN1, 
59). Narratives transform a description of action into a prescription for action, and thus 
furnish those values and norms that one can adhere to in developing one’s character, and 
evaluating the character and actions of others. 323 
The third, and final feature of prefiguration, or mimesis1, refers directly to the 
temporality of action. The temporal character of action is “implicit in” action, and is 
present in our ordinary ways of talking about things that happen to us and those events in 
which we are caught up (TN1, 60). It is because action takes time to complete that it 
“calls for narration” (TN1, 59). The temporality of action is significantly different from 
the abstract sequence of instantaneous now points. “There is not a future time, a past 
time, and a present time,” Ricoeur argues, “but a threefold present, a present of future 
things, and a present of past things, and a present of present things” (TN1, 60). Everyday 
action, in other words, orders our experience of the past, present, and future by relating 
the experience of time back to the self. 
To elaborate the connection between time and the self, Ricoeur draws from 
Heidegger’s explication of the temporality of care from the second division of Being and 
Time. However, rather than connect the temporality of action to the authentic temporality 
of care (Zeitlichkeit), in which time is “entirely desubstantialazed” and is figured “as the 
exploded unity of the three temporal extases” from the point of view of Dasein’s Being-
toward-death, Ricoeur focuses on “our relation to time as that ‘within which’ we 
ordinarily act” (TN1, 61). Though Heidegger claims that this dimension of temporality, 
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the time “within-which” we take care of business, is the least primordial (Cf. BT/SZ §79-
81), it is where ordinary discourse about time takes place and the time in which we take 
care of our daily affairs. The temporality of care provides the framework for 
understanding ourselves because care not only concerns our own being-toward-death, but 
also our orientation to the past and the present. 
Ricoeur’s account of prefiguration is thus closely connected to Heidegger’s 
account of the fore-structures of understanding. Understanding, for Heidegger, is the 
mode of Dasein’s Being wherein its possibilities for being concerned with its world are 
realized as possibilities. We understand our world, objects, and others from the 
perspective of “a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides itself in the explicitness 
of the assignment-relations (of the ‘in-order-to) which belong to that totality” (BT 189/SZ 
149, my italics). Ricoeur interprets the hiddenness of such relations in terms of the tacit 
semantic, syntactic, rules, and norms that govern our everyday lives: “the plane we 
occupy, at this initial stage of our traversal, is precisely the one where ordinary language 
is truly…the storehouse of those expressions that are most appropriate to what is properly 
human in our experience” (TN1, 62, my italics). This suggests that this first level of 
mimesis is the domain of sedimented and implicit meaning. Because they are implicit, 
they make narration possible. 
 
IV.4.2.2. Mimesis2: Configuration 
Mimesis2 mediates, or “configures,” what was prefigured in the understanding of 
action and the application of meaning to identity. It interprets and renders explicit the 
implicit semantic, symbolic, and temporal structures that are implicit in human activity 
 236 
and selfhood. Narrative identity is thus distinct from the life represented; nevertheless 
“despite the break it institutes, literature would be incomprehensible if it did not give a 
configuration to what was already a figure in human action” (TN1, 64). By making 
explicit the possibilities implicitly contained in the prefigured world, narrative identity 
belongs to the world. 
In order to see the meaning of narratives, Ricoeur performs a kind of “narrative 
epochè.” 324 This process brackets the question of narrative’s referents in order to 
describe the narrative act itself, which he names “emplotment.” Emplotment has three 
features. First, it is “the operation that draws a configuration out of simple succession” 
(TN1, 65). The plot mediates “individual events or incidents and a story taken as a 
whole” (TN1, 65). The plot of a story not only describes action, by highlighting the 
causes of events, it does so in such a way that it organizes agents, events, motives, and so 
forth “into an intelligible whole, of a sort that we can always ask what is the ‘thought’ of 
the story” (TN1, 65). The second element of emplotment is the way that it “brings 
together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means interactions, circumstances, and 
unexpected results” (TN 1, 65). Emplotment thus respects the episodic qualities of a 
story, thus allowing the author to be creative in writing the story and offering surprises, 
reversals, and recognitions for the reader. These first two elements of plot are the 
“concordant discordance” that characterizes narrative unity (TN1, 66). Finally, plot 
configures these elements into a temporal unity. While the first two elements require that 
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the plot must be a coherent whole that fits its elements together, this final feature 
emphasizes temporal features of narrative. By arranging events temporally, the narrative 
function of emplotment creates new meaning and offers different worlds into which the 
reader to project him or herself.  
I have already indicated the role that traces of the past and being indebted to it is a 
central feature of memory. Emplotment, similarly, is “constituted by the interplay 
between innovation and sedimentation” that occurs in historical existence (TN1, 68). 
Ricoeur names this structure “traditionality.” The past furnishes the present with 
paradigms for thinking, acting, understanding and interpreting the world; the present 
always offers us the possibility of returning to, and reactivating those creative moments 
of poetic activity, reactivating them for the sake of the future. The dialectic between the 
present and the past, Ricoeur suggests, “proceeds from the tension…between the 
efficacity of the past that we undergo and the reception of the past that we bring about 
today” (TN3, 220). As a result, emplotment, or more specifically “traditionality,” rather 
than referring to a particular content that is transmitted, is the transcendental condition for 
thinking about history and memory at all (TN3, 219). 
By understanding the transmission of tradition in terms of a dialectic between the 
sedimentation and innovation of meaning, Ricoeur avoids several problems that often 
arise the ways that we remember the past. First, it avoids thinking about the past as 
wholly foreign to the present by arguing that contemporary forms of thinking are 
indebted to the past. If the past could be wholly abolished, transcended or otherwise 
overcome, it would be difficult to understand what meaning the past might have for us. If 
the past is to be meaningful, such that writing history is a possible endeavor, it has to 
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affect the present. Second, it avoids thinking of the present in terms of the summation or 
culmination of the past by respecting its otherness. Were the present to be nothing but the 
rote imitation of the past, it would be impossible to retrieve possibilities from it and 
constitute new meaning. Ricoeur’s conception of traditionality is thus a “transmission 
that is generative of meaning” that respects the way that the past is both foreign to the 
present and continuous with it (TN3, 221). The construction of a particular tradition thus 
occurs through narrative.  
Traditions, because they draw from narratives, are dynamic. Narratives are a 
“synthesis of the heterogeneous” (TN1, 66). There are thus two dimensions of narrative: 
on one hand, there are episodic events, vignettes even, and, on the other, the concordant 
unity in which they come together (TN1, 66). The episodic dimension of human action is 
more or less linear, wherein actions and events follow one another in succession. Ricoeur 
follows Aristotle here, arguing that “a beginning is not an absence of some antecedent, 
but the absence of necessity in the succession” (TN1, 38). The end of a story comes after 
something prior to it “as its necessary sequel or as its usual [and hence probable] sequel” 
(TN1, 38). The middle of a story is defined by mere succession: it comes after something 
else, and has another event following it. In order to configure what appears to be a 
contingent succession of events into a meaningful whole, an author needs to introduce 
necessity. 
Narrative necessity, however, is unique kind of necessity. It is not the deductive 
necessity that characterizes an argument. A narrative explains the events contained 
therein only to the extent that the connections it establishes between events are plausible. 
Narratives lead the reader to believe that the obstacles the protagonist encounters will be 
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overcome and that the conflicts that impede progress will be acceptably resolved or 
attenuated. Ricoeur writes: 
 
To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and 
peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfillment in 
the “conclusion” of the story. This conclusion is not logically implied by 
some previous premises. It gives the story an “end point,” which in turn, 
furnishes the point of view from which the story can be perceived as 
forming a whole. To understand the story is to understand how and why 
the successive episodes led to this conclusion, which, far from being 
foreseeable must finally be acceptable, as congruent with the episodes 
brought together by the story. (TN1, 66-67).  
 
A story is acceptable from the perspective of its end: if the point of it is lacking, if there 
are “loose ends” that still need to be resolved, or if the characters do something 
dramatically “out of character” or for what seems to be no reason, the story is not an 
acceptable or plausible one. 
Does this mean that traditions are merely stories, without any reference to what 
actually happened? Could it be that history is nothing but a pure fiction? Does bracketing 
the question of narrative’s referents mean that there is no significant distinction between 
fictional narratives and historical narratives? Ricoeur phrases this problem thusly: “we 
may be tempted to say that narrative puts consonance where there was only 
dissonance…At best, it furnishes the ‘as if’ proper to any fiction we know to be just 
fiction, a literary artifice” (TN1, 72). Is history merely one such artifice, a lie that we tell 
ourselves in order to make sense of action? 
Underlying this objection is a problematic understanding of the relationship 
between temporality and narratives. Narratives do not externally impose form on the 
formless. As long as narrative is understood solely in terms of consonance, and 
temporality in terms of dissonance, “we miss the properly dialectical character of their 
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relationship” (TN1, 72). To oppose narrative and temporality seems to rely on an overly 
abstract understanding of time, one that is linear or sequential. In other words, it misses 
the mediated ways that we experience time. Kim Atkins explains their relationship thusly, 
“by connecting earlier and later events narrative sentences articulate no less than three 
temporal dimensions: that of the event being described; that of the earlier event in terms 
of which the latter is described, and the time of the narrator.”325 Depending on the 
beginning and end that one wants to recount, an author can “play” with time in such a 
way that does not correspond with the linear “before” and “after” of an action, such as in 
a flashback, vivid memory, in order to stretch out the present in order to highlight 
tension. This gives narrative a lived feel to them, one that makes time relatable to human 
experience. The creativity, or poeisis, involved in recounting a story moves beyond what 
is presented in order to render explicit whas was only implicit. They disclose meanings 
that may have been missed in the immediate present, and has the power to reveal and 
redefine experiences. Narratives thus arise out of the experience of time; they belong to 
temporal experience even as they are distinct from such experience. 
Just as memory can disclose meanings and truths that might not have been 
available at the moment when we initially experienced, narratives can disclose meanings 
that might have gone unnoted or unarticulated. They both disclose a world in such a way 
that adds to it and releases possibilities. This point further suggests that in constructing 
personal identity through the resources of narrative, the events we hold to be significant, 
and the story that we tell about ourselves, can be scrutinized and contested. Narrative 
identity is caught up with others’ narrative identities, and the various stories that others 
can tell about each of us, for example the story of being a member of a particular class, 
profession, gender, nation, ethnicity, and the like. Emplotting a narrative thus helps to 
                                                
325 Kim Atkins. “Narrative Identity, Practical Identity, and Ethical Subjectivity.” Continental Philosophy 
Review, Vol. 37 (2004): pp. 341-366, p. 350. 
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establish the possible stories that can be told as well as one in which an agent acts, 
suffers, and the one for which the self takes responsibility. Narrative identity, that is, 
being a self, is thus the story in which one explicitly recognizes oneself. 
 
IV.4.2.3. Mimesis3: Refiguration 
If the configuration of the text effectively separates the text from the practical 
field, mimesis3 refers to the act of reading that reconnects the world opened up by the text 
with the world of the reader. Refiguration completes the movement “from a prefigured 
world to a transfigured world through the mediation of a configured world.”326 Thus, the 
prefigured structure of action, which was made explicit in the articulation in the plot of a 
narrative, is applied to and transforms the world in which one lives.  
Refiguration brings to a temporary closure to the process of understanding and 
interpretation. As Ricoeur puts it, insofar as the text “consists of holes, lacunae, zones of 
indetermination,” the reader’s task is to “configure what the author seems to take malign 
delight in defiguring” (TN1, 77). The reader thus has the task of explicitly bringing the 
plot of the text to light. “What is to be interpreted in the text,” Ricoeur writes, “is a 
proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my ownmost 
possibilities.”327 The practice of reading “lies in a thought experiment by means of which 
we try to inhabit worlds foreign to us” (TN3, 249). Similarly, in giving an account of 
oneself, one proposes a narrative which one could be responsible for—it is to attest to 
such an identity.  
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Ricoeur clearly privileges the role of fiction over the role of historical narratives 
in the process of refiguration. The reason for this should be apparent: while historical 
narratives are defined by referring to the reality of the past, fiction is free from such 
constraints. As such, fiction is more closely aligned with opening new possibilities for 
self-understanding and understanding the world. Fiction is, for Ricoeur, “undividedly 
revealing and transforming” (TN3, 158). It is revealing “in the sense that it brings 
features to light that were concealed and yet already sketched out at the heart of 
experience, our praxis.” Fiction thus makes explicit possibilities that are implicitly part of 
our experience. It is transformative “in the sense that a life examined in this way is a 
changed life, another life” (TN3, 158). Transforming possibilities is possible only if the 
fictional dimension of hermeneutic seeing allows one to see the temporal world of human 
action disclosed by the narrative as if it could be inhabited by a responsible agent and the 
actual being of an agent in search of his or her identity. 
 
IV.4.3. Narrative Identity and Selfhood 
The process of narration tends toward praxis. Ricoeur writes, “the meaning of the 
literary work rests upon the dialogical (dialogisch) relation established between the work 
and its public image in each age” (TN3, 171). While individuals act, they do so on the 
basis of an inherited tradition. Just as Gadamer had characterized this process of 
inheritance as dialogical, Ricoeur incorporates the logic of question and answer and the 
“history of effects,” into his own understanding of the meaning and reception of narrative 
identity. To form an identity entails finding oneself opened up by and open to a tradition, 
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which necessarily refers to others, present and past, with whom you share the tradition. 
As such, narrative identity is to give an account of oneself and attest to one’s own being. 
Recounting and responding to the stories that constitute a tradition appear “by 
turns as an interruption in the course of action and as a new impetus to action” (TN3, 
179). Narratives have a practical effect insofar as reading a text and listening to others 
includes “a provocation to be and to act differently” (TN3, 249). Thus, the act of 
reconfiguration does not merely show us “a smorgasbord of possible identities; it is 
intended as a discipleship toward selfhood.”328 Reading and listening allows us to look at 
our actions and evaluate them, so that we can wonder whether or not we ought to 
continue acting in that particular way. Such provocation “is transformed into action only 
through a decision whereby a person says: Here I stand!” (TN3, 249). In such instances, 
narrative identity overlaps with self-constancy and “makes ethical responsibility the 
highest factor in self-constancy” (TN3, 249). Thus, while a text or story may offer 
various possibilities for the reader to inhabit, it still “belongs to the reader, now an agent, 
an initiator of action, to choose among the multiple proposals of ethical justice brought 
forth by reading” (TN3, 249). Narrative identity at this point thus encounters a limit. This 
limit occurs when it intersects “nonnarrative components,” such as at the moment of an 
individual’s decision or action, which cannot be rendered fully intelligible by a narrative.  
Recounting one’s identity can thus be cathartic, and can help discharge the debt to 
the past. The cathartic effect of narratives can propose “new evaluations, hitherto unheard 
of norms, [thus] confronting or shaking current customs” (TN3, 176). Richard Kearney 
similarly argues that retelling the stories of the past can have a cathartic effect insofar as 
they recount “events that were too painful to be properly registered at the time but which 
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can, après coup, be allowed into expression indirectly, fictionally, ‘as if’ they were 
happening.”329 Recounting such memories and histories, in other words, allow us to 
experience ourselves as another, and the other as oneself by borrowing from fiction the 
ability to empathetically project oneself into the past. Historical narratives can thus 
“generate feelings of considerable ethical intensity” and establish a bond with between 
those in the present and the dead of history (TN3, 187). 
Narratives thus provide a structure through which one’s identity can make sense. 
Telling a story of who one is, or what happened, combines the temporal, practical, and 
historical dimensions of human existence. While it often arises as a first person account, 
it also refers to dialogical dimensions and even the impersonal dimensions of human 
existence. Such reference, however, is such as to weave them into a complex, unstable, 
and contestable. Personal identity can thus be constituted in and through narratives. 
We can now better see how memory and selfhood are related through stories. To 
remember an event is to articulate its meaning. Often such meaning was not apparent 
when the event was first experienced; rather, it is only because we able to constitute the 
meaning of it by situating it in proximity and distance to other events, organize it 
according to a plot, that allows us to have insight into what happened. Similarly the 
poetic resources of narrative allow us to creatively draw out meaning where we might not 
have seen any. Narrative memory and selfhood thus allow us to understand the meaning 
of what happened, and reconfigure it in such a way to make it acceptable to us. 
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IV.5. Tragedy and Collective Memory 
The contribution of memory to narrative selfhood, Ricoeur argues, applies at both 
the individual and the communal level: “individual and community are constituted in 
their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history” (TN3, 
247). For example, the reconstruction of identity by can be achieved by “working 
through” those unintelligible or unbearable pieces of a story in order to construct a 
coherent and acceptable story in which the patient can recognize his or her or self-
constancy. Psychoanalysis reveals “how the story of a life comes to be constituted 
through a series of rectifications applied to previous narratives, just as a history of a 
people, or a collectivity, or an institution proceeds from the series of corrections that new 
historians bring to the predecessors’ descriptions and explanations” (TN3, 247). The goal 
of this reconstruction thus helps individuals and communities to see themselves in the 
stories that they recount about who they are.  
Additionally, narrative selfhood at the communal level also arises when a group 
accepts a collection of texts, taken to be canonical, which expresses their character as a 
community and helps to constitute such identity. Ricoeur identifies the hermeneutic 
circularity of this relationship: “the historical community…has drawn its identity from 
the reception of those texts that it produced” (TN3, 248). The poetic resolution of their 
relationship in the dialectical and hermeneutic movement between idem-identity and ipse-
identity, and its further elaboration in narrative arc of mimesis, ensure that it is not 
viciously circular but hermeneutically circular.  
 What, however, can we say about the relationship between the individual and the 
community? How can an individual’s identity arise from his or her communal existence, 
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and how can a community’s identity arise from a story produced by an individual? 
Ricoeur phrases this problem as a dilemma: “on one side, it is the emergence of a 
problematic of a frankly egological mode of subjectivity, on the other, the irruption of 
sociology in the field of the social sciences and, with it, the appearance of an 
unprecedented concept of collective conscience” (MHF, 94). The problem with beginning 
with subjectivity to understand the meaning of remembering is that it “gave rise both to 
problematizing consciousness and to the movement by which consciousness turned back 
upon itself, to the point of speculative solipsism” (MHF, 94). Remembering, on this 
model, falls within the domain of an individual’s mind. When beginning with 
consciousness, collective identity becomes unthinkable, parasitic on individual identity, 
or merely metaphorical. By starting with the “mineness” of consciousness and 
intentionality, this “tradition of inwardness” cannot think the meaning of community 
except as an aggregate of individuals (MHF, 94).330 On the basis of the latter, individual 
memory is impossible without the social structures provided by one’s specific historical 
community. Whether one wants to begin with the meaning of remembering from the 
perspective of the individual or of the community, without inquiring into the possibility 
of their mutually supporting one another, they ultimately make it difficult to confront the 
complexities that befall the ethics of memory. 
Ricoeur offers a clue regarding the meaning of the relationship between 
individual and communal identity when he claims, “that all private and public memories 
are constituted simultaneously, according to the schema of mutual and reciprocal 
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establishment (instauration).”331 This reciprocity is established “only by analogy, and in 
relation to individual consciousness and its memory,” such that “collective memory is 
held to be a collection of traces left by the events that have affected the course of history 
of the groups concerned, and that it is accorded the power to place on stage these 
common memories, on the occasion of holidays, rites, and public celebrations” (MHF, 
119). To express the analogical relationship between individuals and communities, I will 
employ a familiar phenomenological strategy and look at an instance where the mutually 
supporting ground of individual and communal identity becomes fragmented and 
untenable. For Ricoeur, it is in lessons that tragic drama teaches where the conflict 
between an individual and its community come to a head. By delineating how tragedy 
opens up the gulf between selfhood and community through the inability to come to 
terms with the debt owed the dead, we will be in a better position to see how they 
reciprocally and mutually establish one another. 
 
IV.5.1. “The Little Ethics”: The Ethical Aim and the Moral Norm 
The debt owed the dead, for Ricoeur, constitutes a moral obligation to remember. 
In order to understand how this obligation contributes to constituting the relationship 
between the self and community, it will be useful to briefly describe what Ricoeur 
describes as is “little ethics.”332 “Ethics,” according to Ricoeur, is teleological because it 
refers to “the aim of an accomplished life,” whereas “morality” refers to “the articulation 
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of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an affect of 
constraint” (OA, 170). Ricoeur maintains the priority of ethics over morality, even 
though the aim of the good life must pass through the “sieve” of the moral norm. In the 
case of conflicts, the norm is resubmitted to the aims of the good life through practical 
wisdom.  
Ethics teleologically aims at “the good life, with and for others in just institutions” 
(OA, 172). This initial level involves the practice “of judging well and acting well in a 
momentary approximation of living well” (OA, 180). It includes a formulation of what 
the good life is, and attempts to integrate actions into a “global project” or unified whole. 
“With respect to its content,” Ricoeur writes, “the ‘good life’ is, for each of us, the 
nebulous ideals and dreams of achievement with regard to which a life is held to be more 
or less fulfilled or unfulfilled” (OA, 179). The choices a person makes are based on the 
working conception of the good life, and the good life is attained through the choices one 
makes. Each person is set with the task of weaving together a number of different aims 
under the heading of the good life, such as, for example, his or her professional life, 
family life, religious commitments, recreation, political commitments and so forth. By 
appreciating our successes and failures in carrying the project of a good life, we attest to 
ourselves and to the conception of the good. Thus, the ethical aim is profoundly self-
reflexive insofar as the formation of goods at any level realizes one’s “self-esteem,” and 
attests to the self’s ability to constitute a narrative identity and the capacity to act. 
Self-esteem opens the second dimension of the ethical aim, solicitude. The term 
“solicitude” captures the sense that the good life is one that is “lived with and for others.” 
Because the basis of my self-esteem is found in the capacity to act, it refers to others who 
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can also act and evaluate my actions. Others mediate the basic capacities of human being 
and their realization by recognizing the self and imputing actions to him or her. The 
recognition of who I am in solicitude works in two ways: in friendship and in the work of 
justice. On one hand, there is a movement of the self toward the other in friendship, in 
order to establish mutual relationship and reciprocity between the self and the other. On 
the other hand, there is the ethical dimension in which the self recognizes “the superiority 
of the authority enjoining to act in accordance with justice” (OA, 190). In other words, 
there is an important sense in which the other, in his or her suffering, calls upon the self 
to do the work of justice. Ricoeur thus writes that “this is perhaps the supreme act of 
solicitude, when unequal power finds compensation in an authentic reciprocity in 
exchange, which, in the hour of agony, finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or the 
feeble embrace of clasped hands” (OA, 191). Thus, where the desire for friendship 
reveals the mutual recognition of each person’s singularity, the call to justice arises from 
the recognition of our equality and our desire to render the unequal equal. 
This brings the third dimension of the good life, justice, to the foreground. With 
the idea of justice, Ricoeur extends the meaning of the good life to the communal level. 
To be a self means to be a self in community; it is to be a citizen. Individuals participate 
in the life of a community through institutions. Institutions, for Ricoeur, refer to “the 
structure of living together as this belongs to a historical community—people, nation, 
region, and so forth—a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up 
with them in…the notion of distribution” (OA, 194). While a community is more than the 




It [is] only in a specific institutional milieu that the capacities and predispositions 
that distinguish human action can blossom; the individual…becomes human only 
under the condition of certain institutions…if this is so, the obligation to serve 
these institutions is itself a condition for the human agent to continue to develop. 
(OA, 254-255). 
 
In so doing, institutions concretize the desire to live and act in concert with one another 
through the distribution of goods and removal of evils. Mark Muldoon writes, “the 
concept of distribution is tied to that of justice in the sense that it is institutions that 
govern the apportionment of roles, tasks, and advantages and disadvantages between 
members of a society.”333 The work of justice ensures that the goods distributed by such 
institutions do not transform the power to live together into a power over others by 
withholding goods, merit, or wealth. This work also takes note of the consequences of 
such distribution in order to ensure that the shares are appropriate to those who receive 
them. Because the recipients of the distribution of goods are the same people who 
comprise a community, the work of justice is a communal project. 
While the aim towards the good life remains fundamental, Ricoeur nevertheless 
suggests that by itself it is incomplete. “It is necessary,” he writes, “to subject the ethical 
aim to the test of the norm” (OA, 203) in order to guard against the threat of violence. We 
need, in other words, to recognize both that our actions have consequences and that there 
may be others who suffer because of them. To guard against the inevitable possibility of 
violence, Ricoeur draws from Kant by suggesting that the morality of obligation can be 
seen as the “progressive strategy of placing at a distance, of purifying, of excluding, at 
the end of which the will that is good without qualification will equal the self-legislating 
will, in accordance with the supreme principles of autonomy” (OA, 207). The notion of 
                                                
333 Mark S. Muldoon. “Ricoeur’s Ethical Poetics: Genesis and Elements.” International Philosophical 
Quarterly Vol. 45, No. 1, (March 2005): pp. 61-86, p. 79. 
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the good life must be submitted to the test of the norm because self-esteem tends to be 
perverted into self-love (OA, 216). There is a tendency to take oneself to be an exception 
to the rule and think one’s conception of the good life to be the only legitimate 
conception. The process of universalization ensures that the pursuit of the good life does 
not succumb to the propensity to evil that haunts our choices. As such, the ever-present 
possibility of violence and domination in our choices makes it necessary to employ the 
test of universalization for the good life. Such a process reveals the autonomy of human 
beings insofar as it enables an individual to act according to a rational, self-imposed law. 
In order to further connect the ethical aim and the moral norm, Ricoeur finds an 
analogue for the notion of self-esteem on the moral plane. Just as solicitude is a 
component of the good life, respect is essential to understand autonomy. John Wall 
glosses self-respect as “an intensification that thematizes and radicalizes selves’ singular 
hermeneutical otherness from each other.”334 Just as we respect ourselves for being able 
to formulate meaning, we should respect others for being able to do the same. Thus, 
while I esteem myself as one who has a tradition and who is able to draw from that 
tradition in approximating the good life, I respect myself when I put my intuition of the 
good life to the test of universalization, and I respect others who are also able to 
approximate the good life. Self-esteem is thus connected with the respect of others. 
Ricoeur thus writes, “violence is equivalent to the diminishment or destruction of the 
power-to-do of others” (OA, 220). Ricoeur thus suggests that reducing others to one’s 
own conception of the good life, such as when I impose my own view of the good onto 
                                                
334 John Wall, “Phronesis, Poetics, and Moral Creativity,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (vol. 6, 
2003): pp. 317-341, p. 328. 
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others, can only be adjudicated if we are able to respond to the vulnerability and suffering 
of the other.  
 
IV.5.2 Tragedy as the Self and Community in Conflict 
Despite his unique synthesis of teleological and deontological conceptions of our 
practical lives, Ricoeur neverhtelss recognizes that conflicts are possible, perhaps even 
unavoidable. Universal norms, precisely because they are universal, cannot do justice to 
the complexity of human life; similarly, the conception of the good life cannot be realized 
without performing some violence or injustice to others. These conflicts directly threaten 
to undermine a just and harmonious relationship between selves, others, and 
communities. In order to see how the possibility of such violences threatens both 
individuals and the communities to which they belong, I will now turn to Ricoeur’s 
account of Antigone. 
Ricoeur turns to Sophocles’ Antigone because “this tragedy says something about 
the unavoidable nature of conflict in moral life and, in addition, outlines a wisdom—the 
tragic wisdom of which Karl Jaspers spoke—capable of directing us in conflicts of an 
entirely different nature” (OA, 243). Ricoeur’s analysis is most obviously indebted to 
Hegel’s account of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in Phenomenology of Spirit. Both Hegel and 
Ricoeur are concerned with the potentially tragic dimensions of communal existence, 
and, more specifically, the conflicts that arise because of the reciprocal constitution of 
community, or institutions, and individuals. This tragedy, more than others, reveals 
something important about the ethical life of a community and the limits of such 
communal life. However, while Hegel suggests that such a conflict can be resolved in a 
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higher form of consciousness that grasps the conflict as a unity, Ricoeur interprets such a 
conflict as an ineluctable dimension of human life. However, just as conflict is inevitable, 
it also gives us the conceptual and practical tools through which we can forge a response 
to it.335 
Where, then, does the tragic conflict of the play lie? Ricoeur’s answer is 
remarkably direct: “the source of conflict lies not only in the one-sidedness of the 
characters but also in the one-sidedness of the moral principles which themselves are 
confronted with the complexity of life” (OA, 249). It is thus a problem identity at the 
level of character and at the level of self-constancy: they are stubborn inflexibility 
ultimately prevents them from keeping their respective promises. The plot runs as 
follows: Antigone defies the laws of the city by burying her dead brother, Polyneices, out 
of filial piety. Polyneices had died a traitor, having attacked his home city, Thebes, in an 
attempt to take the mantle of king. Creon, the new ruler of the city after Antigone’s other 
brother, Eteocles, died, prohibits Polyneices’ burial in order to uphold justice. The 
tension between Antigone and Creon leads Antigone to allow herself to by buried alive, 
which is then followed by the suicides of Haemon, Creon’s son and Antigone’s love, and 
Eurydice, Creon’s wife and Haemon’s mother. Creon recognizes, too late, that his 
practical world is too narrowly circumscribed, and that his adherence to his moral 
principles has caused his ruin. 
                                                
335 It is interesting to note that in a later essay, “Fragility and Responsibility,” Ricoeur revises his 
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Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. Ed. Richard Kearny. London: Sage Publications, 1996 (p. 15-21). 
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Creon’s narrowness arises from his identification with his duties to the city by 
maintaining the laws of justice. His edict recognizes the equality and sameness of 
individuals regardless of filial connections. For Ricoeur, this understanding “does not 
take into account the variety and perhaps heterogeneity of the tasks belonging to the city” 
(OA, 244). Conversely, Antigone’s narrowness stems from her commitment to filial piety 
and her recognition of the singularity of her brother—this person was her brother, and no 
one else can take his place. Insofar as both Creon and Antigone understand themselves 
from the possibilities afforded them by the institutions of their community—Creon from 
the political institutions of Thebes and Antigone from the religious rites that establish the 
lines of filiation—the conflict arises from within the community itself. In other words, 
Antigone, Creon, and the community reciprocally constitute and are constituted by one 
another. The crisis of the play reveals the inherent crises of communal life, specifically 
that it harbors within itself potentially discordant and conflicting possibilities.336 
Both Antigone and Creon fail to reconcile, which they tragically recognize only 
too late. Their failure, however, is instructive, though not in the way Hegel supposed. 
While Hegel sought recourse in a higher synthesis of their actions, Ricoeur recognizes 
that such conflict is inevitable and suggests that we reorient our principles. Watching it 
teaches the audience to “deliberate well” and “condemns the person of praxis to reorient 
action, at his or her own risk, in the sense of a practical wisdom in situation that best 
responds to tragic wisdom” (OA, 246-247). Antigone directs us to constantly negotiate 
the complexities of a life in which others challenge our own existence and inevitably all 
                                                
336 Theodore George puts the point thusly: “In the experience of ethical life, both of the laws place 
necessary demands on consciousness: but necessary though they may be, it is impossible that they always 
admit of mutual fulfillment.” “Community in the Idiom of Crisis: Hegel on Political Life, Tragedy, and the 
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too human ventures, and, as John Wall notes “requires us to face and overcome our own 
historical narrowness…in poetically re-shaped practice.”337 Rather than act from a 
different principle, we ought instead understand the situation differently. Ricoeur writes, 
the play “condemns the person of praxis to reorient action, at his or her own risk, in the 
sense of a practical wisdom in situation that best responds to tragic wisdom” (OA, 247). 
Robert Piercey emphasizes that this is a matter of perspective: “the chorus’s last piece of 
advice is not that we do anything in particular, but that we change our way of looking at 
the moral principles that come into conflict.”338 Rather than advocate a specific content 
that defines practical wisdom, Ricoeur offers the modest suggestion that it is a style of 
looking, understanding, and judging the situation. 
Conflicting moral principles can only be adjudicated by phronesis, or practical 
wisdom. Ricoeur notes that practical wisdom, “consists in inventing conduct that will 
best satisfy the exception required by solicitude” for the other (OA, 269). This exception 
requires that that we invent “just behavior suited to the singular nature of the case” (OA, 
269). Rather than discovering a rule that reduces the heteronomy of the other into the 
sphere of sameness and identity, we must develop a plan of action or reconfigure our 
narrative-identity such that it does justice to the singularity of the other. This creative 
element that responds to tragic wisdom stands in contrast to Heidegger’s account such, 
which emphasizes the way that tragedy renders humanity ineluctably passive and finite. 
Ricoeur’s account of tragic wisdom recognizes the fragility of such situations and it 
suggests that we can create new meaning from the conflict. Indeed, the best we can hope 
for is through “admitting proposals of meaning that are at first foreign to us” while 
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developing and revising our own meaningful proposals in conjunction with others (OA, 
289). Human life is not only threatened by narrowness of vision, contingency, and 
chance; it is also oriented toward the good life and thus can be refigured through 
poetically minded practice.  
Ricoeur offers three guidelines for judging moral conflicts. First, it is necessary 
that the conflicting parties recognize the same moral principles and that disagreements 
only concern the application of the principles. Second, explicitly drawing from Aristotle, 
Ricoeur suggests that the judgment must aim at the mean, even if such a mean is 
“extreme.” Third, such a judgment is most sound when “the decision maker—whether or 
not in the position of legislator—has taken the counsel of men and women reputed to be 
the most competent and wisest” (OA, 273). As such, the appeal to a universal rule cannot 
be divorced from the context in which it is applied, but must be developed through a 
dialogue with others and remain close to the particularities disclosed by the situation. 
This third principle suggests that judgment not only ought to arise from dialogue with 
others, which helps to establish a broader sense of communal life, but also that “the 
phronimos is not necessarily one individual alone” (OA, 273). By making phronesis into 
a social practice, in other words, we can transform the identity of a community. By 
developing a critical capacity for practical wisdom, human life with others is on a 
trajectory toward consensus, though never finally achieving it (OA, 289). 
 
IV.5.3 The Self and Community as a Response to Tragic Conflict 
Ricoeur’s account of tragedy reveals that communal identity is forged through the 
cooperation of individuals to listen to, challenge, and judge the stories and memories of 
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one another. Indeed, because one of the main lessons the play teaches us is that Antigone 
“posited the limit that points to the human, all too human, character of every institution” 
(OA, 245), it reveals possibilities for social coherency.339 In confronting the limits of 
social coherency, phronesis establishes the bonds of community. It reveals the way that 
the self and the community are correlates, such that to be a self is to be a self in 
community and to be a community is to be a community of selves. 
How can this notion of imputation, and thus responsibility, extend to the level of 
communal identity and existence? One place where the correlation between the self and 
community can be found is in the concepts of imputation and responsibility.340 Because 
imputation is “phenomena of initiative and intervention whereby we catch sight of the 
interference of the agent on the course of the world, an interference that effectively 
causes changes in the world” it reveals the communal and intersubjective nature of 
remembering.341 Ricoeur thus formulates a rather Kantian notion of acting: to initiate an 
action is to intervene in the course of the world, and such initiative allows us to designate 
an author or agent for the act. When an agent acts, she attests to who she is by allowing 
herself to be imputed as the action’s author.  
Actions have effects that go beyond what the agent intended. Ricoeur thus limits 
responsibility in order to prevent it from covering all of the consequences of an action: 
 
The idea of a person for whom one has responsibility joined with that of the thing 
one has under one's control, leads in this way to a quite remarkable broadening 
that makes the direct object of one's responsibility vulnerable and fragile insofar 
as it is something handed over to the care of an agent. Responsible for what, one 
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340 John L. Meech. Paul in Israel’s Story (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): pp. 96-99. 
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may ask? For what is fragile, one is henceforth inclined to answer…one becomes 
responsible for harm because, first of all, one is responsible for others.342 
 
Responsibility, for Ricoeur, is primarily responsibility for the other because it is the 
other, in its fragility and vulnerability that calls us to be responsible. “The self is 
‘summoned to responsibility’ by the other. It is in the accusative mode alone that the self 
is enjoined. And the summons to responsibility has opposite it the passivity of an ‘I’ who 
has been called upon” (OA, 189). This suggests that responsibility is not merely a 
responsibility for an action, although such imputation is a central dimension of it. It is 
also being responsible to the other who calls upon me to be responsible for it.343 We are 
thus responsible for that which is within the sphere of care. 
Far from being self-evident, however, the semantics and paradigms for imputing 
responsibility for an action are to be found at the intersubjective level. Not only does the 
self draw from the stock of meaningful predicates and ascriptions that are in circulation in 
a community; it also finds that, as John L. Meech notes, “the community supplies 
resources for telling stories that constitute the self as a meaning.”344 As a result, “the self 
acts in concert with others by internalizing practices that circulate in the life of a 
community.”345 Such practices include both the stock of social and cultural roles one can 
embody—such as a teacher, musician, lawyer, or doctor—and those canonical genres—
such as tragedy, comedy, epic, farce, pastiche, and satire—that provide a structure for 
identifying the beginning and end of a series of events. Thus, the community in which 
one lives offers those possibilities from which one interprets one’s life. It provides, in 
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other words, a stock of cultural roles, characters, and identities on which an individual 
can formulate life plans and goals.  
 An additional way that imputation and responsibility appear at the communal 
level is through the way in which an individual explicitly acts in the name of the 
community. Meech writes, “imputability thus articulates a self who, in seeking to own 
her actions in accord with her intentions, also owns these actions on the behalf of a 
community when there has been profound collective misdirection.”346 Similarly, to be 
responsible in this communal context is to own “the consequences of [one’s] actions—
even, perhaps, where there was no original intent to harm—and in so doing [seek] to live 
out the community’s ethical aim.”347 By taking on the burden of being imputed, and thus 
responsible, for the actions of others, an individual speaks for the community.  
 Speaking for, in this case, is symbolic. An individual takes the place of, or stands 
for, as a sacrifice, representive, or heir of the community. The structure of imputation and 
responsibility can reveal and constitute the community’s narrative identity insofar as it is 
one can it can assume its past or heritage as one’s own. Community emerges in the 
resolution of conflicts and their embodiment in the symbolic in such a way that it can be 
passed down to another generation. Similarly, an individual assumes selfhood not a 
product of work but as inherited from his or her own community. This means that the 
narratives and memories that are passed through institutions, symbols, and practices 
constitue the history and identity a community.  
 This symbol becomes the “spirit of a people” because it arises from the conflicts 
that might arise among “the moral consciousness” of a community and their “desire to 
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 260 
live together” (OA, 256). If “spirit of a people” is to be used to refer to a community, 
however, it must be divested of the metaphysical connotations that Hegel vested in it. 
John Meech suggests that “spirit…is not an ontological term but a metaphor for the 
collective life of a community in its ethical aim” and that “one has to speak, at least in an 
analogical sense, of the community as a person.”348 By designating spirit as a mere 
metaphor, however, Meech goes too far in divesting its Being. We should, of course, be 
wary of any conception of spirit that is wholly distinct from individuals and institutions. 
Such a conception would characterize spirit as an underlying substrate. However, 
suggesting spirit is a metaphor for communal identity or that communal identity is an 
analogue swings the pendulum too far the other way. It makes such identity into an 
illusion, in much the same way Nietzsche and Hume had attacked personal identity. 
Rather, “spirit” in the sense that Ricoeur briefly suggests, is the form of ipseity 
proper to a community. In other words, if the dialectic of an individually existing person 
is between selfhood and sameness, the dialectic of identity that characterizes a 
community is between spirit and the individuals who comprise it. While a community is 
comprised of individually existing selves, it is not reducible to them. Rather, to be able to 
say “we” requires a unified commitment to something, even if each individual performs a 
different task. Genuine community is established when each individual recognizes his or 
her interdependence on others, while at the same time receiving that very recognition 
from others. As such, the “spirit” of a community is to be found in the way that they 
recognize others, incorporate them into the community while nevertheless recognizing 
their alterity and their desire to tell the story of his or her community. 
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IV.6 Conclusion: The Crisis of Death 
With the sketch of Ricoeur’s use of Antigone complete, I would now like to see 
how it figures into an understanding of remembering. This will occur in two steps. First, I 
will connect tragedy and death, a link that Ricoeur misses in his account of Antigone. 
Second, I will argue that there is a sense of death that eludes us, and which reopens the 
possibility of memory’s use and abuse at a more fundamental level. This will open the 
discussion for the process of healing and reconciliation that I will explore in the next, and 
final, chapter. 
 
IV.6.1. Tragedy and Death 
Ricoeur’s discussion of Antigone overlooks the central conflict of the tragedy in 
order to make a larger point about the necessity of refiguring one’s view. In doing so, he 
misses an opportunity to concretely examine the connection between tragedy, death, and 
remembering that is central to communal existence. As I will be suggesting, the debt 
owed the dead plays a decisive role in the play, and thus can reveal something about the 
constitution of communal life. 
I noted above that Ricoeur’s analysis of Antigone draws primarily from Hegel’s 
classic account in the Phenomenology of Spirit. However, Ricoeur misses an important 
detail that sets the course of the play to its inevitable conclusions: it is the suggestion that 
ethical life is framed around a dispute about the dead, Polyneices’ corpse. Indeed, if the 
possibilities of communal existence are to be reexamined, then they must be pressed to 
their utmost limits. This means that we need to inquire into the ways that the community 
relates to those at its margins. The dead are one such group, partly because cemeteries are 
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walled off from the rest of the city and partly because the corpse occupies a space 
between the lived body (Leib) and a brute object. Thus we need to examine the meaning 
of burial that Antigone raises. 
Why do the dead need to be buried? The empirical and psychological answer is 
that burial aids in the grieving process. However, burial also works to, as Hegel suggests, 
spiritualize the dead. Burial interrupts the destructive work of nature and rescues the 
corpse from oblivion.349 Indeed, the act of burial does not so much lay the past to rest as 
it reincorporates its loss into the life of the community. Burial gives the dead a “spiritual” 
life in the community by suggesting that the life was not lived in vain, and in so doing it 
offers the dead a place among the living. The problem that the play raises is that it 
appears that both Antigone and Creon can legitimately claim to the rights of burial. Creon 
can claim it as the right of the state because the state maintains and upholds the equality 
and sameness of individuals. Insofar as all individuals must die, death equalizes every 
individual. Theodore George puts the point concisely: “given its requirement that respect 
for the law be completely universal, the human law cannot but assert that the reach of the 
juridical extends over the sphere of not only the living, but of the dead as well.”350 Justice 
tends toward universality, and thus political institutions reconfirm their right to maintain 
and perpetuate themselves. Thus, if one were to try to undermine the rule of law or try to 
make themselves an exception to the law—traitors, in other words—such a person would 
not be granted the right to be reassumed spiritually into the community. To betray the 
laws of the state means to forfeit the right to be buried by the state. 
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350 Theodore George, “Community in the Idiom of Crisis,” p. 127-128. 
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At the same time, Antigone can claim burial rights for herself. Her actions are 
justified because she is responsible to recognize the singularity and irreplaceability of 
each family member. There is thus a difference between the meaning behind her action 
and the meaning underlying Creon’s rejection of Polyneices’ burial. For Creon, 
maintaining the right to burial is a way to maintain his own sovereignty. Insofar as justice 
aims toward the universal, its highest expression occurs when it maintains control over 
the death, that is, the phenomenon to which all humans are subject. For Antigone, burial 
recognizes the singularity of the individual’s death. What Antigone recognizes, in other 
words, is the asymmetry between herself and her brother. Such asymmetry is not merely 
that she cannot die his death for him, but that she is granted a possibility that is foreclosed 
to others—the possibility of birth.351 Burial, in terms of filial piety, is not a recognition of 
the universality of death, but a recognition of the singularity of death and the possibility 
of rebirth.  
The claims that both Antigone and Creon lay on the rights of burial normally do 
not conflict. They can both legitimately lay claim to Polyneices. Normally, the state 
protects the family in times of war, and the family provides the soldiers who battle. As 
such, the family is preserved and destroyed by the function of the state.352 To go off to 
war to protect the state, and to die for it, is the highest duty an individual can undertake 
for the community. Conversely, burial is the highest duty for the family. As such, the 
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political sphere performs the pageantry of honoring the dead while the family performs 
the rites of burial. One honors the dead; the other mourns them. 
Antigone focuses on the way that right to bury, and burial rites, help constitute 
social and communal life. By claiming the right to bury, through the rites of burial, the 
protagonists of the play claim that they solely legitimate the social bond. In so doing, 
they expose the limits of community. The conflict that arises in the play is thus one of a 
conflict, even the conflict that defines communal life. This forms the backdrop of the 
play, and, if the meaning of communal existence and the possibility of resolution and 
reconciliation is to be intelligible, it needs to be articulated because it provides the 
specificity of the situation that calls for phronesis. To neglect the contexts and reasons for 
Antigone’s and Creon’s actions is to risk missing something fundamental, which, in this 
case, is the way that burial constitutes a community. Furthermore, because it is the 
inevitability of conflict over the rite of burial, and the right to bury, that takes hold of 
each of these institutions and brings them to utter ruin, the act of burial should call our 
attention to the way that communities are constituted.    
 
IV.6.2. Death and Burial 
I suggested above that burial serves to “spiritualize” the dead and reincorporate 
them into the life of the community. Burial is, in a sense, to bear witness to the dead. 
Ricoeur offers at least two symbols understand the spiritualization of such an act. First, 
burial is a symbolic act that makes manifest the transition of generations. Second, the 
materiality of the corpse and the symbolism of burial participate in the larger dialectic of 
the trace. However, this account threatens to make the movement of memory and history 
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too coherent and too concordant; it appears to make the transmission of tradition too 
seamless. 
Burial first secures the transition from one generation to the next. Ricoeur had 
noted in Time and Narrative that the succession of generations is one of the ways that 
phenomenological time is mediated with objective time. He writes, “the notion of a 
succession of generations provides an answer to this antinomy [between mortal and 
public time] by designating the chain of historical agents as living people who come to 
take the place of dead people” (TN3, 109). Burial becomes a symbolic act of making 
manifest such a replacement and helps to establish the interconnection between the living 
and the dead. Burial does not resist the brute fact of death; it instead resists and 
transforms the rupture that death inevitably brings with it. Burial, insofar as it thus bears 
witness to the dead through burial helps to hold together a past no longer present with a 
past that continues to exist as having been. The burial site thus helps confer on the dead a 
lasting presence that is transformative of the decay of the corpse’s body.353 Thus, Ricoeur 
writes, “we must characterize the connection between generations 
(Generationszusammenhang) by prereflective participation in a common destiny as much 
as by real participation in its recognized directive intentions and formative tendencies” 
(TN3, 111). To remember someone through burial is to thus participate in the narrative 
formation of identity. 
If burial symbolizes the transition between generations, it is because the corpse is 
a trace. It indicates a past that is no longer here, but nevertheless remains. This corpse is, 
quite literally, the remains of the past. If the corpse symbolizes the way that the past is 
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experienced through traces, the act of burial helps to confer meaning on the person’s 
death. If, in other words, the act of burial is to be meaningful, it must be because those in 
the present find themselves under a debt owed to those who have died. Burial thus 
recognizes a debt that one has “fundamentally contracted on behalf of another” (TN3, 
256). Such a debt arises because of the way that, as I suggested in Chapter II, we come 
from others and the way our existence is dependent on others. The gravestone, tomb, 
sepulcher, and even writing itself, can call upon individuals and a community to bear the 
memory of those who came before them. As such, burial recognizes the way that being 
indebted not only makes it possible for one to be responsible for oneself but it is a 
recognition that one’s existence is dependent on others. Burial thus participates in 
establishing a heritage, which in turn makes one living indebted to it. In the act of burial, 
the past is rendered its due. 
However, before moving to an account of this tenuous reconciliation in the next 
chapter, I will raise, once again, the question of ability to represent the dead, and 
Ricoeur’s resolution of the play in the adage to deliberate well. The power that Antigone 
has is the power to call attention to, and, even, memorialize the crisis that establishes 
communal life. However, to the extent that such a crisis is precipitated by the crisis of 
burial and death, it raises a fundamental question about the very possibility of 
representing it in language at all. Theodore George puts the point concisely: “while it 
may be that the phenomenon of language provides the chief resource by means of which 
it is possible for consciousness to incorporate into the life of spirit even the memory of 
the dead, it is doubtful given the immeasurability of the loss that characterizes death, that 
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any language, even the language of tragedy, could capture it completely.”354 If the 
symbol of burial grants meaning to the past, it also withholds it. To bring memory to 
language, especially memory of the dead is to risk suggesting that we can recuperate the 
loss of the past without remainder. Indeed, to be able to bury, even symbolically, the dead 
suggest that the work of death has been completed. To suggest that one has adequately 
represented death, in other words, is, in some sense, to forget the meaning of such a 
death. It is, in other words, to think that the debt owed the dead has been paid back in 
full. 
This problem is further exacerbated if the synthetic power of narrative is further 
questioned. Narrative, as I have suggested, operates by synthesizing the discordant 
experiences of time into something human. It renders time and memory meaningful by 
organizing them in the order of a plot. The problem arises when one is confronted with a 
narrative form that challenges our received notions of plot and unity. While Ricoeur 
suggests that such narratives “finally end up imitating by dint of not imitating the 
received paradigms, (TN1, 73), such a claim seems to avoid directly confronting the 
aporetic and paradoxical forms of narrative that these works can introduce.355 
This will have significant implications at the level of memory. With burial, for 
example, one may be tempted to think that a continuous tradition is all too easily 
established, and that the continuity with the past is all too seamless. One might be 
tempted to think that the symbolic of burial, and, analogously, the writing of history, 
simply puts the dead to rest or completes payment on the debt owed the dead. Ricoeur 
himself acknowledges that there is thus a “close tie between the restitution of this debt 
                                                
354 Theodore George, “Community in the Idiom of Crisis,” p. 136. 
355 Ridvan Askin makes the same point in “Mneme, Anamnesis, and Mimesis.”  
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and the return of the repressed, in the psychoanalytic sense of this term” (TN3, 312 n.42). 
To think one has repaid the debt, in other words, risks a return of the past. The debt, it 
seems, cannot be annulled; it can return insofar as we might try to repress what happened 
through the composition of an official or canonical history.356 Even though historians 
might think they are paying down the debt through writing, as it were, they may in fact be 
offering complicated strategies of repression and avoidance of the wrongs that might be 
part of their heritage.  
In addition to seeing how remembering both constitutes a heritage and a 
community, it now remains to be seen how its paradoxical nature of representing the past 
can challenge a community or heritage and call it into question, and, if impossible to 
resolve, how best to respond to such a challenge. In order to do so, I will develop in the 
next, and final chapter of this dissertation, Ricoeur’s account of the ethical trajectory of 
memory and the process of healing and reconciliation that it offers. This process will thus 
highlight the therapeutic dimensions of writing history, and the possibility of justly 
representing the past through memory. 
                                                
356 Ernst Gerhardt notes that the word “restitution” conveys both of senses: it can mean the paying down of 
the debt or the re-institution of the debt. Cf. “A Return on the Repressed: The Debt of History in Ricoeur’s 
Time and Narrative.” Philosophy Today, Vol. 48, no. 3 (Fall 2004): pp. 245-254, p. 249. 
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Chapter V: The Promises of Narrative Memory 
 
V.1. Introduction and Thesis 
In the previous chapter, I examined how memory is an important source for 
narrative identity. The stories we tell about our past helps to make us who we are. 
However, Ricoeur’s account of the formation of selfhood risks implying that paradox of 
representing the past has been dissolved or overcome. In this chapter, my exploration of 
the connection between memory and communal identity comes to a close with an 
examination of the tension between conflict and reconciliation that arises in the 
relationship between memory and communal identity. Ricoeur suggests that the 
appropriate relationship to the past requires a “just allotment” of memory and forgetting: 
how much should we remember? How much should we forget? Should we forgive, if 
possible? (MHF, xv) 
By developing the therapeutic and ethical dimensions of memory, I be arging that 
memory has two interrelated aims. First, memory is responsible for reconciling a self and 
community with the reality of its past. Second, by retrieving a heritage and transmitting it 
to future generations, memory can revitalize forgotten possibilities and help us fulfill the 
promises made by our forebears. These two elements show that memory generate 
alternative modes for expressing that which resists narrative representations, and thus can 
help to reconcile a community with its past without dissolving its tragic dimensions. 
In developing these points, I will examine two forms of reconciliation that 
Ricoeur, without explicitly calling attention to them, develops. The first form of 
reconciliation, which I name “critical reconciliation,” refers to the recognition that one’s 
narrative identity is tenuous and fragile. It is, in other words, a recognition of an always 
revisable, and ever expanding, reconciliation with the past and others. In delineating what 
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this reconciliation entails, I will develop the typology of the uses and abuses of memory 
that Ricoeur introductes in Memory, History, Forgetting. Once a community has 
confronted the reality of its own past, it is faced with the challenge of incorporating it 
into the present, in an act that Ricoeur names “scriptural entombment.” This completes 
the just distribution of memory, and responds to the tragic wisdom of limits that was 
presented in the previous chapter. The second form of reconciliation, one that steps 
beyond the realm of justice to something more hopeful, culminates in the possibility of 
forgiveness. It is a “creative reconciliation” because it offers the possibility of a new 
beginning. I will be arguing that forgiveness, while it cuts against the grain of justice, 
nevertheless gives justice its sense and opens a future for new possibilities for an 
enlarged, more inclusive, communal life. 
 
V.2 Conflict and Reconciliation: The Uses and Abuses of Memory  
The first form of reconciliation that I will discuss centers on the way that selves, 
institutions, and communities come to recognize the sources and validity of each other’s 
narrative identity.  Such reconciliation occurs through the telling, retelling, and rewriting 
one’s narrative identity. Importantly, reconciliation does not mean the dissolution of 
conflict or its resolution in complete harmony. It instead signifies an always tenuous 
resolution of conflict insofar as it recognizes the creativity of memory. Such creativity, or 
poiesis, I will be arguing, helps to expand a community’s identit to be more inclusive.  
However, before detailing the prospects for reconciliation, it will first be 
necessary to detail some impediments to it. “The diseases of memory are basically 
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diseases of identity,” Ricoeur writes.357 In some instances we suffer from too much 
memory, as when as we dwell on the humiliations and traumas of the past with us. In 
such cases, we can speak of the ways that the past haunts and intrudes on the present, 
limiting and foreclosing possibilities for self-understanding. In other instances, we suffer 
from a lack of memory, such as when avoid confronting past traumas that have befallen 
us or that we have caused. Maria Duffy puts this point concisely: “wounded memories 
cause a rupture between the ‘area of experience’ (the past) and the ‘horizon of 
expectation (the future). It is the vivid present that plays the role of mediator between 
these two spheres – excess and lack of memory.”358 Ricoeur identifies three ways that 
memory distorts identity on an individual and social level: the pathological-therapeutic, 
the pragmatic, and the ethico-political. Each identifies a specific obstacle to remembering 
and each offers a way to begin to heal the troubles of memory. This analysis will help 
support the ethical and political implications of identity outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
V.2.1. Pathological-Therapeutic Memory 
The stories we tell about ourselves are suspect at a psychological level. We want 
to have a sense of identity, and we want to make sure that the stories we tell about us are 
acceptable ones. This can lead us to repress, distort, or block what happened, which can 
fragment identity. Psychoanalysis attempts to heal trauma by “working through” 
repressed memories. Drawing on Freud’s essays “Remembering, Repeating, and 
Working-Through” and “Mourning and Melancholia,” Ricoeur analyzes how we 
                                                
357 Paul Ricoeur, “Memory and Forgetting,” Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. 
Eds. Mark Dooley and Richard Kearney (New York: Routledge Press, 1999): pp. 5-11, p. 7. 
358 Maria Duffy. Paul Ricoeur’s Pedagogy of Pardon: A Narrative Theory of Memory and Forgetting 
(London: Continuum Press, 2009), p. 52. 
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unconsciously bury traumatic memories, and he identities some of the effects of 
repressing traumatic memories. Repressing memories can lead to their return in various 
guises, which can inhibit the development of healthy relationships with others.  
 In a classic statement, Freud writes that pathologies and obsessions are  
Characterized by the return of the repressed memories -- that is, therefore, 
by the failure of the defense...The re-activated memories, however, and 
the self-reproaches formed from them never re-emerge into consciousness 
unchanged: what become conscious as obsessional ideas and affects, and 
take the place of the pathogenic memories so far as conscious life is 
concerned, are structures in the nature of a compromise between the 
repressed ideas and the repressing ones...A wounded identity in this case is 
one that has undergone a traumatic experience.359 
 
In Ricoeurian terms, trauma displaces those horizons and expectations that constitute an 
individual’s or a community’s field of experience. It can circumscribe too tight a horizon, 
and thus limit the possible ways that we can act and understand ourselves. In his essay 
“Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Freud writes, “we may say that the 
patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it 
out. He reproduces it not as memory but as an action; he repeats it without, of course, 
knowing that he is repeating it.”360 The starting point of psychoanalysis is thus the 
identification of actions the patient tends to obsessively repeat. Repeating and acting out 
replaces the ability to remember and reveals a desire on the patient’s part to deny the 
reality of the past because it is unbearable. Repressed memories can return in unexpected, 
and sometimes violent, ways.  
                                                
359 Sigmund Freud.“Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense.” The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 3, Trans. and Ed. James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1952): pp. 159-185, p. 169-170. 
360 Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through.” The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 12, Trans. and Ed. James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1958): pp. 147-156, p. 150. 
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But why should such memories return? In the essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” 
Freud suggests that both mourning and melancholia are a “reaction to the loss of a loved 
one, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s 
country, liberty, an ideal, and so on.”361 However, whereas mourning reconciles an 
individual to such a loss, in melancholia the loved object is lost without hope for 
reconciliation. Instead of ridding oneself of the attachment to the lost object, the 
melancholic person divests him or her self of “self-regard” (Selbstgefühl).362 The loss of 
the object is transformed into a denigration of the self; a person identifies with the loss to 
such an extent that she comes to identify herself with the lost object or ideal. 
Though Freud does not explicitly do so, Ricoeur establishes a connection between 
repeating, acting out, and melancholia. He writes, “the wounds and scars of history…are 
repeated in the state of melancholia.”363 This means that “what, in historical experience, 
takes the form of a paradox—namely, too much memory here, not enough memory 
there—can be reinterpreted in terms of the categories of resistance and compulsion to 
repeat, which…leads us to substitute acting out for the true recollection by which the 
present would be reconciled with the past” (MHF, 79). 364 Those individuals and 
                                                
361 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, Trans and Ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, Press, 1958): pp. 243-
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362 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” p. 244, also Cf. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 72. 
363 Ricoeur, “Memory and Forgetting,” p. 7. 
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such repression. The implication here is that if there is to be reconciliation between Israel and Palestine, 
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communities with too much memory lose themselves in the past, obsessing over the 
details of it and reopening its wounds. Those people who have too little memory fear 
being engulfed by the past, and avoid confronting it. Such fear can lead to repression and 
acting violently when similar situations arise. 
Against these obsessive and pathological tendencies, Ricoeur connects the “work 
of remembering” with the “work of mourning.” Both help the patient confront the past 
and the ways that he or she remains attached to it. “Descriptively speaking,” Freud 
writes, the work of remembering “[fills] in the gaps of memory; dynamically speaking, it 
is to overcome the resistances due to repression.”365 This work allows the patient to 
become reconciled with the repressed memories by situating them within his or her life, 
which renders them understandable. Mourning complements remembering by 
incorporating “reality testing.” Reality testing occurs when a person “proceeds to demand 
that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that [lost] object.”366 Through 
the work of mourning, the patient breaks off those desires that connect him or her to the 
object, and “interiorizes” the lost object. This interiorization of memory allows the 
mourner to become “free and uninhibited,” capable of attaching itself to new objects. The 
work of mourning thus can extend the horizons of an individual’s expectations and 
possibilities. As Ricoeur puts it, “mourning and ‘working through’ are to be brought 
together in the fight for the acceptability of memories: memories not only have to be 
understandable, they have to be acceptable, and it is this acceptability that is at stake in 
                                                                                                                                            
they first need to embark on a long process of working through the repressed memories of the Shoah and 
other conditions under which Israel was granted statehood. 
365 Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” p. 148. 
366 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” p. 244. 
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the work of memory and mourning. Both are types of reconciliation.”367 The process can 
be lengthy, and so both the analyst and patient must be patient with one another: “they 
must be patient concerning the symptoms, which in turn allows them to be reconciled 
with the impossibility of going directly to the truth. But also the patient has to accept his 
illness in order to anticipate a time when he could be reconciled with his own past.”368 
Memory is thus a difficult work of making its memories acceptable and bearable. 
 
V.2.2. The Pragmatics of Memory 
The stories a community tells to itself about itself lend cohesion among its 
citizens. What makes this particularly problematic is that individuals and communities 
want to have an acceptable view of who they are. There is thus a pragmatic dimension of 
narrative identity: rather than faithfully representing the past, there is always a temptation 
to exalt glories and triumphs over defeats—for example, to ignore colonialism and 
imperialism while praising one’s cosmopolitanism and philanthropy—or to selectively 
forget certain events perpetrated by individuals in the name of the community. Such 
retelling flees in the face of the fragility of identity. 
Ricoeur offers several reasons for claiming that the link between memory and 
identity is fragile. First, the dialectic between ipse and idem renders one’s narrative 
identity fragile insofar as we often tend to respond to the questions “Who am I? Who are 
we?” in terms of what I am or what we are. By answering questions of identity in terms 
of a national character rather than in terms of the ability to keep one’s word, we do not 
understand ourselves in terms of possibilities, values, and commitments but in terms of 
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static properties. Second, the fact that there are others who differ from us, both in the way 
that they lead their lives and in the way that they have their own ways to understand 
themselves, can be seen as a threat to our own form of life. Indeed, if the other is 
perceived as threatening, the response is often one of suspicion, hostility, and rejection. 
“Humiliations, real or imaginary are linked to this threat, when this threat is felt as a 
wound which leaves scars.”369 Third, there is the heritage of violence. Insofar as 
collective identity is rooted in founding, violent events, collective memory is a repository 
of such a heritage. For any triumph or glory, others are humiliated and debased. 
Following Hannah Arendt, Ricoeur suggests that such violence threatens, wounds, and 
ultimately deforms those capabilities that define the self. In short, such violence prevents 
the self from having a future. 
Memory can respond to the fragility of identity by developing narrative strategies 
that buttress and protect it from being called into question. One especially important 
narrative strategy, if only because it is so insidious, is the way that ideology insinuates 
itself between the demand for identity and public expressions of memory. At its most 
basic level, ideology helps to integrate and guard identity insofar as it offers a way to 
integrate individuals into a common world through the symbolic system immanent in 
action (MHF, 82). By doing so, it helps to configure narrative identity by offering a way 
to make action intelligible. At this basic level, there is no abuse of memory, according to 
Ricoeur, because it operates as a “factor of integration” and a “guardian of identity” 
(MHF, 82, 83).  
Nevertheless, the symbolic, constitutive role that ideology plays is never innocent, 
insofar as it also aids in “the justification of a system of order or power” (MHF, 83). 
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Because ideology revolves around power, authority, and legitimation, it is ultimately 
inseparable from the possibility of distortion and violence. “It is on the level of where 
ideology operates as a discourse justifying power, domination, that the resources of 
manipulation provided by narrative are mobilized” (MHF, 85). It is easy to identify ways 
that ideology manipulates and distorts identity. Ideology can selectively omit some 
events, emphasize and exaggerate others, create associations among them, and even 
outright fabricate “facts.”370 While wartime propaganda is a rather clear example of this, 
ideological manipulation is often more insidious. Ideology is promulgated, celebrated, 
and perpetuated through stories of founding events, turning points, or the progression and 
expansion of certain ideals. Additionally, ideology can be used to enforce a specific 
social hierarchy by mobilizing and manipulating beliefs and memories by, among other 
things, reviving ancient feuds, obscuring past wrongs, and promulgating a specific 
national identity. Such a canonical or state-sponsored history strips “the social actors of 
their original power to recount their actions themselves” (MHF, 448). By speaking for the 
community, such narratives deprive its members of their voice to speak for themselves. 
Fortunately, we are not consigned to ideological distortion. Though ideology is 
powerful, it is not omnipotent. To be able to narrate at all entails that we are also able to 
narrate otherwise. Richard Kearney puts the point thusly: “once one recognizes that one’s 
identity is fundamentally narrative in character, one discovers an ineradicable openness 
and indeterminacy at the root of one’s collective memory.”371 Because of this openness, 
                                                
370 Cf. Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings. “Distortions of Collective Memory: How Groups Flatter 
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and Bernard Rimé. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1997): pp. 277-293. 
371 Richard Kearney, “Narrative and the Ethics of Remembrance.” Questioning Ethics: Contemporary 
Debates in Philosophy. Eds. Mark Dooley and Richard Kearney (New York: Routledge, 1999): pp. 18-32, 
p. 26. 
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we can learn how to identify with the sufferings of others, share in their triumphs, and 
experience ourselves as another. Ricoeur further explains, “this exercise of memory is 
here an exercise in telling otherwise, and also in letting others tell their own history, 
especially the founding events which are the ground of a collective memory.”372 By 
narrating otherwise, and exchanging memories through the process of retelling our stories 
to others, we can expand our narrative memory and our self-understanding to include 
others. 
Through the exchange of memory, we can guard against possible abuses. The 
historian plays an important role here. On one hand, the historian is “supposed to set 
aside [his or her] own feelings” on the matter in order to establish the salience and 
meaning of certain facts and place them into relation to one another (TN3, 187). It would 
thus seem that the historian, as historian, is in no position to forgive or condemn anyone. 
To be able to give a critical and sober account of what happened as one writes history 
practice, one must respect the historical singularity of the era under consideration. On the 
other hand, “when it is a question of events closer to us, like Auschwitz, it seems that the 
sort of ethical neutralization that may be set at a distance in order to better be understood 
and explained, is no longer possible or desirable” (TN3, 187). What makes certain events 
worthy of reconsideration is their moral incomparability. This makes the historian’s task 
one of , “[extracting] from traumatic memories the exemplary value that can become 
pertinent only when memory has been turned into a project” (MHF, 86). This project, 
furthermore, “can only be formed by an enlightened public opinion that transforms the 
retrospective judgment on the crime into a pledge to prevent its reoccurrence” (MHF, 
332). History’s aim to recount what actually happened thus helps in wresting us away 
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from the vicious cycles of lamentation and melancholy, inculpation and exculpation, in 
directing us meaningfully toward the future. As Ricoeur writes, the power to tell one’s 
history otherwise and the ability to let others recount one’s own history, “is the power of 
justice to be just regarding victims, just also regarding victors, and justice towards new 
institutions by means of which we may prevent the same events from recurring in the 
future.”373 The question of the good life that memory directs itself toward indicates the 
third, and final, site where memory’s excesses appear. 
 
V.2.3. The Ethico-Political Memory 
The ethical and political dimensions of memory concern the relationship between 
the future and the meaning of the debt we have to the past. “The duty to remember 
consists not only in having a deep concern for the past, but in transmitting the meaning of 
the past to the next generation.”374 This duty obligates us not to repeat the mistakes that 
our forebears have made, and to see ourselves as heirs to a tradition and their promises. 
The duty to remember the past need not be something commanded by an external 
authority, such as the State, and enforced by a State-sponsored apparatus. We do a 
disservice to future generations when we construe our obligation to the dead in terms of a 
self-serving political agenda. The duty to remember is instead an obligation to be 
responsible to the others of the past and for them. Befitting the summoned or called 
subject that Ricoeur advocates, the obligation to remember the past is issued by an other 
for and to whom we are responsible, and such an obligation must be carried out for the 
sake of the future. 
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Why, however, should we think of the debt to the past in terms of an obligation? 
Why should we think that we are responsible for the past? To answer these difficult 
questions, it may be useful to redeploy the Ricoeur’s account of the connection between 
imputability and solicitude. “Imputability,” as Ricoeur writes, “is that capacity, that 
aptitude, by virtue of which actions can be held to someone’s account” (MHF, 460). 
Imputation thus presupposes first that actions can be submitted to rules, norms, and moral 
laws. Second, its structure suggests that agents can be held responsible for aligning or not 
aligning their actions with such rules. Third, to be able to be imputed actions or to be held 
responsible for such actions suggests that one is able to initiate a course of action in the 
first place. In this manner, imputation helps to articulate the connection between what 
happened and who made it happen by assigning responsibility to the agent for the action. 
Thus, it belongs to the way the self appears as ipse, as capable of doing something.  
There is, however, more to imputation than holding someone accountable for his 
or her actions. W. David Hall notes that, though Ricoeur sometimes glosses over this 
dimension, “there is the question of the other who imputes actions to me and, in so doing, 
holds me responsible.”375 Imputation is thus not merely an abstract or impersonal 
assignment of responsibility, nor is it limited to those acts that I would like to hold myself 
responsible for. Rather, someone holds someone responsible for some action. In such a 
case, we are not merely responsible for those actions that are imputed to us; we are also 
responsible to another person, group, or community. This responsibility to the other 
refers to the capacity to respond to the other who calls me to justice. 
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In order to draw out the way that responsibility involves responding, Ricoeur 
draws from Emmanuel Levinas. According to Levinas, the other confronts me as one 
who makes a moral claim upon me, which is to say as one who commands me to be 
responsible. The experience of the other is the condition for making moral action 
possible. I am responsible only because the other imputes actions to me. Ricoeur makes 
this clear in his discussion of the ethical aim in Oneself as Another: 
The “appearing” of the Other in the face of the Other eludes vision, seeing 
forms, and even eludes hearing, apprehending voices. In truth, the face 
does not appear; it is not a phenomenon; it is an epiphany. Whose face is 
it?...This face is that of a master of justice, of a master who instructs and 
who does so only in the ethical mode: this face forbids murder and 
commands justice…To be sure, the self is “summoned to responsibility” 
by the other. But as the initiative of the injunction comes from the other, it 
is in the accusative mode alone that the self is enjoined. And the summons 
to responsibility has opposite it simply the passivity of an “I” who has 
been called upon. (OA, 189) 
 
If the face of the other is to make the self responsible, then the self must be understood in 
terms of its capacity to hear, respond and be summoned. In short, the self must be 
construed as being open to the other who calls. Ricoeur later suggests that “to find 
oneself called upon in the second person at the very core of the optative of living well, 
then of the prohibition to kill, then of the search for the choice appropriate to the 
situation, is to recognize oneself as being enjoined to live well with and for others in just 
institutions and to esteem oneself as the bearer of this wish” (OA, 352). The cluster of 
related concepts – guilt, indebtedness, responsibility, and imputation – thus signifies how 
we are accountable for our actions and the way that we are guilty, indebted to, or 
otherwise responsible to the other who calls me. 
The link between being indebted and responsible to the other suggests, in the 
words of Hall, that, “the other confronts me as the master of justice out of his/her poverty, 
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nakedness, vulnerability, etc.; in short, out of his/her suffering.”376 It is thus the suffering 
other that calls the sovereignty of the self into question by confronting it with a moral 
claim. The suffering other demands responsible action. The concept of responsibility and 
indebtedness therefore extends beyond holding oneself accountable for one’s own past, 
present, or future actions; it is constituted in and through being responsible and 
responsive to the suffering other. 
If the work of memory is connected to the work of justice, to be guilty of abusing 
memory means that one has neglected the ways that one is responsible to the past. 
Furthermore, since memory is tied to identity, to be guilty of the abuses of memory is 
thus to be guilty of avoiding a confrontation with the very concrete ways that one’s 
indebteness and heritage contribute to the formation of one’s identity. This appears most 
forcefully in forgetting the injustices, violences, and humiliations that one has committed 
to others in the past. However, it can also include the ways that individuals and 
communities distort what happened, either willfully or unconsciously, in order to protect 
their self-identity. These strategies, as we saw in the previous section, include the 
selective omission of disagreeable facts, the alteration or exaggeration of “facts,” blaming 
others or the circumstances for what happened, or contextually framing the narrative 
through the omission or emphasis of a certain causal chain of events. Such abuses of 
memory make the self and the community guilty because they attempt to avoid having 
such wrongs and evils imputed to it. The guilt that lies at the core of selfhood thus 
becomes a kind of motivation for not taking responsibility for the way that one recounts 
one’s past. 
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To be indebted to the past no only means to hold one responsible for a particular 
narrative or a particular understanding of the past, it also implies that we are responsible 
to the past. We are responsible to the past for the sake of the future. Responsibility is tied 
to the work of remembering, and corresponds to a duty to justice in three interlocking 
ways. First, insofar as the duty to justice is directed toward others, “the duty of memory 
is the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self” (MHF, 89). Second, 
“the duty of memory is restricted to preserving the material trace, whether scriptural or 
other, of past events, but maintains the feeling of being obligated with respect to these 
others…Pay the debt, I shall say, but also inventory the heritage” (MHF, 89). By directly 
confronting the past, its horrors and triumphs, we, the heirs of the past, are able to 
inventory and reactivate promises that were not kept and acknowledge promises that we 
still need to fulfill. Third, “the moral priority belongs to the victims…The victim at issue 
here is the other victim, other than ourselves” (MHF, 89). The work of memory thus 
extends the notion of responsibility further, widening it to include responsibility for the 
past. To be indebted to the past thus does not merely mean that I am responsible for my 
past actions; it means that I am responsible to the past for my very identity. It is, in other 
words, because my forebears, my tradition, and heritage give to me the linguistic, social, 
and symbolic tools that allow me to identify what counts as an action, I am able to 
distinguish myself in and through my actions and thus come to have an identity. Without 
these transmitted structures, I could not understand my world, others, or myself. 
The duty to remember thus is based on a debt owed the dead, and is an obligation 
to ensure that the present and future are more just than the past. Responding to this duty 
helps connect people together, thereby widening the scope of community in two ways. 
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First, following Freud’s insight, the narration of the sufferings of the past helps to 
reintegrate the fragmented and traumatized self into the community. Where trauma 
isolates an individual, the narration of trauma can help to reincorporate the individual into 
community. Second, the fruits that the work of memory can bear help to unite people. 
Here, the suffering of others calls out for justice and can lead to a better and more 
inclusive community. By revealing the ways injustice occurs, we can make use of the 
lessons of the past for the sake of the future. 
If there is an obligation to remember, is there also a corresponding obligation to 
forget? First, note that such an idea is philosophically dubious. The act of remembering 
does not seem to have a corresponding partner on the side of forgetting. The reason for 
this is that remembering is characterized by a search, and, insofar as it is a search, it is 
something that is knowingly undertaken. Forgetting, on the other hand, is often not 
actively performed. Rather, the information “slips our mind” or is “on the tip of our 
tongue.” Forgetting is thus something that often happens involuntarily. 
However, there is an additional sense in which we can understand the duty to 
forget. “A command of this sort,” Ricoeur suggests, “would amount to a commanded 
amnesia” (MHF, 456). It may be useful to note first that the terms “amnesty” and 
“amnesia” share a common semantic root, such that to grant political amnesty is to forget 
the misdeeds or evils that an individual or group has committed. Commanded forgetting 
is an institutionalized form of amnesty. In order to make this connection, Ricoeur uses the 
examples of Athenian decree of 403 B.C., as detailed by Aristotle’s “The Athenian 
Constitution,” and the Edict of Nantes, issued in 1598 by Henry IV. From these 
documents, Ricoeur notes that the citizens were “forbidden to recall the evils” that 
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happened, and instead act as if “something [had] not occurred” (MHF, 453). The 
proximity between “amnesty” and “amnesia,” however, is not merely semantic: it 
“signals the existence of a secret pact with the denial of memory” even as it attempts to 
disguise itself as a form of forgiving (MHF, 453). The result of this “secret pact” is that it 
disallows the exchange of memories that would have allowed grievances to be aired and 
worked through.   
Amnesty attempts to enact the common phrase “forgive and forget.” It is, 
however, unclear if it is even possible to perform this act. Amnesty is ultimately a sort of 
forgetting against forgetting: citizens are commanded to act as though nothing had 
happened, and to forget the disagreement regarding the harms suffered, which they are to 
forget. Forgiveness, as we shall see below, is not simply forgetting; it requires going 
beyond anger, resentment, and hatred. This suggests that forgiveness has an intrinsic 
relation to remembering. For example, when deciding to forgive a loved one for some 
wrong or betrayal, I decide to suspend my anger and hurt feelings in order to continue to 
enable a future with this person. While I may not or perhaps even cannot forget what 
happened, I can go beyond my resentment. Amnesty, on the other hand, attempts to bring 
civil disorders to an end by exonerating all parties of culpability of crimes committed. As 
a result “it functions as a sort of selective and punctual prescription which leaves outside 
of its field certain categories of lawbreakers” (MHF, 453). The consequences of such 
enforced forgetting, Ricoeur claims, is that “private and collective memory would be 
deprived of the salutary identity crisis that permits a lucid reappropriation of the past and 
of its traumatic charge” (MHF, 456). Amnesty attempts not only to erase the debt that 
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present owes to the past, but it attempts to erase the fact that such deeds happened.377 In 
so doing, it erases an important distinction between forgetting and forgiving. To forgive, 
in other words, is not necessarily to forget; nor, as Ricoeur suggests in his discussion of 
amnesty, is forgetting a kind of forgiving. Amnesty might be a useful social or political 
function, but only for a time—it cannot take the place of actually working through the 
conflicts and problems that led to its edict. Amnesty thus cannot be a form of 
reconciliation in service of truth.  
 
V.2.4. The Critical Reconciliation of Memory 
The recognition of the fragile ties between memory and identity is the first step in 
reconciliation, and one that I call “critical reconciliation.” Critical reconciliation shares 
some important features with what J.G. Finlayson, names “reflective reconciliation.”378 
Though Finlayson applies this term specifically to Hegel’s theory of the tragic, it can be 
extended to Ricoeur insofar as Ricoeur’s account of tragedy and the conflicts that arise 
through it are primarily Hegelian and insofar as the culmination of tragic wisdom, for 
Ricoeur, transforms one’s perspective.  
Finlayson defines reflective reconciliation as “both the process in which a human 
agent reaches…self-knowledge by living through the consequences of her actions, and to 
the state of self-knowledge thus achieved.”379 It arises when an individual recognizes that 
suffering arises as a consequence of action.380 In terms of Ricoeur’s analysis thus far, this 
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stage of reconciliation refers to the various ways that the self recognizes that her own 
self-understanding arises from narrative necessity. Narrative identity is a basic form of 
reconciliation insofar as through it synthesizes heterogeneous elements; it establishes 
concord out of discordance. It is also a form of reflection insofar as it requires identifying 
the sources of action, the motives for undertaking them, and the consequences intended. 
The work of such reflection is a preliminary stage in which the self and community 
determines how their perspectives have been distorted, repressed, oppressed, or forced.  
For Ricoeur, once we recognize how identity arises from narrative memory, 
especially in its communal guise, we come to recognize two elements of selfhood’s 
fragility. First, by retelling the stories that one takes to be definitive of identity, the self 
combines empathy with an acknowledgment of the cause of what happened. In other 
words, rather than identifying wholly with the past, as evidenced in melancholic 
nostalgia, or by distancing oneself from it, as in cases of extreme forgetfulness, narratives 
can allow us to experience certain events as if they happened. The hermeneutic interplay 
between distance from a narrative and our belonging to it becomes raised to the level of 
self-understanding: “The narrative work of displacement and condensation, of 
emplotment and schematism, of estrangement and synthesis, enables us to come in touch 
with the reality of the suffering which could not be faced head-on or at first-hand.”381 By 
allowing ourselves to “relive” such events, we can begin to come to terms with them, or, 
in other words, begin to be reconciled with them. 
The second point is that through such recounting, we can recognize the fragility of 
such stories. “Fragility,” according to Ricoeur, “calls for action by virtue of an intrinsic 
                                                
381 Richard Kearney, “Narrating Pain: The Power of Catharsis.” Paragraph, Vol. 30, no. 1 (March 2007): 
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relation…with the idea of responsibility.”382 To recognize that identity is fragile, such as 
when one sees a helpless child, a victim of injustice, or someone who is unable to speak 
for him or her self, is to “feel that we are rendered responsible for, and by, someone.”383 
To be responsible with the ways that we remember means to recognize its fragility, and to 
direct ourselves toward the future such that we can help nurture the survival and growth 
of that which is fragile or who is fragile. In short, to recognize the fragility of communal 
life means to recognize the responsibility and the flexibility that comes with such a life. 
This point warrants further clarification. The fragile thread that connects memory 
and identity arises in part because of its narrative dimensions. This means, as Richard 
Kearney notes, that “after such discovery of one’s narrative identity, it is more difficult to 
make the mistake of taking oneself literally, of assuming that one’s collective identity 
goes without saying.”384 By telling and retelling one’s narrative identity, as well as letting 
it be told by others, each community, institution, or individual recognizes the other. In 
this manner, confronting the deeds of the past, and recognizing the ways that others 
recount them, can help give traction to one’s own narrative identity. Paradoxically, one’s 
identity, whether it is an individual’s, community’s, or nation’s, becomes more secure the 
more it confronts the suffering, trauma, and violence that give rise to its narrative 
identity. Narrative identity becomes meaningful when it allows itself to be called into 
question, as when it is retold by the victims and by those who are marginalized. Here, one 
is reminded of the chorus of Antigone exhorting the audience to “deliberate well!” This is 
a call to recognize the fragility of the situation and to recognize the reasons for action and 
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the narrative identity that gives rise to such stories and helps to justify one’s motives for 
acting.  
Ricoeur’s critical reconciliation is at once challenged by the otherness of the past 
and unsettled by it, though in such a way that otherness does not completely decenter the 
self or render it meaningless. Critical reconciliation instead offers a way to recognize the 
incommensurability of differing narrative identities while also acknowledging the 
necessity of living together. Even though it does not result in an absolute synthesis, as in 
Hegel’s Absolute Knowing, it nevertheless mediates proposals of meaning that are ever 
more inclusive and more just. By recognizing the otherness of the past and the possible 
challenges it poses to identity, a community is afforded the opportunity to reorganize and 
restructure itself as a response to the demands issued by its past. In order to see better 
how memory is flexible and the ways that it can give rise to change at the institutional 
and communal levels, I will now move to the second step in the process of reconciliation 
that Ricoeur delineates. This step is that of scriptural entombment. 
 
V.3. The Scriptural Entombment of the Past 
If critical reconciliation refers to an individual’s or community’s recognition of 
the fragility of its narrative identity, it does not yet reorder the institutions that comprise it 
or give any indication how such reordering is to take place. To recognize that narratives 
configure identity is not yet to recognize how they do so. Even though a community 
might recognize that its identity is organized according to a narrative, it may not see any 
need to reevaluate it or it can even become all the more stubborn in the face of the reality 
of the past. Indeed, it is quite possible that a community might uncritically replace one 
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ideological narrative with another; it may reemphasize its narrative identity in order to 
safeguard it against being questioned..  
In order to see how narrative identity can be reconfigured by way of memory, 
another dimension of such reconciliation needs to be examined. I have indicated some of 
these strategies already under the names the “work of remembering” and the “work of 
mourning.” In order to see what these phrases mean and fix their content more securely, 
we need to go one step further and examine how reflection can transform the 
understanding of the human historical condition and the possibilities contained therein. 
Ricoeur characterizes this more “poetic” dimension of critical reconciliation as 
“scriptural entombment” (Cf. MHF, 365ff.).385 
 
V.3.1. History and the Representation of the Past 
Ricoeur argues that there is a form of reconciliation that occurs in the process of 
writing history. This form of reconciliation is different from the reconciliation that occurs 
in the work of remembering and the work of mourning. Memory concerns our being 
faithful to the past; history attempts to discover the truth of what actually happened. 
However, history, Ricoeur argues, should not “disregard its discipline of distantiation in 
relation to lived experience [and] collective memory” (MHF, 189). Ricoeur describes 
their different aims in a remarkably clear passage:  
Between the mnemonic representation from the beginning of our discourse and 
the literary representation situated at the end of the trajectory of the 
historiographical operation, representation presents itself as an object, a referent, 
of the historian’s discourse. Can it be that the object represented by the historians 
bears the mark of the initial enigma of the mnemonic representation and 
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anticipates the final enigma of the historical representation of the past? (MHF, 
190) 
 
Does the separation between memory, which is to be understood phenomenologically, 
and history, which is essentially epistemological, mean that the historian’s representation 
of the past cannot aid in the process of reconciliation? How can the scriptural or literary 
dimensions of historiography aid in reconciliation? 
 Ricoeur’s answer draws on the ambiguity of the phrase “the historian’s 
representation” of the past. On one hand, this phrase refers to an object—the 
representation through which the historian depicts the past—and is but one part of the 
complex work of historiography. On the other hand, the historian’s representation refers 
to the entire process of historiography, which includes sifting through documents, 
listening to testimony, and bringing together the causal connections and hermeneutic 
dimensions through which we understand human action. In this ambiguity that Ricoeur 
proposes to “narrow the gap between the notion of representation as an object of the 
historian’s discourse” and the other use of the term (MHF, 228).  
 Ricoeur does so by considering the implications of a particular hypothesis: “does 
the historian, insofar as he does history by bringing it to the level of scholarly discourse, 
not mime in a creative way the interpretive gesture by which those who make history 
attempt to understand themselves and their world? (MHF, 228-229). If this is the case, 
then “there would indeed be a mimetic relation between the operation of representing as 
the moment of doing history, and the represented object as the moment of making 
history” (MHF, 229). In this case, then, just as he found in the phenomenology of 
memory, there is an ambition in the historian’s project to faithfully represent the past.  It 
is still the power of memory “to make present an absent thing that happened previously” 
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(MHF, 229). The result is that the ambition of memory to be faithful to the past precedes 
and underlies the pretension to truth that history makes (MHF, 229). 
 Representation lays bare the connection between memory and history. A 
phenomenology of memory makes use of representation insofar it describes “the 
mnemonic phenomenon in what is remembered is given as an image of what previously 
was seen, heard, experienced, learned, acquired” (MHF, 235). The past is given to 
consciousness as an image, icon, or representation of the past. With this, the correlation 
between the historian’s representation and mnemonic representation will have decisive 
implications: “literary or scriptural representation must in the final analysis allow itself to 
be understood as ‘standing for’ (représentance),” which places “the accent not only on 
the active character of the historical operation, but on the intended something that makes 
history the learned heir of memory and its foundational aporia” of being a representation 
of the past (MHF, 236).  
The prospects for reconciliation to be found in the scriptural act of writing are 
summed up in the notion of “standing for.” The notion of standing for refers to the 
demands, expectations, and intentions that are involved in writing history. These 
expectations and demands first imply that there is a public dimension to the historian’s 
representation. “Pulled by the archive out of the world of action, the historian reenters 
that world by inscribing his work in the world of his readers” (MHF, 234). This implies 
that there is a kind of contract between the writer of history and the public, insofar as it 
poses the questions of “whether, how, and to what degree the historian satisfies the 
expectation and promise conveyed by this contract” (MHF, 275). This contract is one in 
which “the author and the reader of a historical text agree that it will deal with situations, 
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events, connections, and characters who once really existed” (MHF, 275). The work of 
the historian is complete only when it is addressed to a public body.  
But, if the historian has constructed a narrative representation of what happened, 
what is to prevent it from being considered an outright fabrication? Ricoeur’s answer is 
again direct: 
[O]nce the representative modes supposed to give a literary form to the historical 
intentionality are called into question, the only responsible way to make the 
attestation of reality prevail over the suspicion of nonpertinence is to put the 
scriptural phase back in its place in relation to the preliminary ones of 
comprehensive explanation and documentary proof. In other words, it is together 
that scripturality, comprehensive explanation, and documentary proof are capable 
of moves back from the art of writing to the “research techniques” and “critical 
procedures” is capable of raising the product to the rank of what has become a 
critical attestation. (MHF, 278) 
 
Memory retains its priority over history insofar as the entirety of the historian’s 
representation is drawn up on the basis of listening to and accounting for the witness’s 
testimony. The centrality of witnessing and testimony is evidenced even in attempts to 
criticize the historian’s work: “we have nothing better than our memory to assure 
ourselves of the reality of our memories—we have nothing better than the testimony and 
criticism of testimony to accredit the historian’s representation of the past” (MHF, 278). 
The truth of history is thus measured against the past that it purports to represent. 
 At this point, Ricoeur raises a particular problem. “The historian’s representation 
is indeed a present image of an absent thing; the absent thing gets split into disappearance 
into and existence in the past. Past things are abolished, but one can make it that they 
should not have been” (MHF, 280). Again, we encounter the distinction between the 
understanding of the past as no longer and the understanding of the past as having been, 
which, in turn, forces the historian to confront the problem of death. 
 294 
Ricoeur uses the phrase “scriptural entombment” to describe the relationship 
between death and history. Death becomes a problem for the historian because of “the 
simple fact that in history one is concerned with practically nothing but the dead of other 
times” (MHF, 364). The dead of history refers both to those prominent individuals who 
did great deeds, and those anonymous individuals who do nothing but silently pass across 
the grand stage of history (MHF, 365). However, conceived in this way, history offers us 
nothing but a “theater of shadows, stirred by survivors in possession of a suspended 
sentence of death” (MHF, 365). 
Against this “theater of shadows,” Ricoeur offers a striking metaphor for the 
historiographical operation, one which refers to the process through which the historian’s 
representation enables us to come to terms with the relationship between the character of 
the past as having been and as no longer. He suggests tha we consier the 
“historiographical operation to be the scriptural equivalent of the social ritual of 
entombment” (MHF, 365). Ricoeur writes: 
Sepulcher, indeed, is not only a place set apart in our cities, the place we call a 
cemetery and in which we depose the remains of the living who return to dust. It 
is an act, the act of burial. This gesture is not punctual; it is not limited to the 
moment of burial. The sepulcher remains because the gesture of burying remains; 
its path is the path of mourning that transforms the physical absence of the lost 
object into an inner presence. The sepulcher as the material place thus becomes 
the enduring mark of mourning, the memory aid of the act of sepulcher. (MHF, 
366) 
 
Historical writing, as a symbolic form of burial, aids the works of memory and mourning 
transforming the absence of a past no longer there into a past that exists as having been 
by making a place for the dead. By externally marking out a place for the past in writing, 
we can confront what happened and come to terms with it. 
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Drawing on Michel de Certeau’s work on history, Ricoeur makes several 
important points about the nature of the absent past and the process of historical writing 
as an act of scriptural entombment. First, scriptural entombment calls attention to the way 
that “the dead are those who are missing from historical discourse.”386 The dead in this 
case are traces of what has been, but, because they cannot speak for themselves, they are 
irrevocably absent and lost to us. “Absence” Ricoeur writes “is thus no longer a state but 
the result of the work of history, the true machine for producing gaps, giving rise to 
heterology, that logos of the other” (MHF, 366). The cemetery and sepulcher is thus a 
fitting image for the work of history: the deceased are irrevocably absent, and histories 
are those works that make us all too aware of this dimension of their being. Writing thus 
makes room for the dead by carving out a place for them, and allowing a space to appear 
as once having been alive. 
Second, taken to its extreme, the symbolic meaning of burial turns out to be 
something positive. Where writing history gives a place for the dead, reading history, as 
it were, “reopens” the tomb. Thus, on the one hand, as Ricoeur approvingly cites Certeau, 
“writing, like a burial ritual, ‘exorcises death by inserting it into discourse” (MHF, 
367).387 On the other, “writing performs a ‘symbolic function’ which ‘allows a society to 
situate itself by giving itself a past through language’” (MHF, 367).388 This means that by 
constructing a place for the dead through writing, the act of entombment helps to make a 
place for the reader, the “addressee of the writing of history.”389 Not only do we bury the 
dead to let them be dead; we bury the dead for the sake of the living. “Scriptural 
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entombment,” in other words, “goes beyond simple narrativity in order to play a 
performative role; performativity assigns to the reader a place, a place to be filled, a ‘task 
to be undertaken.’”390 The reader of the text comes to understand him or herself through 
writing and reading history, as if to say “this is my history, and, in part, who I am.” By 
assigning the reader with the task of “filling” the tomb, thereby imbuing the past with 
meaning, history is prevented from sliding into a mere story or fiction. 
By interpreting the meaning of death in history as the act of scriptural 
entombment, Ricoeur reconfigures the ontological meaning of death to include both the 
past and others. The retrospective discourse of history is not a “leveled off” form of 
history, as Heidegger had argued in Being and Time, because it also opens up the 
possibility of transforming the present and future. This suggests, contra Heidegger, that 
the historian does have a voice in the explication of the relationship between being and 
time. By retrospectively organizing a narrative of what happened, the historian organizes 
the way that necessity and contingency intertwine and allows the reader to see how 
events might have happened. The process of scriptural entombment reconfigures our 
possibilities with others because, rather than emphasize the individuating characteristics 
of death, it allows each person to see him or herself as having come from a shared past. It 
further resurrects lost possibilities for configuring communal identity so that it is more 
inclusive and more just. The final transformation of our understanding of the relationship 
between death and history arises when the dead are not only understood as that about 
whom history writes, but as the living of the past who made history. 
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Critical reconciliation operates against those forms of reflection that tend to 
distort or impede healthy ways of remembering the past. Narrative identity, recall, “is not 
a stable and seamless identity. Just as it is possible to compose several plots on the 
subject of the same incidents…so it is always possible to weave different, even opposed, 
plots about our lives…in this sense, narrative identity continues to make and unmake 
itself” (TN3, 289-249). Scriptural entombment, and burial in general, is both 
retrospective and prospective, and operates much the same way that “repetition” does in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time. Because the historian’s representation of the past is an act 
of scriptural entombment, it incorporates a critical moment into its movement as it 
reinterprets Heidegger’s connection between being-indebted and being-toward-death. 
Rather than understand death as the ground of history insofar as it radically individuates 
Dasein, Ricoeur instead wants to emphasize how being-towards-death opens human 
being to the possibility of retrieving from the past new ways of being-with-others. In 
other words, the confrontation with death will allow a community to reorder its 
institutions and reconcile itself with its own past and with the accounts given by others, 
who might have experienced such a past differently. 
 
V.3.2. Traces of the Past and Repetition 
To suggest that the dead are both the objects of historical writing and subjects 
who have made history leads, for Ricoeur, to a reevaluation of the meaning of history for 
the present. In order to do so, he returns to the concept of “trace” or “vestige,” which, he 
suggests, is “capable of straddling [the] ontological discontinuity” between “the 
problematic of standing-for, on the historical plane, and, preceding it, that of iconic 
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representation on the mnemonic plane” (MHF, 378). While Heidegger overlooks the 
problem of deriving historiography from historicity by rigidly separating the two, in other 
words, Ricoeur attempts to show their connection by reexamining the meaning of traces 
and of repetition. 
I have already noted how burial helps to make manifest the way that the living 
come to replace the dead and thus secures the transition from one generation to the next. 
Underlying that discussion, however, was the notion of the trace and of debt. By coupling 
together the trace and the debt, Ricoeur intends to “express our pure dependence on the 
past in the positive sense of a transmitted and inescapable heritage.”391 By contrast, the 
trace, because it is only an effect of a sign, signifies without issuing an obligation. Debt, 
on the other hand, does obligate by linking “together the human being affected by the 
past to the potentiality-for-Being hidden in that past and in quest of the futural in the form 
of promise.”392 Insofar as we are indebted to the past, in other words, we also have an 
obligation to redeem the past, to render it as a reconstruction or representation of the past, 
and “to free, retrospectively, certain possibilities that were not actualized in the historical 
past” (TN3, 191). While Heidegger understands the importance of the debt, trace, and 
heritage in terms of the transmission and appropriation of possibilities inherited from the 
past, Ricoeur includes the recognition of indebtedness that one contracts from another 
and thus incorporates a dimension of responsibility and ethics (Cf. TN3, 256). 
The concept of repetition helps to reconfigure narrative identity and the 
possibilities it holds for understanding the meaning of memory. Repetition is not a slavish 
devotion or imitation of something that came before; nor is it an attempt to restore some 
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bygone era. Rather, as Ricoeur writes, “it is a matter of recalling, replying to, retorting, 
even of revoking heritages” (MHF, 380). First, at the most formal and abstract level, 
repetition allows us to read the end of a story into its beginning and the beginning of the 
story into its end. Repetition, in other words, allows us to recount the initial conditions of 
a course of action from the perspective of the consequences; similarly, we can learn to 
recount the consequences of an action in terms of what the agent intended to bring about 
or what motives impelled him or her to act. “In this way,” Ricoeur writes, “the plot does 
not merely establish human action ‘in’ time, it also establishes it in memory. And 
memory in turn repeats—re-collects—the course of events according to an order that is 
the counterpart of the stretching-along of time between a beginning and an end.”393 To 
remember something is to trace back the course of events such that we can see how the 
end unfolds with a kind of literary necessity from the beginning. Memory, under the 
guise of repetition, “therefore, is no longer the narrative of external adventures stretching 
along episodic time. It is itself the spiral movement that, through anecdotes and episodes, 
brings us back to the almost motionless constellation of potentialities that the narrative 
retrieves. The end of the story is what equates the present with the past, the actual with 
the potential.”394 In this way, the repetition that arises through narratives helps set the 
ground for the critical appropriation of the memorial past. 
Second, and more importantly, repetition “means the ‘retrieval’ of our most 
fundamental potentialities, as they are inherited from our own past, in terms of a personal 
fate and a common destiny.”395 Such inheritance implies by recognizing that “the dead of 
the past were once living,” and that writing history evokes the way that they had been 
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alive. By acknowledging such an inheritance, the past is reopened to critical scrutiny. “In 
the end, it is all about reopening the past onto the future, more precisely onto the future of 
that past.”396 Because repetition reopens the past by bringing to light buried or forgotten 
possibilities, it offers the opportunity to re-appropriate such possibilities in the name of 
the community. 
 By connecting repetition and indebtedness, the ethical and political dimensions of 
scriptural entombment can be seen in a clearer light. Ricoeur writes, 
If, in fact, the facts are ineffaceable, if one can no longer undo what has been 
done, nor make it so that what has happened did not occur, on the other hand, the 
sense of what has happened is not fixed once and for all. In addition to the fact 
that events of the past can be recounted and interpreted otherwise, the moral 
weight tied to the relation of debt with respect to the past can be increased or 
lightened. (MHF, 381) 
 
As written, history unfolds according to narrative necessity; however, historians can also 
show that such events did not have to be as such, that if someone acted differently a 
catastrophe could have been avoided. In so doing, the historian can retrospectively 
reinsert contingency into history. Historiography and the work of historians help aid the 
understanding of the past by retrieving and making explicit hidden or buried possibilities. 
John Wall puts the point well: “beneath the actual grounds of social life in which we bury 
and murder those who are oppressed is an empty space of impossible new possibility for 
a still more radically shared community of all.”397 The repetition of buried possibilities, 
which allow us to image who we are and who we have been otherwise, can transform the 
way that we understand our history, our shared language, our community, and the hopes 
and promises that we wish to fulfill. 
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V.3.3. Just History, Reconciled Memory 
Memory aims at fidelity to the past; history aims at the truth of what happened. 
However, epistemologically speaking, one cannot claim definitive priority over the other: 
“the competition between memory and history, between the faithfulness of the one and 
the truth of the other, cannot be resolved on the epistemological plane” (MHF, 498-499). 
Memory however, is not a province of history merely because it aims at fidelity; nor is 
history an abstracted, theoretical, or scientific form of memory merely because it attempts 
to represent the past as it really happened. Rather, the “rival claims of history and 
memory to cover the totality of the field open up behind the present by the representation 
of the past does not, therefore, end in a paralyzing aporia” (MHF, 392). The history of 
memory, where the conception of memory is an object to be studied, is to be put into 
open dialectical conversation with the dimension of historicity that memory reveals.   
This just balance of history and memory, of the historiographical operation and 
the historicity of memory, must preserve the dialectical, even “uncanny,” relationship 
between memory and history (cf. MHF, 393). On the one hand, there is the claim of 
historians to reduce memory to yet another one of its objects in writing a “history of 
memory.”  On the other hand, memory retains for itself the capacity to historicize itself 
under a number of figures. What makes this dialectic possible and sustaining is that “the 
relation of the past to the present of the historian is set against the backdrop of the great 
dialectic that mixes resolute anticipation, the repetition of the past, and present concern” 
(MHF, 392). To the extent that history aims to be objective, it can correct the abuses of 
communal memory. To the extent that memory requires fidelity to the past, it can 
moderate the historian’s hubris to faithfully and accurately represent the past. 
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This dialectic is most apparent in Ricoeur’s discussion of the limits of the 
historian’s representation. The historian encounters a peculiar set of limits when trying to 
represent historical events of extreme horror or trauma. The phrase “limits of 
representation” has two meanings. On one hand, it refers to the exhaustion of possibilities 
that a given culture has for representing events like the Shoah. This is an “internal” limit 
of representation, insofar as contemporary forms of representation cannot do justice to 
what happened. The limit to representing it arises because of the event itself—it is 
singular. On the other hand, there is an “external” limit, one which arises from the event 
itself—“a request, a demand to be spoken of” (MHF, 254). This limit is one which 
demands to be represented, one which, in order for it not to be forgotten, must be brought 
to language. It is an external limit insofar as it can be made to be an exemplar and 
instructive to us. 
What, then, does it mean to come to terms with the past? Echoing the social 
practice of phronesis described in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur argues that it is the 
citizen, at the level of his or her participation in collective memory, and prior to taking up 
the critical resources of historiography, that is summoned to recount the event (MHF, 
258). It is the citizen who is called upon to recognize the acceptability or unacceptability 
of the event and make a moral judgment upon it. The representation of the event not only 
synthesizes different points of view into a coherent whole; it also acknowledges 
“heterogeneous investments” that different individuals and communities might have in 
the representation itself (MHF, 259). This means that the legitimacy of the historian’s 
account is not founded primarily on the resemblance of the historical narrative to the 
events narrated. The account is instead legitimate insofar as it takes the diversity of 
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witnesses and their situations into account. Such a criterion, however, is not as 
epistemologically motivated as it is therapeutic. That which demands truth, and thus the 
source of the representation, lies in the lived experience of those who made history. This 
means that we must hone our ability to empathize with others and work to find a deeper, 
more inclusive, level of solidarity. It is, Ricoeur suggests, because of the moral protest 
arising from a collective memory—“Never again!”—that puts both the heirs of the past 
and the historians who write about it in a situation of indebtedness and responsibility. 
To come to terms with the past thus means to accept responsibility for it, and to 
work toward making the memory of it acceptable. History is thus a kind of corrective to 
the possible pathologies of memory. Ricoeur thus writes, “it is by delivering, through 
history, on the unkept promises of the prior course of history, whether blocked or 
repressed, that a people, a nation, or a cultural entity can arrive at an open and living 
conception of their traditions.”398 This means that the historian has a debt to the past, to 
those individuals who have come before, to recount their stories in order to retrieve a 
vision of what happened, how it shapes who we are today, and offer a vision for where 
we are going. The threat of an internal limit to representation must thus not be taken to 
preclude exploration or lead to despair at representing the past; rather, it must instead 
stimulate alternative modes of expressing what happened.  
Historical narratives participate in the transmission of tradition by bringing the 
present into a confrontation with the past. The result is that “the ‘true’ histories of the 
past uncover the buried potentialities of the present…there is only a history of the 
potentialities of the present. History, in this sense, explores the field of ‘imaginative’ 
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variations which surround the present and the real that we take for granted in everyday 
life.”399 In order to guard against the tendency to rigidly divide the past and the future, 
Ricoeur writes, 
We must struggle against the tendency to consider the past only from the 
angle of what is done, unchangeable, and past. We have to reopen the past, 
to revivify its unaccomplished, cut off—even slaughtered—possibilities. 
In short, when confronted with the adage that the past is unequivocally 
closed and necessary, we have to make our expectations more determinate 
and our experience less so. (TN3, 216) 
 
It is only when we render our possibilities for existing more determinate, more specific, 
and more concrete, that we can see our past as a heritage that we appropriate. Insofar as 
critique is motivated by the possibility of liberation, it makes sense only against the 
horizon of a heritage we come to share with others. 
Scriptural entombment thus refers to the poetic human capacity for social 
imagination and transformation because, in its return to the past to recount what 
happened, it revivifies those potentialities that were seemingly lost in the death of those 
who lived through those events. This poetic dimension of critical reconciliation has at 
least two features. First, it arises as a response to conflicting demands of memory and 
history. It recognizes a commitment to being true to the past, thus ensuring that a sense of 
selfhood and the debt owed the dead are acknowledged, and it recognizes the demands to 
be truthful about what happened in the past. It is thus a constitution of an individual’s or 
community’s selfhood. Second, because the act of scriptural entombment is a response to 
the past, it is also a moment where it can become more inclusive of other voices that 
recount what happened. Here, the dialectic between memory and history suggests that 
history must always look out for and accredit those testimonies that go against the grain 
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of a received history. The poetics of such critical reconciliation thus recognizes the 
other’s demand, and responds to it by creatively responding to and including it in its 
reconfigured identity. As a result, the challenge that the past poses to narrative identity, 
whether in the guise of remembering too much or remembering too little of the past, must 
be met with a response that reconfigures the debt owed the dead. 
 
V.4. Forgiveness 
The exchange of memories, the just allotment of memory, and the therapeutic 
work of memory might be taken to imply that this is all there is to about its ability to help 
us reconcile with the past. The exchange, and retelling, of memory aims at social 
inclusion, at a more expansive community, and works under the heading of justice. 
Insofar as this exchange occurs, one might assume that the task of forging an identity has 
been satisfactorily met. However, Ricoeur further adds a radical form of reconciliation as 
an epilogue to Memory, History, Forgetting: forgiveness. “What forgiveness adds to the 
work of remembrance and the work of mourning” Ricoeur argues, “is its generosity.”400 
The generosity of forgiveness helps to relieve guilt and absolves the offender of a debt, 
and thus releases the offender from carrying the burden of the offence and reconfigures 
social and communal possibilities. In so doing, forgiveness opens new possibilities for 
communal living through its generosity, a generosity that exceeds the gains made in the 
first two stages.  
Forgiveness is difficult. One reason the wounds and offenses of the past persist is 
because of the connection between the agent and the action. Fault and guilt are intimately 
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connected with the problem of imputation. Without imputation, there can be no guilt. To 
initiate an action is to be responsible for it; it is to be its author. Thus, because imputation 
binds an agent to the act, “human action is forever submitted to the experience of fault” 
(MHF, 466). To annihilate guilt would render meaningful human action impossible 
because it would annihilate the possibility of distinguishing an impersonal event from an 
action that has been freely initiated by an agent. “This adherence of guilt to the human 
condition,” Ricoeur claims, “renders it not only unforgiveable in fact, but unforgiveable 
by right” (MHF, 466). While we can thus comprehend and explain an action by stating 
the causes, motivations, intentions, and desires of the agent, we are never justified in 
absolving the doer for committing the deed. It is against this background that Ricoeur 
suggests that if there is forgiveness, it must be “directed to the unforgiveable, or it does 
not exist” (MHF, 468). Why, however, must forgiveness be directed to the unforgiveable 
and how are we to understand the meaning of this paradox? 
Ricoeur offers two hints when he suggests that “forgiveness belongs to the same 
family” as joy, wisdom, extravagance, and love (MHF, 467) and when he identifies a 
semantic kinship between forgiving, giving, and the gift (MHF, 480). Ricoeur makes 
their connection explicit in his short essay, “Can Forgiveness Heal?” There, he explains 
that in forgiveness “it comes to light what one might call the economy of the gift, if one 
characterizes the latter in terms of the logic of superabundance which distinguishes love 
from the logic of the reciprocity of justice.”401 Nevertheless, he does not explicitly offer 
an account of the way that the logic of superabundance and love are connected. To follow 
the direction of the path down which these clues point, it will be necessary to briefly 
elaborate the distinction between what Ricoeur names the “logic of equivalence” and the 
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“logic of suberabundance.” On the basis of this distinction, Ricoeur elaborates two kinds 
of economies: the economy of reciprocity and the economy of the gift. After elaborating 
these formal structures, I will then show how Ricoeur’s discussion of forgiveness 
employs them and offers a form of reconciliation that critical reconciliation cannot offer. 
 
V.4.1. The Logic of Equivalence and the Logic of Superabundance 
The juxtaposition of the logic of equivalence and the logic of superabundance 
underpin Ricoeur’s discussion of justice and forgive. The logic of equivalence appears to 
render forgiveness impossible insofar as it establishes the possibility of justice. The first 
way it appears is as retribution or vengeance, which receives its most direct formulation 
in lex talionis: an eye for an eye. Vengeance is the first attempt to reestablish equality 
between two parties after one has been wronged. It does so by calculating a particular 
punishment that “fits” the harmful effects of the crime. John Wall puts the point 
concisely: “vengeance purports to right the wrongs of the past by calculating an 
equivalent return of harm for the harm that has been done.”402 This is no doubt a 
primitive form of justice, and its punitive nature can quickly escalate. However, to 
conceive of justice as retribution represents the first step in establishing the rule of law. 
The second, and more important, dimension of the logic of equivalence 
emphasizes the just distribution of goods. In order to share a life in common, the 
members of a community need to allot goods. This strengthens the social bond by 
incorporateing individuals into the community through the establishment of institutions. 
While it is difficult to determine what the just proportion of goods are, Ricoeur 
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nevertheless maintains that it is essential for a community to consider justice as a social 
practice and maintain an ongoing discourse regarding the meaning of it (Cf., OA 283-
290).  
Critical reconciliation, which settles the uses and abuses of memory, operates 
according to the logic of equivalence. Put in perhaps the most utilitarian terms, in 
response to the suffering other, or the dead of the past, I give my attention to them in 
hopes that my response and attempts to do justice to the past will be acknowledged by 
future generations. It is utilitarian insofar as the attention given we take others into 
consideration when acting. Doing justice to the past requires that we recognize the aims, 
desires, motivations, and promises of past agents. Taking stock of one’s heritage, for 
example, can lead a community to recognize promises that have been left unheard, and 
bind themselves to it. The give and take of heritage and projection of possibilities can 
thus be understood as a kind of just relationship with one’s forebears and children. 
Communal memory, then, is both a matter of deteremining what to remember or forget, 
and a matter of identifying with, or participating in, the narrative identity of a 
community. 
A heritage is not simply a quarry to be mined. In order to ensure that the dead of 
the past are not lauded merely because they have transmitted to us a past, there needs to 
be an additional way to understand a relationship to the other. One such path is offered by 
forgiveness. If justice seeks to establish an ideal of reciprocity and equivalence that 
intends to guide interpersonal relations, forgiveness offends justice insofar as it does not 
return harm for harm. Ricoeur writes, “if punishment is required by the violation of the 
law in order to restore the law, of satisfying the complaint of the victim and protecting 
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public order, then forgiving should appear as an act of injustice.403 Through forgiveness, 
the guilty party, who rightly deserves punishment, is released from the guilt so richly 
deserved. Furthermore, forgiving appears to favor some of the guilty and not others. To 
forgive, in other words, wounds the reciprocal standing among citizens. 
In contrast to the logic of equivalence, forgiveness, like love, belongs to the logic 
of superabundance. Love, according to Ricoeur, is not to be understood in terms of the 
cardinal virtues belonging to an idealized Christian character. Rather, it designates a limit 
experience between the finite and the transcendent. Rather than responding to an act in 
terms of exchange and reciprocity, it offers the possibility of reorienting action by calling 
into question those established modes of behavior and judgment about the proper 
response in a given situation. In so doing, it reorients one’s attention to the suffering 
other, who calls me to be responsible. This suggests that love operates as a kind of focal 
point directing one’s attention to specific, and even highly unusual, situations. As a 
result, it cannot be made into a universal principle to which every action must conform; it 
instead refers us to what Heidegger might describe as the temporal situation in all of its 
specificity and what Jaspers might describe simply as a limit situation. The limit 
experience of love, and the possibility of forgiveness, disorients only in order to reorient 
us. 
What, however, makes love part of the logic of superabundance? Ricoeur 
explains, “each response gives more than that asked by ordinary prudence…Not just this, 
but even that! It is this “giving more” that appears to me to constitute the point of these 
                                                
403 Ricoeur, “The Difficulty to Forgive,” Memory, Narrativity, Self and the Challenge to Think God: The 
Reception within Theology of the Recent Work of Paul Ricoeur. Eds. Maureen Junker-Kenny and Peter 
Kenny (Lit Verlag: Münster, 2004): pp. 6-16, p. 9. 
 310 
extreme commands.”404 This logic of excess constitutes the logic of superabundance by 
allowing us to refigure and reorient our actions toward the other who demands a response 
and calls me to be responsible. It is, in Karl Simms’s words, “a logic of generosity in 
which I give more than the other deserves in relation to me, and not merely an amount to 
that which I will receive in return.”405 If the Golden Rule presents the logic of 
equivalence, the logic of superabundance is “supraethical” insofar as it transcends the 
reciprocity that lies at the heart of traditional ethical theories. The logic of 
superabundance, in other words, becomes manifest in paradoxical and extreme forms of 
behavior and commitment.406 
 
V.4.2 The Economy of the Gift 
The connection Ricoeur draws between reciprocity and giving further clarifies 
Ricoeur’s account of forgiveness. The commandment to love one’s enemies “seems to 
constitute the expression closest, on the ethical plane, to which I have called the economy 
of the gift.”407 The reason for this, he continues, is that “the commandment to love one’s 
enemies is not ethical but supraethical, as is the whole economy of the gift to which it 
belongs.”408 We have already seen how the excesses of love operate according to the 
logic of superabundance. What, however, might Ricoeur mean by the phrase “economy 
of the gift”? 
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This is not an idle question, as both John Wall and W. David Hall suggest the 
“economy of the gift” plays a central role in Ricoeur’s poetical project.409 The economy 
of the gift is the structure through which the imperative to forgive operates. However, 
Ricoeur does not fully explain what the “economy of the gift” might mean in Memory, 
History, Forgetting. In fact, this phrase often arises in those essays that are marked by 
explicit theological concerns. Nevertheless, there is also a philosophical and poetic 
meaning of the economy of the gift. In order to elaborate this meaning, I will first 
delineate a few important formulations of the meaning of the “gift” and its economy. 
Recent French thought has emphasized the notion of the gift in order to 
understand the practice of phenomenology and its ethical, political, and theological 
implications.410 The classic formulation of the gift is to be found in the anthropologist 
Marcel Mauss.411 Mauss claimed, contrary to the intuitive opposition between economy 
and gift, that these notions are inseparable. In fact, the systems based on the exchange of 
gifts come prior to the market systems of exchange currently in use. Gift giving is part of 
the logic of exchange, and thus helps to create and maintain institutions and legitimates 
the distribution of goods. The reason for this, according to Mause, is that the gift is not a 
generous, free donation to someone else. Instead, giving a gift places the recipient under 
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an obligation to return in kind. This system of reciprocity and obligation creates social 
relationships. 
Jacques Derrida responds to this connection between the economy and gift with a 
remarkably strong thesis: anything given as a gift under any circumstances annuls itself 
were one to give something in return. The gift is thus not unrelated to exchange, but its 
relationship is such that they are mutually exclusive concepts—a gift that inspires a 
return is not, properly speaking, a gift any longer. Even though “one cannot treat the gift, 
this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to money 
economy… the gift, if such exists, [is] also that which interrupts economy.”412 Gifts, on 
Derrida’s account, must therefore be given out of pure generosity and thus without an 
expectation of return. He writes, 
 
[A]s soon as a gift is identified as a gift, with the meaning of the gift, then 
it is cancelled as a gift. It is reintroduced into the circle of exchange and 
destroyed as a gift. As soon as the donee knows it is a gift, he already 
thanks the donator, and cancels the gift. As soon as the donator is 
conscious of giving, he himself thanks himself and again cancels the gift 
by re-inscribing it into a circle, an economic circle.413 
 
On Derrida’s account, the gift operates at the limits of economy—both in the sense of 
making it possible and in the sense of interrupting and challenging its very possibility. 
Significantly, Derrida understands forgiveness in these same terms. If there is 
forgiveness, it can, he argues, only be directed toward the unforgiveable. A forgiveness 
that is asked for does not deserve the name because it brings two parties together in a 
relationship of exchange – one asks, so that the other gives. A forgiveness that is 
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performed in order to get something in return, even if it is to put each party back on equal 
footing, is impure forgiveness, undeserving of the name.414 
A second account of the gift, one that runs counter to Derrida’s, can be found in 
Jean-Luc Marion’s work. In reply to Derrida’s claim regarding the impossibility of the 
gift, that for there to be a gift, it must not given or received as a gift, Marion argues that 
the most radical phenomenological reduction is neither Husserl’s eidetic or 
transcendental reductions nor Heidegger’s attempt to trace a phenomenon back to its 
Being. Rather, Marion’s radical understanding of the reduction traces the phenomenon 
back to its “givenness” (donation). Insofar as the world appears to us, he argues, it is also 
primordially given to us. Phenomena, in other words, give themselves. In the most 
primordial sense possible, then, “givenness remains an immanent structure of any kind of 
phenomenality, whether immanent or transcendent.”415 This form of givenness is, 
according to Marion, constitutive of the givennesss of the world itself, which, because it 
makes possible exchange and giving back, does not allow a return. 
Ricoeur draws on this discussion in his employment of the phrase the “economy 
of the gift.” However, there is something of a paradox in his use of this phrase. If the gift 
lies outside the bounds of exchange, as Derrida argued, or is part of the structure of 
reciprocity, as in Mauss, how can there be an “economy” of the gift? If Ricoeur uses the 
“economy of the gift” in the latter sense, the phrase is tautologous; if he uses it in the 
former sense, the phrase is absurd insofar as exchanging gifts seems to cancel the gift. 
The paradoxical nature of this phrase is somewhat attenuated if we do not see economy 
and the gift as simple oppositions. For Ricoeur, the economy of the gift implies both 
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activity and passivity. John Wall puts this point concisely, “although we receive this gift 
through the passivity of faith, the gift itself received is nothing other than our own 
freedom to give—in this case, to give meaning to our own fallen existences.”416 Ricoeur 
thus argues that the gift generates an obligation to give while at the same time 
transforming the relationship between the giver and the recipient by reorienting them 
toward new and yet to be hoped for configurations of communal existence.417 
The gift is something received, thus making the experience of it passive. Rather 
than argue that the passivity of being thrown into a world, and, with it, the recognition 
that one might never have existed at all is cause for anxiety, Ricoeur argues that it is 
instead the occasion for an “originary affirmation.” Originary affirmation is, for Ricoeur, 
“the joyous affirmation of being-able-to-be, of the effort to be, of the conatus at the 
origin of ethics’ very dynamic.”418 Even in the experience of fault, or the experience of 
the tragic, affirmation remains originary because in such experience one feels “the gap 
between the desire to be and its actualization…The feeling of the fault, in its absolutely 
primitive form, even before any determination of the law is inherent in any active 
consciousness (la conscience oeuvrante) in its feeling of inequality with its positing of 
freedom.”419 To recognize that one’s situation is tragic or morally evil is to implicitly 
affirm a capacity for goodness that is able to transform the situation. Affirmation is the 
expression of the unique human ability to create new meaning and reconfigure the world 
in new ways, despite the ever-present tendency for such meaning to be taken as ever-
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present, literal, or something that goes without saying. It reaffirms the ability to aim at the 
good, despite one’s necessarily finite and constrained existence. Originary affirmation 
arises out of the experience of the “givenness” and directs human beings to the possibility 
of creatively refiguring their world. 
If the gift in the phrase “economy of the gift” refers to the ability to recreate and 
reinterpret the meaning of one’s world, what then does economy mean in this context? 
With the notion of economy we return to the level of intersubjective relations, and 
specifically the problem of the other. However, because the logic of equivalence 
encourages equal exchange, it threatens to reduce communal existence to one of mutual 
reciprocity. W. David Hall writes, “the gift is not without a demand for reciprocity, but 
the reciprocity that it articulates is placed elsewhere than the attempt to establish 
equivalence.”420 The economy of the gift arises because the excess of that which is given 
motivates the refiguration of the world. As a result, the economy of the gift has the 
structure of a creative response to something other than oneself, which has been given to 
oneself. The experience of others, and of the past, contributes to the constitution of 
selfhood. Ricoeur writes, “it is in me that the movement coming from the other completes 
its trajectory: the other constitutes me as responsible, that is, capable of responding” (OA, 
336). The result of this is that the other “comes to be placed at the origin of my 
acts…[and] is now inscribed within an asymmetrical dialogic structure whose origin lies 
outside me” (OA, 336). If we are responsible for what arises out of our poetic capacities 
to create meaning, it is because we are already responsible to an other. The other 
demands a response, and Ricoeur suggests that such a response is to be construed in 
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terms of one’s poetic ability to transform, reconfigure, and re-narrate the possibilities of 
selfhood. 
If the originary affirmation of the poetics of human creativity refers to the 
structure of the gift, the economic dimension of the gift suggests that it also be given back 
to the other in its otherness. Ricoeur thus claims, along with Levinas, that the possibility 
of being responsible for how we treat others presupposes that we have always already 
been constituted as being called by the other to be responsible to him or her. This anterior 
gift of the Other’s call creates the self’s obligation to it. “It is”, as Ricoeur notes, “the gift 
which engenders the obligation.”421 At this point we can see how the economy of the gift 
is one of ever-increasing generosity: “because it has been given to you, you give in 
turn.”422 Even if the commandment to return the gift is one that can never be fully 
discharged, and the task that it sets out for us is never-ending, it nevertheless reorients 
human relations toward “a tenacious incorporation, step by step, of a supplementary 
degree of compassion and generosity.”423 This suggests that the economy of the gift is 
one that can refigure experience and can reorient action toward upholding and respecting 
the integrity and alterity of the other. It demands that the generosity be directed toward 
the other and toward the prospects of reconciling the disparity of social goods in more 
inclusive ways. The other’s call to me to be responsible is a poetic call, because it 
reorients us from thinking ourselves to be the master of meaning toward giving oneself 
over to creative possibilities of refigured meaning. 
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The response to the command of love reorients the imagination to consider 
different possible ways of being. Ricoeur writes, “parables, paradoxes, hyperboles, and 
extreme commandments all disorient only in order to reorient us. But what is reoriented? 
and in what direction? I would say that what is reoriented by these extreme sayings is less 
our will than our imagination.” The imagination, he continues, “is the power to open us to 
new possibilities, to discover a new way of seeing, or acceding to a new rule in receiving 
the instruction of the exception.”424 Forgiveness, insofar as it shares a kinship with love, 
can poetically reorient one’s attention to the other and to other possibilities for existing. It 
poetically reorients action from the ideal of exchange and reciprocity that characterizes 
the just distribution of goods among individuals and from the ideal of equalizing the 
intersubjective relations of give and take, and directs one’s attention toward the 
vulnerable other who calls out to the self and calls out to creatively reconfigure the world 
such that it becomes a better world. These imaginative variations reveal how selfhood is 
constituted not only by holding myself responsible for my actions. They also reveal that 
selfhood is constituted through my being responsible for another and through my 
generosity to him or her. To be responsible for my own actions is possible only because I 
am responsible to another who obliges me to respond. 
This means that selves are called by others to enter into, not transcend, the 
troublesome and murky sphere of finite moral being. As John Wall puts it, “facing 
otherness is not just a disruption of human life but part of the fabric of how the self 
transforms itself in the direction of ever more radically responsible human meaning.”425 
Because the other calls for a creative response, each person is ultimately responsible for 
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the creation of meaning in a finite, temporal situation. It is in a word poetic. The poetic 
response to otherness is thus a way of exceeding the boundaries of selfhood and creating 
new, different meanings that respect the otherness of the other. To participate in such a 
poetics means to transform oneself in the response, and as the response to the call. It 
means to reconfigure the world in a new way such that it can further include the other and 
work against those forms of violence that attempt to reduce the alterity of the other to a 
form of sameness. 
  
V.4.3. The Possibility of Forgiveness 
It is clear, for the reasons already suggested, that forgiveness, if it is possible, 
does not belong to the logic of equivalence or market exchange. The work of 
remembering and the work of mourning fulfills the taks of justice, insofar as they allow 
an individual and community to deal with the memory of the past. For example, in 
speaking of the duty to remember, Ricoeur emphasizes that we have a duty to teach our 
children and “keep alive the memory of suffering against the general tendency of history 
to celebrate the victors.”426 The duty to forget, on the other hand, is a duty to go beyond 
anger and hatred. Though the aims of the duties to remember and forget are 
incomparable, “justice is the horizon of both processes.”427 As such, the work of memory 
is to aid in establishing a culture of “just memory” that would help to right the wrongs of 
the past that continue to affect relations between states in the wake of the violence and 
victimization of the last century. 
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In order to specify what makes forgiveness extraordinary it will be useful to 
further delineate what Ricoeur finds problematic about political pardons and amnesty. 
First, note that both amnesty and pardoning refer to specific actions. Political pardons 
release those who have committed crimes from further legal punishment, and usually 
come before a sentence is carried out or before the sentence has been completed. 
Amnesties, on the other hand, prevent legal action against certain crimes from taking 
place. Granting a person or a group amnesty is a way to ensure that they are not 
prosecuted for their crimes or their participation in an act of disobedience. Furthermore, 
both political pardon and amnesty refer to the connection between imputation and 
responsibility insofar as they recognize that certain parties have wronged others. It 
merely suggests that they cannot be punished for their culpability. Granting amnesty 
covers an individual or group who stand accused of committing certain actions.  
Bernard Dauenhauer clarifies amnesty and political pardoning further by noting 
that in each case only a legitimate legal body, properly convened, can issue such edicts. 
This means that “the legitimacy of both pardons and amnesty [require] that only the 
appropriate legal official, acting in accordance with the law’s provisions, grant them.”428 
Because they aim at a judicial redress of political crimes, both of these acts are intended 
to ensure civil peace, and as such these forms of forgiveness are tainted with the stamp of 
instrumentality. Jacques Derrida writes along these lines, that such forms of 
reconciliation always deal with “negotiations more or less acknowledged, with calculated 
transactions, with conditions and, as Kant would say, with hypothetical imperatives.” He 
further continues, “there is always a strategical or political calculation in the generous 
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gesture of one who offers reconciliation or amnesty, and it is necessary always to 
integrate this calculation in our analyses.”429 These forms of reconciliation are ways to 
ensure that a nation’s citizenry are not implicated as accomplices or unfairly burdened by 
the criminal acts of those responsible. Forgiveness used as a political tool can maintain 
the continuity of the state and ensure that the legitimacy of the state can survive the 
conflict. Indeed, Ricoeur follows Derrida, and approvingly cites his claim that 
“forgiveness is not, and it should not be, either normal, or normative, or normalizing” 
(MHF, 469).430 
Ricoeur insists that genuine forgiveness only occurs between the guilty and the 
victim. What makes forgiveness difficult, however, is the relationship between the act 
and the agent. Forgiving the act, as we have seen in the discussion of amnesty, does not 
necessarily forgive the agent. At the same time, imputing an act to an agent seems to tie 
the two together so tightly as to render forgiveness impossible. If the ties that bind an 
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agent to an act are dissolved, then imputation is impossible, and, insofar as forgiveness 
aims to undo that tie, it appears that we are inextricably linked to our actions. The 
dimension of height, that forgiveness comes from “on high and is unconditional, is 
revealed through a series of dilemmas. The first is concisely formulated as a question: 
“can one forgive someone who has not admitted his or her fault?” If so, then it would 
appear that forgiveness enters into the logical of exchange and reciprocity. An additional 
problem that arises if one suggests that forgiveness cannot be granted if it is not asked for 
is that the door is open to the concern that “giving secretly creates inequality by placing 
the givers in a position of condescending superiority; giving ties the beneficiary, placing 
him or her under obligation, the obligation to be grateful; giving crushes the beneficiary 
under the weight of a debt he cannot pay” (MHF, 481). The objection is thus one that 
attempts to locate behind every act of generosity, a self-interested agent. On the one 
hand, it seems that asking for forgiveness gives too much superiority to the one forgiving; 
on the other hand, it also appears to reduce forgiveness to an exchange. 
As we have already seen, however, the commandment to love one’s enemies 
begins by calling the logic of equivalence into question. Thus, rather than the give and 
return that characterizes some conceptions of gift-giving, Ricoeur identifies a kind of 
non-market form of the gift that occurs in forgiveness. What is at issue, he notes, is a 
“vertical” dimension that appears as “the confrontation between the unconditionality of 
forgiveness and the conditionality of the request for forgiveness” (MHF, 482). This 
vertical dimension is one that emphasizes the unconditional dimension of forgiveness, 
which is to say that it lies outside the sphere of calculation and distribution. It is only 
through the recognition of the exemplarity of the situation that forgiveness becomes 
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possible. What makes two parties capable of asking for, granting, and receiving 
forgiveness is heeding the call of the other. Forgiveness is given, in other words, as a 
response by the self to the other who calls upon the self to transform the way it 
understands its world. Forgiveness is thus a possibility in the self that is constituted by 
the other’s irreducible and singular voice. Because forgiveness occurs only between 
individuals, and it is called for because of extremely singular events,  
The unconditionality of forgiveness renders it asymmetrical. In seeking 
forgiveness, the guilty party must be prepared to receive a negative answer (MHF, 483). 
Merely because one has “paid the price of a formidable work of formulating the wrong” 
and has attempted to narrate it does not ensure that forgiveness will be granted (MHF, 
478). Indeed, if it did, the model for forgiving would be that of exchange, which takes for 
granted the obligation to give, to receive, and to give in return. The distinction between 
the guilt or fault that one has for an action and the absolution that forgiveness grants is 
radically asymmetrical. One cannot presume to think that forgiveness is forthcoming 
even though it is asked for.   
Forgiveness exists outside the sphere of the mere exchange of memories and the 
cultivation of a just memory. In fact, it disrupts such a language. Indeed, forgiveness 
speaks in the mode of silence because “there is no clamor of what rages” (MHF, 467). 
Rather than speak in everyday modes of discourse, forgiveness breaks with it and appears 
as an irruption of meaning. Ricoeur emphasizes, however, that such silence does not 
mean that it is mute. The language of forgiveness is the language of the hymn and praise 
(MHF, 467). “What the hymn names is not someone,” Ricoeur continues; rather, as if to 
stress its distinction from the economy of reciprocity, it names a “spiritual gift” (MHF, 
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467). If forgiveness is to exist, if it is at all possible, it must be directed to the 
unforgiveable. The reason for this claim should now be somewhat clearer. If forgiveness 
belongs to the same family as love, and if love is defined by excess and generosity, then 
forgiveness too is characterized by excess. Suzanne Guerlac writes, “when forgiveness is 
weighed and placed in relation to considerations of commensurate punishment, degree of 
repentance, and other criteria, it becomes instrumental, contaminated by political 
agendas. It engages us in acts of calculation.”431 For forgiveness to be worthy of the 
name, it paradoxically must be directed toward unforgiveable events and crimes.  
While forgiveness must be directed toward the unforgivable, Ricoeur does not 
think that forgiveness is impossible. There is forgiveness. Here we connect back with 
Ricoeur’s originary affirmation. There is forgiveness, according to Ricoeur, in the same 
way that “there is” (es gibt, il y a) Being. In each case, there is a sense of opacity or 
resistance to understanding the way that it exists. That there is forgiveness goes beyond a 
mere reciprocal relationship between selves. Despite the sadness, suffering, and despair 
that often marks the finitude of the world, despite the fact that we often act from one-
sided principles, despite even the fact that in many cases we do not deserve forgiveness, 
there is forgiveness. It is there, it exists, and it is good. 
There is a thin line separating Derrida’s claim that forgiveness is impossible, and 
Ricoeur’s claim that forgiveness is directed toward the unforgiveable. For Ricoeur, 
forgiveness is very difficult. However, the incalculability and exceptionality of 
forgiveness does not mean that forgiveness does not exist. That forgiveness is there at all 
suggests that, despite the unforgivably enduring presence of evil, forgiveness forgives. 
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Forgiveness thus participates in the excesses of love. Forgiveness need not come on the 
condition of repentance, nor can one ever be expected to be forgiven. Forgiveness, on 
Ricoeur’s account, thus is to remain extraordinary and exceptional, outside of the sphere 
of justice and exchange. It cannot be rendered into a logic where we could determine 
when, where, and who to forgive. It is for this reason that it appears to come from “on 
high.” There is forgiveness not in the sense that there are empirical instances of it, but in 
the sense of a promise—that there might be, there can be, some measure forgiveness for 
us. For Ricoeur, forgiveness does not properly belong to the speculative language of 
philosophy, but rather the poetic language of the hymn. Where philosophical language is 
abstract and conceptual insofar as it articulates the conditions for the possibility of 
experience, the language of forgiveness breaks with this language. In this way, it appears 
that forgiveness comes from a different domain and appears as the possibility of another 
world, even a world yet to come.  
In addition to the dimension of height that characterizes forgiveness, there is also 
a “horizontal” dimension. Forgiveness arises in dialogical, face-to-face exchanges. The 
experience of the height of forgiveness intersects with the horizontal relations of 
intersubjectivity. The dialogical exchange is one of contrasting speech acts: asking for 
and granting forgiveness. This exchange can obscure the height and unconditionality of 
forgiveness. Indeed, it turns the vertical dimension on its side, creating a horizontal 
exchange and a willingness to embrace the other. The “horizontal” exchange 
reestablishes the relationship between the self and the other. Asking for forgiveness and 
granting it occur through speech acts. “The two speech acts do what they say: the wrong 
is actually admitted; it is actually forgiven” (MHF, 485). The performativity of such 
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speech acts condenses the vertical disparity between the two parties, and enables each 
party to enter into a reciprocal relationship of admitting fault and reconciling. By 
reestablishing a new relationship between the self and the other, the event of forgiveness 
transforms the current conditions of communal existence. The reconstruction of the 
interpersonal relation ultimately helps to “convert the enemy into a friend” (MHF, 482). 
What is restored in the act of forgiving is the mutual recognition of each parties’ dignity. 
As such, what forgiveness aims at is the restoration of the self. 
 
V.4.4 Unbinding the Agent from the Act 
In elaborating how forgiveness helps to restore the self, and thus operates at the 
margins of mere market exchange, Ricoeur draws on the conception of forgiveness 
Hannah Arendt elaborates in The Human Condition. Rather than absolve a person for 
performing a wrongful and evil action, Arendt proposes that forgiveness aims at restoring 
the dignity of the perpetrator. In a claim Ricoeur no doubt would agree with, Arendt 
writes, “although [love] is one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, [it] indeed 
possesses an unequaled power of self-revelation and an unequaled clarity of vision for the 
disclosure of who, precisely because it is unconcerned to the point of total unworldliness 
with what the loved person may be.”432 The power of forgiveness thus goes beyond what 
a person is, and instead recognizes who a person is. Arendt puts this point thusly, 
“forgiving and the relationship it establishes is always an eminently personal (though not 
necessarily individual or private) affair in which what was done is forgiven for the sake 
of who did it.”433 This position draws on Kantian morality, specifically the claim that 
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each person has incomparable worth and unconditional dignity. Because of the respect 
that each person deserves, she writes, it “is sufficient to prompt forgiving what a person 
did, for the sake of the person.”434 Forgiveness thus is possible because it aims at the 
agent, not at the action the agent had performed. 
 For Arendt forgiveness is thus connected to the phenomenon of “natality.” 
Natality, for Arendt, refers to the distinctly human capacity to begin something new, and 
to initiate a new course of action. Furthermore, the ability to act and to embark on a new 
course of action means that “the unexpected can be expected” from humans Furthermore, 
the condition of natality entails that humans are “able to perform what is infinitely 
improbable.”435 Action is thus a kind of miracle insofar as “the new always happens 
against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability.”436 It is this small 
miracle of action that prevents human existence from being consigned to causal, 
deterministic laws of nature. Stated positively, the miracle of action is the source of faith 
and hope; its existence reveals that what has happened does not have to happen again. 
Humans are thus born not in order to die, but in order to initiate a new course of action. 
Natality, not mortality, Arendt argues, defines human finitude. 
However, whereas forgiveness for Arendt is perhaps the most exemplary way that 
acting is miraculous insofar as it frees “from [the act’s] consequences both the one who 
forgives and the one who is forgiven,” for Ricoeur it rather unbinds the agent from the 
action.437 By releasing the agent from the action, Ricoeur suggests that the “horizontal 
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disparity between power and act” becomes inscribed with “the vertical disparity between 
the great height of forgiveness and the abyss of guilt” (MHF, 490). This inscription is no 
doubt the miracle of forgiveness—signifies that the capacity of commitment belonging to 
the moral subject is not exhausted by its various inscriptions in the affairs of the 
world...[and] expresses an act of faith, a credit addressed to the recourses of self-
regeneration” (MHF, 490). In seeking forgiveness and granting atonement, “the guilty 
person is considered capable of something other than his offences and his faults.” Ricoeur 
continues 
He is held to be restored to his capacity for acting, and action restored to 
its capacity for continuing…[t]his restored capacity is enlisted by 
promising as it projects action toward the future. The formula for this 
liberating word, reduced to the barrenness of its utterance, would be: you 
are better than your actions. (MHF, 493) 
 
In forgiveness, the self is thus returned to itself as the initiator of action and capable of 
being self-constant. If the victim can thus forgive the aggressor it is because the victim 
recognizes the incomparable worth of the accused. In other words, it is because the 
accused stands as radically other, debased in his or her moral evil, that he or she faces 
humanity with the overwhelming and excessive possibilities for moral renewal and 
creativity. What does it mean to claim that forgiveness releases an agent from the action? 
In this context, it should be helpful to reconsider the meaning of poetics as it 
generally appears in Ricoeur’s later work and apply it to the way that forgiving helps to 
release an agent from the act. In Ricoeur’s work on narrative, poetics refers to the unique 
power of human beings to use language for semantic innovation, by which he means the 
creation of meaning through various kinds of syntheses of heterogeneous elements (TN I, 
ix). Poetics, in other words, “‘grasps together’ and integrates into one whole and 
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complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the intelligible 
signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole” (TN I, x). The acts of recounting 
what happened through a narrative, through the creation of a metaphor, and the 
interpretation of symbols do not merely “stand for” something and represent them. They 
create, produce, and innovate new meaning. 
Narratives integrate different experiences of time and construct a temporal and 
semantic unity. By configuring language into a story with its own meaning, narratives are 
able, through the reader’s ability to follow and interpret the story being told, to refigure 
his or her understanding of the world in which he or she lives. By reading a narrative, in 
other words, I am able to recreate, by reinterpreting, my own self-understanding, my 
understanding of my world, and my understanding of my responsibilities to others. 
Poetics, in short, is the ability of redescription of what has already been given to us. 
Though Ricoeur does not develop fully how forgiveness offers us the possibility 
of a new meaning apart from the unbinding of the agent from the action, it is clear that it 
too must participate in the process of semantic and narrative innovation. Forgiveness is 
part of Ricoeur’s larger project of delineating the poetic dimension of human existence. 
In order to show how forgiveness is poetic, it may be helpful to turn to one of Ricoeur’s 
privileged interlocutors, Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas and Ricoeur agree that forgiveness 
helps to inaugurate a new beginning. In Totality and Infinity, for example, Levinas 
distinguishes a sense of time that is linear, which he describes in terms of our ability to 
represent the past and bring it present, and the “discontinuous time of fecundity” that 
“makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement.”438 Fecund time is a time that 
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opens one up to possibilities. This form of temporality renews time by making possible 
“a free return to that past…and in free interpretation and free choice, in an existence as 
entirely pardoned.”439 Like Ricoeur, Levinas’s conception of forgiveness emphasizes a 
sense of rebirth that occurs through an experience of the other. As Levinas puts it, “this 
recommencement of the instant, this triumph of the time of fecundity over the becoming 
of the mortal and aging being, is a pardon, the very work of time.”440 Forgiving, on 
Levinas’s account, is thus a way to begin again. 
Levinas continues that forgiving is paradoxical insofar as it is retroactive and 
reverses what happened. The paradox can be construed thusly: if it reverses what 
happened, there will have been no need for forgiveness; if forgiveness is to have 
meaning, on the other hand, it cannot eradicate what happened. Levinas’s solution this 
paradox is to suggest that forgiveness does not erase from history the fact that the deed 
was done; it instead it reverses the ethical import of the action. When the forgiver faces 
the one who has been forgiven, it is not as though the forgiver is not unaware of the deed. 
It is instead as though, when facing the forgiven person, the forgiven is treated as though 
the deed had not happened. Forgiveness, in his words, “permits the subject who had 
committed himself in a past instant to be as though that instant had not past on, to be as 
though he had not committed himself.”441 Whereas memory represents the past and 
brings it forward to the present, forgiving “acts upon the past, somehow repeats the event, 
purifying it.”442 This reversal is not a blotting out or erasing of the past because it does 
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not “nullify the relations with the past.”443 The reversal that constitutes forgiveness 
conserves the past in the purified present. As such, forgiveness is an ethical event that 
does not erase what happened. It instead reverses time and repeats the past as if it had not 
happened and as if the agent or subject had not undertaken that course of action. The 
repetition and reversal of the past purifies and cleanses the event, but does not eradicate 
the event. The result of this purification is to give the offender a new beginning, but 
without eradicating the “fact” that something happened. The possibility of a new 
beginning is offered by the Other who pardons and thus constitutes time. 
 This account helps to give traction to Ricoeur’s epilogue on forgiveness in 
Memory, History Forgetting. Ricoeur is certainly correct to argue that forgiveness aims to 
separate the doer from the deed, and open a future for a new configuration of communal 
life. Levinas’s account explicates how this is possible. Forgiveness does not entail that 
the deed did not occur; it only aims at the ethical relationship among humans. 
Forgiveness goes back to the misdeed, purifies it and makes it as if it did not happen. In 
so doing, forgiveness offers the possibility of a new beginning. 
    
V.5 Conclusion 
Forgiveness is a poetic possibility. Specifically, it is the possibility of refiguring 
time as if the offense had not been committed. Narratives can thus be seen to be 
purifying, not only insofar as they give the guilty and the victim an opportunity to 
describe what happened, but insofar as they help to retroactively work on the fault to 
repeat and purify it through narratives of forgiving. Repetition conserves the pardoned 
past in the present, though it does so in a way that allows us not be tied to the event. It is 
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a repetition that opens up the possibility of a new beginning. It can disburden a 
community from the weight of the past and thereby enables it to project its own 
possibilities creatively into the future. Though Ricoeur does not put it thusly, forgiveness 
is a radical form of poetic reconciliation. It participates in a radical innovation of 
meaning, insofar as it offers the possibility of a new beginning and break with the past. 
Furthermore, it aims at incorporating the other into a new form of social and communal 
life. It is able to recreate and reconfigure inherited possibilities from its heritage and 
refigure this tradition to include those who have wronged us. It allows us to retrieve those 
possibilities that were destroyed or ruined in the action, and creatively project them into 
the future as a new form of self-understanding. Thus, rather than limiting the guilty to a 
heavily circumscribed set of possibilities, which may lead to unhealthy repression and 
violently acting out, forgiving offers new possibilities through its poetic reconfiguration 
of what happened. 
This form of forgiveness is modest. It does not eradicate the debt owed the 
victims or the one owed the dead. Rather, it resignifies it and changes its meaning. 
Furthermore, it is difficult, especially if one is to practice it openly and publicly. In so 
doing, such narratives of forgiveness enable one to begin again. Forgiveness is thus the 
gift of time insofar as it gives us a new beginning. Because the effects of forgiveness 
come slowly, sometimes with a great deal of pain, its possibility requires a radical 




 In this dissertation, I have explored how Martin Heidegger’s and Paul Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic projects open new dimensions of remembering and forgetting at the 
communal level. These new dimensions, I have suggested, arise because the structure of 
selfhood that both envision is construed in terms of the dynamic structure of calling and 
responding to a debt. To be a self is to be, as Ricoeur puts it, enjoined by the other. In 
other words, possibilities for selfhood are delivered over to the self from another, for 
whom the self is responsible. I have interpreted the other’s call as being issued from the 
past and as harboring possibilities for future existence. There remains a sense of memory 
that is not merely concerned with the past, but one that harbors hope for the future. It is 
this dynamic structure between the past and the future that I will turn to in this 
conclusion. 
A fundamental tension that stubbornly clings to the hermeneutic analysis of 
subjectivity is the relationship between thrownness and understanding, finitude and 
freedom, and the memory of one’s heritage or tradition and one’s prospects for the future. 
This tension reaches a kind of culmination in the contrast between remembering and 
promising. Like the aforementioned dualities, remembering and promising do not imply a 
strict opposition or mutually exclusive concepts. Rather, just as Heidegger suggests that 
Dasein is a “thrown projection” and Ricoeur suggests that freedom is best understood in 
relation to finite historical existence, the use of memory in political and ethical contexts 
is essentially hopeful because it helps to constitute identity through the interpretation of 
possibilities inherited from tradition. Memory and hope are essentially poetic because 
they creatively respond to the past by projecting a vision of the future. 
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To explicate the particular way that remembering and hoping participate in the 
poetic and creative act of constituting meaning, I focus on the meaning of death by way 
of a striking symbol: the sepulcher. While it seems clear that the tomb can be a symbol of 
memory, less clear is the way that it might be said to be symbolic of hope. I will suggest 
in these concluding pages that the site of burial is hopeful because it directs attention to 
new ways to reconfigure communal existence and insofar as it reconciles with the past. 
The symbolic dimension of the sepulcher is able to so because it operates at the 
intersection between the personal and the social dimensions of remembering and hope, 
and because it offers a special site where the possibilities of the poetics of remembering 
meet with ethical and political possibilities for resisting oppression and respecting the 
singularity of each individual within a community. 
Examining the symbolism of two sepulchers can help clarify how the 
reconfiguration of possibilities at the social and communal levels occurs. I propose to 
interpret these tombs symbolically, which is to say as a kind of imagination of the limits 
of human experience. Neither Ricoeur nor Heidegger exploits this potential symbolic 
meaning of these tombs. However, a comparison of these two specific acts of 
entombment can indicate the possibility of social creativity that can resist the ossifying 
effects of an uncritical stance toward tradition and the threats of using tradition to 
continue to justify oppression. In this manner, I am not suggesting that all tombs reveal 
this possibility, but only that these particular tombs reveal a poetics of memory that 
underlies communal life. The first tomb there is the empty tomb of Polynices in 
Sophocles’ Antigone. The second tomb I will briefly analyze is the Cenotaph in London, 
which memorializes the British dead of World War I. Both tombs, I suggest, help to 
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reveal the tension between memory and the future, and the tensions that arise in the social 
and political realm between the ability to act in concert in order to remember, mourn and 
find meaning and the possibility that such power will lead to oppression, marginalization 
and violence. It is the poetic ability to refigure experience that ultimately gives rise to 
hope. 
While many philosophical accounts of Sophocles’ Antigone focus on underlying 
principles of Antigone’s and Creon’s actions, less attention has been paid to the symbolic 
meaning of the entombment that motivates the drama of the play. The act of entombment, 
Antigone’s burial of Polyneices and her own burial, begins and ends the drama of 
Antigone. Insofar as they are the bookends of the play, the act of entombment frames the 
meaning of the course of the play’s events. Indeed, the central question of the play is 
“who has the right to bury a corpse?” The corpse is, to put it succinctly, uncanny. On the 
one hand, the corpse is no longer the body of a singular being characterized by 
understanding itself in terms of its possibilities. It is, we might say, a shell or husk of the 
person. On the other hand, insofar as a corpse is such a shell, it nevertheless indicates the 
now-deceased person. Corpses are thus ambiguous things, belonging both to the natural 
realm and the “spiritual” or human realm. They serve to remind the living that we are 
bodies that are subject to natural processes but not reducible to such processes. It is 
because they occupy this enigmatic space between living bodies and that which is merely, 
brutally present or useable that we are to bury them. The act of burial and entombment 
thus functions to counteract the work of nature and rescue the corpse from oblivion and 
decay. This means that burial does not merely fulfill a psychological need for grieving, it 
also serves to protect the dead from the descent into nothingness. 
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Creon’s edict that Polyneices be “neither buried nor mourned by anyone, but 
everyone must leave him unburied, a feast for birds and dogs, an outrage to see” (A, 207-
209) is an attempt to extend the universal jurisdiction of the law to include the dead. 
Burial, from the perspective of the political domain, subsumes the individual back into 
the body politic; it reincorporates the dead into the life of the community as subject to the 
law. By excluding Polyneices from being buried, Creon implicitly suggests that his life as 
a traitor is antithetical to the aims of the city and cannot be made part of the city. 
Antigone, on the other hand, argues that Creon “has no right to keep [her] from [her] 
own,” (A, 49). Burying her brother is the highest duty she can perform because it is 
directed toward the protection of the singularity of his being. Thus, though their reasons 
for their actions differ, both Antigone and Creon see the act of burial as an attempt to 
rescue the corpse from oblivion, decay, and dissolution. Where Antigone’s burial of 
Polyneices is done in order to acknowledge his singularity, Creon’s attempt to prevent his 
burial is ultimately done in order to ensure that his life is not subsumed into the 
community’s. An empty tomb, from Antigone’s perspective, is thus an affront to the 
singularity and non-substitutability of a human life.  
This means that Antigone’s desire to bury her brother is not motivated by a desire 
to preserve the specific duties of the family, as she refuses to let her own sister share her 
action. Rather, as Dennis Schmidt notes, “Antigone dies as an act of solidarity with the 
dead.”444 To leave Polynices unburied, to leave the tomb empty, would be a failure to 
make meaning out of death. The failure to bury is thus to foreclose the possibility of 
having meaning at all, insofar as a relationship to death characterizes our relationship to 
                                                
444 Schmidt, “Ruins and Roses: Hegel and Heidegger on Sacrifice, Mourning and Memory,” Endings: 
Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger. Eds. Rebecca Comay and John McCumber. (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999): pp. 97-113, p. 107. 
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life. An exposed corpse, in other words, fails to make a person’s death, and thus life, 
meaningful.  
By substituting herself for Polyneices, Antigone symbolically fills his tomb 
thereby rendering his death meaningful. In so doing, she reveals an important dimension 
regarding possibilities for communal life. Burial not only connects to those with whom 
we perform the burial act; it also connects us to those of whom we speak in our eulogies, 
laments, and sorrows. The experience of death through the act of burial helps to reveal 
possibilities that constitute a community. Entombment offers a way to render one’s life 
with others meaningful. Antigone’s tragic act is thus devoted to highlighting that we have 
a connection to the dead and a responsibility to them. Antigone’s burial  reveals that 
though the past is irretrievable, we cannot responsibly understand the past as if it did not 
occur.  
Yet precisely because the act of burial recognizes the finality of death, it equally 
becomes a symbol of hope because it creates meaning through entombment. To bury 
someone is to show honor toward the life of the person buried in it; it is a kind of 
reconciliation with the past so that we can move on and even leave it behind. As Hegel 
puts it, the “negative essence” of death “shows itself to be the real power of the 
community and the force of its self-preservation” (PS, §455). Every act of burial, every 
eulogy, and indeed every memory, Schmidt further claims, “is directed toward the 
memory of future times” and the continuation of the community.445 Death and burial thus 
help to create solidarity with both the dead and with those who have yet to come. 
However, this is not all there is to say about the relationship between 
remembering and hope as it is figured through the act of burial. While the empty tomb 
                                                
445 Schmidt, “Roses and Ruins,” p. 108 
 337 
symbolically threatens meaning insofar as it resists placing meaning on death, this 
emptiness retains a positive value. In other words, I am suggesting that we should not be 
too quick to bury the dead. Heidegger’s language of death, the impossibility of Dasein’s 
possibilities, is helpful in this regard. Not only does death reveal that certain possibilities 
for self-understanding are no longer viable. Death also shows that through the experience 
of this impossibility our possibilities can be transformed. On this understanding, the filled 
tomb becomes symbolic of our inert and dead possibilities. In order to see how this is 
possible, I will now examine the symbolic nature of another tomb: the Cenotaph in 
London. 
The word “cenotaph” literally means “empty tomb,” and honors an individual or 
group whose remains are interred elsewhere. Rather than Antigone’s filled tomb, the lack 
of a corpse in the Cenotaph preserves a fundamental absence. Jenny Edkins writes, “the 
design in its simplicity provides a monument that succeeds because it does not conceal 
the trauma of war but yet provides a means of marking it.”446 It does so in a few 
important ways. First, as Jay Winter notes, the Cenotaph is “elemental in form and 
structure.”447 Its mathematical and geometrical precision lacks ornamentation and overt 
symbolism. This lack of decoration evokes a mood of collective loss and bereavement. 
While Winter suggests that it is “a form on which anyone could inscribe his or her own 
thoughts, reveries, sadnesses,” it nevertheless helps to evoke absence and loss that 
underlie the traumatic experience of war. 448 According to Edkins, “it represents the lack, 
the trauma” of the Great War and “the impossibility of closure” in the wake of the 
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destruction and horror of that war.449 This lack of closure and the inability to “fill” the 
tomb with meaning ensures that its significance is not the property of a single individual 
or political group.  
Second, it does not contain a single, vertical or horizontal line. Rather, as Sir 
Edwin Lutyens, the artist responsible for it, notes: “all its horizontal surfaces and planes 
are spherical, parts of parallel spheres 1801 feet 8 inches in diameter; and all its vertical 
lines converge upwards to a point some 1801 feet 8 inches above the center of these 
spheres.”450 While creating an illusion of linearity, these curved lines suggest that the 
monument is not a free-standing, separate structure. Though difficult to the untrained eye 
to see, they help to situate the monument within a larger though apparently absent whole. 
The whole that encircles the monument radiates out to the political and bureaucratic 
district of Whitehall. In so doing, it transforms the political and urban landscape of 
“official” London into a symbolic cemetery. Winter thus concludes that precisely because 
the Cenotaph “is the tomb of no one [it] became the tomb of all who had died in the 
war.”451 By extension, it is a tomb for the ideals of British valor, patriotism, and service 
that “died” as a result of the war, insofar as British subjects could no longer see these 
ideals as possible for themselves. 
An empty tomb, a tomb honoring the memory of the Unknown Soldier, or one 
dedicated to the memory of those who died in mass genocide opens up the possibility of 
unearthing new possibilities for honoring their promises and taking up the inheritance 
they have bestowed upon us. The empty tomb stares out at us, and suggests that we have 
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not yet lived up to the charge of making death of those who came before us meaningful. 
Ricoeur’s characterization of phronesis as the “wisdom of limits” is instructive in this 
regard. Recall, phronesis consists in overcoming an all-too narrow perspective on a moral 
problem by attending to and taking care of the particularities of the situation. Insofar as 
one might be tempted to think that death renders one’s life meaningless, phronesis calls 
upon us to recognize and respond to the ways that others constitute the self (OA, 296). 
The recognition that the dead were once living not only draws on our ability to empathize 
with others, it can also allow us to regenerate communal possibilities by putting them into 
dialogue. As a result, in giving us the charge to make death meaningful, critical phronesis 
as a response to the dead marks out at the same time the very possibility of creativity and 
meaning bestowal. With our inability to stand with the dead comes an opportunity to 
reconfigure our own existence in such a way that we can understand ourselves in light of 
possibilities for more inclusive social configurations. The figure of burial thus 
symbolically brings together memory and hope, even turning one into the other. 
There is yet a final feature of these tombs worth noting. The tombs can also mark 
the way that politics and ideology can distort selfhood. As John Wall writes, “social life 
may not just lack procedures to ensure participation, but tragically distort how it defines 
(and who is included in) social participation itself” because it places ideological limits 
that too narrowly construe selfhood.452 Antigone’s tomb becomes a marker for the way 
that she is uniquely disempowered by the patriarchal structure of Thebes. Pamela Sue 
Anderson writes “Antigone is, first, marginalized as a woman who remains excluded 
from the public domain by the ancient polis, even when she initiates a political act of 
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dissent; so she would have been marginalized in this sense whether she acted or not.”453 
There is a further sense in which Antigone is disempowered. Anderson continues, “she is 
further marginalized from her family and religious community even as a consequence of 
her religiously motivated duty to bury her brother, since this involves ‘unwomanly’ 
public dissent from a civil religious duty to follow the king’s edicts.”454 Whatever claims 
to justice her position has does not receive even a hearing in the political structure of that 
polis. One’s participation in communal discourse is already configured by a heritage.  
Similarly, the political battles that surrounded the construction and dedication of 
the Cenotaph were mired in the vocabulary of the language of commemoration. Some 
worried at its lack of overt Christian or Romantic symbolism. The attempts to 
reincorporate the traumatic dimension of the state’s promotion and sanction of war are 
attempts to neutralize its otherness and place the event back into a narrative structure that 
is easily understandable. In such instances, the poetics of remembering comes into 
tension with the ideological forces of a commanded memory and the state-legitimated 
forms of public expressions of memory. 
As both the empty tomb and the filled tomb show, what we do with such memory 
has significant implications for our understanding of ourselves in a community. These 
two tombs highlight the way that narratives are constructed and can reinforce a particular 
identity. Similarly, they also suggest that, we can reinterpret their meaning, the selfhood 
that arises from a particular understanding of what happened is not set in stone. We can 
modify and change our relationship to the past and to the meaning of the past in light of 
our hopes for reconciliation. Similarly, though hope concerns the future, it is enlivened 
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by understanding its underlying vision of “a task to be accomplished, which corresponds 
to that of an origin to be discovered.”455 Such a vision of hope is thus to be understood 
from within a community’s practices and directed toward the possibility of regenerating 
freedom in anticipation of a revived humanity. To paraphrase Kant, memory without 
hope is dead, hope without memory is blind. The creative tension between the two is the 
possibility for renewing possibilities for all humanity while being faithful to the past. 
 How to progress together after forgiving raises a new set of difficulties. 
Specifically, how are the newly reconciled parties to proceed? The initial problem 
Ricoeur identifies is the way that forgetting includes a hidden reserve of possibilities for 
understanding. A forgetting “in reserve” refers to the persistence and priority of the past 
as having-been rather than as elapsed. It refers to the survival of images and traces of the 
past in mind, but without being subject to the deleterious psychological blockages that 
can stunt memory. This “reserve” functions as a kind of repository for the past, harboring 
possibilities that one can retrieve and revitalize in the present. The cultivation of 
reconciled forgetting is “a concerned disposition established in duration” (MHF, 505). 
This form of forgetting is thus a kind of character trait or habit. It is the ability to let the 
past go, without forgetting it. This “memory,” if it deserves the name is a kind of carefree 
memory. It is part of the project of hope, a calm memory in conjunction with hope. 
 Memory and hope operate together in a kind of “poetic” fight against and a 
dismantling of the structures of oppression. The use of memory in these contexts directs a 
community toward a less violent and absolutely inclusive community. The hope that 
underlies the political and communal use of memory does not merely intend to reconcile 
one with another, but aims at the reconciliation of all. Such hope, as John Wall notes, has 
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 342 
both a positive and negative component to it. Hope is “an aim combined with a 
prohibition, a sense of direction constrained by responsibility to alterity.”456 What hope 
seeks to negate or prohibit is a certain form of life. It can be used as a tool to critique 
forms of oppression and way to undo the deleterious effects of one’s history. It can also, 
as Heidegger had suggested, be directed toward dismantling those public forms of 
discourse that erect barriers that prevent us from appropriating those possibilities that are 
“our own.” By taking apart those apparently self-evident and unquestioned ways to 
interpret oneself, Heidegger opens up the possibility of an appropriation of one’s own 
heritage. Formally speaking, the movement from constraints is a movement away from 
present forms of understanding and interpretation. As Heidegger writes in one lecture, 
“the sort of critique already arising precisely through the concrete actualization of 
destruction is thereby centered not on the fact that we always stand within a tradition, but 
rather on the how of our standing within a tradition.”457 How we belong to the past is thus 
what is at issue. The reason to critique contemporary forms of life or institutions that 
promulgate and perpetuate forms of violence is in service of the hope to live an 
“authentic” life. What makes such institutions and ossified possibilities worthy of 
destruction and contempt is that they mask and obscure creative expressions of human 
existence. 
The dismantling of traditional ideas traces them back to their origins. While 
Heidegger is certainly more concerned with the “spiritual” heritage of philosophical 
concepts, rather than political or social change, there is room to understand such a 
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process in existential terms. The critique of various forms of ideology and the way that it 
works to obscure possibilities opens the scars of history and uses them for political 
advantage. This critique can show that ideas and practices, when traced back to their 
origins and remembered, are unsuitable for contemporary life and for the purposes they 
were initially intended. Additionally, such a critique can further show that contemporary 
practices of such ideas in fact run counter to their stated aims. 
Positively speaking, hope can, at least in Heidegger’s words, “free up” or 
“liberate” possibilities from the past for the sake of the future (Cf. BT 437/SZ 385). 
Similarly, for Ricoeur, hope is socially creative because it opens up new possibilities for 
social life that incorporates the fullest participation of humanity in its work. Such hope is 
not an abstract hope but instead comes from a tradition with its own set of symbols and 
concerns. On this basis, we can say that such hopeful remembering is one that does not 
slavishly imitate the past, or is beholden to a specific ideological framework, but is one 
that responds to the past by making it one’s own, with regard to the current situation for 
the sake of the future. Does this mean that we must forget the debt we owe the dead? 
Ricoeur responds to the question of the possibility of fully absolving oneself of 
debt both affirmatively and negatively. We are released from it insofar as the debt 
confines a community to its past, and places it in danger of unconsciously repeating 
pathological symptoms. We are not released from it insomuch as the debt signifies the 
recognition of one’s tradition and heritage. Ricoeur writes “a subtle work of binding and 
unbinding is to be pursued at the very heart of debt: on one hand, being released from the 
fault, on the other, binding a debtor who is forever insolvent. Debt without fault. Debt 
stripped bare. Where one finds the debt to the dead and history as sepulcher” (MFH, 
 344 
503). The image of the sepulcher, and the relationship to death that it reveals as 
underlying communal existence, conveys both hope and remembering. The work of 





Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. New York: 
Zone Books, 1999.  
 
Anderson, Pamela Sue. A Feminist Philosophy of Religion: The Rationality of Myths of 
Religious Belief. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
 
Aristotle. “On Memory.” The Complete Works of Aristotle: Vol. 1. Ed. Jonathan Barnes 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
 
Askin, Ridvan. “Mneme, Anamnesis, and Mimesis: The Function of Narrative in 
Ricoeur’s Theory of Memory.” Forum for Inter-American Research. Vol. 2, no. 1 
(January 2009). 
 
Atkins, Kim. “Ricoeur’s Human Time as a Response to the Problem of Closure in 
Heideggerian Temporality.” Philosophy Today vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 108-
122 
  
---. “Narrative Identity, Practical Identity, and Ethical Subjectivity.” Continental 
Philosophy Review, Vol. 37 (2004): pp. 341-366. 
 
Bailyn, Bernard. “Considering the Slave Trade: History and Memory.” The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 58, no. 1. (January 2001): pp. 245-252. 
 
Bambach, Charles. Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003 
 
Barash, Jeffrey Andrew. Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2003. 
 
---. “Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Remembrance.” International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 10, no. 2 (June 2002): pp. 171-182. 
 
de Beistegui, Miguel. Heidegger and the Political. New York: Routledge Press, 1999. 
 
Bernasconi, Robert. The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being. Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1985. 
 
Bontekoe, Ronald. Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1996. 
 
Booth, W. James. Communties of Memory: On Witness, Justice, and Identity. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006). 
 346 
 
Bourgeois, Patrick and Frank Schalow. Traces of Understanding: A Profile of 
Heidegger’s and Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics. Rodopi: Köninghausen & Neumann, 
1990. 
 
Butler, Judith. Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Carman, Taylor. Heidegger’s Analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Casey, Edward. Remembering, 2nd Ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
 
Celan, Paul. “Speech on the Occasion of Receiving the Literature Prize of the Free 
Hanseatic City of Bremen.” Trans. John Felstiner. Selected Poems and Prose of 
Paul Celan. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001: pp. 395-396. 
 
Chanter, Tina. Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Cohen, Richard and James L. Marsh. Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity. 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. 
 
Crooks, James. “Getting Over Nihilism: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Appropriation of 
Tragedy.” International Journal of the Classical Tradition. Vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 
2002): pp. 36-50. 
 
Crowe, Benjamin. Heidegger’s Religious Origins. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2006. 
 
Crowell, Steven Galt. “Spectral History: Narrative, Nostalgia, and the Time of the I.” 
Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 29 (1999), pp. 83-104. 
 
---. “Authentic Historicality.” Space, Time, and Culture Ed. David Carr and Cheung 
Chan-Fai. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2004: 57-73. 
 
Dastur, Françoise. Death: An Essay on Finitude. Trans. John Llewelyn. London: Athlone, 
1996. 
 
---.Heidegger and the Problem of Temporality. Trans. Francois Raffoul and David 
Pettigrew. Amhurst: Humanity Books, 1999. 
 
Dauenhauer, Bernard. “History’s Sources: Reflections on Bernard Dauenhauer’s 
“History’s Sources: Reflections on Heidegger and Ricoeur,” Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology. Vol. 20, no. 3 (October 1989): pp. 246-247. 
 
 347 
---. Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of Politics. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1998.  
 
---. “Responding to Evil” Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 
pp. 207-222. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Given Time I: Counterfeit Money. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Presss, 1992. 
 
--- and Jean-Luc Marion, “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Luc Marion.” God, the Gift, and Postmodernism Eds. John Caputo and Michael 
Scanlon. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999: pp. 54-78. 
 
---. “‘A Self-unsealing Poetic Text’: Poetics and Politics of Witnessing.” Trans. Rachel 
Bowlby. The Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today. 
Ed. Michael P. Clark. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000: 180–207. 
 
---. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. New York, NY: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Dilthey, Wilhelm. “The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Sciences,” 
Selected Writings. Ed. H.P. Rickman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979. 
 
---. “The Development of Hermeneutics,” Selected Writings. Ed. H.P. Rickman. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979: 246-263 
 
Donohoe, Janet. “Rushing to Memorialize,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Vol. 
13, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 6-12.   
 
Dosse, François “Ricoeur and History: The Ricoeurian Moment of Historiographical 
Work.” Trans.  Scott Davidson. Ricoeur Across the Disciplines. Ed. Scott Davidson. 
(London: Continuum, 2010): pp. 65-83. 
 
Draaisma, Douwe. Metaphors of Memory. Trans. Paul Vincent. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000.  
 
Dreyfus, Hubert. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Division I. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Duffy, Maria. Paul Ricoeur’s Pedagogy of Pardon: A Narrative Theory of Memory and 
Forgetting. London: Continuum Press, 2009. 
 
Edkins, Jenny. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
 
Findlayson, J. G. “Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the Tragic.” The 
Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 37, no. 3 (July 1999): pp. 493-520, 
 348 
 
Fóti,	  Véronique.	  “Heidegger,	  Hölderlin,	  and	  Sophoclean	  Tragedy.”	  Heidegger Toward 
the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s. Ed. James Risser. Albany: SUNY Press, 
1999: pp. 163-186,. 
 
Freydberg, Bernard. “On Hölderlin’s ‘Andenken’: Heidegger, Gadamer, and Henrich—A 
Decision?” Research in Phenomenology Vol. 34 (2004): pp. 181-197. 
 
Fried, Gregory. Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000.  
 
Freud, Sigmund. “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense.” The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 3, Trans. and 
Ed. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1952: pp. 159-185. 
 
---. “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through.” The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 12, Trans. and Ed. James 
Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1958: pp. 147-156. 
   
---. “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, Trans and Ed. James Strachey. London: Hogarth, 
Press, 1958: pp. 243-258. 
 
---. The Uncanny. Trans. David McClintock. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. 
 
Funkenstein, Amos. “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness.” History and 
Memory Vol. 1, no. 1 (1989): pp. 5-26. 
 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. ““Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Hölderlin’s 
‘Andenken,’” Trans. Richard Palmer, in Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the 
Work of the 1930s. Ed. James Risser. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999: pp. 145-162. 
 
Gall, Robert. “Interrupting Speculation: The Thinking of Heidegger and Greek Tragedy,” 
Continental Philosophy Review 36 (2003): 177-194. 
 
Gedi, Noa and Yigal Elam. “Collective Memory: What Is It?” History and Memory Vol. 
8, no. 1 (1996): 30-50. 
 
Geiman, Clare Pearson. “Heidegger’s Antigones.” A Companion to Heidegger’s 
Introduction to Metaphysics. Ed. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001: 161-182. 
 
George, Theodore. “Community in the Idiom of Crisis: Hegel on Political Life, Tragedy, 
and the Dead.” Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 32 (2002): pp. 123-138, 
 
Gerhardt, Ernst. “A Return on the Repressed: The Debt of History in Ricoeur’s Time and 
Narrative.” Philosophy Today, Vol. 48, no. 3 (Fall 2004): pp. 245-254. 
 349 
 
Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna. Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic 
Language. The Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2004. 
 
Gover. Karen. “Tragedy and Metaphysics in Heidegger’s ‘The Anaximander Fragment.’” 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology Vol. 40, no. 1 (January 2009): pp. 
37-53. 
 
Greish, Jean. “Testimony and Attestation.” Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. 
Ed. Richard Kearney. London: Sage Publication, 1996: 81-98. 
 
---. “Trace and Forgetting: Between the Threat of Erasure and the Persistence of the 
Unerasable.” Diogenes vol. 51, pt. I no. 201 (2004): 77-94 
 
Guenther, Lisa. “Being-From-Others: Reading Heidegger after Cavarero”. Hypatia: Vol. 
23, no. 1 (Jan-March 2008): pp. 99-118. 
 
Guerlac, Suzanne. “The Fragility of the Pardon.” Derrida and the Time of the Political. 
Eds. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009: pp. 
255-273. 
 
Guignon, Charles. Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1983.   
 
---.  “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy.” Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger. Ed. Charles Guignon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993: 
pp. 215-239. 
 
---. “The History of Being.” A Companion to Heidegger. Eds. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark 
Wrathall. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005: pp. 392-406, 
 
Haar, Michel. “The History of Being and its Hegelian Model,” Endings: Questions of 
Memory in Hegel and Heidegger. Eds. Rebecca Comay and John McCumber. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999: pp. 45-56. 
 
Hahn, Lewis Edwin, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur Chicago: Open Court, 1995 
 
Halbwachs, Maurice. The Social Frameworks of Memory. On Collective Memory. Ed. 
and Trans. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
Hall, W. David. Paul Ricoeur and the Poetic Imperative: The Creative Tension between 
Love and Justice. Albany: SUNY Press, 2007 
 
 
Hannoum, Abdelmajid. “Ricoeur on Memory.” Theory, Culture, and Society vol. 22, no. 
6 (Dec. 2005): 123-137. 
 350 
 
Haugeland, John. “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism,” in 
Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus Vol. 1. 
Ed. Jeff Malpas and Mark Wrathall (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000): pp. 43-77. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. J.N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. 
Harper and Collins, 1962. 
 
---. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1985. 
 
---. The Concept of Time. Trans. William McNeill. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
 
---. Basic Questions of Philosophy. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
---. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997. 
 
---. Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
---.  Hölderlin’s Hymnen: “Germanien” und der “Rhine.” (Winter semester 1934/35), 
ed. S.Ziegler, 1980, 2nd edn. 1989, 3rd edn. 1999, XII: p. 3-4. 
 
---. Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
---. Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000. 
 
---. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, Trans. Keith Hoeller. Amherst, NY: Humanities 
Press, 2000 
 
---. “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview”. Trans. 
Charles Bambach. Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and 
Beyond. Ed. John Van Buren Albany: SUNY Press, 2002: pp. 147-176. 
 
---. The Essence of Human Freedom. Trans. Ted Sadler. New York: Continuum, 2002 
 
---. Mindfulness. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. New York: Continuum, 2006. 
 
 351 
Henrich, Dieter. The Course of Remembrance,” Trans. Taylor Carman. The Course of 
Remembrance and Other Essays. Ed. Eckhart Föster. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997: 
pp. 141-254. 
 
Hohler, Thomas. “From Being to Ethics: The Time of Narration,” International Studies 
in Philosophy. Vol. 27, no. 4: pp. 21-43. 
 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Huntington, Patricia. Ecstatic Subjects, Utopia, and Recognition: Kristeva, Heidegger, 
and Irigaray. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998. 
 
Ireton, Sean. An Ontological Study of Death. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
2007. 
 
Junker-Kenny, Maureen. “Memory and Forgetting in Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of the 
Capable Self.” Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary 
Handbook. Eds. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2008: pp. 203-213. 
 
Kain, Philip J. Hegel and the Other: A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2005. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Kaplan, David. Ricoeur’s Critical Theory. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003 
 
Kearney, Richard. “Remembering the Past: The Question of Narrative Memory” 
Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 24, no. 2-3 (April 1998): 49-60 
 
--- and Mark Dooley, eds. “Narrative and the Ethics of Remembrance.” Questioning 
Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1999: pp. 18-
32. 
 
---. On Paul Ricoeur: Owl of Minerva. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2004. 
 
---.  “Narrating Pain: The Power of Catharsis,” Paragraph. Vol. 30, no. 1 (March 2007): 
pp. 51-66. 
 
Kellner, Hans. “As Real as it Gets…: Ricoeur and Narrativity.” Philosophy Today, Vol. 
34, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 229-242. 
 
 352 
Kemp, Peter. “Ricoeur between Heidegger and Lévinas: Original Affirmation between 
Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction.” Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of 
Action. Ed. Richard Kearney. London: Sage Press, 1996: pp. 41-61. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Ed. and Trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993. 
 
---. Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretive Signposts. Ed. Alfred Denker 
and Marion Heinz. New York: Continuum, 2002. 
 
Krell, David Farrell. Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1990.  
 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger. Art and Politics. Trans. Chris Turner Cambridge, 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 
 
Laub, Dori and Shoshanna Felman, eds. Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso 
Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1991. 
 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975. 
 
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Soceities. 
Trans. W.D. Halls. New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1990. 
 
McNeill, William. “Porosity: Violence and the Question of Politics in Heidegger’s 
Introduction to Metaphysics. The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14:2-15:1 
(1991): pp. 183-212. 
 
Meech, John L. Paul in Israel’s Story. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Muldoon, Mark S. “Ricoeur’s Ethical Poetics: Genesis and Elements.” International 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 45, No. 1, (March 2005): pp. 61-86. 
 
Nelson, Eric Sean. “History as Decision and Event in Heidegger” Arhe Vol. 4, no. 8 
(2007): 97-114. 
 
Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 
Vol. 26 (Spring 1989): 7-24. 
 
 353 
Nuzzo, Angelica. “Memory and History in Hegel’s Phenomenology.” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal. Vol. 29, no. 1 (2009): 161-198. 
 
Olick, Jeffery The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical 
Responsibility. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Oliver, Kelly. Witnessing: Beyond Recognition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001. 
 
---. “Witnessing and Testimony.” Parallax, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2004) pp. 79-88. 
 
Parfit. Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
 
Pellauer, David. “At the Limit of Practical Wisdom: Moral Blindness.” Ricoeur as 
Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity. Ed. R. Cohen and J. Marsh. Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2002: 187-201. 
 
---. “Hermeneutics and the Philosophy of History: Ricoeur at Ninety” Philosophy Today 
Vol. 47, supplement (2003): 12-22. 
 
---. “The Symbol Gave Rise to Thought.” The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ed. Lewis 
Edwin Hahn. Chicago: Open Court, 1995: p. 99-126. 
 
---. “Limning the Liminal: Carr and Ricoeur on Time and Narrative.” Philosophy Today. 
Vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 51-62. 
 
 
Phillips, Kendall, ed. Framing Public Memory. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 2004.  
 
Piercey, Robert. “Ricoeur’s Account of Tradition and the Gadamer-Habermas Debate.” 
Human Studies. Vol. 27 (2004): pp. 259-280.  
 
---. “The Role of Greek Tragedy in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,” Philosophy Today, 
Vol. 49, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 3-13. 
 
---.  The Crisis in Continental Philosophy: History, Truth, and the Hegelian Legacy. 
London: Continuum Press, 2009. 
 
Plato, Theaetetus, trans. M.J Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. 
John Cooper Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997. 
 
Raffoul, François. Heidegger and the Subject. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 
2001. 
 




Richardson, William. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: M. 
Nijhoff, 1963. 
 
Ricoeur, Paul Freedom and Nature. Trans. Erazim Kohak. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966. 
 
---. The Conflict of Interpretation. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1974. 
 
---. “Narrative Time” Critical Inquiry. Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative (Autumn, 1980), pp. 
169-190. 
 
---. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Ed. and Trans. John B. Thompson. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
---. Time and Narrative, 3 vols. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-1988. 
 
---. From Text to Action, Essays in Hermeneutics II. Trans. John B. Thompson. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1991. 
 
---. “Mimesis and Representation.” A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. Ed. 
Mario J. Valdes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991: pp. 137-158. 
 
---. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992. 
 
---. Fragility and Responsibility.” Trans. Elisabeth Iwanoski. In Paul Ricoeur: The 
Hermeneutics of Action. Ed. Richard Kearny. London: Sage Publications, 1996: pp. 
15-21. 
 
---. Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, Imagination. Ed. Mark I. Wallace. Trans. 
David Pellauer. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996. 
 
---. “Duty of Memory, Duty of Justice.” Critique and Conviction: Conversations with 
François Azouvi and Marc de Launa. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge: Polity, 
1998: pp. 116-126. 
 
---. “Memory and Forgetting,” Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in 
Philosophy. Eds. Mark Dooley and Richard Kearney. New York: Routledge Press, 
1999: pp. 5-11. 
 
---. “Can Forgiveness Heal?” The Foundation and Application of Moral Philosophy: 




---. “Temporal Distance and Death in History.” Trans. Bert Peeters. Gadamer’s Century: 
Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Eds. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnsuald, and 
Jens Kirtscher. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002: pp. 239-255. 
 
---. The Difficulty to Forgive.” Memory, Narrativity, Self, and the Challenge to Think 
God. Eds. Maureen Junker-Kenny, Peter Kenny. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004: pp. 6-
16. 
 
---. Memory, History, Forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
 
---. “Memory – Forgetting – History.” Meaning and Representation in History. Jörn 
Rüsen. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006: pp. 9-19. 
 
Rockmore, Tom and Joseph Margolis, eds. The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and 
Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.  
 
Roediger, Henry. “Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology.” Memory and Cognition 
Vol. 8, no. 3 (1980): 231-246. 
 
Ruin, Hans. Engimatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity in Heidegger’s Works. 
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994. 
 
Schmidt, Dennis, “Ruins and Roses: Hegel and Heidegger on Sacrifice, Mourning and 
Memory,” Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger. Eds. Rebecca 
Comay and John McCumber. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999: pp. 
97-113 
 
---.  On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2001. 
 
---.  “What We Owe the Dead.” Heidegger and the Greeks. Edited by Drew A. Hyland 
and John Panteleimon Manoussakis, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006, 
pp. 111-125, 
 
Scott, Charles. The Time of Memory. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999.  
 
Searle, John. “Collective Intentions and Actions.” Intentions in Communication. Eds. P. 
Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 
1990: pp. 401-416 
 
---. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press, 1995. 
 
 356 
Sheehan, Thomas. “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion.” A 
Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time", edited by Joseph J. 
Kockelmans, Washington D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology 
and University Press of America, 1986, pp. 40-62. 
 
---. “Time and Being 1925-1927” Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1. Ed. 
Christopher Macann, London: Routledge, 1992: pp. 29-67. 
 
---. “Heidegger’s New Aspect: On In-sein, Zittlichkeit, and The Genesis of “Being and 
Time.” Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 25 (1995): pp. 207-225. 
 
Simms, Karl. Paul Ricoeur New York: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Sophocles. Three Tragedies. Trans. David Greene. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991. 
 
Sturken, Marita. “Memorializing Absence,” in Understanding September 11, ed. Craig J. 
Calhoun et al. New York: The New York Press, 2002: 374–384.  
 
Szondi, Peter. Essays on the Tragic. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
Taminiaux, Jacques. Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1991. 
 
---. “Plato’s Legacy in Heidegger’s Two Readings of Antigone.” Phenomenology and 
Literature: Historical Perspectives and Systematic Accounts. Ed. Pol Vandevelde. 
Würtzburg: Königshausen & Neuman, 2010: pp. 58-76. 
 
Venema, Henry. Identifying Selfhood: Imagination, Narrative, and Hermeneutics in the 
Thought of Paul Ricoeur. Albany: SUNY Press, 2000. 
 
Wall, John. “The Economy of the Gift: Ricoeur’s Significance for Theological Ethics” 
Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2001) pp. 235-260,  
 
---. “Poetics, Phronesis, and Moral Creativity.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Vol. 
6 (2003): 317-341. 
 
---. Moral Creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the Poetics of Possibiltiy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Warnock, Mary. Memory. London: Faber, 1987. 
 
White, Carol. Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude. Ed. Mark Ralkowski. 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. 
 
Wiesel, Elie. “The Holocaust as a Literary Inspiration” Dimensions of the Holocaust. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977: pp. 5-19. 
 357 
 
Whitehead, Anne. Memory. New York: Routledge, 2009.  
 
Winter, Jay. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural 
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Wolin, Richard, ed. The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1993. 
 
Wood, David. The Deconstruction of Time. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989.  
 
---. Time After Time. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.  
 
Wright, Kathleen. “Heidegger’s Hölderlin and the Mo(u)rning of History.” Philosophy 
Today: vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 423-435. 
 
---.  “Heidegger and the Authorization of Hölderlin’s Poetry,” Martin Heidegger: 
Politics, Art, Technology, eds. Karsten Harries, Christoph Jamme. New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1994: pp. 164-174. 
 
Wyschogrod, Edith. An Ethics of Remembering: History, Heterology, and the Nameless 
Others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.	  
 
Yerushalmi, Yosef. Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1996. 
 
Young, Julian. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. 
 
---. “Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin’s “Der Ister. Dialogue: Canadian 
Philosophical Review. Vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1999): pp. 391-416, 
 
Zimmerman, Michael. The Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept 
of Authenticity. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981. 
 
